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Status
Unpublished
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Release Date
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Court
Court of Appeals
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PDF
118767
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Nos. 118,767
118,962
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,
v.
BRADEN LANCE SCHMIDT,
Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from Douglas District Court; PEGGY C. KITTEL, judge. Opinion filed August 17, 2018.
Affirmed.
Submitted by the parties for summary disposition pursuant to K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6820(g) and
(h).
Before MALONE, P.J., LEBEN and POWELL, JJ.
PER CURIAM: Braden Lance Schmidt appeals the district court's decision to
revoke his probation and impose his underlying prison sentences in two cases. We
granted Schmidt's motion for summary disposition pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
7.041A (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 47). The State did not file a response. After a review of the
record, we affirm the district court.
In 16 CR 656, Schmidt pled no contest to burglary of a motor vehicle and
interference with law enforcement, both felonies. On August 26, 2016, he was sentenced
to 16 months in prison but was placed on probation from that sentence for 12 months.
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However, roughly a month later, Schmidt committed another burglary of a motor vehicle
and was charged with this crime in a new case, 16 CR 948. On March 10, 2017, Schmidt
pled no contest to this new offense, but despite having committed a new crime while on
probation and as part of a plea agreement with the State, the district court placed Schmidt
back on probation in 16 CR 656. Schmidt was sentenced in his new case, 16 CR 948, on
May 19, 2017, to 10 months in prison, to run consecutive to his sentence in 16 CR 656,
and placed on probation for 12 months.
On May 31, 2017, the State again alleged new probation violations, which were
subsequently amended to include allegations that on June 16, 2017, Schmidt had
committed new crimes which included theft, burglary of a motor vehicle, and interference
with law enforcement, all felonies, in 17 CR 657. On September 22, 2017, Schmidt pled
no contest in 17 CR 657 to felony theft. As a result of this conviction, Schmidt's
probation was revoked on November 3, 2017, in 16 CR 656 and 16 CR 948, and he was
ordered to serve his original prison sentences in those cases. Schmidt was also sentenced
to prison for 10 months in 17 CR 657.
On appeal, Schmidt argues that the district court erred in revoking his probation
and imposing his underlying prison sentences in 16 CR 656 and 16 CR 948. Once a
violation has been established, the decision to revoke probation is within the discretion of
the district court. See State v. Skolaut, 286 Kan. 219, 227-28, 182 P.3d 1231 (2008).
Judicial discretion is abused if the action "(1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e.,
if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is based
on an error of law . . . ; or (3) is based on an error of fact." State v. Jones, 306 Kan. 948,
Syl. ¶ 7, 398 P.3d 856 (2017). This discretion is limited by the intermediate sanctions as
outlined in K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716. Schmidt bears the burden to show an abuse of
discretion by the district court. State v. Rojas-Marceleno, 295 Kan. 525, 531, 285 P.3d
361 (2012).
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K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716 requires that the district court impose intermediate
sanctions before revoking an offender's probation. State v. Huckey, 51 Kan. App. 2d 451,
454, 348 P.3d 997, rev. denied 302 Kan. 1015 (2015). However, there are exceptions that
permit a district court to revoke probation without having previously imposed the
statutorily required intermediate sanctions. One of these exceptions allows the district
court to revoke probation if the offender commits a new crime while on probation. See
K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716(c)(8)(A).
Here, it is undisputed that the district court based its finding that Schmidt violated
the terms of his probation when he pled no contest to the new crime. Thus, the district
court was entitled to revoke his probation and impose his underlying prison sentences. As
Schmidt fails to persuade us that no reasonable person would have taken the view of the
district court, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.