State v. Mason

1

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 117,735

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

LAWRENCE MASON JR.,
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Shawnee District Court; RICHARD D. ANDERSON, judge. Opinion filed September
21, 2018. Affirmed.

Kai Tate Mann, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Jon S. Simpson, assistant solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before SCHROEDER, P.J., LEBEN, J., and BURGESS, S.J.

PER CURIAM: After sentencing, Lawrence Mason Jr. filed a motion to withdraw
his plea, asserting his trial counsel was ineffective on several grounds. The Shawnee
County District Court denied his motion after an evidentiary hearing. Mason now
appeals. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 28, 2008, the State charged Mason with one count of rape of a child
under the age of 14 while he was over the age of 18, contrary to K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-
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3502(a)(2), an off-grid person felony, and two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy
with a child under the age of 14 while he was over the age of 18, contrary to K.S.A. 2006
Supp. 21-3506(a)(1), an off-grid person felony. M.M. was the victim. State v. Mason, 294
Kan. 675, 279 P.3d 707 (2012).

Mason retained Steven Rosel as his counsel. In December 2012, Rosel voluntarily
surrendered his license to practice law in Kansas and was disbarred, apparently resulting
from his representation of a different client. See In re Rosel, 296 Kan. 97, 97-98, 290
P.3d 611 (2012). During his representation of Mason, Rosel had various meetings with
Mason and members of his family. Mason testified that he met with Rosel on at least
three occasions: one meeting about the preliminary hearing; one meeting about the plea
offer; and one meeting about sentencing. Rosel conducted at least one meeting with
members of Mason's family.

On June 4, 2009, the State sent Rosel a letter outlining an offered plea. The plea
offer provided that in exchange for Mason's guilty plea to rape and one count of
aggravated criminal sodomy, the State would recommend the mitigated grid sentence and
dismiss the second aggravated criminal sodomy charge.

Shortly after, Rosel obtained orders from the district court to secure independent
DNA testing of the State's evidence. Rosel did not receive the results of this testing until
just before a scheduled pretrial hearing on October 2, 2009.

On October 2, 2009, the day of a pretrial hearing, Mason and Rosel discussed the
State's plea offer. At the hearing, the parties expressed Mason's desire to accept the plea
offer. Mason provided every assurance that he understood his rights, the agreement's
terms, the State's evidence, and the consequences of pleading guilty. When he had
questions, Mason consulted Rosel and the district court before proceeding. Specifically,
Mason expressed satisfaction with Rosel's representation:
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"THE COURT: Now, I'm going to turn to questions about counsel. I want to
make sure that you have had adequate time and opportunity to speak with Mr. Rosel
about your decision to enter a plea, consider your overall legal circumstances. Have you
indeed had adequate time?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Have you carefully considered his advice?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I have.
"THE COURT: Has he in any way forced you to enter the plea?
"THE DEFENDANT: No, he hasn't.
"THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the work he has done on your behalf?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Do you have any complaints you wish to make known about the
way your attorney has treated you?
"THE DEFENDANT: No, not at the present.
"THE COURT: Not at the present?
"THE DEFENDANT: No, he's been pretty good.
"THE COURT: Okay.
"THE DEFENDANT: I have to be honest.
"THE COURT: Okay. I want to make sure that you've―
"THE DEFENDANT: What? Excuse me.
"THE COURT: So the two of you are exchanging, I guess, laughs now. I know
it's a very serious matter, but the point that I'm making sure that is covered is that you're
satisfied with the work he's done for you?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. He makes sure I understand.
"MR. ROSEL: I feel compelled to respond to the laughs comment with all due
respect, Judge.
"There have been incredible moments of stress, of trauma, of emotions between
my client and I and my client's family. And a little laugh is maybe a release, that's all I
would say about that.
"THE COURT: Okay.
"MR. ROSEL: Okay.
"THE COURT: I was not suggesting otherwise.
"MR. ROSEL: All right.
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"THE COURT: Mr. Mason, today I've asked you several questions. I know this
is a difficult decision to make. You've appeared to me to understand the questions I've
asked by the way you've responded. That you have responded in a way that leads me to
believe that you've understood. Have you indeed understood everything?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I have."

