State v. Little

1

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 115,347


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

CORY A. LITTLE,
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Russell District Court; MIKE KEELEY, judge. Opinion filed December 16, 2016.
Affirmed.

Caroline M. Zuschek, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Daniel W. Krug, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before POWELL, P.J., PIERRON and HILL, JJ.

Per Curiam: Corey A. Little contends his conviction for traffic in contraband into
a correction facility must be overturned because he had not been given the Miranda
warning prior to his admission that he hid some chewing tobacco in one of the jail's
toilets. We conclude that the jailer was not required to caution Little prior to asking him
about the tobacco.

Further, the record clearly shows Little was warned that he could not bring his
chewing tobacco into the Russell County jail.
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We affirm his conviction.

Little was serving weekends in the Russell County jail as part of his sentence in
an unrelated case. Deputy Karl Houck, the jail supervisor, received a call from an
unknown Barton County officer who said he had information that Little was smuggling
contraband into the jail. Then on February 27, 2015, Little reported to the jail to serve his
time. Houck placed Little in a holding cell in the booking room until he could be booked
into the jail. Houck advised Little that he had information that Little might be carrying
contraband. Houck testified that the conversation was as follows:

"Q. What was your contact with Mr. Little at that time initially?
"A. I had asked Mr. Little if he had any contraband on him or in him.
"Q. And his response?
"A. He said no.
"Q. Okay. What did you do then?
"A. I advised him that if he had anything it could be considered contraband, and it
would be a felony. He denied having anything. I –
"Q. And what was your response then?
"A. Well, I'd asked him if he would sign a consent for a doctor to check him for
contraband.
"Q. And what happened then?
. . . .
"A. And he advised that he could just get rid of it right now.
. . . .
"A. I believe that he said he could go to the bathroom and get rid of it."

Deputy Houck checked the bathroom and determined it was clear. He
disconnected the water flush valve so Little could not flush anything. Houck got Little
out of the holding cell and Little went into the bathroom. After Little was finished, Houck
placed Little back into the holding cell. Houck went into the bathroom and retrieved a
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package of chewing tobacco, wrapped in cellophane and black electrician's tape, from the
toilet. Little hid it in a cavity of his body.

Little was charged with traffic in contraband into a correctional facility, a felony.
Little filed a motion to suppress his statements and the contraband evidence because he
was not advised of his Miranda rights. Little also filed a motion to dismiss, contending
the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was insufficient to show that he had
notice of what constituted contraband.

The district court denied the motions. With regard to the motion to suppress, the
court found that the deputy was permitted to ask Little if he had any contraband without
giving a Miranda warning:

"The reason is this is something allowable to make sure the person is not bringing in any
type of illegal contraband or other property into the jail. The correctional officer has a
duty and obligation to make it safe for the jail and other prisoners and this question is
within the province of an officer. When the defendant denied this, the officer pointed out
he had some information and the defendant voluntarily, without any type of search or
seizure, proceeded to divulge he had tobacco in a body cavity and he personally removed
it. Defendant did this voluntarily and was not unduly pressured or coerced to provide this
information."

The court found the questioning was for the safety of the other inmates and did not
violate Miranda.

With regard to the motion to dismiss, the court found that there were adequate
warnings posted throughout the jail as to what constituted contraband. Also, Little had
previously been in the jail and seemed to be aware that tobacco was contraband because
he attempted to hide it in a cavity of his body. The court found there was sufficient
evidence that a felony had been committed.
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A bench trial was held on stipulated facts. Defense counsel noted that Little
intended to appeal the denial of the motions. The court found Little guilty of traffic in
contraband into a correctional facility. The court sentenced Little to 36 months in prison
and 24 months of postrelease supervision. Little timely appeals.

Deputy Houck's questioning of Little did not constitute custodial interrogation.

Little contends that the district court erred by not suppressing the statements he
made to Deputy Houck and the evidence obtained as a result of the statements. Little
contends the deputy interrogated him about a suspected crime while he was in custody in
violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

Appellate courts review a trial court's determination whether an interrogation was
custodial employing two distinct inquiries. First, the appellate court reviews the district
court's factual findings as to the circumstances surrounding the interrogation for
substantial competent evidence. The appellate court does not reweigh evidence, assess
the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicting evidence. Second, the appellate
court reviews de novo whether, under all of the circumstances, a reasonable person would
have felt free to terminate the interrogation and disengage from the encounter. State v.
Lewis, 299 Kan. 828, 835, 326 P.3d 387 (2014).

