State v. Crawford

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 113,492

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

LUKE LOGAN CRAWFORD,
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Atchison District Court; MARTIN J. ASHER, judge. Opinion filed June 17, 2016.
Affirmed.

Adam D. Stolte, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Gerald R. Kuckelman, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before BRUNS, P.J., POWELL and GARDNER, JJ.

Per Curiam: Luke Logan Crawford appeals his conviction and sentence after a
jury convicted him of one count of theft, a severity level 9 nonperson felony. Crawford
argues the State presented insufficient evidence to support a finding that the value of the
property involved in the theft was more than $1,000 but less than $25,000. Crawford
further contends the district court erred by imposing certain conditions of probation. For
the reasons stated below, we affirm the district court's judgment.



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Procedural background

In June 2014, Michael Scott received a check for $25,000 as part of an inheritance.
He asked Jody Crawford for a ride to Kansas City so that he could deposit the check at a
bank. She agreed and drove Scott and Jody's friend, Summer Giles, to Kansas City.

At the bank, Scott deposited $20,000 and asked for $5,000 in cash. Scott put $400
in his billfold and put the remaining $4,600 in a bank bag. Scott set aside the $400 to pay
bills and intended to use the $4,600 to purchase the car Jody was driving. After finishing
his banking transaction, Scott returned to the car and placed the bag containing the
money "[r]ight between the console and the car seat down far enough [where] it could not
be seen."

After completing their errands, Jody told Scott they needed to pick up her son,
Luke Crawford, and his friend. After picking up Crawford, they drove to Jody's house
where she parked in the driveway and all of the passengers exited the vehicle. Jody and
Crawford went inside the residence while Scott, Giles, and Crawford's friend remained
outside. Meanwhile, Scott inspected the vehicle that he was thinking about buying. After
a few minutes, Jody and Crawford came out of the house and went back to the car. When
Jody opened the driver's side door, Crawford jumped in, grabbed the money, and took off
running. At first, Scott thought Crawford was joking, but after a few minutes he realized
Crawford was not coming back so he notified law enforcement.

Lieutenant Timothy Stout received the report regarding Scott and Crawford and
took Scott's statement. Scott said Crawford stole a bag containing $4,600. Lieutenant
Stout also spoke to Giles. She gave the same information but thought Crawford was
getting into the vehicle to retrieve his work clothes. Lieutenant Stout tried to speak with
Jody, but she refused.

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Following a trial, the jury convicted Crawford of one count of theft, a severity
level 9 nonperson felony. On January 16, 2015, the district court sentenced Crawford to 7
months' imprisonment with 12 months' postrelease supervision, suspended the sentence,
and ordered Crawford to serve 12 months' probation. Crawford raises two issues on
appeal.

Sufficiency of the evidence

Crawford first argues the State presented insufficient evidence to show that the
value of the theft was between $1,000 and $25,000. The standard of review regarding
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence is well known to this court. "After reviewing
all the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court must be
convinced a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary
conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations. [Citation omitted.]" State v.
Williams, 299 Kan. 509, 525, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014).

Crawford contends Scott's allegations regarding the deposited amount varied. He
claims Scott first stated he cashed a $5,000 check, then a $10,000 check, then a $20,000
check, and then a $25,000 check. We believe this mischaracterizes Scott's statements to
some degree.

At the preliminary hearing, Scott claimed he deposited a $10,000 check and
received $5,000 in cash from the check. Scott also said of the $5,000 he took out $400
and put the remaining $4,600 in the bag. He stated at the end of the preliminary hearing
that it was actually a $20,000 check he deposited, and not a $10,000 check. Then, at the
trial, Scott testified he received a $25,000 check as part of an inheritance; he deposited
$10,000 in one account, $10,000 in another account, and asked for $5,000 in cash. He
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again testified that of the $5,000, he took $400 and put the remaining $4,600 in the bag.
Additionally, the State admitted a copy of the $25,000 check as State's Exhibit 1.

Scott explained his earlier misstatement regarding the amount of the check to the
jury. He admitted he makes mistakes, but he believed this was due to some health issues
and a previous head injury. Regardless of Scott's misstatement, the amount of the original
check he deposited was not relevant. The relevant issue is the amount of money
remaining in the bag Crawford took. Scott consistently stated that amount was $4,600,
and Lieutenant Stout confirmed Scott's statement that $4,600 remained in the bag.
Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, Crawford's attorney stated, "we would like to say
for the record that we do dispute the restitution order insofar as we don't believe that
anything is owed. . . . But we understand that the evidence at trial was that there was
$4,600."

On appeal, Crawford argues the State could have gone to the bank to obtain
documentation regarding the $5,000 in cash. However, he fails to show that the State had
any duty to do so. Crawford further claims: "There is no evidence other than Scott's
unsupported allegations that he even had $4,600." But a victim's testimony, standing
alone, can be sufficient to sustain a conviction, and Scott's testimony, although confused
in part, is not so incredible or improbable as to defy belief. Further, Scott's testimony is
supported by Lieutenant Stout's testimony. Crawford is asking this court to reweigh
evidence and make witness credibility determinations, which is not our role. See
Williams, 299 Kan. at 525.

