State v. Church

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 118,311

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

STEVEN C. CHURCH,
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; STEPHEN J. TERNES, judge. Opinion filed July 5, 2019.
Affirmed.

Carl F.A. Maughan, of Maughan Law Group LC, of Wichita, for appellant.

Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before STANDRIDGE, P.J., GARDNER, J., and WALKER, S.J.

PER CURIAM: Steven C. Church directly appeals his convictions by a jury of rape
and aggravated indecent liberties with a child. On appeal, Church claims his convictions
are based on insufficient evidence. Church also argues that the district court erred by
failing to instruct the jury to consider the victim's testimony without sympathy, in
denying his motion for a mistrial, and in denying his motion to suppress his statements to
police. Because we find no errors requiring reversal, Church's convictions are affirmed.


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FACTS

In 2016, V.R. told her soon-to-be adoptive father S.D. that she needed to tell him a
secret; she was 10 years old at the time. V.R. told S.D. that a man she knew as "Zero"
was babysitting her when she woke up to him naked in her bed and under the covers with
her. Specifically, V.R. explained that she fell asleep watching television and when she
awoke to something touching her, she lifted her covers to find Zero in her bed and naked.
This event was alleged to have occurred between October 2012 and January 2013 when
V.R. was only six or seven years old. Knowing Zero was the nickname for Church, one
of V.R.'s biological mother's friends, S.D. relayed the information to his wife before also
reporting it to the police.

After the report, police began investigating the incident. As a part of the
investigation, police interviewed V.R., Church, and Church's wife Shirley McCabe. The
investigation yielded no physical evidence of the crime.

During Church's interview with police, he initially denied the allegation against
him but eventually confessed to having various sexual contacts with V.R. Specifically,
Church confessed to penetrating V.R.'s vagina with his penis and to having V.R. fondle
his penis with her hand. Church told police that the sexual contact occurred at his home
when V.R. was approximately six or seven years old. V.R. gave a similar explanation of
the events but added that Church also put his penis in her mouth.

As a result of the investigation, the State charged Church with rape, aggravated
criminal sodomy, and aggravated indecent liberties with a child.

At trial, Church testified that he never had sexual contact with V.R. and that he
only confessed to police to stop the questioning. V.R. testified that Church did engage in
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various sexual acts with her but no longer thought Church put his penis in her mouth. As
a result of that testimony, the State dismissed the aggravated criminal sodomy charge.

Ultimately, a jury convicted Church of the two remaining counts—rape and
aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Church was sentenced to life in prison without
the possibility of parole for 25 years.

Church has timely appealed his convictions. We will add additional facts in
discussing the issues on appeal.

ANALYSIS

Does sufficient evidence support Church's conviction?

Church argues that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.

The law regarding sufficiency of evidence is well settled:

"'When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard
of review is whether, after reviewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, the appellate court is convinced a rational factfinder could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence,
resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations.' [Citation
omitted.]" State v. Chandler, 307 Kan. 657, 668, 414 P.3d 713 (2018).

It is only in rare cases where the testimony is so incredible that no reasonable fact-finder
could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that a guilty verdict will be reversed. State v.
Matlock, 233 Kan. 1, 5-6, 660 P.2d 945 (1983).

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Church has numerous complaints about the evidence presented against him in this
case. He maintains that because the State's case lacked physical and forensic evidence
and eyewitness testimony, it was weak and did not amount to sufficient evidence. Church
further contends that this is a "'he said/she said' case in which the credibility of the parties
was crucial." Church also emphasizes that there was testimony regarding his low IQ and
tendency to "agree with people to avoid uncomfortable situations."

The analysis Church asks us to conduct, however, would require that we reweigh
evidence and decide the credibility of the victim's testimony. But when a verdict or trial
court decision is challenged for insufficiency of evidence or as being contrary to the
evidence, we cannot reweigh the evidence or pass on the credibility of the witnesses. If
the evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
supports the verdict, the verdict will not be disturbed on appeal. Wolfe Electric, Inc. v.
Duckworth, 293 Kan. 375, 407, 266 P.3d 516 (2011).

Here, the jury heard testimony from the victim and an admission from Church
during his interview with police. That information was enough to prove the elements of
both rape and aggravated indecent liberties with a child. V.R. testified that Church kissed
her, penetrated her vagina with his penis, and put his penis in her hand. Church admitted
to those actions. Although Church attempts to cloud the analysis with assertions
regarding his low IQ, those assertions are irrelevant here. The victim's testimony and
Church's confession were enough to support the jury's conviction.

Did the district court err in failing to give a no-sympathy instruction?

Church argues that the district court erred when it failed to sua sponte instruct the
jury to consider the victim's testimony without sympathy. The State asserts that this case
is not one of the unique cases in which the no-sympathy instruction was factually
appropriate. The State furthers its argument by pointing out that there is no Kansas
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caselaw supporting Church's argument and that Church does not demonstrate clear error
requiring reversal on this issue.

