State v. Sutton

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 114,646

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

BRYANT SUTTON,
Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Reno District Court; TIMOTHY J. CHAMBERS, judge. Opinion filed June 24, 2016.
Affirmed.

Joanna Labastida, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Keith E. Schroeder, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before GREEN, P.J., MCANANY and ATCHESON, JJ.

Per Curiam: Bryant Sutton appeals the imposition of lifetime postrelease
supervision following his no-contest plea to two counts of aggravated indecent
solicitation of a child. He contends that imposing lifetime postrelease supervision violates
the United States and Kansas constitutional prohibitions against cruel and/or unusual
punishment.

In 2007, Sutton was charged with aggravated indecent liberties with a child,
attempted rape, and aggravated indecent solicitation of a child. Pursuant to a plea
agreement, the charges were reduced and Sutton entered a no-contest plea to two counts
of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child.
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At Sutton's plea hearing, the State presented the affidavit of the investigating
police officer as factual support for Sutton's crimes. According to the officer's affidavit,
Sutton, age 18, fondled his 6-year-old cousin. He pulled the child into a car and told her
to touch his penis and "'do things like big people do.'" The child told Sutton that she did
not want to play this game, but Sutton put his hand down her pants and would not let her
go. This conduct occurred more than once. She also reported that on many occasions,
both in his car and in his room, Sutton had sexual intercourse with her and ejaculated in
the process. The district court accepted Sutton's pleas and sentenced him to a controlling
term of 89 months in prison, with 24 months of postrelease supervision.

Eight years later, in 2015, the State moved to correct Sutton's sentence, claiming
that it was illegal because the district court was required to impose lifetime postrelease
supervision and failed to do so. Sutton argued that under the factors to be considered in
State v. Freeman, 223 Kan. 362, 574 P.2d 950 (1978), imposing lifetime postrelease
supervision constitutes unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment. He asked the
district court to consider his youth, mental illness, and a claim that the victim had
suffered no physical injury. He also asked the court to compare the punishment imposed
in this case to far more serious offenses and to crimes in other jurisdictions.

Applying the Freeman factors, the district court granted the State's motion and
imposed lifetime postrelease supervision. In doing so, the court found that (1) Sutton
received a very favorable plea agreement considering the facts supporting the charges and
the potential for a Jessica's Law lifetime sentence; (2) his victim was a young child; (3)
Sutton was in a position of trust; (4) the crime was a violent sexual offense; (5) since his
original sentencing Sutton had been on parole but violated parole and was returned to
prison at Larned; (6) Sutton had 25 disciplinary reports while in prison, including reports
of possession of sexually explicit materials and four reports in the past 2 months, all of
which indicated that Sutton was not taking the matter seriously; (7) Sutton posed a risk to
society; (8) lifetime supervision served a valid penological purpose; (9) lifetime
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postrelease supervision under these circumstances does not shock the court's conscience,
and (10) the fact that "as I understand the statute [this matter] can be reviewed after 10
years if, in fact, you can go 10 years by living by the rules everyone else does."

Discussion

On appeal, Sutton contends that lifetime postrelease supervision is grossly
disproportionate in his case and therefore cruel and unusual punishment in violation of §
9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights and the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3717(d)(1)(G) requires lifetime postrelease supervision for
persons convicted of sexually violent crimes. Whether K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-
3717(d)(1)(G) is constitutional is a question of law over which we have unlimited review.
State v. Hilt, 299 Kan. 176, 202, 322 P.3d 367 (2014).

We begin by presuming the statute is constitutional and resolve all doubts in favor
of constitutionality. State v. Toahty-Harvey, 297 Kan. 101, 106, 298 P.3d 338 (2013).
When "deciding whether a sentence is cruel and unusual under § 9 of the Kansas
Constitution Bill of Rights, a district court must make both legal and factual
determinations. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Mossman, 294 Kan. 901, 906, 281 P.3d 153
(2012). In our review, we do not reweigh the evidence but consider whether there is
sufficient evidentiary support for the district court's factual findings. We review de novo
the district court's legal conclusions drawn from those facts. 294 Kan. at 906.

Section 9 Analysis—State Constitutional Claim

Section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights prohibits cruel or unusual
punishment. A punishment may be impermissibly cruel or unusual "'if it is so
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disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and
offends fundamental notions of human dignity.'" State v. Spear, 297 Kan. 780, 799, 304
P.3d 1246 (2013) (quoting State v. Gomez, 290 Kan. 858, Syl. ¶ 9, 235 P.3d 1203
[2010]).