We hold the district court's factual findings were supported by substantial
competent evidence. The district court found that Deputy Houck was made aware of the
possibility that Little was smuggling contraband into the jail through a telephone
conversation with the Barton County Sherriff's Office. Deputy Houck asked Little if he
had any contraband. Little initially denied it. The deputy pointed out he had information
that Little was carrying contraband. Little then divulged he wanted to dispose of it. Little
personally removed the tobacco. Deputy Houck's testimony was uncontroverted.
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Next, the court has unlimited review over whether, under all of the circumstances,
a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and disengage
from the encounter. Lewis, 299 Kan. at 835. Here, all parties agree that Little was not free
to leave the jail. But that does not necessarily mean he did not feel free to terminate the
interrogation and disengage from the encounter. Little was in "custody" in the traditional
sense of the word. But he was not clearly in custody for purposes of Miranda. Little had
just self-reported to serve his weekend jail sentence for an unrelated matter. Upon
entering the jail, he was placed into the booking cell. He was asked if he had any
contraband on him, as are all inmates when they enter the jail.

Imprisonment is not, without more, Miranda custody.

In Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1503, 20 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1968),
the United States Supreme Court applied Miranda to the questioning of an inmate by
federal tax investigators, when the inmate was in prison on a state law matter:

"The Government also seeks to narrow the scope of the Miranda holding by
making it applicable only to questioning one who is 'in custody' in connection with the
very case under investigation. There is no substance to such a distinction, and in effect it
goes against the whole purpose of the Miranda decision which was designed to give
meaningful protection to Fifth Amendment rights. We find nothing in the Miranda
opinion which calls for a curtailment of the warnings to be given persons under
interrogation by officers based on the reason why the person is in custody. In speaking of
'custody' the language of the Miranda opinion is clear and unequivocal:

'To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is
subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized.' [Citation
omitted.]" 391 U.S. at 4-5.

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Despite that "clear and unequivocal" language, courts continued to struggle with
the meaning of "custodial interrogation" in a prison setting after the Mathis decision. In
Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 429 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit held that the
questioning of an inmate in the prison library after marijuana was discovered during a
routine search did not constitute custodial interrogation. Rather, the questioning
constituted on-the-scene questioning to determine whether a crime was in progress. 589
F.2d at 429. The defendant argued that any interrogation during prison confinement
constituted custodial interrogation. 589 F.2d at 427. The court rejected that view:

"To interpret Mathis as Cervantes urges would, in effect, create a per se rule that
any investigatory questioning inside a prison requires Miranda warnings. Such a rule
could totally disrupt prison administration. Miranda certainly does not dictate such a
consequence. 'Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police
officers in investigating crime. . . . General on-the-scene questioning as to facts
surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is
not affected by our holding.' Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S. Ct. at
1629.

"Adoption of Cervantes' contention would not only be inconsistent with Miranda
but would torture it to the illogical position of providing greater protection to a prisoner
than to his nonimprisoned counterpart." 589 F.2d at 427.

The court held that for Miranda to apply in a prison setting, there must be "a change in
the surroundings of the prisoner which results in an added imposition on his freedom of
movement." 589 F.2d at 428.

In State v. Benoit, 21 Kan. App. 2d 184, 898 P.2d 653 (1995), this court agreed
with the Ninth Circuit:

"To create a custodial interrogation of an inmate in a prison setting, some change
in the inmate's surroundings that results in an added imposition or restriction on the
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inmate's freedom of movement should occur. To apply the test to determine if an inmate's
freedom of movement has been restricted, a court must consider the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the alleged interrogation." 21 Kan. App. 2d 185, Syl. ¶ 8.

Benoit was serving a sentence in a minimum security "boot camp." One night, a
correctional officer saw Benoit bent down at the back door putting his ID badge between
the lock and door facing. The correctional officer notified two other correctional officers.
Officer Qualls saw Benoit's hand on the door knob. When Qualls saw Benoit crawling
toward him, the officer asked Benoit to stand up. Qualls asked Benoit what he was doing.
Benoit initially said he was doing nothing. Qualls told Benoit that he and the other
correctional officers had seen him. Then Benoit admitted he was trying to jimmy the door
open to leave. Benoit was transported to the Labette County jail. Two days later, Walter
Whorten, the jail administrator, asked Benoit if he had attempted to escape. Benoit
answered affirmatively. Benoit was convicted of attempted aggravated escape.

