State v. Tisdale

1

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 118,864

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

ELIZABETH L. TISDALE,
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; DAVID L. DAHL, judge. Opinion filed March 8, 2019.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part.

Corrine E. Gunning, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before BRUNS, P.J., SCHROEDER and GARDNER, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Elizabeth L. Tisdale appeals from the district court's imposition of
Board of Indigent Services' (BIDS) attorney fees totaling $300. She also contends that the
district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to withdraw her plea.
Because we find that the factors set forth by the Kansas Supreme Court in State v.
Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 132 P.3d 934 (2006), were not properly applied, we vacate the
assessment of attorney fees and remand that issue to the district court. However, because
we find that Tisdale has not shown an abuse of discretion by the district court, we affirm
the district court's denial of her motion to withdraw plea.
2

FACTS

On May 18, 2017, Elizabeth L. Tisdale was charged with one count of felony
theft, a severity level 9 nondrug grid nonperson felony in violation of K.S.A. 2016 Supp.
21-5801(a)(1), (b)(3) for taking items from a Kohl's store in Wichita. On July 12, 2017,
Tisdale pleaded guilty to this charge pursuant to a written plea agreement. The district
court accepted that plea. Accordingly, Tisdale was found guilty.

At the plea hearing, the district court had the following colloquy with Tisdale:

"THE COURT: You're represented in this case by [Brandon] Hottman, the attorney
standing next to you, is that correct?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Have you had enough time to discuss with him the charges filed against
you, your rights in this case and the consequences of changing your plea?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the services he's provided for you in this case?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Have the courts treated you in a professional and courteous manner up to
this point?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Miss Tisdale, I've received two documents. The first is entitled
defendant's acknowledgment of rights and entry of plea. It is a document that is four
pages long and your signature's here on the last page dated July 10, 2017. Is that your
signature, ma'am?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Was it your decision alone to sign this document?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Have you had enough time to review it completely with your attorney?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Has he answered any and all questions about what is in this document?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir." (Emphases added.)

3

On July 26, 2017, 14 days after the plea hearing, Tisdale filed a pro se motion to
withdraw her plea. In her motion, Tisdale argued (1) that she was "unaware of the
intricate details" of the case because she "was not [p]roperly [p]rovided with a full
discovery," (2) that "the small amount of discovery . . . elucidated that [Tisdale] hadn't
unlawfully deprived anyone nor the store in question of its posse[s]sions," (3) and that
"she was m[ali]ciously m[a]nipulated by appointed counsel into signing a [p]lea
agreement."

Almost 30 days after Tisdale's pro se motion was filed, a new attorney appointed
to represent Tisdale, Sharon Barnett, filed a supplemental motion to withdraw plea. The
supplemental motion attempted to further explain Tisdale's pro se motion. It alleged that
Tisdale felt "she was misled by prior counsel and that he took advantage of her custody
status to get her to enter a plea by promising her she'd get work release immediately upon
entering a plea." It was also alleged that Tisdale "believe[d] [her] prior counsel was not
competent in that he did not review discovery with her and didn't explain to her exactly
what she was pleading to." Finally, it was asserted that Tisdale was innocent and that
"were it not for the conduct of prior counsel, she would not have entered a guilty
plea . . . ."

The district court held a hearing on Tisdale's motion to withdraw plea on
September 19, 2017. At the hearing, Tisdale testified as did her prior attorney, Brandon
Hottman. Tisdale testified that she met with Hottman "[t]wo or three" times. She asserted
that during their first conversation, Hottman told her that if she "wanted to get work
release authorized, [she] would have to enter a plea." Moreover, Tisdale asserted that
during their second conversation, Hottman told her that he had received a plea offer from
the State in which she would plead guilty to the felony theft charge and that he could "get
this in court next week and [she would] be in work release two days after that."
According to Tisdale, Hottman told her that "'[o]nce you enter the plea, I don't see the
judge not allowing you to go to work release.'"
4

Tisdale also testified about the plea hearing. She admitted that she reviewed the
written plea agreement with Hottman and did not have questions concerning her rights.
Moreover, she admitted that the district judge questioned her about the plea and that she
did not raise any concerns at the hearing. She also admitted that she told the district judge
that she was pleased with Hottman's representation.