Kansas courts analyze challenges under § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of
Rights by using the three-factor analysis provided in Freeman to determine whether a
sentence for lifetime postrelease supervision is a cruel or unusual punishment. See State
v. Ochs, 297 Kan. 1094, 1107, 306 P.3d 294 (2013). The process involves examining the
following Freeman factors:

"(1) The nature of the offense and the character of the offender should be
examined with particular regard to the degree of danger present to society; relevant to this
inquiry are the facts of the crime, the violent or nonviolent nature of the offense, the
extent of culpability for the injury resulting, and the penological purposes of the
prescribed punishment;
"(2) A comparison of the punishment with punishments imposed in this
jurisdiction for more serious offenses, and if among them are found more serious crimes
punished less severely than the offense in question the challenged penalty is to that extent
suspect; and
"(3) A comparison of the penalty with punishments in other jurisdictions for the
same offense." Freeman, 223 Kan. at 367.

Accord State v. Levy, 292 Kan. 379, 384-85, 253 P.3d 341 (2011); Gomez, 290 Kan. at
867; State v. Reyna, 290 Kan. 666, 689, 234 P.3d 761, cert. denied 562 U.S. 1014 (2010).

None of the Freeman factors is controlling. State v. Woodard, 294 Kan. 717, 723,
280 P.3d 203 (2012). Ultimately, one factor may bear so much weight that it directs the
conclusion, but all three factors should be considered by the court. State v. Ortega-
Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, 161, 194 P.3d 1195 (2008). The first Freeman factor is not a
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threshold determination. Rather, we should take a "holistic approach" in applying the
factors. State v. Seward, 296 Kan. 979, 985, 297 P.3d 272 (2013).

First Freeman Factor

We noted the district court's findings earlier. Findings (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7)
and (8) relate to the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Sutton does
not contend the district court's findings were not supported by substantial evidence. But
he contends that the district court erred in finding (4) that the crime was violent because
he did not use a weapon to commit the crimes and because he did not kidnap the victim.
He disregards the fact that the legislature has characterized his crime as a sexually violent
crime. Under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3717(d)(5)(G), aggravated indecent solicitation of a
child, Sutton's crime of conviction, is a sexually violent crime. Further, while he was not
charged with kidnapping, the victim reported that while committing the crimes Sutton
"would not let her go." We are not persuaded by this challenge to the district court's
findings.

Sutton also complains that the district court did not seem to consider his young age
of 18 years, "perhaps making [him] less culpable for his crime." But the court specifically
stated:

"I understand you are young. I understand that's a fact the court can consider. But the
fact remains you molested a 6-year-old cousin and I have a duty to protect the safety of
society and I see nothing in your record to this point and nothing in the facts of the
crime that shock the conscience that you would have a . . . lifetime postrelease."

Sutton also argues that he will be in custody for the remainder of his life and
subjected to many restrictions on his liberties, such as not being allowed to travel or drink
beer without his parole officer's permission and being forced to pay supervision fees as
directed by his parole officer. While Sutton focuses on the restrictions that will be placed
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on him during his lifetime postrelease supervision, he fails to recognize the legitimate
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation aspects of his supervision. The Supreme
Court noted the deterrent effect of postrelease supervision on future crimes "'by keeping
them under the watchful eye of probation officers who may be able to detect problems
before they result in irreparable harm to innocent children.'" Mossman, 294 Kan. at 911
(quoting United States v. Williams, 636 F.3d 1229, 1234 [9th Cir.], cert. denied 132 S. Ct.
188 [2011]); see Toahty-Harvey, 297 Kan. at 107-09.

In Mossman, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the imposition of lifetime
postrelease supervision for a 25-year-old defendant who had a consensual sexual
relationship with a 15-year-old girl. The Supreme Court noted that the crime was one that
had been deemed a violent sexual offense, regardless of its consensual nature, and the
State had an overriding interest in protecting children from such crimes. Even though the
defendant had no criminal history, had a low risk of recidivism, had accepted
responsibility and shown remorse, the district court's findings under the first factor
weighed in favor of finding the imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision to be
constitutional. The Kansas Supreme Court stated:

