White v. State

1

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 117,186

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

GLENN A. WHITE,
Appellant,

v.

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Pawnee District Court; BRUCE T. GATTERMAN, judge. Opinion filed December 8,
2017. Affirmed.

Gerald E. Wells, of Jerry Wells Attorney-at-Law, of Lawrence, for appellant.

Jon S. Simpson, assistant solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., GARDNER, J., and STUTZMAN, S.J.

STUTZMAN, S.J.: In 2003, a Cowley County jury found Glenn A. White to be a
sexually violent predator, resulting in his civil commitment for treatment pursuant to the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, K.S.A. 59-29a01 et seq. (KSVPA). White filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court of Pawnee County, which the
district court dismissed summarily. Since we find no error in the district court's action,
we affirm.



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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A summary of the facts that brought White into involuntary treatment under the
KSVPA can be found in the decision on his direct appeal at In re Care and Treatment of
White, No. 91,687, 2005 WL 823895, at *1 (Kan. App. 2005) (unpublished opinion).
That decision was filed on April 8, 2005, and White's petition for review of that decision
was denied on September 22, 2005. Those facts are omitted here, as the issues of this
appeal do not require repetition.

The present appeal arises from a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that White
filed in the Pawnee County District Court on December 5, 2014, almost 11 years after the
jury trial that led to his present commitment, and over 9 years after his direct appeal was
final. The district court issued the writ on April 2, 2015, and directed the State of Kansas
to respond. That answer was filed on May 18, 2015. After the State filed its answer,
White sent correspondence to the district court, which he clarified was not intended to
constitute a response to the State's answer. White made multiple requests to the district
court for appointment of counsel.

In its "Memorandum Decision and Order," the district court found at the outset
that it lacked jurisdiction to consider White's issues because the petition was not timely
filed, thereby requiring dismissal. Nonetheless, in case some basis might be found to
permit him to file out of time, the district court then considered White's claims. The court
found that White's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective failed on the merits, his
complaint about his treatment program was not a constitutional issue since he had a
statutory course of action available under the KSVPA and he did not allege any shocking
and intolerable conduct, and he was not entitled to appointed counsel on his petition for
the writ since it was being summarily dismissed.

White timely filed this appeal.
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ANALYSIS

Timeliness of White's 60-1501 petition.

Our initial question must be the timeliness of White's petition to the district court.
K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501(c) sets the time for filing a petition:

"Except as provided in K.S.A. 60-1507, and amendments thereto, a patient in the
custody of the secretary for aging and disability services pursuant to K.S.A. 59-29a01 et
seq., and amendments thereto, shall file a petition for writ pursuant to subsection (a)
within 30 days from the date the action was final, but such time is extended during the
pendency of the patient's timely attempts to exhaust such patient's administrative
remedies."

White concedes "from the facts and circumstances" of his case that his 60-1501 petition
was untimely. He argues, however, that the district court could have found it would be a
manifest injustice not to consider the untimely petition.

Can White's untimely filing be cured by a finding of manifest injustice?

Procedural threshold

The State argues White has not complied procedurally to bring the untimeliness
issue—and his claim for an exception—before this court. Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5)
(2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 34-35) applies: "(a) Required Contents. An appellant's brief must
contain the following: . . . (5) . . . If [an] issue was not raised below, there must be an
explanation why the issue is properly before the court." (Emphasis added.)

White's underlying habeas petition never addressed why his untimely K.S.A. 2016
Supp. 60-1501 petition was properly before the district court, and he has failed to brief
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why the issue is properly before this court for the first time on appeal. White now argues
that the merits of his untimely petition should be heard to prevent manifest injustice, but
that argument is not a substitute for compliance with the rule. The Kansas Supreme Court
has held that Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) would be strictly enforced. State v. Godfrey,
301 Kan. 1041, 1044, 350 P.3d 1068 (2015) (litigants have no excuse for noncompliance
with Rule 6.02[a][5]).