Nevertheless, Tisdale testified:

"As we were standing there . . . Brandon Hottman had a file, and he was going
through some papers, and I happened to look over and the—the first two lines stated that
location of the Kohl's and how many people participated. I then asked, 'What's that?' And
he's like, 'oh, nothing, just a little bit of discovery.' Upon seeing that, I knew for sure that
wasn't me."

Tisdale testified that she had not seen any of the discovery prior to that time.

Although Tisdale testified at the motion hearing that she had stolen merchandise
from Kohl's before, she claimed:

"I've never taken $2,000 worth of merchandise from any store. And then I'm never with
four to five people, if that makes sense. It's always the same thing. It's consistent, you
know. The pattern that the people used, it was something that I do or that I've done.
However, it wasn't me that time. And that same location had just sent me maybe a month
or two prior to me being locked up a letter saying that they were suing me for $90."

On cross-examination, Tisdale admitted that although she allegedly saw the papers
in Hottman's possession at the plea hearing, she did not tell the district court that she did
not wish to proceed. Specifically, she testified:

"Q. So if I'm understanding this correctly, you're saying that you saw these additional
discovery materials in Mr. Hottman's file at this hearing, but—
5

"A. I did.
"Q.—you did not stop and tell the court, 'I don't want to go forward with this hearing?'
"A. I did not.
"Q. You didn't stop and tell your attorney that you wanted to stop this hearing?
"A. I did not."

Tisdale also admitted that during the plea hearing, she believed the charge that she
took "property from Kohl's with a value of at least $1,500 but less than $25,000" to be
true.

Hottman testified that Tisdale told him that she was at the Kohl's location with
approximately three other individuals at the time of the theft. Hottman also testified that
he told Tisdale at their first meeting that she was charged with theft from a Kohl's and
that she had brought up the issue of work release. According to Hottman, Tisdale told
him that she was on work release for some municipal court cases and hoped that she
could get work release in this case. Because no plea offer existed at the time, Hottman
and Tisdale did not discuss a plea.

Hottman also testified that at his second meeting with Tisdale, he discussed with
her "what the parameters of what [a] plea agreement might be, and what [Tisdale] would
be willing to agree to." According to Hottman, "[n]o formal offer had been extended at
that time." Hottman indicated that after the second meeting with Tisdale, he received the
discovery from the State.

In addition, Hottman testified that he met with Tisdale three additional times.
Hottman recalled that on one of these subsequent visits he and Tisdale discussed the
discovery in her case. Hottman stated that the discovery included "photographs, a police
report, and some surveillance videos." Hottman stated that he generally reviews
discovery items and provides a summary to his clients rather than providing them with a
copy of discovery items.
6

After receiving an informal plea offer from the State, Hottman discussed it with
Tisdale on July 4, 2017. Two days later, Hottman received a written plea offer and visited
with Tisdale again on July 10, 2017. Hottman testified that on this visit he reviewed "the
plea and the acknowledgement of rights" with Tisdale. After Tisdale raised an issue
regarding the amount of restitution, Hottman told her that they could request a restitution
hearing at sentencing.

Concerning work release, Hottman stated that he "would never had made any
promises that [Tisdale] was going to get work release for sure." Hottman testified that he
"ask[ed] for the work release right after the plea hearing." Hottman further explained:

"And generally I always tell them 'I'm not the judge, I don't make the decision.' And I
always give them my opinion on the likelihood of success—or how successful a bond
modification request might be based on factors. And with Ms. Tisdale, we discussed it
was a good thing that she was already work release authorized in the other case, that
might help her get work release in this case. But I never guaranteed it."