"The judge's conclusion regarding the seriousness of the crime is consistent with
statements made by other courts that have rejected the argument that a lengthy sentence
for a sex crime against a minor is cruel and unusual punishment. These courts recognize
that sex offenses against minors are 'considered particularly heinous crimes.' People v.
Dash, 104 P.3d 286, 293 (Colo. App. 2004). Further, it is generally recognized that
society has a penological interest in punishing those who commit sex offenses against
minors because they 'present a special problem and danger to society' and their actions
produce "'particularly devastating effects'" on victims, including physical and
psychological harm. State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618, 626 (Iowa 2008) (quoting In re
Morrow, 616 N.W.2d 544 [Iowa 2000]). The State's vital interest in protecting minors
from sex activities explains the legislative decision to treat sex crimes against minors as a
forcible or violent felony even if no physical force is involved. Wade, 757 N.W.2d at 626.
Additionally, there are 'grave concerns over the high rate of recidivism among convicted
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sex offenders and their dangerousness as a class. The risk of recidivism posed by sex
offenders is "frightening and high."' Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 155
L. Ed. 2d 164 (2003) (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 153 L.
Ed. 2d 47 [2002]); see Wade, 757 N.W.2d at 626. These views are consistent with the
Kansas Legislature's decision to treat sex crimes against minors, including the crime
committed by Mossman, as 'sexually violent' and deserving of lifetime postrelease
supervision." Mossman, 294 Kan. at 909-10.

As mitigating factors Sutton cites (1) his youth, (2) no use of a weapon, (3) his
conviction was only for solicitation of a sex act, and (4) this was his first conviction of a
sex crime. We have already addressed items (1) and (2). With respect to item (3), Sutton
would have the district court disregard the unchallenged facts at his sentencing regarding
the nature of his conduct. With respect to item (4), while this may have been Sutton's first
conviction, there certainly was evidence of his ongoing inability to conform his conduct
to legitimate authority. Further, the evidence at sentencing did not disclose an isolated
incident but rather a pattern of ongoing sex abuse.

There are fewer mitigating factors in Sutton's case than in either Mossman or
Toahty-Harvey. His victim was much younger than the victims in Mossman and Toahty-
Harvey. There is no evidence that Sutton had a low IQ or a low risk of recidivism.

Based on the foregoing, we find no error in the district court's factual findings or
legal conclusion on the first Freeman factor.

Second Freeman Factor

Under the second Freeman factor, the court must compare the punishment in this
case with punishments imposed in Kansas for more serious offenses. Sutton was
convicted of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child, but the district court found that
the facts in the case supported the original charges, including the crime of aggravated
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indecent liberties with a child, a Jessica's Law crime. The district court found that Sutton
received the benefits of a lesser prison sentence by accepting a plea to the amended
charges.

Sutton offers a number of examples of more serious crimes that have shorter
periods of postrelease supervision, such as second-degree murder, voluntary
manslaughter, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated human trafficking, electronic
solicitation of a child, and terrorism and illegal use of weapons of mass destruction. But
our Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected this argument. See State v. Funk, 301 Kan.
925, 941-42, 349 P.3d 1230 (2015); Toahty-Harvey, 297 Kan. at 109; State v. Cameron,
294 Kan. 884, 892-93, 281 P.3d 143 (2012). Instead, our Supreme Court looks to the total
length of the sentence, including actual incarceration, rather than merely the length of
postrelease supervision. See Mossman, 294 Kan. at 912-13; Cameron, 294 Kan. at 892-
93.

We do not find under the second Freeman factor that the imposition of lifetime
postrelease supervision is grossly disproportionate to the sentences imposed for other
more serious offenses in Kansas.

Third Freeman Factor

Under the third Freeman factor we compare Sutton's punishment with
punishments imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense. In Mossman and
Cameron our Supreme Court concluded that after comparing Kansas law with the laws of
other jurisdictions, the imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision is not cruel or
unusual punishment. Mossman, 294 Kan. at 919-20; Cameron, 294 Kan. at 894-95.
Sutton has presented no argument that the laws of other jurisdictions have significantly
changed since Mossman and Cameron. We are bound to follow our Supreme Court's
holding on this point as expressed in Mossman and Cameron absent some indication it is
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changing its position. We see no such indication. Later Supreme Court decisions have not
deviated from this holding. See Funk, 301 Kan. at 942 (attempted indecent solicitation of
a child); Toahty-Harvey, 297 Kan. at 109 (aggravated indecent liberties with a child).
Sutton's sentence is not grossly disproportionate to sentences for similar crimes in other
jurisdictions.

Considering all three Freeman factors, the imposition of lifetime postrelease
supervision does not violate § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.

Eighth Amendment Analysis—Federal Constitutional Claim

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment has been made applicable to the states
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 667, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1962).