When testifying at his hearing on the motion to withdraw his plea, Mason could
not recall the words that were exchanged during the off-the-record discussion between
him and Rosel, but Mason did recall that their exchange received a strange look from the
district judge. However, Mason did agree that he was being honest when he told the
district court that Rosel had been "pretty good" to him, he had carefully considered
Rosel's advice before entering the plea, and Rosel never told Mason to lie to the court
during the plea hearing or told him that he could not ask questions at that hearing.

Before pleading guilty, Mason also agreed that the State could prove its proffered
evidence. That evidence showed that Mason forcibly inserted his penis into M.M.'s
vagina and anus. Apart from M.M.'s statements, "DNA testing done by the KBI linked
Mason to [M.M.'s] vaginal swab and rectal swab. Independent testing done on Mason's
behalf confirmed the rectal swab." 294 Kan. at 678-79. Further, "Mason admitted
committing these acts." 294 Kan. at 678. M.M. also presented at her sexual assault exam
with an abnormal tear to her perineum.

Ultimately, the district court found no reason not to accept Mason's admission that
he raped and sodomized M.M. as charged in Counts 1 and 2. The district court accepted
Mason's plea and later sentenced him to a life sentence of imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for 592 months. Mason appealed.

On July 6, 2012, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Mason's sentence. 294 Kan.
at 675, 679. The mandate was issued on July 30, 2012. On July 5, 2013, Mason filed a
timely postsentencing motion to withdraw his plea. In this motion, Mason alleged Rosel
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was ineffective because Rosel did not investigate allegations regarding M.M.'s
credibility, motive, past history of false allegations of sexual and other abuse, past threats
of false allegations, past sexual history, and specific facts that would explain the physical
DNA evidence of Mason on M.M. After the attorney who filed this motion withdrew,
Mason's new attorney filed an amended motion to withdraw his plea on November 14,
2014. This motion raised additional grounds for which Mason should be permitted to
withdraw his plea. In addition to the claim that Rosel conducted an inadequate
investigation, it alleged: (1) Rosel was ineffective for failing to apply for a Gregg
evaluation (an independent psychological evaluation of the victim if the defendant is able
to establish compelling reasons for such an examination, as permitted in State v. Gregg,
226 Kan. 481, 489, 602 P.2d 85 [1979]); (2) Rosel waived Mason's preliminary hearing;
(3) Rosel failed to file a motion to suppress evidence; (4) the motion for a downward
departure was ineffective on its face and was not supported by evidence; (5) Rosel
permitted Mason to enter his plea without being fully informed on factual matters in the
case; and (6) Rosel did not give Mason his case file after his representation ended.
Additionally, the motion argued that the plea advisory was not properly given and that
the district court should have been aware that the plea may have been defective because
Mason fainted after the pronouncement of his sentence.

The district court held a three-day evidentiary hearing beginning on August 31,
2015, on Mason's postsentencing motion to withdraw his plea. At this hearing, 15
witnesses testified, including M.M. and Mason. However, Rosel did not testify because
he was unable to be successfully subpoenaed. At the conclusion of this hearing, the
district court ordered the parties to submit briefs. After another change in representation,
Mason ultimately filed a brief on October 11, 2016, and the State filed its brief on
December 30, 2016.

On March 23, 2017, by written order, the district court denied Mason's motion.
The district court held that (1) Rosel was not ineffective for failing to investigate; (2)
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Mason was not misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3) the
plea was fairly and understandingly made.

Mason timely appeals the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his plea.
Additional facts will be introduced in the analysis as necessary.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING MASON'S
POSTSENTENCING MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA?

On appeal, Mason argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to withdraw his plea. Notably, Mason focuses his argument on appeal that the
district court erred in denying his motion on the grounds that Rosel allegedly failed to
conduct a sufficient investigation and that he did not request a Gregg evaluation.
Specifically, he makes three arguments in support of this assertion. First, he argues that
the district court applied the incorrect law to the amount of deference owed to his trial
counsel's performance. Second, he argues that the district court conditioned his relief on
Mason affirmatively proving his innocence; and third, he argues that the district court
ignored evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing.

