State v. Williams-Salmeron

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 114,089

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

GABRIEL L. WILLIAMS-SALMERON,
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Saline District Court; JARED B. JOHNSON, judge. Opinion filed September 30, 2016.
Affirmed.

Michael P. Whalen, of Law Office of Michael P. Whalen, of Wichita, for appellant.

Christina Trocheck, assistant county attorney, Ellen Mitchell, county attorney, and Derek
Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before ATCHESON, P.J., LEBEN, J., and HEBERT, S.J.

Per Curiam: Defendant Gabriel L. Williams-Salmeron appeals the ruling of the
Saline County District Court denying his motion to correct sentences he contends were
impermissibly imposed on him because the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. We
disagree with Williams-Salmeron's jurisdictional arguments and, therefore, affirm.

Given the issue on appeal, we dispense with a detailed account of the underlying
crimes and summarize those facts and the procedural history. Williams-Salmeron, then
19 years old, had sexual relations with a 15-year-old girl multiple times while they were
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"dating" for several months. The girl became pregnant. After being charged with the
felony sex offenses, Williams-Salmeron repeatedly violated a protective order by
contacting the girl. Based on an agreement with the State, Williams-Salmeron pleaded
guilty to two counts of indecent liberties with a child, a felony offense, and two counts of
violating a protective order, a misdemeanor. The agreement included a joint
recommendation to the district court for standard guidelines sentences on the felonies to
run concurrently and 12-month jail sentences on each of the misdemeanors to be served
concurrently with each other and the felonies.

The district court accepted Williams-Salmeron's plea in February 2014 and
scheduled a sentencing hearing for April. Williams-Salmeron remained free on bond.

Before the sentencing hearing, Williams-Salmeron suffered a serious head injury
in a motor vehicle accident. He was in a coma for more than a week and went through a
rehabilitation program after that. The sentencing was continued as Williams-Salmeron
recuperated from his injuries. In the meantime, another district court judge granted a
probate petition requesting appointment of a guardian for Williams-Salmeron to oversee
his care, treatment, and related matters. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 59-3058 (petition for
guardianship); K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 59-3075 (duties of guardian).

At a status hearing in the criminal case in October 2014, Williams-Salmeron's
lawyer requested a competency determination for her client. The district court granted the
request while noting it had seen nothing to suggest Williams-Salmeron was incapable of
assisting his lawyer or unable to understand the nature of the judicial proceedings. See
K.S.A. 22-3301(1) (defining incompetency to stand trial in criminal prosecution). A
licensed clinical social worker conducted the competency examination at a local mental
health clinic and issued a report finding Williams-Salmeron to be competent to be
sentenced or to otherwise proceed in the criminal case.

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Williams-Salmeron's lawyer did not object to the manner in which the competency
examination was done and offered no evidence to dispute the report's conclusion. The
district court found Williams-Salmeron competent within the meaning of K.S.A. 22-
3301(1). At sentencing, the district court imposed a prison term of 36 months on
Williams-Salmeron on the first count of the sex crimes and 32 months on the second
count to be served concurrently, consistent with the plea recommendation. The district
court, however, ordered the 12-month jail sentences on the misdemeanors to be served
concurrently with each but consecutively to the felony sentences, resulting in a
controlling period of incarceration of 48 months.

After his sentencing, Williams-Salmeron hired a new lawyer. Although Williams-
Salmeron had already filed a notice of appeal, his new lawyer filed a motion in the
district court to correct an illegal sentence, as provided in K.S.A. 22-3504(1). The district
court denied the motion, and Williams-Salmeron filed a notice of appeal from that ruling.

For his only points on appeal, Williams-Salmeron reprises the arguments he
presented to the district court in support of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. He
contends the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to sentence him, thereby
rendering the sentences themselves illegal and, thus, void. The Kansas Supreme Court
has recognized that a sentence is illegal within the meaning of K.S.A. 22-3504(1) if the
district court lacked jurisdiction over the proceedings. State v. Jones, 303 Kan. 452, 454,
362 P.3d 595 (2015); State v. Donaldson, 302 Kan. 731, 733-34, 355 P.3d 689 (2015).
Williams-Salmeron's jurisdictional arguments present questions of law we review without
deference to the district court. See State v. Sellers, 301 Kan. 540, 544, 344 P.3d 950
(2015) (subject-matter jurisdiction presents question of law subject to de novo review).

First, Williams-Salmeron contends the district court lost jurisdiction of the
criminal case because the competency examination was not done in conformity with the
statutory requirements in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3302. He says the examination could not
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have been conducted at a local mental health facility or by a licensed clinical social
worker. We need not and do not take up the substance of the purported statutory
deficiencies Williams-Salmeron alleges. Even if Williams-Salmeron were correct about
who should have performed the examination or where it should have been done, that
would not have deprived the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the criminal
case, including sentencing. See State v. Ford, 302 Kan. 455, 467, 353 P.3d 1143 (2015).

In Ford, the court recognized that the failure to follow the statutory requirements
for competency determinations laid out in K.S.A. 22-3302 may constitute procedural
defects but any such defect would not create a jurisdictional bar. 302 Kan. at 467.
Williams-Salmeron has not argued—nor has he offered evidence, such as an expert
opinion from a psychiatrist or psychologist—that he actually was unable to assist his
lawyer at the sentencing or that he didn't understand the proceedings. Rather, he contends
the district court ordered a competency examination that did not satisfy the procedural
requirements of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3302. Consistent with Ford, any such problem
would not undermine the district court's jurisdiction.

Williams-Salmeron, therefore, cannot rely on a motion to correct an illegal
sentence to challenge the criminal proceedings, since the motion must be predicated on a
lack of jurisdiction. (There are other ways a sentence may be illegal under K.S.A. 22-
3504(1). But they are inapplicable here, and Williams-Salmeron has not based his
argument on them.) In short, the court's reasoning in Ford undercuts Williams-Salmeron's
contention that his sentences must be set aside because of how the competency
examination was done.

Alternatively, Williams-Salmeron contends that the probate proceeding in which a
guardian was appointed for him deprived the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction
to proceed with the criminal case and, in particular, the sentencing. We disagree. The
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argument depends upon a misapprehension about the breadth of district court jurisdiction
following court unification in 1977.

Before unification, various specialized courts exercised exclusive jurisdiction over
particular kinds of proceedings. And district courts had no subject-matter jurisdiction to
hear cases within those areas of the law. Probate matters, including the appointment of
guardians, were entrusted to special probate courts. In re Estate of Heiman, 44 Kan. App.
2d 764, 766-68, 241 P.3d 161 (2010) (discussing impact of court unification particularly
regarding probate proceedings). Unification eliminated those specialized courts and
expanded district court jurisdiction to those areas. As a result of unification, district
courts exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over all civil and criminal actions, including
probate proceedings. See K.S.A. 20-301; In re Estate of Heiman, 44 Kan. App. 2d at 766-
68. In other words, district courts now have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear both
probate and criminal matters.

Accordingly, the imposition of a guardianship in a probate proceeding would not
deprive a district court of subject-matter jurisdiction over a criminal case filed against the
ward of the guardianship. As a result, Williams-Salmeron's motion to correct an illegal
sentence could not have been properly based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over
the criminal prosecution.

Having examined Williams-Salmeron's arguments, we find the district court had
subject-matter jurisdiction to sentence Williams-Salmeron. The district court, therefore,
correctly denied the motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Affirmed.