White's failure to follow the requirements of the rule means the late filing issue,
upon which the district court based its summary dismissal, is not properly before us for
review. Even if White had provided a persuasive explanation for taking up that issue,
however, the outcome would be the same.

Vontress v. State

White argues the "only remedy" that can overcome his failure to file within the
time limit is a finding by the court that it would be a manifest injustice to reject his
petition. He directs us to Vontress v. State, 299 Kan. 607, 325 P.3d 1114 (2014), for
support. In Vontress, our Supreme Court considered a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion that
Vontress filed over four years after the deadline established in K.S.A. 60-1507(f).

Before any discussion of the specific injustice White claims, however, we first
consider whether an exception for manifest injustice applies to the time limits in K.S.A.
2016 Supp. 60-1501.

Structure of the habeas corpus statutes

K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501 sets two separate paths for habeas corpus proceedings
by making K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501(a) "[s]ubject to the provisions of K.S.A. 60-1507,"
and prefacing both K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501(b) and K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501(c)
5

with "[e]xcept as provided in K.S.A. 60-1507." (Emphases added). As the identified
exception to the rules in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501, K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(a)
opens with a clear statement of its purpose:

"Motion attacking sentence. A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of
general jurisdiction claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence
was imposed in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States, or the
constitution or laws of the state of Kansas, or that the court was without jurisdiction to
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may, pursuant to the time limitations
imposed by subsection (f), move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set
aside or correct the sentence."

Thus, a two-tier structure is prescribed for habeas corpus proceedings: K.S.A.
2016 Supp. 60-1501 applies to "any person in this state who is detained, confined or
restrained of liberty on any pretense whatsoever," unless that person is a "prisoner in
custody under sentence of a court of general jurisdiction claiming the right to be
released" via a collateral attack, in which case the remedy lies in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-
1507. K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501(b) establishes a right for an inmate who wants to
challenge the conditions of confinement, rather than assert a collateral attack on his or her
sentence. But since White is civilly committed for treatment and is not a prisoner
attacking his sentence, the time limitation applicable to his 60-1501 petition is the one
prescribed in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501(c)—"30 days from the date the action was
final."

Stated differently, the "subject to" and "except as provided in" clauses in K.S.A.
2016 Supp. 60-1501 are not intended to pull provisions into that section from K.S.A.
2016 Supp. 60-1507; they point to the subset of habeas corpus statutes that applies to a
specific group of petitioners seeking a particular type of relief. Therefore, the K.S.A.
2016 Supp. 60-1507(f) manifest injustice exception for untimely filing is applicable to
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60-1507 motions but not to petitions from those, like White, who must file under K.S.A.
2016 Supp. 60-1501 because they are not prisoners under sentence. Our Supreme Court
recognized this distinction in In re Care & Treatment of Ontiberos, 295 Kan. 10, 26-27,
287 P.3d 855 (2012).

Ontiberos

A jury found Ontiberos to be a sexually violent predator. He appealed, and this
court reversed, finding Ontiberos' trial counsel was ineffective and the State's attorney
committed misconduct during the trial. In re Care & Treatment of Ontiberos, 45 Kan.
App. 2d 235, 254-56, 247 P.3d 686 (2011). Among the issues discussed by our Supreme
Court on review was the means by which a person found to be a sexually violent predator
could challenge the effectiveness of counsel at the civil trial. As part of his claim that the
KSVPA was unconstitutional, Ontiberos contended he had no way to raise
ineffectiveness of trial counsel in his direct appeal and could not raise that challenge in a
collateral attack under K.S.A. 60-1501.

In his appeal to this court, however, Ontiberos' appellate counsel requested and
was granted a remand to the district court pursuant to State v. Van Cleave, 239 Kan. 117,
716 P.2d 580 (1986), for an evidentiary hearing on his claims of ineffective assistance by
his trial counsel. 295 Kan. at 15. Before the Supreme Court, Ontiberos reversed his field
and claimed there had been no authority to grant the remand he had requested.