"To correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment
of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea." K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-
3210(d)(2). Generally, an appellate court will not disturb a district court's denial of a
postsentence motion to withdraw plea absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Davisson,
303 Kan. 1062, 1064-65, 370 P.3d 423 (2016). Judicial discretion is abused if the action:
"(1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken
the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is based on an error of law . . . ; or (3) is based on
an error of fact." State v. Jones, 306 Kan. 948, Syl. ¶ 7, 398 P.3d 856 (2017).

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Kansas appellate courts review at least three factors, commonly known as Edgar
factors, after State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36, 127 P.3d 986 (2006), when considering
whether a defendant has demonstrated the requisite manifest injustice. These are: (1)
whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the defendant
was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3) whether the plea
was fairly and understandingly made. See State v. Green, 283 Kan. 531, 545-46, 153 P.3d
1216 (2007) (applying the Edgar factors to a postsentence plea withdrawal case); see also
State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 511, 231 P.3d 563 (2010) (collecting cases discussing the
Edgar factors).

"While the Edgar factors are 'viable benchmarks for judicial discretion,' we have
made clear they should not be relied on to the 'exclusion of other factors.' Aguilar, 290
Kan. at 512. See State v. Freeman, 292 Kan. 24, 28, 253 P.3d 1 (2011)." State v. Bricker,
292 Kan. 239, 244-45, 252 P.3d 118 (2011).

Of note, Mason does not argue on appeal that he was misled, coerced, mistreated,
or unfairly taken advantage of nor does he argue that the plea was unfairly or
unknowingly made. He only argues that he was not represented by competent counsel at
the time of his plea. Additionally, Mason does not argue that any factors outside of the
Edgar factors are applicable. Therefore, consideration of whether the district court
abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea is limited to the issue of
whether the district court erred in holding that Mason was represented by competent
counsel for his plea. See State v. Williams, 303 Kan. 750, 758, 368 P.3d 1065 (2016)
(holding an issue not briefed by appellant is deemed waived or abandoned).

"A defendant filing a postsentence motion to withdraw plea under K.S.A. 22-
3210(d) that alleges ineffective assistance of counsel due to deficient performance must
meet constitutional standards to demonstrate manifest injustice." Bricker, 292 Kan. at
245. Those constitutional standards are set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
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668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); see Bricker, 292 Kan. at 245-46.
Under the Strickland test, Mason must show that (1) Rosel's performance fell below the
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that but for
Rosel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different, meaning Mason
would not have entered a plea but would have insisted on going to trial. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687; State v. Kelly, 298 Kan. 965, 969-70, 318 P.3d 987 (2014); Bricker, 292
Kan. at 245-46. "A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome. [Citation omitted.]" 292 Kan. at 246.

Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance in a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is highly deferential and requires consideration of all the evidence before the
judge or jury. See Kelly, 298 Kan. at 970. The reviewing court must strongly presume
that counsel's conduct fell within the broad range of reasonable professional assistance.
298 Kan. at 970. Each of Mason's arguments is now within the purview of this legal
framework.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT GIVE IMPROPER DEFERENCE TO ROSEL'S CONDUCT?

First, Mason argues that the district court gave Rosel's performance improper
deference. Specifically, Mason argues that because Rosel was subsequently disbarred and
allegedly evaded service to testify in this case, his performance should not be given the
deference as enumerated in Pabst v. State, 287 Kan. 1, 192 P.2d 630 (2008).

In Pabst, the Kansas Supreme Court held:

"An important reason for requiring ineffective assistance of counsel claims to originate in
the district court is to allow the allegedly ineffective counsel an opportunity to explain his
or her reasoning and actions. In the absence of that testimony, our scrutiny is highly
deferential. There is a strong presumption when there is no contrary evidence that
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counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
[Citations omitted.]" 287 Kan. at 17.

This is the exact language that the district court quoted and utilized in its written
order denying Mason's motion along with other supporting authority. The district court
then reasoned that "since Mr. Rosel did not testify at the evidentiary hearing, the
presumption that his conduct was objectively reasonable is at its strongest and the judicial
scrutiny of his performance must be 'highly deferential.'"

