Taylor v. State

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 117,897

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

JUSTIN C. TAYLOR,
Appellant,

v.

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Riley District Court; JOHN F. BOSCH, judge. Opinion filed June 29, 2018. Affirmed.

Gerald E. Wells, of Jerry Wells Attorney-at-Law, of Lawrence, for appellant.

Barry K. Disney, senior deputy county attorney, Barry R. Wilkerson, county attorney, and Derek
Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before GREEN, P.J., MCANANY and BRUNS, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Justin C. Taylor was charged in two consolidated cases with
second-degree murder and rape. The State amended the charges and Taylor pled nolo
contendere to voluntary manslaughter and rape. In May 2012, the district court sentenced
him to consecutive prison sentences of 155 months and 59 months. Taylor did not pursue
a direct appeal.

In June 2014 Taylor moved for relief under K.S.A. 60-1507, claiming that (1) his
counsel was ineffective, (2) his sentence was illegal, and (3) his counsel took advantage
of him. In support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he claimed that his
counsel knew that Taylor had a mental disorder but did not consult with an expert about
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it. He also claimed his counsel failed to provide him with the information relating to the
defense of insanity. The district court denied relief, finding that Taylor failed to provide
any evidence to support his claims and failed to present any evidence of manifest
injustice to excuse the late filing of his motion. Apparently this ruling was not appealed.

In June 2016, Taylor filed the instant motion. He again sought relief under K.S.A.
60-1507, claiming (1) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to consult an expert
about Taylor's mental deficiencies and (2) the district violated his due process rights by
failing to order sua sponte a mental competency evaluation.

In August 2016, Taylor asked the district court not to find that this second motion
under K.S.A. 60-1507 was successive because (1) he was asserting a new ground for
relief, (2) his prior motion was not decided on the merits, and (3) justice would be served
by reaching the merits of his second motion under K.S.A. 60-1507.

In November 2016, the district court summarily denied relief, finding that (1)
Taylor failed to prove the manifest injustice necessary to extend the one-year time
limitation in K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1); (2) the motion was successive and thus barred by
K.S.A. 60-1507(c); and (3) Taylor failed to assert a colorable claim of innocence as
required by K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A).

Taylor appeals. On appeal he concedes that his motion was untimely and
successive. He states in his appellate brief: "His present motion pursuant to K.S.A. 60-
1507 was untimely filed and his claims are not substantially different than in his first
K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, making it successive." But he claims we should remand the case
for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of his mental competency to stand trial because
failure to provide a hearing would violate his constitutional right to due process. He relies
on Fischer v. State, 296 Kan. 808, Syl. ¶ 4, 295 P.3d 560 (2013), for the proposition that
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a hearing must be held to address substantial issues of fact even when the motion under
K.S.A. 60-1507 is procedurally barred.

When relief on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion was summarily denied, our review is de
novo to determine whether the motions, files, and records of the case conclusively
establish that the movant was not entitled to relief. Sola-Morales v. State, 300 Kan. 875,
881, 335 P.3d 1162 (2014). Matters of statutory and constitutional interpretation are
issues of law which we review de novo. State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102, 121, 322 P.3d 334
(2014); State v. Holt, 298 Kan. 469, 474, 313 P.3d 826 (2013).

Taylor concedes that his motion was procedurally barred because it was untimely
under K.S.A. 60-1507(f) and successive under K.S.A. 60-1507(c) and Kansas Supreme
Court Rule 183(d) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 223), so we need not address those issues. The
only issue is the effect of Fischer on these proceedings.

Fischer does not save Taylor's motion. In Fischer, the court held that the movant
must be given the opportunity to be present at the hearing on the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion
when the district court determines that there is a substantial issue of fact. The court did
not hold that a hearing is necessary, only that the prisoner must be present if the district
court grants a hearing on the motion. 296 Kan. at 824. In fact, the court recognized that
one of the district court's options when faced with a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 is to
deny the motion summarily if the motion, files, and case records conclusively show that
the prisoner is not entitled to relief. 296 Kan. at 822.

In Manco v. State, 51 Kan. App. 2d 733, 741, 354 P.3d 551 (2015), the court held
that the prohibitions against untimely and successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motions do not
violate the movant's right of habeas corpus relief. The court reasoned that the Legislature
provided reasonable exceptions to the limitations placed on the ability to file a motion
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under K.S.A. 60-1507 and, therefore, the movant's constitutional rights are not violated.
51 Kan. App. 2d at 741.

Manco is persuasive. Taylor's due process right was not violated when the district
court declined to hold a hearing on the issue of whether he was competent to stand trial.
Taylor had a right to due process in the proceedings on his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, but
that right was not unlimited. Taylor did not comply with the reasonable procedural
requirements for making a claim under K.S.A. 60-1507 and failed to properly allege why
any of the exceptions to the procedural bars applied to him. Thus, the district court was
not required to hold a hearing on the matter.

The district court did not err in summarily denying relief on Taylor's second,
successive, and untimely K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

Affirmed.