Wildy v. State

1

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 117,375

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

AARON WILDY,
Appellant,

v.

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; WESLEY K. GRIFFIN, judge. Opinion filed October 27,
2017. Affirmed.

Michael G. Highland, of Bonner Springs, for appellant.

Adam Sokoloff, assistant district attorney, Mark A. Dupree, Sr., district attorney, and Derek
Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before BRUNS, P.J., MCANANY, J., and HEBERT, S.J.

PER CURIAM: Aaron Wildy appeals from the district court's denial of his K.S.A.
60-1507 motion. After a full evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion as
Wildy filed it out of time. In the alternative, the district court also found that the motion
should be denied on the merits. On appeal, Wildy contends that manifest injustice exists
to justify the untimely filing of his motion. He also contends that his trial counsel was
ineffective. Based on our review of the record, we do not find that Wildy has shown
manifest injustice nor has he shown that he was provided with ineffective assistance of
counsel. Thus, we affirm the district court's decision.
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FACTS

On October 18, 2002, the State charged Wildy with five criminal counts—
aggravated burglary of a residence, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3716, a severity level 5
person felony; two counts of aggravated robbery, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3427, a
severity level 3 person felony; and two counts of kidnapping, in violation of K.S.A. 21-
3420, a severity level 3 person felony. On October 23, 2002, the district court appointed
Michael Moroney to serve as Wildy's trial counsel. Subsequently, the State added a sixth
charge of theft, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3701, a severity level 9 nonperson felony.

On April 14, 2003, Wildy signed a petition to enter a plea of guilty to all of the
charges filed against him by the State. In the petition, Wildy stated that his mind was
clear. He also stated that he had never been confined in any institution for the treatment
of mental illness nor had he been adjudicated mentally incompetent. The petition set forth
the maximum penalty for the charges pending against Wildy in this case and in a separate
case. In addition, Wildy's attorney signed a document noting that he "made no predictions
or promises to the defendant concerning any sentence the court may award . . . ."

On the same day, the district court held a plea hearing. During the hearing, the
district court held a colloquy with Wildy. The district court began by advising Wildy to
ask questions along the way if he did not understand something said during the hearing.
Wildy told the district court that he is able to read and write English. He also represented
to the district court that he understood the document he had signed as well as the plea.
Wildy further told the district court that he was not on drugs, not under a doctor's care,
his mind was clear, and understood what was happening at the hearing. The court asked
Wildy if he was sure his mind was clear and that he was able to make decisions regarding
his best interest. In response, Wildy told the district court that he was sure. The district
court then asked if Wildy had held anything back from his attorney, and Wildy indicated
there was nothing he held back.
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Next, the district court reviewed with Wildy the rights he was giving up by
entering a plea. In response, Wildy indicated that he understood those rights. The district
court also advised Wildy of the maximum penalties for the charges he faced. Wildy again
indicated he understood. The district court then repeatedly asked Wildy if he was sure he
wanted to go through with the plea. Wildy indicated he did and stated that the entry of the
plea was voluntary and based on his free will. Ultimately, the district court accepted
Wildy's plea and found him to be guilty on all of the charges filed against him by the
State.

The district court held a sentencing hearing on June 6, 2003. At the hearing, Wildy
received a controlling sentence of 289 months of prison time, with 36 months of
postrelease supervision. Furthermore, the district court ordered this sentence to run
consecutive to sentences imposed in two separate criminal cases in 1996 and 1997. Wildy
never filed a direct appeal.

On February 14, 2014, more than 10 years after he received his sentence, Wildy
filed a pro se K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. In the motion, Wildy claimed that he never filed a
direct appeal due to mental incompetence. Wildy further claimed that his trial counsel
was ineffective because he failed to investigate or raise his incompetence as a defense. In
support of his claims, Wildy included an excerpt from the journal entry of sentencing in a
prior case in which he had received a downward departure based on lack of mental
culpability.

On December 11, 2015, the district court appointed an attorney to represent Wildy
on his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. His attorney filed a memorandum in support of Wildy's
motion on April 8, 2016. The State subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the K.S.A. 60-
1507 motion on the ground that it was untimely. Wildy responded to the motion to
dismiss by arguing that, based in part on his mental impairment, it would be a manifest
injustice for the district court to not hear his motion.
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On October 20, 2016, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Wildy's
motion. At the hearing, Wildy testified about his trial counsel and his mental health
issues. Specifically, Wildy admitted that he was guilty of the crimes. However, he
claimed that his trial counsel had told him he would only receive a 10-year sentence if he
pled guilty. No other evidence was presented. At the end of the hearing, the district court
took the motion under advisement.