The district court's statement of the law and deference given to Rosel's
performance is correct. In Kelly, 298 Kan. at 969-70, in the context of a postsentencing
motion to withdraw a plea, the Kansas Supreme Court reiterated the deference given to
counsel's conduct, holding: "During [the Strickland] analysis, there is a strong
presumption counsel 'rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in
the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.' [Citation omitted.]"; see also
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ("[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.").

In Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 179 L. Ed. 2d 557 (2011),
the United States Supreme Court addressed the effect this deference. In that case, Scott
Lynn Pinholster sought state and federal habeas corpus relief claiming he received
ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial's penalty phase because his attorneys
failed to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence. Pinholster did not
support this claim with testimony from his attorneys; rather, Pinholster offered other
supporting records, witness declarations, and experts as support. In reviewing the
decision granting Pinholster's second petition for habeas relief, the Supreme Court
disapproved of the Court of Appeals' misapplication of Strickland and the deference
owed to counsel's performance under this test:

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"Nor did the Court of Appeals properly apply the strong presumption of
competence that Strickland mandates. The court dismissed the dissent's application of the
presumption as 'fabricat[ing] an excuse that the attorneys themselves could not conjure
up.' 590 F.3d at 673. But Strickland specifically commands that a court 'must indulge
[the] strong presumption' that counsel 'made all significant decisions in the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment.' 466 U.S. at 689-90. The Court of Appeals was
required not simply to 'give [the] attorneys the benefit of the doubt,' 590 F.3d at 673, but
to affirmatively entertain the range of possible 'reasons Pinholster's counsel may have had
for proceeding as they did.' Id. at 692 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). See also Richter, [562
U.S. at 110] ('Strickland . . . calls for an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of
counsel's performance, not counsel's subjective state of mind')." 563 U.S. at 196.

See also Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 123-27, 131 S. Ct. 733, 178 L. Ed. 2d 649
(2011) (discussing Strickland deference in context of ineffective assistance of counsel in
plea assistance).

Even assuming the district court gave Rosel's performance an improper level of
deference, Mason's argument regarding a misapplication of the law in Pabst is still
meritless. The second prong of the Strickland test requires that Mason affirmatively show
that there is a reasonable probability that but for Rosel's errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different, meaning Mason would not have entered a plea but
would have insisted on going to trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Kelly, 298 Kan. at
969-70; Bricker, 292 Kan. at 245-46. Even if the district court gave Rosel's performance
an incorrect level of deference, this does nothing to undermine the district court's
conclusion that Mason failed to show that "had Mr. Rosel prepared differently, he would
not have entered a plea and would have insisted on going to trial."

A review of the record on appeal indicates that Mason presented no "contrary
evidence" to rebut the presumption that Rosel's conduct fell "within the wide range of
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reasonable professional assistance." Pabst, 287 Kan. at 17. The district court did not
make an error of law in the deference it gave to Rosel's conduct.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT CONDITION RELIEF ON WHETHER
MASON AFFIRMATIVELY PROVED HIS INNOCENCE?

Mason's second argument is that the district court required him to affirmatively
prove his innocence rather than prove he would have gone to trial had Rosel
appropriately investigated his case. On appeal, Mason's main contention is that Rosel
should have further investigated two things: (1) M.M.'s credibility, and (2) the allegation
that M.M. wiped Mason's used condom on and in herself, which explained how Mason's
DNA was located in M.M.'s vagina and anus. He essentially argues that because the
district court found the hearsay testimony about M.M. wiping herself with the condom as
"not credible," the district court "effectively denied [his] claims" because he did not
affirmatively prove his innocence.

Mason makes additional claims of fact to support his condom theory. The night of
the rape and sodomy, Mason, his then-girlfriend, and her son—Chandler—were at the
house. That evening, Mason and his girlfriend had vaginal intercourse, during which
Mason wore a condom. At some point in the evening, Chandler allegedly witnessed
M.M. wipe Mason's used condom on herself. However, Chandler never testified in this
case. The only testimony that was offered regarding this claim of innocence was the
testimony of Mason's biological daughter who testified that Chandler told members of
her family this information, and then in turn, members of her family told her about
Chandler's alleged statements.