After weighing the evidence and making witness credibility determinations, the
jury found Crawford guilty of one count of theft, a severity level 9 nonperson felony.
Looking at all the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and considering the
jury's verdict, we find the State provided sufficient evidence to prove beyond a
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reasonable doubt Crawford committed theft of property in the amount of at least $1,000
but less than $25,000. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5801(a), (b)(3).

Conditions of probation

Crawford next contends the district court imposed conditions of probation that
were not reasonably related to the rehabilitative goal of probation. These conditions
included: (1) prohibiting the possession or consumption of alcohol; (2) prohibiting the
patronization of establishments whose primary purpose was to sell alcohol; and (3)
requiring 100 hours of community service.

Crawford did not object to the probation conditions in the district court. Generally,
issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised on appeal. See State v. Kelly,
298 Kan. 965, 971, 318 P.3d 987 (2014). But complying with Supreme Court Rule
6.02(a)(5) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 41), Crawford explains why this issue should be
considered for the first time on appeal. He contends the issue falls under an exception to
the general rule, which is that the newly asserted theory involves only a question of law
arising on proved or admitted facts and is finally determinative of the case. See State v.
Phillips, 299 Kan. 479, 493, 325 P.3d 1095 (2014). We agree. Accordingly, we will
address Crawford's arguments on the merits. See State v. Schad, 41 Kan. App. 2d 805,
813, 206 P.3d 22 (2009).

The statutory authority for a district court to impose conditions of probations is
found in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6607. Its relevant provision provides: "The court may
impose any conditions of probation . . . the court deems proper, including, but not limited
to," 14 enumerated conditions of probation. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6607(b). The
probation conditions the district court imposed on Crawford are permitted by K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 21-6607(b)(1), (2), and (10).

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Our Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he primary purpose of probation is the
successful rehabilitation of the offender. Toward that end courts are authorized to impose
conditions and restrictions on the probationer's liberty to afford the probationer a setting
conducive to the rehabilitative process. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Turner, 257 Kan. 19,
24, 891 P.2d 317 (1995). Accordingly:

"A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it (1) has no reasonable
relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct
which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably
related to future criminality. Conversely, a condition of probation which requires or
forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to
the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality." State v. Lumley,
267 Kan. 4, 14, 977 P.2d 914 (1999).

The district court's discretionary power, however, is not unlimited. For example, a
district court does not have discretion to impose probationary conditions that violate a
probationer's constitutional rights, absent a compelling state interest. State v. Bennett, 288
Kan. 86, 91, 200 P.3d 455 (2009). Moreover, even those conditions that do not infringe
upon constitutional rights may exceed the district court's statutory authority if they are
not "reasonably related to the rehabilitative goal of probation or to the protection of the
victim and society." Schad, 41 Kan. App. 2d 805, Syl. ¶ 8. Crawford bears the burden of
showing the district court abused its discretion by imposing these conditions. See State v.
Vanderveen, 259 Kan. 836, 843, 915 P.2d 57 (1996).

Crawford fails to make any argument regarding the requirement that he perform
community or public service work; thus, we deem his challenge to this condition
abandoned. See State v. Llamas, 298 Kan. 246, 264, 311 P.3d 399 (2013). Regarding the
remaining conditions, Crawford argues alcohol use was not reasonably related to the
crime. Because Crawford makes no assertion that the alcohol-related probation
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conditions restrict his constitutional rights, we examine only whether these probation
conditions bear a reasonable relationship to the rehabilitative goals of Crawford.

In State v. Gordon, No. 94,477, 2006 WL 1379689 (Kan. App. 2006), rev. denied
282 Kan. 793 (2006) (unpublished opinion), our court addressed a similar issue. Gordon
objected to the requirement that he receive tests for drug and alcohol use. We found:

"The use of controlled substances is illegal, and the State has an interest in ensuring that
those placed on probation are not engaged in illegal behavior. While the use of alcohol is
not illegal once one reaches the legal age of consumption, alcohol abuse is a factor that is
directly related to the possibility of engaging in future criminal behavior. The State's
interest in regulating alcohol abuse when one is under the supervision of community
corrections falls within the broad powers of the court in determining conditions of
probation." 2006 WL 1379689, at *3.

Following the decision in Gordon, we find "the conditions of probation imposed
bear a reasonable relationship to the rehabilitative goals of probation, the protection of
the public, and the nature of the offense." 2006 WL 1379689, at *3. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in imposing conditions of probation on Crawford that prohibited
him from possessing or consuming alcohol and from patronizing establishments whose
primary purpose is to serve alcohol.

Affirmed.