State v. Stufflebean

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 112,873

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellant,

v.

ANDY L. STUFFLEBEAN,
Appellee.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Jefferson District Court; GARY L. NAFZIGER, judge. Opinion filed October 30, 2015.
Affirmed.

Bethany J. Graves, assistant county attorney, Jason W. Belveal, county attorney, and Derek
Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant.

Before MALONE, C.J., GREEN and POWELL, JJ.

Per Curiam: A magistrate judge in the District Court of Jefferson County
dismissed with prejudice a traffic citation against Andy L. Stufflebean because the State's
witness and issuing officer, Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper Jacob Moomau, failed to
appear for the bench trial in response to a subpoena. The State appealed to the district
court which affirmed. The State now appeals to this court, arguing the magistrate judge
erred in dismissing the charge against Stufflebean with prejudice. Because we find the
district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice, we affirm.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Moomau issued Stufflebean a citation for following too closely in violation of
K.S.A. 8-1523(a). At the first appearance before a magistrate judge of the Jefferson
County District Court on August 25, 2014, Stufflebean personally appeared, pled not
guilty, and requested a bench trial.

On September 16, 2014, Stufflebean appeared pro se at the bench trial, but the
State's witness—Moomau—failed to appear. The State requested a continuance, which
the magistrate judge denied after Stufflebean objected. Due to Moomau's absence, the
State moved to dismiss the action against Stufflebean without prejudice. At the time the
State made its motion, it was unsure whether the subpoena to appear had been served on
Moomau. The magistrate judge, apparently assuming that Moomau may not have been
served with the subpoena, granted the State's motion to dismiss without prejudice.
However, after the dismissal was granted, it appears the magistrate judge learned that
Moomau had been served with the subpoena and changed the order to a dismissal with
prejudice. The record on appeal lacks a transcript of this hearing. The only
documentation of the bench trial and resulting dismissal in the record is the magistrate
judge's order to dismiss.

The State filed a notice of appeal on September 16, 2014, and a motion to overturn
the magistrate judge's order based on legal error on September 24, 2014. On November
20, 2014, the case was reviewed by a district judge of the same judicial district, and
Stufflebean again personally appeared at the hearing. The State argued that dismissal
with prejudice was legally inappropriate because the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction
to change the original order. The district judge found it was in the best interest of justice
and economy that the case should be dismissed with prejudice.

The State timely appeals.
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The State argues the magistrate judge erred in dismissing the case with prejudice.
Specifically, the State asserts: (1) Stufflebean would have suffered no prejudice in being
required to appear for a second bench trial; (2) dismissing the case without prejudice
would have protected the interests of justice because the State would have had the
discretion to refile the charge against Stufflebean depending on Moomau's reason for
failing to attend the bench trial; and (3) the magistrate judge provided no record to
support the decision to dismiss with prejudice.

Another panel of this court recently set out the applicable standard of review when
a district court dismisses a criminal charge with prejudice:

"An appellate court reviews a district court's dismissal of criminal charges for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Boehmer, 41 Kan. App. 2d 598, 602, 203 P.3d 1274 (2009)
(citing State v. Clovis, 248 Kan. 313, 331, 807 P.2d 127 [1991]). A judicial action
constitutes an abuse of discretion if the action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable;
(2) is based on an error of law; or (3) is based on an error of fact. State v. Mosher, 299
Kan. 1, 3, 319 P.3d 1253 (2014). The party asserting that the district court abused its
discretion bears the burden of showing such abuse of discretion. State v. Rojas-
Marceleno, 295 Kan. 525, 531, 285 P.3d 361 (2012)." State v. Smith, No. 112,530, 2015
WL 4580440, at *4 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion).

Our Supreme Court has explained the circumstances under which a district court
properly dismisses a criminal complaint with prejudice in State v. Bolen, 270 Kan. 337,
342-43, 13 P.3d 1270 (2000):

"We have recognized that in a proper case, a trial court has the power to dismiss a
criminal complaint with prejudice if the interests of justice require such action. State v.
Crouch & Reeder, 230 Kan. 783, 788, 641 P.2d 394 (1982). However, such power should
be exercised with great caution and only in cases where no other remedy would protect
against abuse. 230 Kan. at 788. Dismissal with prejudice should be used only in extreme
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circumstances. State v. Winter, 238 Kan. 530, 534, 712 P.2d 1228 (1986). Dismissal of
charges oftentimes punishes the public rather than the prosecutor and creates a windfall
for the defendant. State v. Davis, 266 Kan. 638, 646, 972 P.2d 1099 (1999). Where there
has been no showing that the defendant suffered actual prejudice as a result of a
prosecutor's misconduct, and alternative means of sanctioning the prosecutor exist for the
violation, dismissal of pending charges with prejudice may constitute an abuse of
discretion by the trial court. 266 Kan. at 646."

Here, the record on appeal reflects that the magistrate judge dismissed the charge
against Stufflebean with prejudice because the trooper who issued the traffic citation
failed to attend the bench trial. While there is no transcript of the original bench trial in
the record, the district judge affirmed the magistrate judge's dismissal in part because
Stufflebean had driven over an hour each way to appear in the Jefferson County District
Court two previous times—once for the first appearance and once for the bench trial at
which Moomau was absent.

It was not unreasonable for the magistrate judge to find that requiring Stufflebean
to appear in court yet again was prejudicial to him, especially after he needlessly traveled
to Jefferson County at least one other time due to the trooper's failure to attend the bench
trial. It is also reasonable not to require a defendant to travel multiple times in order to
resolve a traffic infraction when the issuing officer failed to attend the bench trial with no
excuse. Also significantly, the magistrate judge's decision did not punish the public and it
did not create windfall for Stufflebean. The charge against Stufflebean was not for a
violent or especially dangerous offense, meaning he was not an appreciable danger to the
public. Stufflebean at most faced a fine if found guilty, meaning he did not gain a
substantial windfall through the dismissal when compared to other hypothetical
defendants facing prison sentences or large restitution obligations.

For the above reasons, we conclude the magistrate judge did not abuse his
discretion when he dismissed the State's case against Stufflebean with prejudice because
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it cannot be said that no reasonable judicial officer would have come to the same
conclusion. See Unruh v. Purina Mills, 289 Kan. 1185, 1202, 221 P.3d 1130 (2009) ("If
reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court,
then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.").

Affirmed.