Accordingly, the district court determined that the testimony regarding what
Chandler allegedly witnessed was hearsay evidence and was not credible. See K.S.A.
2017 Supp. 60-460 ("Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness
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while testifying at the hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, is hearsay
evidence and inadmissible."). It was incumbent upon Mason to present admissible
evidence that supported his assertion that Rosel should have investigated this alternative
theory, not just any evidence. Stated otherwise, without Chandler's testimony, Mason
introduced no admissible competent evidence to show what, if anything, Rosel could
have or would have learned from Chandler had Rosel and Chandler spoken. The district
court found M.M.'s testimony to be credible and the hearsay evidence not to be credible.
Refusal to consider hearsay evidence did not require Mason to prove his actual
innocence.

Mason needed to produce evidence that there was information Rosel failed to
investigate that would have changed Mason's plea and instead lead him to elect to go to
trial. See State v. Casey, No. 109,172, 2014 WL 5610078, at *4 (Kan. App. 2014)
(unpublished opinion) (holding the absence of testimony about alternative scenario to
explain presence of defendant's DNA in rape and sodomy case caused defendant no
constitutional prejudice because the "scenario turned on a coincidence so extraordinary
and so convenient as to test a reasonable person's willingness to give it even fleeting
credit"), rev. denied 302 Kan. 1013 (2015). Because the testimony about M.M. allegedly
wiping herself with the used condom was so extraordinary, it afforded the district court
no reasonable basis to find (1) that admissible evidence would have been provided to
Rosel had he made Mason's proposed inquiries; (2) all reasonable attorneys would have
counseled Mason to face the risk of trial based on that information; and (3) the
information would have altered Mason's decision to plead guilty.

A review of the record on appeal clearly shows the district court correctly assessed
Mason's ineffective assistance of counsel claims according to Strickland. In so doing, the
district court did not require that Mason exonerate himself. Rather, the district court
required that Mason affirmatively prove that "[Mr. Rosel's] performance fell below the
standard of reasonableness and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for
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counsel's errors, [Mason] would not have entered the plea and would have insisted on
going to trial." In context of the Strickland test, the district court weighed the strength of
the incriminating evidence Mason faced against the allegations and evidence Mason
produced. "The evidence against Mason was strong," and the district court viewed the
evidence Mason produced with skepticism. Consequently, in weighing the evidence, the
district court concluded that Mason "failed to show Mr. Rosel committed any errors with
respect to his investigation of circumstances and defenses" or that, had "Mr. Rosel
prepared differently, [Mason] would not have entered a plea and would have insisted on
going to trial."

It is not the role of this court to reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of
witnesses. See State v. Dunn, 304 Kan. 773, 822, 375 P.3d 332 (2016). Accordingly,
Mason fails to demonstrate to this court that the district court made an error of law in
denying his motion. The record indicates that the district court correctly analyzed
Mason's claim within the proper Strickland framework.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT IGNORE EVIDENCE
OF ROSEL'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO PROPERLY INVESTIGATE?

Finally, Mason argues the district court made an error of fact because it ignored
evidence that he presented that Rosel failed to properly investigate M.M.'s credibility and
his condom theory.

With respect to Rosel's investigation into witnesses who could speak against
M.M.'s credibility, the district court recognized the evidence attacking M.M.'s credibility
finding that: "M.M. was a troubled child and had significant intellectual, mental, and
emotional challenges. Mason's family's testimony that M.M. was known to lie and make
false accusations, was presented in an attempt to discredit M.M. and her story." Yet, even
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with that evidence in mind, the district court specifically found "M.M. to be credible
concerning the rape" and rejected Mason's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

In so holding, the district court implicitly expressed that Mason's evidence
attacking M.M.'s credibility would not have assisted Rosel in earning any advantages for
Mason in a Gregg evaluation. The same judge who made these findings regarding M.M.'s
credibility at the hearing on Mason's motion to withdraw his plea is the same judge who
would have ruled on any motion for a psychiatric evaluation under Gregg. The district
court held that Mason's evidence attacking M.M.'s credibility was not so persuasive that
all reasonable attorneys would have advised Mason to ignore the physical evidence and
take the case to trial. Implicit in this holding is also the conclusion that no reasonable
likelihood exists that Rosel's alleged failure to collect evidence attacking M.M.'s
credibility influenced Mason's decision to plead guilty.