The Supreme Court took on the task of deciding whether Van Cleave was
applicable to an ineffectiveness claim made in the appeal of a case based on the KSVPA.
In doing so, the court observed "[t]he obvious distinction from Van Cleave is that K.S.A.
60-1507 would not apply to a KSVPA proceeding. See K.S.A. 60–1507(a) (defining
statute's scope as extending to a prisoner in custody under a sentence)." (Emphasis
7

added.) Ontiberos, 295 Kan. at 26. The court then rejected Ontiberos' claim that only a
person challenging the conditions of his or her confinement could use K.S.A. 60-1501.

"Ontiberos' claim lacks merit because it contradicts the plain language of the 60-
1501 statute . . . . The statute's plain language provides a remedy to any detained person
who is excluded from K.S.A. 60-1507's provisions." (Emphasis added.) 295 Kan. at 26-27.

The Supreme Court's reasoning incorporated an understanding that K.S.A. 60-
1501 and K.S.A. 60-1507 apply to distinct groups.

Prior decisions by other panels of this court

We acknowledge that other panels of this court have applied the K.S.A. 60-
1507(f) manifest injustice exception to a petition filed under 60-1501. See Griffin v.
Bruffett, 53 Kan. App. 2d 589, 389 P.3d 992 (2017), and Piersee v. Bruffett, No. 115,489,
2017 WL 543555 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion). The panels in Griffin and
Piersee appear to have based their acceptance of the availability of a manifest injustice
exception on In re Care & Treatment of Howard, No. 108,552, 2014 WL 113428, (Kan.
App. 2014) (unpublished opinion). Griffin, 53 Kan. App. 2d at 600; Piersee, 2017 WL
543555, at *3. For that reason, we next need to consider the context of the Howard
court's holdings.

Context of the manifest injustice exception in Howard

In Howard, the court stated that:

"The version of K.S.A. 60–1501 applicable to this case, provides that any person
who is detained, confined, or restrained of liberty may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus
'[s]ubject to the provisions of K.S.A. 60-1507.' . . . The time limitation articulated
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in K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(l) 'may be extended by the court only to prevent a manifest
injustice.' (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2)." 2014 WL 113428, at *3.

Howard arose from a factual background distinct from the one we consider here.
Howard was under treatment in the Sexual Predator Treatment Program (SPTP) until the
district court removed him from the program and transferred him to the custody of the
Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) to serve sentences for crimes he had
committed while he was in the SPTP. While in KDOC custody, he filed in the Sedgwick
County District Court a "'Pro Se Petition for Release . . . Pursuant to [K.S.A. 2012 Supp.]
59-29a08(a).'" 2014 WL 113428, at *1.

Howard did not ask the district court to consider his petition to be a habeas corpus
petition under K.S.A. 60-1501. On appeal, however, he argued the district court should
have imposed that construction sua sponte. The court commented that Howard could
have petitioned for his release after each of his annual reviews while in the SPTP and,
had a petition been denied, he could have filed a direct appeal to this court within 30 days
of entry of judgment. 2014 WL 113428, at *3. Howard had not pursued those appeal
opportunities, but, for the purpose of analysis, this court considered his petition as if it
were filed under K.S.A. 60-1501 and held the district court had no basis to construe
Howard's petition as a habeas filing under K.S.A. 60-1501 because it was neither timely
filed nor filed in the county of his confinement. 2014 WL 113428, at *4.

