Tackett v. Pryor

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 112,850

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

JAMES E. TACKETT, JR.,
Appellant,

v.

REX PRYOR (WARDEN) (KANSAS PRISONER REVIEW BOARD),
Appellees.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Leavenworth District Court; DAN K. WILEY, judge. Opinion filed September 4,
2015. Affirmed.

Michael G. Highland, of Bonner Springs, for appellant.

John Wesley Smith, assistant attorney general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellees.

Before LEBEN, P.J., HILL and ATCHESON, JJ.

Per Curiam: James E. Tackett, Jr., an inmate at the Lansing state prison, appeals
the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition challenging the decision of the Kansas
Prisoner Review Board to deny him parole. The Leavenworth County District Court
found Tackett failed to assert any constitutional defect in the Board's determination. We,
in turn, find no error in that call and affirm the district court.

In 1994, the Sedgwick County District Court sentenced Tackett to three
consecutive indeterminate terms of imprisonment: 5 to 20 years for aggravated battery;
15 years to life for kidnapping; and 5 to 20 years for indecent liberties with a child.
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Tackett became parole eligible in 2013. The Board denied him parole and postponed any
further consideration for 5 years. The Board cited as reasons the serious circumstances of
the crimes, objections to Tackett's early release, and his disciplinary record while
incarcerated. The Board offered no elaboration on those reasons in its written notice of
the denial.

Tackett filed a petition, as permitted in K.S.A. 60-1501, challenging the Board's
decision on the grounds he had been deprived of due process and equal protection,
thereby violating his constitutional rights protected in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The district court held a nonevidentiary hearing at which
lawyers for Tackett and the Board argued the matter. In a written ruling, the district court
found no constitutional deprivation. Tackett has appealed.

When the district court denies a 60-1501 petition without hearing evidence, we are
in an equally good position to determine if the petition and the relevant record support a
cognizable claim. Accordingly, we owe no particular deference to the district court's
ruling. See Johnson v. State, 289 Kan. 642, 648-49, 215 P.3d 575 (2009). A 60-1501
petition must describe a harm or injury to a person being held in government custody
rooted in "shocking and intolerable conduct or continuing mistreatment of a
constitutional stature." 289 Kan. at 648. A claim will lie if a governmental agency
unlawfully detains a person; the detention would be a constitutional violation. The Board
could not arbitrarily deny parole to an inmate—by, for example, flipping a coin to make
the decision—or base those decisions on protected class characteristics, such as race. See
Parks v. Kansas Prisoner Review Board, No. 111,412, 2014 WL 5801346, at *2 (Kan.
App. 2014) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied ___ Kan. ___ (March 12, 2015); Galloway
v. Kansas Parole Board, No. 110,637, 2014 WL 2229548, at *1 (Kan. App.)
(unpublished opinion), rev. denied 300 Kan. 1103 (2014).

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Under Kansas law, parole remains discretionary with the Board. See K.S.A. 2014
Supp. 22-3710; Bohanon v. Heimgartner, No. 109,023, 2013 WL 3970213, at *3 (Kan.
App. 2013) (unpublished opinion) (citing controlling cases). The denial of parole does
not itself result in unlawful detention; rather, the prisoner simply must continue to serve a
lawfully imposed term of incarceration. The Kansas Supreme Court has held that a
prisoner, therefore, has no protected legal right to parole from a criminal sentence.
Gilmore v. Kansas Parole Board, 243 Kan. 173, 178-80, 756 P.2d 410, cert. denied 488
U.S. 930 (1988); see also Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 11-12, 99 S.
Ct. 2100, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1979) (Nebraska statutory scheme provided parole shall be
granted in certain circumstances—unlike Kansas law—thereby creating a liberty interest
requiring some measure of due process protection). A Kansas prisoner cannot assert a
constitutional deprivation based on a purported lack of procedural due process in a parole
hearing itself—in contrast to a decision made arbitrarily or based on impermissible
prejudice.

On appeal, Tackett first contends the generic description of the reasons the Board
gave for denying him parole demonstrate the arbitrary and capricious character of the
decision. But he is mistaken.

Tackett says the Board's reliance on the circumstances of his crimes is improper
because they are immutable and, thus, can't be "subject to change or improvement."
While those historical facts are fixed, that doesn't render the Board's decision arbitrary or
otherwise improper. A particular kidnapping properly could be viewed as considerably
worse than others if the victim were held for an extended period in oppressive conditions
or repeatedly threatened with physical harm. That kidnapping arguably would warrant
greater retribution than others, so the perpetrator legitimately could be denied parole for
that reason. Similarly, the Board could properly weigh the circumstances of a crime
against the perpetrator's efforts at rehabilitation in prison. Tackett, of course, is well
aware of what he did and makes no argument that the facts of those offenses make him
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somehow less blameworthy or less deserving of retribution. Nothing in the Board's
consideration or weighing of the offenses deprived Tackett of a constitutional protection
against arbitrary or impermissibly prejudicial decisionmaking.