After Hottman testified, the district court applied the factors set forth in State v.
Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36, 127 P.3d 986 (2006). First, the district court found that Tisdale
was represented by competent counsel. Second, the district court found that Tisdale was
not "misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of" in agreeing to enter a
plea. Third, the district court found that the plea was fairly and understandably made in
writing. In denying Tisdale's motion to withdraw her plea, the district court explained:

"You were given counsel, you had an opportunity to speak to that counsel, you had an
opportunity to either agree or disagree at the hearing. And if for some reason you did not
agree, you needed to say so. You needed to say that this—this plea was not being entered
into with the understanding it was written in the agreement, that there was some other
side agreement with work release. None of that was ever mentioned on the record to the
Court. And so the words in the plea agreement that were written and also the words at the
7

plea hearing from the defendant do have meaning and the Court must give them their
ordinary meaning."

On November 1, 2017, the district court held a sentencing hearing. The State
requested an 11-month mitigated sentence to run consecutive to all her other cases.
Tisdale's attorney objected to the restitution figure and requested a hearing. Accordingly,
the district court continued the hearing to a later date.

The district court held the continued hearing on December 8, 2017. Although
Tisdale was sentenced to 11 months of incarceration, her sentence was suspended and she
was placed on probation for a term of 12 months. The district court ordered the sentence
to run consecutive to any other sentences. The district court asked Tisdale if the
$3,255.96 requested by Kohl's in restitution was "fair and just restitution." Tisdale
responded "[y]es, sir." The district court then ordered restitution in the amount of
$3,255.96. The district court also ordered her to complete a theft offender's program.

The district court questioned Tisdale on the record about her job and ability to pay
restitution:

"THE COURT: How far did you get [in school]?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I got my GED.
"THE COURT: Good. Good for you. Have you worked?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
"THE COURT: What kind of jobs?
"THE DEFENDANT: All kinds. I'm working at Hard[ee]'s right now.
"THE COURT: Well, good for you. How many hours do you hold down there?
"THE DEFENDANT: Today was just my fourth day, so I'm not sure. It's part-time.
However, I just had an interview, a second interview with Buffalo Wild Wings, but you
just told me I can't—
"THE COURT: Well, I'll make an exception.
"THE DEFENDANT: Will you?
8

"THE COURT: Yeah. What I want to do is if she gets a job at Buffalo Wild Wings,
please, tell the probation officer I will accept that. No other place, but I will accept
Buffalo Wild Wings if you get a job there, because I want you working there."

Concerning the court costs and fees to be assessed, Tisdale's attorney and the
district court had the following conversation:

"THE COURT: . . . You have to reimburse the Public Defenders Office an intake fee of
$100. Everybody has to pay that. Ms. Barnett did a good job for you. Her fees are $600.
Ms. Barnett, any thoughts about those fees?
"MS. BARNETT: Your Honor, the fact that she's going to be responsible for a
substantial amount of restitution, I would ask the Court to consider waiving attorney fees.
"THE COURT: Here's what I'm going to do. I'm going to put those fees at $300. I'm
going to cut them down to give you the benefit of the doubt. But we'll put a clause in
here, if the defendant makes reasonable progress, according to your probation officer,
into defraying or paying some of the restitution and expenses, I'll go ahead and waive the
rest of it.
"If you kind of double up, pay some money out and if you're doing that and the
probation officer says this is good, you can make a motion. Ms. Barnett can make a
motion that will wipe out the rest of that $300. But if not, you still owe that $300."

Tisdale timely appealed on December 8, 2017.

ANALYSIS

BIDS Attorney Fees

On appeal, Tisdale contends that the district court erred in assessing $300 in BIDS
attorney fees without considering her financial resources or the nature of the burden that
payment of the attorney fees would impose upon her. Although Tisdale did not object to
the imposition of attorney fees below, we may address this issue for the first time on
appeal. Robinson, 281 Kan. at 543-44. In response, the State contends that the district
9

court's inquiry into Tisdale's educational background and work history is adequate to
comply with Robinson and therefore no remand is necessary.

This issue involves an interpretation of the language of K.S.A. 22-4513.
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law and therefore our review is unlimited.
Robinson, 281 Kan. at 539. K.S.A. 22-4513(b) states, in relevant part:

"In determining the amount and method of payment of such sum, the court shall
take account of the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that
payment of such sum will impose. A defendant who has been required to pay such sum
and who is not willfully in default in the payment thereof may at any time petition the
court which sentenced the defendant to waive payment of such sum or of any unpaid
portion thereof. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that payment of the amount
due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or the defendant's immediate family,
the court may waive payment of all or part of the amount due or modify the method of
payment." (Emphasis added.)