It was within that provisional analysis of Howard's petition as if it were filed under
K.S.A. 60-1501 that the court looked at the initial clause of K.S.A. 60-1501(a): "Subject
to the provisions of K.S.A. 60-1507, . . . any person in this state who is detained, confined,
or restrained of liberty . . . may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus," (emphasis added) and
concluded it was a path to the manifest injustice provision in K.S.A. 60-1507. As we
have stated, that panel concluded that Howard's petition could not properly be construed
as a K.S.A. 60-1501 filing. Accordingly, the references in Howard to application of a
9

manifest injustice exception to a filing under K.S.A. 60-1501 were unnecessary for that
court's holding.

As presented in Howard, the statements made as part of the hypothetical
consideration of a manifest injustice exception were dicta. "Dicta in a court opinion is not
binding, even on the court itself, because the court should consider the issue in light of
the briefs and arguments of counsel when the question is squarely presented for
decision." Law v. Law Company Building Assocs., 295 Kan. 551, Syl. ¶ 1, 289 P.3d 1066
(2012). Since Howard did not allege manifest injustice in the district court, the
applicability of that exception to the time limitation was not an argued and determinative
issue. We do not find the Howard reading of these statutes persuasive on the questions
presented here.

Vontress factors codified—and modified

Manifest injustice is a statutory exception to the statutory time limit for filing a
claim under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507. That exception was inserted into the statute by
the Legislature in 2003, predating Vontress by 11 years. L. 2003, ch. 65, § 1. Two years
after Vontress, in 2016, the Legislature modified the manifest injustice exception in
K.S.A. 60-1507 by amending it to include two of the three Vontress factors—omitting the
factor concerning examination of the merits of the movant's claim to see whether
substantial issues of law or fact have been raised. L. 2016, ch. 58, § 2; see 299 Kan. at
616. K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2) now statutorily restricts the scope of a court's
assessment of a claim for a manifest injustice exception under that section:

"(2) The time limitation herein may be extended by the court only to prevent a
manifest injustice.
(A) For purposes of finding manifest injustice under this section, the court's
inquiry shall be limited to determining why the prisoner failed to file the motion within
10

the one-year time limitation or whether the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual
innocence. As used herein, the term actual innocence requires the prisoner to show it is
more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the prisoner in light
of new evidence.
(B) If the court makes a manifest-injustice finding, it must state the factual and
legal basis for such finding in writing with service to the parties.
"(3) If the court, upon its own inspection of the motions, files and records of the
case, determines the time limitations under this section have been exceeded and that the
dismissal of the motion would not equate with manifest injustice, the district court must
dismiss the motion as untimely filed." K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)-(3).

In Vontress, the Supreme Court was required to interpret the Legislature's
intention in K.S.A. 60-1507(f). The court repeated the familiar standard for that
interpretation:

"When interpreting statutes, we are mindful that
'"'[t]he fundamental rule to which all other rules are subordinate is that the intent
of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. When language is
plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to statutory construction. An
appellate court merely interprets the language as it appears; it is not free to
speculate and cannot read into the statute language not readily found
there.' Zimmerman v. Board of Wabaunsee County Comm'rs, 289 Kan. 926, Syl.
¶ 3, 218 P.3d 400 (2009)." [Citation omitted.]' Holt, 298 Kan. at 474, 313 P.3d
826.
Stated another way, the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the
makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used. See Gannon v.
State, 298 Kan. 1107, 1142, 319 P.3d 1196 (2014) (citing Wright v. Noell, 16 Kan. 601,
607, 1876 WL 1081 [1876])." 299 Kan. at 611.

After the 2016 amendments incorporating only two of the Vontress factors into the
statute, the Legislature's intent concerning manifest injustice claims is plain and
unambiguous—the Vontress method, looking to the "totality of the circumstances" and a
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"nonexhaustive list" of factors, specifying three in particular, is not the Legislature's
intent. See 299 Kan. at 616. The clear intent is the narrower, more limited review that is
now a part of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(f). As a result, any manifest injustice claim
proposing a rationale outside that boundary is clearly subject to dismissal.