There are two types of Eighth Amendment challenges that can be made: (1) case
specific proportionality challenges; and (2) categorical proportionality challenges. See
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010);
Mossman, 294 Kan. at 921-22. Claims in the first classification are inherently fact-
specific, and "'[a]ppellate courts do not make factual findings but review those made by
district courts.'" Gomez, 290 Kan. at 864 (quoting State v. Thomas, 288 Kan. 157, 161,
199 P.3d 1265 [2009]). Sutton raises challenges under both.

Case-Specific Analysis

Sutton concedes that a case-specific analysis is virtually identical to an analysis
under § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. "The Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clauses of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 9 of the Kansas
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Constitution Bill of Rights are nearly identical and are to be construed similarly." State v.
Scott, 265 Kan. 1, Syl. ¶ 1, 961 P.2d 667 (1998).

To determine whether a term-of-years sentence is grossly disproportionate for a
particular defendant's crime,

"[a] court must begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the
sentence. [Citation omitted.] '[I]n the rare case in which [this] threshold comparison . . .
leads to an inference of gross disproportionality' the court should then compare the
defendant's sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same
jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.
[Citation omitted.] If this comparative analysis 'validate[s] an initial judgment that [the]
sentence is grossly disproportionate,' the sentence is cruel and unusual. [Citation
omitted.]" Graham, 560 U.S. at 60 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005,
111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 [1991]).

Analysis of a § 9 challenge under the Freeman factors applies with equal force to a case-
specific Eighth Amendment challenge. State v. Ross, 295 Kan. 424, 429, 284 P.3d 309
(2012).

The Eighth Amendment forbids extreme sentences that are grossly
disproportionate to the crime. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 22, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 155
L. Ed. 2d 108 (2003). To demonstrate the rarity of a finding of gross disproportionality,
one need only look to United States Supreme Court cases upholding life sentences for
nonviolent property crimes. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70, 77, 123 S. Ct.
1166, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003) (sentence of two consecutive prison terms of 25 years-to-
life for third-strike conviction for stealing approximately $150 in videotapes); Ewing, 538
U.S. at 28-31 (25 years-to-life sentence under three-strike provision for stealing
approximately $1,200 of merchandise); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961, 994-96 (life sentence
without possibility of parole for first felony offense, which was possession of more than
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650 grams of cocaine); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 266, 284-85, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 63
L. Ed. 2d 382 (1980) (life sentence with possibility of parole, imposed under a Texas
recidivist statute, for a defendant convicted of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses [his
third felony conviction], an offense normally punishable by imprisonment for 2 to 10
years); but see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296-97, 303, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d
637 (1983) (life sentence without possibility of parole imposed on adult offender was
"significantly disproportionate" to the defendant's crime, which was predicated on a
current offense of "uttering a 'no account' check" for $100 and the defendant's lengthy
criminal history that included six nonviolent felonies).

The United States Supreme Court has upheld life sentences for a wide range of
crimes less serious than Sutton's crimes. Sutton's crimes are crimes that the legislature
views as especially serious, categorizing them as violent crimes even when no force is
used.

We cannot ignore the uncontested facts that led to Sutton's convictions. Sutton's
victim was a child of tender age and her much older cousin was in a position of trust.
Sutton restrained the child when she did not want to participate in these crimes. There
was evidence that he repeatedly engaged in sexual intercourse with the child. Considering
the specific facts of this case, we find no error in the district court's conclusion that
Sutton's lifetime postrelease supervision does not violate the Eighth Amendment.

Categorical Analysis

Sutton also argues that lifetime postrelease supervision is a categorically
disproportionate punishment when imposed upon individuals convicted of aggravated
indecent solicitation of a child. We review this categorical challenge to Sutton's sentence
de novo. Mossman, 294 Kan. at 925.

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Under the categorical challenge, we limit our consideration to the elements of the
crime of conviction, not the underlying facts. Here, Sutton was convicted of aggravated
indecent solicitation of a child, which consists of "inviting, persuading or attempting to
persuade a child under the age of 14 years to enter any vehicle, building, room or
secluded place with intent to commit an unlawful sexual act upon or with the child."
K.S.A. 21-3511(b).

We employ a two-prong test to evaluate a categorical proportionality challenge to
a sentence:

"The Court first considers 'objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in
legislative enactments and state practice' to determine whether there is a national
consensus against the sentencing practice at issue [Citation omitted.] Next, guided by 'the
standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court's own understanding and
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's text, history, meaning and purpose' [citation
omitted], the Court must determine in the exercise of its own independent judgment
whether the punishment in question violates the Constitution. [Citation omitted.]"
Graham, 560 U.S. at 61.

See Gomez, 290 Kan. at 861 (recognizing the Graham categorical proportionality
challenge).