In Robinson, the Kansas Supreme Court outlined the procedure a district court is
to utilize when assessing BIDS fees:

"The language of K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 22-4513(b) clearly requires a sentencing
judge, 'in determining the amount and method of payment' of BIDS reimbursement, i.e.,
at the time the reimbursement is ordered, to 'take account of the financial resources of the
defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of such sum will impose.' The
language is mandatory; the legislature stated unequivocally that this 'shall' occur, in the
same way that it stated unequivocally that the BIDS fees 'shall' be taxed against the
defendant. . . . The language is in no way conditional. There is no indication that the
defendant must first request that the sentencing court consider his or her financial
circumstances or that the defendant must first object to the proposed BIDS fees to draw
the sentencing court's attention to those circumstances." 281 Kan. at 543-44.


10

After discussing the history of the BIDS statute, our Supreme Court held

"[T]he sentencing court, at the time of initial assessment, must consider the
financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment will
impose explicitly, stating on the record how those factors have been weighed in the
court's decision. Without an adequate record on these points, meaningful appellate
review of whether the court abused its discretion in setting the amount and method of
payment of the fees would be impossible." (Emphasis added.) 281 Kan. at 546.

Here, we feel confident that the district court did "consider the financial resources
of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment will impose" because it
reduced the defendant's fees from $600 to $300. Although the reduction in the BIDS fee
may very well be reasonable, Robinson also requires that the district court "explicitly"
explain on the record the factors it considered and how they weighed in its decision. In
light of the holding in Robinson, we feel obligated to vacate the ruling regarding the
assessment of BIDS attorney fees and to remand this issue to the district court.

Motion to Withdraw Plea

Tisdale also contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying her
motion to withdraw her plea to reduced charges. A judicial action constitutes an abuse of
discretion if (1) no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court; (2)
it is based on an error of law; or (3) it is based on an error of fact. State v. Marshall, 303
Kan. 438, 445, 362 P.3d 587 (2015). The party asserting that the district court abused its
discretion bears the burden of showing such abuse. State v. Robinson, 303 Kan. 11, 90,
363 P.3d 875 (2015), cert. denied 137 S. Ct. 164 (2016).

Upon a showing of good cause, K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3210(d)(1) permits a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing. Three factors—known as the
Edgar factors—generally guide a district court's consideration of whether a defendant has
11

demonstrated the good cause to withdraw a plea prior to sentencing: (1) whether the
defendant was represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the defendant was misled,
coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3) whether the plea was fairly
and understandingly made. Edgar, 281 Kan. at 36. These factors should not be applied
mechanically and to the exclusion of other factors. State v. Fritz, 299 Kan. 153, 154, 321
P.3d 763 (2014). Nevertheless, these factors establish "'viable benchmarks'" for the
district court when exercising its discretion. State v. Schaefer, 305 Kan. 581, 588, 385
P.3d 918 (2016).

Tisdale argues that her attorney failed to provide her with copies of discovery, that
she was misled into entering the plea deal "because she wanted to get out on work
release," and that the plea agreement was not understandably made. In response, the State
argues that Tisdale fails to cite authority requiring an attorney to provide copies of case
discovery to their client, that Hottman provided adequate disclosure of case discovery to
Tisdale in the form of summaries, that Tisdale understood the details of the theft and
what crime the State charged her with committing, that Hottman did not mislead or
coerce Tisdale into signing the plea agreement, and that Tisdale knowingly entered into
the plea and knew which Kohl's location the charging documents referred to. We agree.

At the hearing on Tisdale's motion to withdraw his plea, her prior attorney testified
about his procedure for providing discovery documents to his clients:

"Q. Okay. And again, [Tisdale's] replies and her conversations about this Kohl's incident
is based on what you've told her because she has not seen any of the discovery?
"A. Yes. I—it is a practice that I have, I review discovery and then I summarize it to my
clients. I don't always give them a copy of all the discovery."