On appeal, Benoit contended that his statements should have been excluded under
Miranda. This court concluded that Qualls' questioning of Benoit was on-the-scene
questioning, not custodial interrogation. The questioning occurred at the scene, the
surroundings were familiar to Benoit, and the questioning was very brief. However,
Whorten's questioning of Benoit was custodial interrogation. Whorten's questioning
occurred 2 days after the incident, the questioning was after Benoit had been removed
from his familiar surroundings to the jail where his freedom of movement was greatly
restricted, and the investigation was already underway. 21 Kan. App. 2d at 196.

More recently, in Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 506-07, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 182 L.
Ed. 2d 17 (2012), the United States Supreme Court revisited the issue. The Court rejected
a categorical rule that a prisoner is in custody for purposes of Miranda. The Court stated
that Mathis simply held, as relevant here, that a prisoner who otherwise meets the
requirements for Miranda custody is not taken outside the scope of Miranda because the
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prisoner was incarcerated for an unrelated offense. "Mathis did not hold that
imprisonment, in and of itself, is enough to constitute Miranda custody." 565 U.S. at 507.
The Court concluded that "service of a term of imprisonment, without more, is not
enough to constitute Miranda custody." 565 U.S. at 512.

The Fields Court explained that Miranda adopted a "set of prophylactic measures"
to protect against the "inherently compelling pressures" of custodial interrogation.

"[B]ut Miranda did not hold that such pressures are always present when a prisoner is
taken aside and questioned about events outside the prison walls. Indeed, Miranda did
not even establish that police questioning of a suspect at the station house is always
custodial. See Mathiason v. Oregon, [429 U.S. 492, 495, 975 S. Ct. 711, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714
(1977)] (declining to find that Miranda warnings are required 'simply because the
questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one
whom the police suspect')." 565 U.S. at 507-08.

"'[C]ustody' is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally
to present a serious danger of coercion." 565 U.S. at 508-09. The first step in the analysis
is to determine whether, in light of the objective circumstances, a reasonable person
would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and leave. Relevant factors include the
location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during the questioning, the
presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and the release of the
person at the end of the interrogation. 565 U.S. at 509.

The Court explained:

"Not all restraints on freedom of movement amount to custody for purposes of Miranda.
We have . . . instead asked the additional question whether the relevant environment
presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at
issue in Miranda." 565 U.S. at 509.
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The Court gave three reasons. First, questioning a person who is already in prison does
not necessarily involve the same shock as when a person is arrested and whisked away to
a police station for questioning. In the latter scenario, detention is a "sharp and ominous
change" that may give rise to coercive pressure. Second, a prisoner already serving a
sentence would not be pressured to speak in the hope of immediate release upon
answering the questions. Third, a prisoner, unlike a person who has not been convicted
and sentenced, knows that the questioning officer probably lacks authority to change the
duration of the prisoner's sentence. 565 U.S. at 511-12.

In Fields, the inmate was escorted to a conference room and questioned by two
deputies about allegations that before he was incarcerated, he had engaged in sexual
conduct with a 12-year-old boy. 565 U.S. at 502. The inmate did not invite the interview
or consent to it, and he was not advised that he could decline to speak with the deputies.
The interview lasted 5-7 hours and continued well after bedtime. The deputies were
armed, and one of the deputies used a "very sharp tone." But the inmate was told at the
beginning of the questioning, and reminded thereafter, that he could leave and go back to
his cell whenever he wanted. He was not physically restrained or threatened, he was
escorted to a well-lit conference room, he was not uncomfortable, he was offered food
and water, and the door to the room was sometimes left open. Under these circumstances,
the prisoner was not in custody within the meaning of Miranda. 565 U.S. at 514-15.

We hold that Little was not in Miranda custody.

Several factors support the conclusion that Little was not in Miranda custody.
Little was subjected merely to routine questions during the booking process. He entered
the jail and was asked if he had contraband on him. Houck testified that all inmates who
come through the door are asked the same question. The Fields Court explained that an
inmate is not in Miranda custody because routine security precautions are taken. See 565
U.S. at 513. Asking an incoming inmate if he or she is carrying contraband is a
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reasonable routine security question. And, the routine nature of the question is not an
added imposition or restriction on the inmate. See Benoit, 21 Kan. App. 2d 185, Syl. ¶ 8.