The structure of the habeas corpus statutes limits the provisions of K.S.A. 2016
Supp. 60-1507 to the category of prisoners expressly named. Previous interpretations of
that section to allow consideration of manifest injustice claims made by those in the
SPTP are without support in the statute or caselaw. And while the Legislature placed a
manifest injustice exception into 60-1507(f), then prescribed its limits, the Legislature
has not done the same for K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501. Based on the plain language of the
habeas corpus statutes, read together, we find there is no manifest injustice exception to
the requirement for timely filing a petition under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501.

White's claim for a manifest injustice exception to save his late filing is based on
the second Vontress factor, asserting his petition raised "substantial issues of law or fact."
Even if the manifest injustice exception from K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2) were to
be engrafted onto K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501 for White's claim, that section does not
include his claim among those that may be considered.

White's progress in the SPTP; appointment of counsel

White makes two further claims but acknowledges they face obstacles. First, he
asserts a claim relating to his lack of progress in the SPTP. As the district court noted in
its rejection of this claim, White failed to show shocking and intolerable conduct and he
has a statutory remedy within the KSVPA to assert those claims. For those reasons, that
claim fails.

12

Second, White asserts counsel should have been appointed to represent him on his
petition. "In Merryfield v. State, 44 Kan. App. 2d 817, 826, 241 P.3d 573 (2010), our
court held constitutional principles of due process require the court to appoint counsel for
a civilly committed sexual predator filing a K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501 petition if the
claims asserted in the petition are not subject to summary dismissal." Johnson v. Bruffett,
No. 115,868, 2017 WL 2001623, at *4 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied
October 25, 2017. We find, as did the district court, that White's claims were subject to
summary dismissal. The district court did not err in denying appointment of counsel.

Conclusion

White's petition was not timely filed, and the manifest injustice exception he
claims does not apply to his 60-1501 petition. Even if that were not the case, the factor
from Vontress upon which he relies has been legislatively eliminated in the incorporation
of a restricted exception into K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507. White's other arguments are
without merit, so we find no error by the district court in summarily denying White's
petition.

Affirmed.

* * *

ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., concurring: The majority properly finds that because
Glenn A. White did not argue before the district court that manifest injustice requires the
court to consider his untimely habeas corpus petition, "[the issue] is not properly before
us for review." Slip op. at 4. Our Supreme Court has firmly held that if an issue was not
raised before the district court it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal absent an
explanation. See State v. Godfrey, 301 Kan. 1041, 1044, 350 P.3d 1068 (2015). Because
White provided no explanation in his appellate brief, the majority reaches the proper
13

conclusion. But contrary to most expectations, the opinion does not end there. The
majority goes on, in dicta, to discuss whether the manifest injustice standard contained in
K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2) extends the statute of limitations in an action filed
under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501. It concludes that the manifest injustice exception does
not apply to an otherwise untimely action filed under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501(c). I
disagree.

White filed an action under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501, challenging the
conditions of his civil confinement as a sexually violent predator. The statute requires
that such actions be brought within 30 days of the date any action by the Secretary for
Aging and Disability Services was final. The time is extended during the pendency of the
patient's timely attempts to exhaust his or her administrative remedies. K.S.A. 2016 Supp.
60-1501(c). Whether the manifest justice standard contained in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-
1507(f)(2) applies to extend the 30-day limit in 60-1501 is purely a matter of statutory
construction.

Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which appellate courts have
unlimited review. Neighbor v. Westar Energy, Inc., 301 Kan. 916, 918, 349 P.3d 469
(2015). The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the
Legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. State ex rel. Schmidt v. City of
Wichita, 303 Kan. 650, 659, 367 P.3d 282 (2016). An appellate court must first attempt to
ascertain legislative intent through the statutory language enacted, giving common words
their ordinary meanings. Ullery v. Othick, 304 Kan. 405, 409, 372 P.3d 1135 (2016).
When a statute is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court should not speculate about
the legislative intent behind that clear language, and it should refrain from reading
something into the statute that is not readily found in its words. 304 Kan. at 409. Where
there is no ambiguity, the court need not resort to statutory construction. Only if the
statute's language or text is unclear or ambiguous does the court use canons of
construction or legislative history to construe the Legislature's intent. 304 Kan. at 409.
14