There was testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing that Rosel did discuss
M.M.'s character with Mason's family. According to Mason, Rosel expressed concern
that a jury would believe M.M.'s testimony. Given the DNA evidence against Mason, that
concern was logically reasonable. Attacking her credibility might have exacerbated that
situation. See Giles v. State, No. 88,480, 2004 WL 1041086, at *2 (Kan. App.)
(unpublished opinion) (considering it "defense strategy" to minimize "jury sympathy" for
a victim), rev. denied 278 Kan. 844 (2004). Moreover, pursuing a compelled psychiatric
evaluation of M.M. could have negatively impacted plea negotiations. See State v.
Taylor, No. 108,548, 2013 WL 4046587, at *10 (Kan. App. 2013) (unpublished opinion)
(finding it reasonable trial strategy to pursue plea negotiations rather than filing a
meritless motion that could have precluded plea negotiations), rev. denied 298 Kan. 1208
(2014).

Rather than pursue a Gregg evaluation, it appears that Rosel decided to invest
resources into examining the strength of the State's DNA evidence by requesting
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independent DNA testing, rather than pursuing a defense around discrediting M.M. See
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 107, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011)
(holding that an attorney directing limited resources to avoid activities that appear
distractive from more important duties is in line with the Sixth Amendment under
Strickland). When results from this testing further incriminated Mason, it became even
more reasonable for Rosel to doubt the success of a Gregg evaluation or any defense
strategy at trial that would have attempted to attack M.M.'s credibility. See Thompson v.
State, 293 Kan. 704, 717-19, 270 P.3d 1089 (2011) (denying similar claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland absent proof that motion for independent
psychological evaluation under Gregg would have been successful); State v. Sprung, 294
Kan. 300, 314-17, 277 P.3d 1100 (2012) (discussing difficulty justifying psychological
evaluation under Gregg of abuse victim). In light of this evidence, it was also reasonable
for Rosel to facilitate plea negotiations to mitigate Mason's exposure to punishment. See
Premo, 562 U.S. at 126-27 (holding it a "reasonable choice to opt for a quick plea
bargain" over risking potentially harsher punishment via trial).

Rosel's own contemporaneous statements at Mason's sentencing further bolster the
decision not to attack M.M. At sentencing, many of Mason's family members spoke
against M.M., her credibility, and their own inability to come to terms with Mason's guilt.
Rosel responded to these statements that his concern in facilitating the plea was to avoid
making M.M. "out to be the culprit." He also explained his view regarding Mason's
decision to plead guilty:

"[Mason's family does not] necessarily understand that you can maybe do better for
yourself as a defendant if you concede, if the evidence is such that you need to. Judge, it
becomes sometimes from the defense perspective, a better thing to plead versus go to
trial. And I don't mean to compromise my job or what I do for my clients, but it's
incredibly difficult when evidence says what it does. And for the family's sake, they
maybe don't understand that [Mason] made decisions based on what he and his attorney
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had discussed. He doesn't intend for [M.M.] to be the culprit, for anything here to be her
fault. He assumes full responsibility for what has happened. That's why he pled."

Rosel's own contemporaneous statements demonstrated that the decision to plead
was based on a concern not to villainize M.M. and the strength of the incriminating
evidence against Mason. Such thinking shows that further investigation into M.M.'s
credibility was unlikely to change Rosel's recommendation as to the plea offer. Finally,
given that Mason was familiar with M.M.'s troubles at the time of his decision to plead,
and even claimed that his decision to waive his preliminary hearing and to plead guilty
was, in part, based on his desire to protect M.M. from testifying, no reasonable
probability exists that further investigation into M.M.'s credibility by Rosel would have
led Mason to trial. See State v. Adams, 297 Kan. 665, 672-73, 304 P.3d 311 (2013)
(weighing defendant's "expressed desires to protect her daughter from testifying," the
potential of a greater sentence, and the strength of the State's evidence against defendant's
claim that she would have risked trial but for counsel's actions).

