State v. Tindle

1

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 113,980
No. 113,981
No. 113,982

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

MEAGEN TINDLE,
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; HAROLD E. FLAIGLE, judge. Opinion filed September 2,
2016. Affirmed.

Caroline M. Zuschek, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Lance J. Gillett, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before MALONE, C.J., HILL and ATCHESON, JJ.

Per Curiam: Defendant Meagen Tindle appeals the decision of the Sedgwick
County District Court revoking her probation in four cases and ordering her to serve the
underlying prison sentences. She contends the district court abused its discretion in that
ruling. Given Tindle's ongoing abuse of drugs and criminal behavior, we cannot agree
and, therefore, affirm the district court.

2

This chapter in Tindle's life began in 2011 when she was charged with and later
convicted of felony drug possession. While she was on bond in that case, she was
charged with and convicted of aggravated assault and theft, crimes often associated with
obtaining money to buy illegal drugs. Tindle was placed on probation in those cases and
monitored through Sedgwick County's drug court program. We need not catalogue the
details of Tindle's difficult journey down that path aimed at rehabilitating criminals
whose unlawful behavior appears to be tied to their addiction. Tindle repeatedly violated
the terms of her probation by testing positive for controlled substances, missing drug
tests, and failing to complete treatment programs and community service obligations.
Along the way, Tindle also picked up additional criminal convictions. The district court
revoked and reinstated Tindle's probation and imposed escalating intermediate jail
sanctions, as outlined in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3716(c).

In March 2015, Tindle was alleged to have violated her probation by attempting to
circumvent a drug test and by admitting to abusing both illegal and prescription drugs.
During a hearing in district court, Tindle did not dispute the allegations. The district court
again revoked her probation and outlined her repeated failures over several years in
trying to remain free of illegal drugs and related crimes. The district court concluded
Tindle would no longer benefit from probation and might be better able to deal with her
addiction in a highly restrictive prison setting. The district court ordered Tindle to serve
modified sentences in her four open criminal cases, resulting in a controlling 49-month
term of imprisonment. Tindle has appealed.

Tindle acknowledges the district court followed the statutory requirements for
imposing intermediate sanctions on probationers before requiring them to serve prison
sentences. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3716(c). She submits the district court's decision to
send her to prison was so singularly harsh as to be an abuse of judicial discretion.

3

Probation is an act of judicial leniency afforded a defendant as a privilege rather
than a right. See State v. Gary, 282 Kan. 232, 237, 144 P.3d 634 (2006). A district court's
decision to revoke probation usually involves two steps: (1) a factual determination that
the probationer has violated a condition of probation; and (2) a discretionary
determination as to the appropriate disposition in light of the proved violations. State v.
Skolaut, 286 Kan. 219, Syl. ¶ 4, 182 P.3d 1231 (2008).

A defendant's stipulation to the alleged violations satisfies the first step. Here,
Tindle so stipulated, obviating the State's duty to prove the violations by a preponderance
of the evidence. See State v. Gumfory, 281 Kan. 1168, 1170, 135 P.3d 1191 (2006); State
v. Inkelaar, 38 Kan. App. 2d 312, 315, 164 P.3d 844 (2007), rev. denied 286 Kan. 1183
(2008). After a violation has been established, the decision to revoke probation and then
to reinstate the probationer with some sanction or to send the revoked probationer to
prison rests within the district court's sound discretion. See Skolaut, 286 Kan. at 227-28.
Judicial discretion has been abused if the district court's decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or
unreasonable or rests on a substantive error of law or a material mistake of fact. State v.
Cameron, 300 Kan. 384, 391, 329 P.3d 1158, cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 728 (2014). Tindle
carries the burden of showing that the district court abused its discretion. See State v.
Stafford, 296 Kan. 25, 45, 290 P.3d 562 (2012).

Tindle does not suggest the district court misapplied the governing law or mistook
the relevant facts. Rather, as we have said, she contends the decision to send her to prison
was so extreme that no reasonable judicial officer would come to that conclusion under
the circumstances. We disagree.

As we have indicated, the district court afforded Tindle repeated opportunities to
succeed on probation despite her chronic transgressions. Over several years, Tindle could
not refrain from abusing drugs for extended periods, failed to comply with treatment
regimens and other probation conditions, and continued to engage in criminal behavior.
4

Faced with Tindle's inability to succeed in a comparatively structured probation setting
coupled with the imposition of substantial intermediate sanctions, the district court fairly
concluded a prison environment might provide a sharper spur for rehabilitation.

Under these circumstances, we conclude the decision to revoke Tindle's probation
easily rested within the discretionary authority afforded the district court and comported
with what many other district courts would do in like cases. There was no abuse of
discretion.

Affirmed.