State v. Yost

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 111,523

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

STANLEY YOST,
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JAMES R. FLEETWOOD, judge. Opinion filed November 23,
2016. Affirmed.

Michael P. Whalen, of Law Office of Michael P. Whalen, of Wichita, for appellant.

Lance J. Gillett, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before HILL, P.J., BUSER and LEBEN, JJ.

LEBEN, J.: Stanley Yost pled guilty to and was convicted of indecent liberties and
aggravated indecent liberties with a child in 2002. In compliance with the law at the time,
he was ordered to register as a sex offender for 10 years. See K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 22-
4906(a)(1); K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 22-4902(c)(2)-(3). But in 2011, the legislature amended
the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) to require lifetime registration for certain
offenses, including aggravated indecent liberties with a child. See L. 2011, ch. 95, sec. 6;
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-4906(d). The Kansas Bureau of Investigation informed Yost that
he would have to register for life.
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In 2013, Yost filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504,
contending that applying the 2011 KORA amendments to his 2002 case made his
sentence illegal. His main argument was that applying the amendments to his case
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, which prohibits
states from increasing the punishment for crimes already committed. See Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1990). The district court
denied Yost's motion, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his claims because
none of Yost's arguments fell within the scope of an illegal sentence. Yost then appealed
to our court.

On appeal, Yost argues that the 2011 KORA amendments and other KORA
provisions were unconstitutional. But a defendant may not generally raise constitutional
claims in a motion to correct an illegal sentence because such claims do not fit within the
narrow definition of an illegal sentence: (1) a sentence imposed by a court without
jurisdiction; (2) a sentence that does not conform to the applicable statutory provision,
either in character or the term of punishment; or (3) a sentence that is ambiguous with
respect to the time or manner in which it is to be served. State v. Warrior, 303 Kan. 1008,
1009-10, 368 P.3d 1111 (2016). Because none of Yost's claims fall within the definition
of an illegal sentence, the district court properly concluded it lacked jurisdiction to
consider them.

To understand why we don't have jurisdiction to consider Yost's claims, let's first
place his motion to correct an illegal sentence in context. Generally, a district court does
not have jurisdiction to modify a sentence once it has pronounced the sentence and
entered judgment. See State v. Tafoya, 304 Kan. 663, 666-67, 372 P.3d 1247 (2016). But
under K.S.A. 22-3504(1), courts have jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence at any
time. Even so, relief under K.S.A. 22-3504 is available only if a sentence is illegal, and
the Kansas Supreme Court has narrowly defined "illegal sentence" as: (1) a sentence
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imposed by a court without jurisdiction; (2) a sentence that does not conform to the
applicable statutory provision, either in character or the term of punishment; or (3) a
sentence that is ambiguous with respect to the time or manner in which it is to be served.
Makthepharak v. State, 298 Kan. 573, 578, 314 P.3d 876 (2013).

In this appeal, since the motion to correct an illegal sentence is provided for in a
statute, the only question before us is one of statutory interpretation, a question that—
along with questions about a court's jurisdiction—are questions of law, which we review
independently, with no required deference to the district court's conclusions. State v.
Jeffries, 304 Kan. 748, 751, 375 P.3d 316 (2016); State v. Williams, 298 Kan. 1075,
1079, 319 P.3d 528 (2014).

Yost made essentially three claims in his motion to correct an illegal sentence and
on appeal: (1) retroactively applying the 2011 amendments violated the separation-of-
powers doctrine; (2) the 2011 amendments were not intended to apply retroactively based
on the statutory language; and (3) the retroactive application of the amendments and
other provisions of KORA was unconstitutional. None of these claims fall within the
narrow definition of an illegal sentence. As a general rule, a defendant cannot raise
constitutional claims in a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Warrior, 303 Kan. at
1009-10; State v. Moncla, 301 Kan. 549, 551, 553-54, 343 P.3d 1161 (2015); State v.
Mitchell, 284 Kan. 374, 376-77, 162 P.3d 18 (2007) (rejecting defendant's claims that his
sentences were illegal for violating double jeopardy, equal protection, and the Eighth
Amendment). While a defendant may challenge his or her criminal-history score based
on a constitutional claim, that exception is not applicable here. See State v. Dickey, 301
Kan. 1018, 1034, 350 P.3d 1054 (2015).

A motion to correct illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504 simply was not an
available method to bring these claims. Cf. Doe v. Thompson, 304 Kan. 291, 292, 373
P.3d 750 (2016) (ruling on declaratory-judgment request seeking determination of
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retroactive application of Kansas Offender Registration Act amendments), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Petersen-Beard, 304 Kan. 192, 377 P.3d 1127 (2016). The
district court correctly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction under K.S.A. 22-3504 to
consider Yost's motion. See Mitchell, 284 Kan. at 377 (district court had no jurisdiction
to address defendant's constitutional claims under K.S.A. 22-3504); State v. Dillon, No.
111,530, 2015 WL 1882161, at *4 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion) (district court
had no jurisdiction to address defendant's ex post facto argument under K.S.A. 22-3504),
rev. denied 303 Kan. 1080 (2016).

We therefore affirm the district court's judgment.