And most importantly to our interpretation of the statutes involved here, the court
presumes that the Legislature does not intend to enact superfluous or redundant
legislation. See Board of Miami County Comm'rs v. Kanza Rail-Trails Conservancy, Inc.,
292 Kan. 285, 322, 255 P.3d 1186 (2011). Courts generally presume that the Legislature
acts with full knowledge about the statutory subject matter, including prior and existing
law, and judicial decisions interpreting the same. University of Kan. Hosp. Auth. v. Board
of Comm'rs of Unified Gov't, 301 Kan. 993, 1000, 348 P.3d 602 (2015).

I agree with the majority that K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501 and K.S.A. 2016 Supp.
60-1507 set forth two separate paths for habeas corpus proceedings. I also agree that this
sets up a two-tier structure. K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501(a) applies to "any person in this
state who is detained, confined or restrained of liberty on any pretense whatsoever,"
unless that person is a "prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of general
jurisdiction claiming the right to be released" via a collateral attack, in which case the
remedy lies in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(a). Thus the Legislature set out the prefatory
language in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501(a) making the entire statute "[s]ubject to the
provisions of K.S.A. 60-1507." That language alone accomplishes everything the
majority argues that K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501 stands for. But the Legislature did not
stop there. If it had, I would agree with the majority's conclusion that manifest injustice
does not have any application to a petition filed under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501.

But, the subsection of the statute at issue here, K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501(c),
goes one step further to establish:

"Except as provided in K.S.A. 60-1507, and amendments thereto, a patient in the
custody of the secretary for aging and disability services pursuant to K.S.A. 59-29a01 et
seq., and amendments thereto, shall file a petition for writ pursuant to subsection (a)
within 30 days from the date the action was final, but such time is extended during the
pendency of the patient's timely attempts to exhaust such patient's administrative
remedies." (Emphasis added.)
15

Clearly, the reader must examine K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507 to determine what
exceptions apply to this general rule. There is only one exception in K.S.A. 2016 Supp.
60-1507 to time limits. There is unequivocally only one provision that the Legislature
could possibly be referring to, K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2): "The time limitation
herein may be extended by the court only to prevent a manifest injustice." The statute
then goes on to explain that the court is only to consider the reasons why the prisoner
failed to meet the time limits and whether the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual
innocence. K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A). In the case of manifest injustice, the
district judge examines the evidence and uses his or her discretion to determine the
existence of manifest injustice, unlike the mandatory extension when the prisoner is
attempting to exhaust administrative remedies as set forth in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-
1501(c). To find otherwise, renders the "except as provided in K.S.A. 60-1507" language
absolutely meaningless. "It is presumed the legislature understood the meaning of the
words it used and intended to use them . . . in their ordinary and common meaning."
Boatright v. Kansas Racing Comm'n, 251 Kan. 240, Syl. ¶ 8, 834 P.2d 368 (1992).

The "except as provided" language in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501(c) clearly and
unambiguously means that one should look to K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507 for an
exception to the rule stated in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501(c). There is no need to
examine any other rules of statutory construction or legislative history. We assume the
Legislature means what it says. As our Supreme Court wrote in Gannon v. State, 298
Kan. 1107, 1143, 319 P.3d 1196 (2014) (quoting Wright v. Noell, 16 Kan. 601, 607, 1876
WL 1081 [1876]), "'the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the
makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used.'" Whether we
believe the language was ill-advised is irrelevant. Accordingly, I record my disagreement
with the majority's conclusion, in dicta, that the manifest injustice exception does not
apply to petitions filed under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501(c). Otherwise, I agree with the
result in this case.