Moving now to Rosel's investigation into Mason's condom theory, the district
court regarded the testimony pertaining to this theory as "hearsay evidence and . . . not
credible." In support of this holding, the district court noted that the alleged eyewitness to
M.M. rubbing the condom on herself—Chandler, the 11-year-old son of Mason's then-
girlfriend—never testified. Unlike Chandler, M.M. testified credibly at the evidentiary
hearing, in the district court's opinion, that Mason raped her and his "whole family was
trying to get her to change her story." Considering these circumstances against the
credible and incriminating evidence Mason faced at trial, the district court denied
Mason's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Substantial competent evidence supports the district court's skepticism of Mason's
condom theory and what evidence Rosel could have discovered had he further
investigated it. At the evidentiary hearing on Mason's motion, 15 witnesses testified in
17

support of his motion. Mason claimed he had intercourse with his then-girlfriend and
used a condom the night M.M. said she was raped and sodomized. Only one of Mason's
biological daughters mentioned anything at the evidentiary hearing about M.M. wiping
herself with a used condom. However, Mason's daughter did not see M.M. wipe herself
with a condom. "Family" told her that Chandler told them that he saw it happen. Mason's
daughter never spoke with Chandler about this allegation. There was no testimony
offered to corroborate this third-hand account. Further, Mason testified himself that "[he]
couldn't tell you what [Chandler] would say."

Besides the condom theory being a third-hand account and hearsay evidence, other
evidence undermines this theory. The officer who executed the search warrant on
Mason's home looked for but found no condoms. M.M. was resolute in her testimony at
the evidentiary hearing that Mason raped and sodomized her while Chandler was not
around, and she said that one of Mason's biological daughters—the one who advanced
the condom theory at the evidentiary hearing on Mason's motion—had been "trying to get
[her] to change [her] story." This same biological daughter recorded conversations with
M.M. in October 2013, and these videos were offered into evidence at the evidentiary
hearing as alleged recantations of M.M.'s allegations against Mason. In these videos,
M.M. made no mention of wiping a used condom on herself and she could not explain
how Mason's DNA got inside of her. Further, Mason's biological daughter testified at
Mason's sentencing and made no mention of the condom theory. Chandler's mother also
testified at Mason's sentencing about what Chandler told her when she "questioned him
the day after this incident happened," and she also said nothing about Chandler
witnessing M.M. wipe a used condom on herself. In fact, this condom theory was not
discussed at all at Mason's sentencing. Finally, at the evidentiary hearing, neither Mason
nor his biological daughter could explain why, if the DNA found inside M.M. was from a
condom Mason used to have vaginal sex but not oral sex with his girlfriend, none of
Mason's girlfriend's DNA was found in M.M. and why saliva consistent with Mason's
DNA was found on M.M.'s anus.
18

All of this contradictory evidence supports the district court's holding. Rosel's
performance cannot be deemed insufficient for a failure to discover or use this alleged
information, and Mason did not show a reasonable probability that investigation into the
condom theory would have changed his decision to plead guilty. See Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985) ("[W]here the alleged error of
counsel is a failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the
determination whether the error 'prejudiced' the defendant by causing him to plead guilty
rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would
have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn,
will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed
the outcome of a trial.").

Finally, the same district judge who denied Mason's motion to withdraw his plea
presided over Mason's criminal proceedings and witnessed firsthand Rosel's
representation of Mason. Considering that much "'deference and reliance must be placed
upon the wisdom and determination of the trial judge who saw all,'" the district court's
decision and credibility determinations are further difficult to disregard. Pabst, 287 Kan.
at 16.

Therefore, Mason has failed to show the district court's decision was based on an
error of law or fact. Nor does Mason show that no reasonable person would adopt the
view of the district court. Accordingly, Mason has failed to carry his burden in
demonstrating that the district court abused its discretion in denying his postsentencing
motion to withdraw his plea. There is no error.

Affirmed.