State v. Hartnett

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 112,199

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

RONALD B. HARTNETT
A/K/A/ R. BRUCE HARTNETT,
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Ness District Court; BRUCE T. GATTERMAN, judge. Opinion filed November 13,
2015. Affirmed.

Ronald Bruce Hartnett, appellant pro se.

Craig S. Crosswhite, county attorney, for appellee.

Before GREEN, P.J., GARDNER, J., and JOHNSON, S. J.

Per Curiam: Ronald B. Hartnett, a/k/a R. Bruce Hartnett, "in propria persona"
appeals the district court's judgment that he was guilty of speeding. Rather than
contesting the fact that he was going 81 mph in a 65 mph zone, he challenges the trial
court's jurisdiction to hear his case, its failure to grant him default judgment, the
sufficiency of the complaint, the state's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and
the state's violation of his right to travel.


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The facts are simple, undisputed, and well known to the parties so they will not be
set forth herein. The claims are unclearly written making them difficult to discern, but we
address them briefly as best we understand them.

Hartnett contends the district court lacked standing and jurisdiction over him.
Kansas district courts have general original jurisdiction of all matters, unless otherwise
provided by law, and also have such appellate jurisdiction as prescribed by law. K.S.A. .
20-301; see K.S.A. 22-2601; K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5106(a)(1). Magistrate judges have
the jurisdiction "to conduct the trial of traffic infractions . . . or misdemeanor charges.
. . ." K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20-302b. Nothing in the facts of record or in Hartnett's
allegations shows any lack of jurisdiction either in the magistrate judge's initial trial of
the matter or in the district court's subsequent trial de novo trial of the same matter.

Hartnett generally alleges that the charging document was insufficient, but he does
not explain what the defect was in the traffic citation or how that defect harmed him, as is
necessary. See State v. Martis, 277 Kan. 267, 275, 83 P.3d 1216 (2004). Because Hartnett
has not adequately briefed this issue, we deem it waived or abandoned. Cooke v.
Gillespie, 285 Kan. 748, Syl. ¶ 6, 176 P.3d 144 (2008).

Hartnett also claims that he is entitled to default judgment because the State failed
to "[a]rgue or file any [p]roof, [a]nswers nor [r]ebuttals, enabling any proper research for
rebuttal." To the extent this same argument was resolved against Hartnett in his previous
case, State v. Hartnett, 105,409, 2011 WL 5526569, at *4 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished
opinion), rev. denied 294 Kan. 945 (2012), it is frivolous. To the extent this argument is
different than that previously resolved, it is meritless and insufficiently briefed.

Hartnett contends that the State presented insufficient evidence for the district
court to find him guilty of speeding because it was required to prove that he was unable
to "control the speed of the vehicle as necessary to avoid colliding with another person or
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vehicle that is on or entering the highway in compliance with law and the duty of each
person to use due care." But that language is from a Texas statute which is inapplicable
here, making this argument frivolous.

Hartnett argues he is not subject to the traffic laws of Kansas because enforcement
of those laws violates his right to travel and his right to drive. But we rejected a similar
argument in State v. Hershberger, 27 Kan. App. 2d 485, 492-94, 5 P.3d 1004, rev. denied
269 Kan. 937 (2000). Hartnett's right to travel is not infringed by the enforcement of
traffic laws because there are other methods of travel available to him. See 27 Kan. App.
2d at 493. And he has no right to drive because driving is a privilege, not a right. See
State v. Bowie, 268 Kan. 794, 800, 999 P.2d 947 (2000).

Similarly, Hartnett contends that he is not subject to the traffic laws of Kansas
because he was using his vehicle for personal rather than commercial purposes. But
Hartnett does not cite any authority supporting his belief that traffic laws do not apply to
one using his or her car for personal purposes, and the plain language of K.S.A. 2014
Supp. 8-1558(a) shows the maximum speed limits apply to drivers of commercial and
noncommercial vehicles. This argument is thus frivolous.

Hartnett argues throughout his brief that the district court lacked jurisdiction
because the State failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. But Hartnett fails to
provide any authority holding that the Kansas Department of Revenue has jurisdiction in
this case or that the State is required to exhaust any administrative remedies before it can
charge him with speeding. Hartnett raised this same argument to us in another case and
we rejected it, finding that he waived the issue by only incidentally mentioning it in his
brief. Hartnett, 2011 WL 5526569, at *4. Likewise, we find this issue waived because
Hartnett has not cited any authority supporting his argument and raises the issue only
incidentally. See Gillespie, 285 Kan. at 758.

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We find all of Hartnett's claims to be without merit. Further, Hartnett has raised
similar issues in previous appeals to this court. See City of Ensign v. Hartnett, No.
108,536, 2013 WL 2936333 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 298 Kan.
___ (November, 22, 2013); and Hartnett, 2011 WL 5526569. Finally, evidence
established at the de novo trial supports the district court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law, which adequately explain its decision.

Affirmed under Rule 7.042(b)(1), (2), (3), and (5) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.67).