On October 26, 2016, the district court entered an order denying Wildy's K.S.A.
60-1507 motion. In its written decision, the district court first addressed the issue of
untimeliness. Based on hearing Wildy's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the district
court determined that he failed "to establish manifest injustice that would excuse his late
filing of this habeas corpus motion." Thus, the district court concluded that Wildy's
motion "is untimely and could be dismissed solely for that reason."

Nevertheless, the district court went on and considered the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion
on the merits. In doing so, the district court noted that trial counsel had died several years
ago. As such, the district court turned to the court record for the history of the underlying
criminal case. After doing so, the district court found that "[i]t is exceedingly clear that
[Wildy] was properly advised of the maximum sentences for the crimes involved in his
plea." The district court also found that there was nothing in the motion, supporting
memorandum, or in Wildy's testimony to establish that his trial counsel was ever
informed of his mental health history. Finally, applying the factors set for in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and Edgar v. State,
294 Kan. 828, 283 P.3d 152 (2012), the district court concluded that Wildy "failed to
establish the prejudice prong" and that he had failed to establish that he was mentally
incompetent. Thus, the court denied Wildy's motion based on him filing it out of time and
on the merits.

On November 18, 2016, Wildy timely filed this appeal.
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ANALYSIS

On appeal, Wildy raises two issues. First, he contends that the district court erred
by determining that his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion was barred because it was untimely filed.
While Wildy concedes that his petition was untimely, he argues that his failure to file
sooner was based on his alleged mental impairment. Second, Wildy contends that the
district court erred in concluding that he had failed to establish that his trial counsel was
ineffective. In support of this contention, he argues that his trial counsel induced him to
enter a plea of guilty by promising him he would receive only a 10-year prison sentence.

A district court has three options when handling a K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507
motion:

"'(1) The court may determine that the motion, files, and case records conclusively show
the prisoner is entitled to no relief and deny the motion summarily; (2) the court may
determine from the motion, files, and records that a potentially substantial issue exists, in
which case a preliminary hearing may be held. If the court then determines there is no
substantial issue, the court may deny the motion; or (3) the court may determine from the
motion, files, records, or preliminary hearing that a substantial issue is presented
requiring a full hearing.' [Citations omitted.]" Sola-Morales v. State, 300 Kan. 875, 881,
335 P.3d 1162 (2014).

The standard of review depends upon which of these options a district court utilizes.
Sola-Morales, 300 Kan. at 881.

Here, the district court held a full evidentiary hearing and issued a comprehensive
written decision. We review the district court's findings of fact to determine whether they
are supported by substantial competent evidence and are sufficient to support its
conclusions of law. In turn, we review the district court's ultimate conclusions of law de
novo. State v. Adams, 297 Kan. 665, 669, 304 P.3d 311 (2013). Furthermore, to the extent
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that this case involves interpretation of a statute, we have unlimited review. State v.
Collins, 303 Kan. 472, 473-74, 362 P.3d 1098 (2015).

Timeliness of the K.S.A. 60-1507 Motion

It is undisputed that Wildy failed to file his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion within one-
year from when his conviction became final. See K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1).
However, a district court may extend the one-year time limitation to prevent a manifest
injustice. K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2). Manifest injustice must be determined from
the totality of the circumstances. Vontress v. State, 299 Kan. 607, 616, 325 P.3d 1114
(2014). As the movant, it is Wildy's burden to establish manifest injustice by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Supreme Court Rule 183(g) (2017 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
222).

In 2016, the Kansas Legislature amended K.S.A. 60-1507 to limit the inquiry into
manifest injustice to "determining why the prisoner failed to file the motion within the
one-year time limitation or whether the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual
innocence." K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A). Multiple panels of this court have
determined that this amendment was procedural in nature and, as such, is to be applied
retroactively. See Gant v. State, No. 116,115, 2017 WL 3669078, at *2 (Kan. App. 2017)
(unpublished opinion); Garcia-Gomez v. State, No. 116,018, 2017 WL 3447781, at *3
(Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion), petition for rev. filed September 8, 2017; Rojas-
Marceleno v. State, No. 115,140, 2017 WL 1196731, at *4 (Kan. App. 2017)
(unpublished opinion), petition for rev. filed May 1, 2017; Olga v. State, No. 115,334,
2017 WL 840296, at *3 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion), rev. granted __ Kan. __
(October 12, 2017); Perry v. State, No. 115,073, 2017 WL 462659, at *2-3 (Kan. App.
2017) (unpublished opinion), rev. granted __ Kan. __ (October 12, 2017). We find the
analysis of these panels persuasive.