Under this test, we must determine whether the challenged sentencing scheme
serves legitimate penological goals. Retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation are legitimate penological interests. Graham, 560 U.S. at 71. In order to
successfully challenge a sentence under this test, a defendant must show that based on the
characteristics of the class of offenders and the nature of the offense, the sentencing
practice is disproportionate with the offender's culpability. State v. Williams, 298 Kan.
1075, 1087-88, 319 P.3d 528 (2014).

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Sutton argues there is a national consensus against lifetime postrelease supervision
for individuals with whom he is similarly situated. Only seven states allow lifetime
postrelease supervision for this class of offenses. But our Supreme Court has turned to
United States v. Williams, 636 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 188 (2011),
for guidance when considering categorical challenges to sentences for sex offenses. See
Mossman, 294 Kan. at 929-30; Cameron, 294 Kan. at 897-98. In United States v.
Williams, the court concluded that "objective indicia" suggest society is comfortable with
the common practice of imposing lifetime supervised release for sex offenders. 636 F.3d
at 1233-34.

In State v. Reed, 51 Kan. App. 2d 107, Syl. ¶ 6, 341 P.3d 616 (2015), rev. denied
304 Kan. ___ (2016), a panel of this court rejected the defendant's categorical challenge
to his sentence for attempted aggravated indecent liberties, finding that "[t]he 'attempt'
nature of the conviction does not remove it from the general category of sexually violent
crimes subject to lifetime postrelease supervision." The Reed court rejected the argument
that there is a national consensus against lifetime postrelease supervision, finding instead
that it is "'a widespread phenomenon.'" 51 Kan. App. 2d at 113 (quoting State v. Barrera,
No. 104,667, 2013 WL 517581, at *9-10 [Kan. App.] [unpublished opinion], rev. denied
297 Kan. 1248 [2013]); see State v. Hindman, No. 110,261, 2014 WL 5312925, at *6-7
(Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion) (attempted indecent liberties with a child subject
to lifetime postrelease supervision), rev. denied 302 Kan. ___ (2015). The defendant in
Reed was convicted of an attempted sex crime, i.e., committing "an overt act toward the
perpetration of a crime [with the intent] to commit such crime but [failing] in the
perpetration thereof." K.S.A. 21-3301. Sutton, on the other hand, was convicted of
completed sex crimes. Further, in State v. Russell, No. 107,588, 2013 WL 3867180, at
*4-6 (Kan. App. 2013) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 299 Kan. 1273 (2014), a panel
of our court determined that attempted aggravated indecent solicitation of a child is
subject to lifetime postrelease supervision. Here, Sutton was convicted of aggravated
indecent solicitation of a child, an even more serious offense.
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Because Kansas considers aggravated indecent solicitation of a child to be a
sexually violent offense, we find that Sutton's crime of conviction falls within the
classification of crimes for which Kansas courts find it permissible to impose lifetime
postrelease supervision. We are duty bound to follow Kansas Supreme Court precedent
regarding the imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision following convictions of
sexually violent crimes. State v. Capps, No. 107,361, 2013 WL 1444501, at *2 (Kan.
App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 297 Kan. 1249 (2013).

In the second step of a categorical analysis, we are asked to exercise independent
judgment to determine whether a sentence is unconstitutional. Sutton argues that the
crime of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child does not justify lifetime postrelease
supervision because it does not serve the legitimate penological goals of retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.

Our Kansas Supreme Court has looked to the 9th Circuit for guidance on whether
lifetime postrelease supervision serves the legitimate penological goals of retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation for the second part of this analysis. See
Williams, 298 Kan. at 1089; Mossman, 294 Kan. at 930; Cameron, 294 Kan. at 898. In
United States v. Williams, the 9th Circuit court found:

"Rehabilitation and incapacitation are central purposes of the criminal justice system, and
they are particularly critical here given the propensity of sex offenders to strike again.
Supervised release can further the end of rehabilitating sex offenders. For instance, in this
case, the express conditions of supervised release will require [the defendant] to receive
sex offender treatment and to avoid situations where he may be tempted to offend again.
Relatedly, supervised release helps incapacitate sex offenders by keeping them under the
watchful eye of probation officers who may be able to detect problems before they result
in irreparable harm to innocent children." 636 F.3d at 1234.

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Because our Supreme Court has followed this reasoning and found that lifetime
postrelease supervision serves the valid penological objectives of deterring such conduct
and in incapacitating and rehabilitating the offender, we conclude that lifetime
postrelease supervision for aggravated indecent solicitation of a child is not categorically
disproportionate and does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.

Affirmed.