The questioning took place in the booking room shortly after Little entered the jail.
The place and the nature of the questioning suggests that it was on-the-scene questioning
to see if a crime was in progress, rather than custodial interrogation. See Miranda, 384
U.S. at 477; Benoit, 21 Kan. App. 2d at 196. The questioning was quite brief. The deputy
testified that he asked Little two questions. The questioning took place in familiar
surroundings. Little had been booked into the jail many times. See Benoit, 21 Kan. App.
2d at 196. He was not moved to different surroundings. Little voluntarily checked himself
into the jail.

The record does not indicate that more than one deputy was present during the
questioning, physical restraints were used, a firearm was drawn, or that Little was
threatened. Rather, the deputy asked for Little's consent for a doctor to search him,
implying that Little could refuse. After the questioning, Little was booked into the jail.
See Lewis, 299 Kan. at 835.

While the fact that a defendant was in a locked holding cell during an interrogation
may normally support a finding of Miranda custody, the routine nature of the questioning
as part of the booking process into the jail does not give rise to the same inherently
coercive pressures as the type of questioning at issue in Miranda. See Fields, 565 U.S. at
509. Therefore, Little was not in Miranda custody.

Other courts considering similar facts have reached the same conclusion. See
People v. Bowen, 2015 IL App. (1st) 132046, 38 N. E. 3d 98 (2015); People v. Cortez,
299 Mich. App. 679, 832 N.W.2d 1 (2013); Conriquez v. Paramo, No. 1:09-CV-01003-
SKO-HC, 2012 WL 3069156 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (unpublished opinion).
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The district court based its decision in part on the safety interest of the jail
officials, citing Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 566
U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 182 L. Ed. 2d 566 (2012). In Florence, the court upheld the
strip search of incoming jail detainees, noting that detecting contraband concealed by
new detainees is a serious responsibility to ensure the safe operation of the jail. 132 S. Ct.
1513, 1519. It stands to reason that if jail officials may strip search incoming jail inmates
for contraband without implicating the inmate's Fourth Amendment search and seizure
rights, then those same officials may take the less drastic measure of asking inmates upon
entering the jail if they are carrying contraband without implicating the inmate's Fifth
Amendment Miranda rights. In both cases, the jail has a strong interest in the safe
operation of the jail. But the present situation does not fit within the narrow public safety
exception to Miranda. See State v. Cosby, 285 Kan. 230, 241, 169 P.3d 1128 (2007).
Rather, the fact that the deputy asked Little a routine question, designed to ensure the safe
operation of the jail, is a factor that supports a conclusion that the questioning was not
custodial interrogation. See Fields, 565 U.S. at 513.

Even if there was a Miranda violation, the physical evidence should not have been
excluded.

Even assuming that the statements Little made in response to questioning by
Deputy Houck should have been excluded, no "statements" made by Little were included
in the stipulated facts. The parties stipulated as follows:

"1. That defendant, Cory Little, was in custody in the Russell County
Sheriff's department in the Russell County jail on February 27, 2015.
"2. That on February 27, 2015 the defendant, while in custody at the
Russell County jail, was interviewed about possibly bringing
contraband into the Russell County jail.
"3. That the defendant went to the restroom, which was checked prior by
Deputy Houck to be sure it was clear, and when the defendant exited the restroom an
item was left in the toilet which appeared to be wrapped in black plastic.
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"4. That the item left in the toilet that was wrapped in black plastic tape was retrieved
by Deputy Houck and was inspected by Under Sheriff Barett and was found to
contain tobacco.
"5. That possession of tobacco in the Russell County jail is a violation of
the jail rules and considered to be contraband."

Must the physical evidence Little removed from his body cavity after the questioning by
Deputy Houck be excluded based on a Miranda violation?

Our Supreme Court adheres to the rule that physical evidence located as a result of
a suspect's voluntary statements—made while the suspect was in custody but without
Miranda warnings—can still be admitted at trial because the physical evidence does not
implicate the protection against self-incrimination. Mattox v. State, 293 Kan. 723, 729,
267 P.3d 746 (2011) (citing United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 159
L. Ed. 2d 667 [2004]). Therefore, the tobacco would be admissible even if Little's
statements were inadmissible.