Later, Hottman expanded upon his reasoning for his discovery policy:

12

"Q. And your policy for reviewing discovery with defendants who are in custody, what is
that policy?
"A. I—I don't typically, for instance, give copies of videos or photographs. I occasionally
will give copies of police reports that have been redacted if I think that it's likely that
these cases are going to go to a preliminary hearing or a trial, just to get another [set of]
eyes on it. Sometimes my clients can spot things that I have missed and so that's—but it's
more of a case-by-case process, decision-making process.
"Q. In your recollection was there a lot of materials you had to go through in this case?
"A. I believe there was a police report, maybe a dozen or so photographs, and some
surveillance videos.
"Q. In your experience would that be more on the low end when you are looking at the
volume of materials to go through for a case?
"A. I've definitely seen more, yes.
"Q. Okay. Fair to say that's an amount that you could go through relatively quickly and
synthesize what the kind of results of those documents are?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And fair to say you were able to relay the information from those materials to Ms.
Tisdale?
"A. Yes."

Because her attorney did not receive the discovery from the State until after his
second meeting with Tisdale, he could not have provided that information to Tisdale until
after that date. According to her attorney, he did discuss the contents of all the discovery
documents with Tisdale in a subsequent visit. Her attorney also testified that he and
Tisdale discussed photographic evidence and police reports. Although Tisdale claims that
she saw some papers in her attorney's hands at the plea hearing that were exculpatory, she
told the district court at the plea hearing that she wished to proceed.

At the hearing on her motion to withdraw plea, Tisdale testified:

"Q: So if I'm understanding this correctly, you're saying that you saw these additional
discovery materials in Mr. Hottman's file at this hearing, but—
13

"A: I did.
"Q: —you did not stop and tell the court, 'I don't want to go forward with this hearing'?
"A: I did not.
"Q: You didn't stop and tell your attorney that you wanted to stop this hearing?
"A: I did not."

In denying the motion to withdraw plea, the district court stated on the record:

"I will render my decision in the framework of the Edgar factors. Specifically the
first one was, was the defendant represented by competent counsel. The answer is yes.
There is no indication in the evidence presented that Mr. Hottman is not competent
counsel. It appears to me after listening to the testimony that he was competent in all
phases. He did review discovery with Ms. Tisdale, although not according to her—or not
to her satisfaction. However, I would note she did underestimate the number of meetings
that she had with Mr. Hottman. She testified to three. Mr. Hottman testified to five and he
gave us specific dates. At least one of which, but actually probably more than one, but I
think he said the June 8th meeting he went through discovery with her in detail. He did
summarize it to her. And said that he discussed it in, perhaps, less detail at the other two
meetings after he received it. I don't find anything in these—in the testimony that would
allow the Court to reach the conclusion that Mr. Hottman was incompetent." (Emphases
added.)

After witnessing both Tisdale and her attorney on the witness stand, the district
court believed that she had been provided with summaries of all of the relevant discovery
information. The State also correctly points out that Tisdale fails to provide legal
authority indicating that counsel must provide actual copies of all discovery to a client
prior to entering a plea. Issues not adequately briefed are deemed waived or abandoned.
State v. Arnett, 307 Kan. 648, 650, 413 P.3d 787 (2018).

It is unclear from a review of the record what documents Tisdale allegedly saw in
her attorney's possession. She simply testified that she saw "some papers" and that these
papers listed the Kohl's address and the number of participants in the theft. On appeal,
14

Tisdale does not provide any additional information to help us in understanding what
documents she alleges should have been provided to her by her attorney. Thus, we have
no reason to conclude that her attorney was incompetent.

Likewise, we do not find from a review of the record that Tisdale was misled,
coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of in entering the plea agreement. At the
plea hearing, the district court questioned Tisdale at length regarding her plea.
Specifically, Tisdale advised the district court that (1) she had discussed the charges and
plea with her attorney; (2) that she was satisfied with her attorney's representation; (3)
she voluntarily agreed to sign the acknowledgement of rights and entry of plea; (4) that
her attorney answered all of her questions; and (5) no one had promised her anything
other than what was contained in the written plea agreement.