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In this case, Wildy admitted at the evidentiary hearing on his motion that he was
guilty of the crimes charged and made no colorable argument of actual innocence.
Accordingly, Wildy must show that the failure to consider his motion would be
"obviously unfair" or "shocking to the conscience." Vontress, 299 Kan. at 614. We note
that a panel of this court cited an approach in federal appellate courts, whereby a
defendant's mental incapacity tolls the deadline for filing a habeas corpus action only in
"rare and exceptional circumstances." Wilson v. State, No. 106,815, 2012 WL 5519182,
at *5-6 (Kan. App. 2012) (unpublished opinion). In federal court, a defendant may file a
habeas corpus action outside of the time limit for mental incompetence only when he or
she has been adjudicated incompetent, was institutionalized for mental incapacity, or has
produced evidence that he is incapable of pursing his own claim due to mental incapacity.
Wiegand v. Zavares, 320 Fed. Appx. 837, 839 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished opinion)
(citing Reupert v. Workman, 45 Fed. Appx. 852, 854 [10th Cir. 2002]).

Based on our review of the record, we find that Wildy has failed to meet his
burden to establish manifest injustice. We find nothing in the record on appeal that
establishes that Wildy was ever adjudicated to be mentally incompetent or that he has
been institutionalized for mental incapacity. Although Wildy refers to a psychological
examination in his brief, we do not find the report to be in the record. Rather, the only
indication of Wildy's mental status—beyond his bare assertions—is an excerpt from the
sentencing journal entry in an unrelated 1996 criminal case. In that case, the Lyon County
district court granted a downward durational departure because Wildy evidently "lacked
substantial capacity for judgment when the offense was committed."

We do not find the 1996 sentencing journal entry to be sufficient to show that
Wildy was mentally incompetent at the time he entered his plea in this case in 2003.
Likewise, we do not find it to be sufficient to establish that Wildy was incapable of
pursing his K.S.A. 60-1507 petition due to mental incapacity for the next 10 years.
Hence, we agree with the district court that Wildy has failed to establish manifest
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injustice. Thus, we conclude that Wildy's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion was time barred and
that he has failed to show manifest injustice.

Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The district court concluded that even if Wildy had timely filed his K.S.A. 60-
1507 motion or had shown manifest injustice, his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel would have failed on the merits. Although Wildy alleged that his attorney misled
him regarding the sentence he could receive and failed to investigate a possible defense
of diminished capacity, Wildy was unable to prove these allegations at the evidentiary
hearing. As indicated above, when a district court conducts a full evidentiary hearing, as
the district court did in this case, our review is limited to whether the factual findings are
supported by substantial competent evidence and whether such findings support the legal
conclusions reached by the district court. Fuller v. State, 303 Kan. 478, 485, 363 P.3d
373 (2015).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant
must establish (1) that the performance of defense counsel was deficient under the totality
of the circumstances, and (2) prejudice, i.e., that there is a reasonable probability the jury
would have reached a different result absent the deficient performance. Sola-Morales v.
State, 300 Kan. at 882 (relying on Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Judicial scrutiny of
counsel's performance in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is highly deferential
and requires consideration of all the evidence before the judge or jury. The reviewing
court must strongly presume that counsel's conduct fell within the broad range of
reasonable professional assistance. State v. Kelly, 298 Kan. 965, 970, 318 P.3d 987
(2014).

To establish prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
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different, with a reasonable probability meaning a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome. State v. Sprague, 303 Kan. 418, 426, 362 P.3d 828 (2015).
Here, based on our review of the record, we find that substantial competent evidence
supported the factual findings made by the district court. In addition, we find that the
evidence presented at the hearing held by the district court did not establish that trial
counsel's performance was deficient or that Wildy's rights were prejudiced by the alleged
deficiencies.

The district court heard and rejected Wildy's testimony regarding the allegation
that his trial counsel had told him that he would only receive a 10-year sentence if he
entered a plea. Because it is not our role on appeal to determine the credibility of
witnesses or to weigh the evidence presented, we will not replace our judgment on this
issue for that of the district court. Moreover, we note that the document memorializing
the plea signed by Wildy set forth the possible sentence for each charge and indicated
that he could receive a maximum of 247 months. Furthermore, the record reflects that at
his sentencing hearing, the district court told Wildy that he could receive up to 247
months in prison and that he indicated he understood.

Despite Wildy's claim that he has a "lengthy and well documented history of
mental and emotional impairment," he offers no evidence beyond an excerpt from a
sentencing journal entry in a prior case to support this allegation. Even if he had mental
health issues in the past, Wildy has not shown that he was mentally incompetent when he
committed the crimes in this case nor at the time he entered his plea in 2003. Likewise,
he has not shown how any action or inaction by his trial counsel prejudiced him.
Therefore, Wildy's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion fails on the merits as well.

Affirmed.