There was sufficient evidence that Little had notice.

Little contends, for the first time on appeal, that his due process rights were
violated because there was insufficient evidence that he was given adequate notice that
chewing tobacco constituted contraband. In essence, he is raising a sufficiency of the
evidence argument based on a due process right to fair notice of what conduct is criminal.
Little raised a similar argument in his motion to dismiss before the trial court, which was
denied.

This court reviews de novo whether a defendant's due process rights were violated.
State v. Smith-Parker, 301 Kan. 132, 165, 340 P.3d 485 (2014). When the sufficiency of
evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the appellate court reviews all the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State. A conviction will be upheld if the court is convinced
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that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt based on that evidence. State v. Laborde, 303 Kan. 1, 6, 360 P.3d 1080 (2015).
Appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. State v.
Daws, 303 Kan. 785, 789, 368 P.3d 1074 (2016).

Little was convicted of violating K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5914(a)(1) and (b)(1). The
statute provides:

"(a) Traffic in contraband in a correctional institution or care and treatment
facility is, without the consent of the administrator of the correctional institution or care
and treatment facility:
(1) Introducing or attempting to introduce any item into or upon the grounds of
any correctional institution or care and treatment facility."

The statute does not itself define what items are prohibited.

In State v. Watson, 273 Kan. 426, 435, 44 P.3d 357 (2002), our Supreme Court
held that it was constitutionally permissible to vest the administrators of correctional
institutions with the authority to determine what items constitute contraband, provided
that adequate safeguards are in place to ensure the statute is implemented in a
constitutional manner. The administrators of correctional institutions must provide
persons of common knowledge adequate warning of what conduct is prohibited.
Adequate warning is necessary to provide fair notice and to safeguard against arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement of the statute. 273 Kan. at 435.

Little compares his case to State v. Hackney, No. 103,495, 2011 WL 2175942, at
*6-9 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished opinion). In Hackney, a panel of this court reversed
Hackney's conviction for traffic in contraband in a correctional facility, relying on
Watson, because there was insufficient evidence that Hackney had any warning that the
items he carried into the jail constituted contraband. 2011 WL 2175942, at *6-9. During a
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search of Hackney, a jail administrator found several items wrapped up in a sock: a
cigarette lighter, two q-tip swabs with burnt ends, one cotton ball, two rubber bands, and
a brown leafy substance. 2011 WL 2175942, at *6. The State did not present evidence
that the jail rules and regulations were ever reviewed with Hackney. An officer testified
that he did not review the rules with new inmates; rather, the officer relied on other
inmates to let new inmates know about the rules and regulations book. Jail policy
required the rules and regulations book to be in the cell pods; but there was no evidence a
rules and regulations book was in Hackney's cell pod. The officer did not know if a
lighter was on the list of prohibited items in the book. The court held that the State's
circumstantial evidence that Hackney concealed the items from prison authorities was
insufficient to sustain his conviction because Hackney could have been concealing the
items from other inmates for his own protection. 2011 WL 2175942, at *9.

Here, like in Hackney, the deputies did not go over the rules and regulations with
new inmates. The inmate rules and regulations booklet was available to inmates as they
are booked into the jail, but there was no requirement that the inmate take one. Also, like
in Hackney, the fact that Little hid the tobacco in a cavity of his body was cited as
circumstantial evidence that Little knew that tobacco was contraband.

But unlike Hackney, Deputy Houck testified that a list of what is considered
contraband was hanging on the wall in the booking room above a table where the inmates
are made to stand and "empty their pockets and take their belts off and things such as
that." The wall was straight ahead of the holding cell where Little was held. Tobacco and
tobacco products were listed as contraband. The booking room was visible from the
holding cell. Little had been processed into the jail through that room on many occasions.
The list of contraband was posted in many locations throughout the jail, adjacent to the
cells and in the bull pen. Also, here, the deputy testified that the inmate rules and
regulations booklet stated that tobacco was considered contraband.

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When viewed as a whole, the evidence that there were written warnings posted
throughout the jail that clearly stated tobacco and tobacco products constituted
contraband, that Little had previously been in the jail, and that Little hid the tobacco from
the deputy, is sufficient evidence that Little had adequate warning that tobacco
constituted contraband.

Affirmed.