At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, Tisdale acknowledged that her
attorney had provided the plea agreement to her, that he had read it aloud to her, that she
followed along with him as he read, and that the only questions she had were about the
amount of restitution. Furthermore, during cross-examination, Tisdale admitted that no
promises were made regarding work release. In particular, the following exchange
occurred:

"Q. Okay. And I think you told Ms. Barnett he said, 'I don't see the judge not authorizing
work release'?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Is that an accurate recollection of what you said just a few minutes ago?
"A. Yes. What are you asking me?
"Q. Did [Hottman]—he said, 'I don't see the judge not authorizing work release'?
"A. You're asking me if he said that?
"Q. That's what you told Ms. Barnett—
"A. Yes.
"Q. —just a minute ago?
"A. Okay.
15

"Q. Is that what he said to you?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Did he say, 'I promise you're going to get work release'?
. . . .
"A. No, he never promised me anything." (Emphasis added.)

Similarly, Tisdale's attorney denied that he ever guaranteed or promised that she
would be placed on work release. Specifically, he testified:

"Q. At any point did you ever promise Ms. Tisdale that she would be placed in work
release?
"A. No.
"Q. At any point did you promise her that if she took a plea she would be placed in work
release?
"A. No.
. . . .
"Q. What specifically was your advisory to her?
"A. Word for word, I don't know. And generally I always tell them 'I'm not the judge, I
don't make the decision.' And I always give them my opinion on the likelihood or
success—or how successful a bond modification request might be based on factors. And
with Ms. Tisdale, we discussed it was a good thing that she was already work release
authorized in the other case, that might help her get work release in this case. But I never
guaranteed it." (Emphasis added.)

Ultimately, the district court determined:

"I cannot find that [Tisdale] was misled by [her attorney] with regard to any
issue. Specifically with regard to work release. I find [her attorney] credible. He has
stated in detail what has happened here.
"I cannot find the defendant credible with regard to the alleged exchange of a
plea for work release. It simply—I can't believe that occurred based on the testimony
that's been given here. [Tisdale's attorney] was very clear that there were no promises
made with regard to work release or anything else outside the plea agreement."
16

Finally, we conclude from our review of the record that Tisdale fairly and
understandingly entered into the plea agreement. At the hearing on the motion to
withdraw plea, Tisdale's attorney testified that he discussed with her the nature of the
charges and the allegations in support of the charges. Although the attorney candidly
stated that he did not recall if they talked about the specific address of the Kohl's store, he
testified that he did discuss "the specific allegations in the affidavit [of probable cause]
and the police reports" with his client.

We note that the affidavit of probable cause includes the following:

"This incident involves Elizabeth L. Tisdale. Affiant, after the investigation states:
"On April 24, 2017 at approximately 1250 hours, D.T. was working as a cashier
at Kohl's, 6900 W. Kellogg, when four black females came to her register. . . .
"N.S. was employed as a loss prevention officer for Kohl's, 6900 W[.] Kellogg,
when she reported for work at approximately 1400 hours on April 24, 2017." (Emphases
added.)

After hearing the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to withdraw
plea, the district court concluded:

"Finally was—the third factor was the plea fairly, understandingly made. The
answer is yes. The plea is actually written down. The acknowledgment is actually written
down. They were both read and signed by Ms. Tisdale. In addition, she acknowledged
that she read, understood, and signed them during the hearing.
"I cannot find anything that this Court believes was unfair to this process. It
appears that she made this plea in an understanding manner . . . .
"In addition, this Court must find that the words in the plea hearing have
meaning. And that when Ms. Tisdale states that she has read and understood these
documents, . . . that the Court must take you at your word. You were given counsel, you
had an opportunity to speak to that counsel, [and] you had an opportunity to either agree
or disagree at the hearing. And if for some reason you did not agree, you needed to say
so."
17

We, therefore, conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Tisdale's motion to withdraw plea. Accordingly, we affirm her conviction.
However, for the reasons set forth above, we vacate the order requiring Tisdale to pay
BIDS attorney fees and remand that issue to the district court for rehearing.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part.