Tackett contends the Board acted arbitrarily in relying on the objections to his
parole request and complains about the lack of specificity depriving him of the ability to
"offer any form of meaningful rebuttal." The complaint, as Tackett has framed it, really
goes to the sufficiency of the procedural due process afforded him. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976) ("The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.' [Citation omitted.]"); State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 354, 204 P.3d
585 (2009). But, as we have said, potential parolees have no procedural due process
protections with regard to the Board's review.

Tackett also contends the mere mention of his disciplinary record while in prison
reflects an arbitrary consideration of his parole request. Again, we disagree. As with his
criminal history, Tackett is well aware of what he has done in prison. His record shows
scores of violations of prison rules and regulations, some serious and others
comparatively minor. But the number of violations suggests Tackett's inability to
conform to rules—a characteristic that could be troublesome in the far less structured
environment of parole. The Board can and should consider an inmate's disciplinary
record. Tackett has not shown how that consideration led to an arbitrary outcome in his
case.

Next, Tackett argues that Kansas inmates actually have a protected liberty interest
in parole and must be afforded procedural due process. He says the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84, 115 S. Ct. 2293,
132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995), undercut the legal foundation for the holding in Gilmore, 243
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Kan. at 178-80. But Tackett's argument misreads Sandin, as the panel in Parks
recognized:

"In [Sandin], the Court held that regulations related to the day-to-day management of
penal institutions or the terms and conditions of confinement of inmates do not create
protected liberty interests for those prisoners simply because they are written using
mandatory rather than discretionary language. See 515 U.S. 482-87. The Sandin decision
did not deal with or affect the determination of a prisoner's liberty interest, if any, in
parole or some other form of early or conditional release from incarceration. See
Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052, 1063-64 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2013); Ellis v. District of
Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Sandin did not overrule Greenholtz with
respect to liberty interests in parole); Valles v. Busby, No. CV I4-1360-GAF, 2014 WL
1614615, at *2 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (unpublished opinion). In turn, Parks' argument that
he has some sort of liberty interest in parole requiring procedural due process protections
fails." 2014 WL 5801346, at *2.

We agree with the assessment in Parks and reject Tackett's point on that basis.

Finally, Tackett argues that the prison terms imposed on him for these crimes he
committed before adoption of the sentencing guidelines should be converted to terms
calculated under the guidelines for parole purposes. The legislature did permit conversion
of sentences for some crimes under K.S.A. 21-4724(c)(1). But the statute expressly
excluded other crimes—an exclusion covering Tackett. K.S.A. 21-4724(c)(1). The
legislature has repealed K.S.A. 21-4724, so there is no longer any legal basis for
converting preguidelines sentences.

Nonetheless, Tackett suggests he is entitled to conversion of his sentences under
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3717(h)(2). But he misses the mark. In K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-
3717(h)(2), the legislature outlined factors the Board should weigh in making parole
decisions, including the "proportionality of the time the inmate has served to the sentence
a person would receive under the Kansas sentencing guidelines for the conduct that
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resulted in the inmate's incarceration." Tackett contends the language in K.S.A. 2014
Supp. 22-3717(h) requires his sentences be converted to guidelines punishments.

But the statute does not provide for conversion. It simply directs the Board to take
account of the term of imprisonment the inmate would have received under the
sentencing guidelines as one of a host of relevant factors in considering a request for
parole. Moreover, Tackett presents no proportionality argument. The language of K.S.A.
2014 Supp. 22-3717(h) authorizes the Board to consider "the [inmate's] conduct" in
assessing the sentence he or she would have received under the guidelines. We take that
to mean the facts underlying the criminal activity—rather than the crimes of conviction—
channel the assessment of the potential guidelines punishment. So the Board may look
behind plea bargains that reduced the number or seriousness of the crimes of conviction
to consider what crimes the factual circumstances actually supported. Tackett neither
challenges that statutory method nor offers an explanation for why the time he has
already served is disproportionately longer than a guidelines sentence based on his
criminal conduct. Tackett has failed to outline any basis for relief in that respect.

Having reviewed Tackett's points on appeal, we find no error in the district court's
ruling.

Affirmed.