The rules surrounding our review under these circumstances are clear:

"When analyzing jury instruction issues, we follow a three-step process:
'(1) determining whether the appellate court can or should review the issue, i.e., whether
there is a lack of appellate jurisdiction or a failure to preserve the issue for appeal; (2)
considering the merits of the claim to determine whether error occurred below; and (3)
assessing whether the error requires reversal, i.e., whether the error can be deemed
harmless.' [Citation omitted.]" State v. McLinn, 307 Kan. 307, 317, 409 P.3d 1 (2018).

Whether a party has preserved a jury instruction issue affects the appellate court's
reversibility inquiry at the third step. 307 Kan. at 317; K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3414(3)
("No party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction . . . unless the
party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict . . . unless the
instruction or the failure to give an instruction is clearly erroneous."). At the second step,
appellate courts consider whether the instruction was legally and factually appropriate,
using an unlimited review of the entire record. McLinn, 307 Kan. at 318.

When we apply the clear error standard at the third step because the party did not
object to the jury instruction below, we will only reverse the district court if an error
occurred and we are firmly convinced that the jury would have reached a different verdict
if the instruction error had not occurred. The party claiming a clear error has the burden
to demonstrate the necessary prejudice. McLinn, 307 Kan. at 318.

In evaluating whether an instruction rises to the level of clear error, the issue of
"[r]eversibility is subject to unlimited review and is based on the entire record. It is the
defendant's burden to establish clear error under K.S.A. 22-3414(3)." State v. Betancourt,
299 Kan. 131, 135, 322 P.3d 353 (2014). The clear error determination must review the
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impact of the erroneous instruction in light of the entire record including the other
instructions, counsel's arguments, and whether the evidence is overwhelming. In re Care
& Treatment of Thomas, 301 Kan. 841, 849, 348 P.3d 576 (2015).

"To establish clear error, 'the defendant must firmly convince the appellate court
that the giving of the instruction would have made a difference in the verdict.' [Citation
omitted.]" State v. Cooper, 303 Kan. 764, 771, 366 P.3d 232 (2016).

Church concedes that the no-sympathy instruction was not requested before the
district court. Still, Church argues that because the victim was 10 years old when she
gave her testimony, was six or seven years old when she was assaulted, and while
testifying held onto a stuffed animal which she described as her "'worry eater,'" the
instruction was required to ensure the jury did not give in to their prejudices or
sympathies. Although the facts of V.R.'s assault in relation to her age are disturbing, they
are not so unique that failure to give the instruction was clearly erroneous. After a careful
review of the record, we are not convinced that the jury would have reached a different
verdict if the instruction had been given.

Both parties acknowledge that the no-sympathy instruction is no longer included
in the standard PIK instructions and that our Supreme Court has recognized that the
instruction has been disapproved for general use. See State v. Jones, 298 Kan. 324, 338-
39, 311 P.3d 1125 (2013); State v. Baker, 281 Kan. 997, 1004, 135 P.3d 1098 (2006).
Our Supreme Court has also held that "a no-sympathy instruction is only legally
appropriate in very unusual circumstances." State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 1039, 1044, 329
P.3d 420 (2014).

The State correctly notes that Church's brief has failed to provide us with a
factually similar instance in which our appellate courts have granted relief on these
grounds. But Church does cite State v. Rhone, 219 Kan. 542, 548 P.2d 752 (1976), in
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which the victim was dying from cancer when she was required to testify. In that case,
the judge, jury, and defendant were required to go to the victim's house to hear her
testimony. Under those unique circumstances, our Supreme Court held that the district
court adequately instructed the jury that "neither prejudice nor sympathy should be
allowed to influence the verdict." 219 Kan. at 545.

However, we believe Rhone has little applicability here. Constructively moving an
entire courtroom to the bedside of a dying victim is such a dramatic and factually singular
event, and one without precedent in our caselaw, that our Supreme Court felt the unique
circumstances were best left to the trial court's discretion. There are fact patterns in other
Kansas cases which are more similar to ours.

The State cites Baker, 281 Kan. 997; State v. Holmes, 278 Kan. 603, 102 P.3d 406
(2004); and State v. Reser, 244 Kan. 306, 767 P.2d 1277 (1989), to argue that this case
did not warrant the instruction. In Baker, our Supreme Court held that the no-sympathy
instruction was not warranted in a case with evidence that a murder victim was paraplegic
and suffered from extreme pain and physical weakness when he was killed. 281 Kan. at
1005. Our Supreme Court made a similar holding in Holmes where the family members
of a murder victim began crying and were escorted out of the courtroom. 278 Kan. at
635-36. Finally, in a case involving facts more closely analogous with the crime
committed here, our Supreme Court held that there were no unusual circumstances
requiring the no-sympathy instruction where a 14-year-old was testifying against her
stepfather for rape and sodomy. Reser, 244 Kan. at 317. These cases illustrate that the
circumstances of this case are not so unusual that a no-sympathy instruction was required
to curb the sympathies and prejudices of the jury.

To find that this case presents a sufficiently unique factual scenario warranting use
of the no-sympathy instruction would ignore the regularity of this awful but prevalent
situation. Because of this, we are not persuaded by Church's request for a new trial on
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these grounds. In short, we find no clear error by the district court in not giving a no-
sympathy instruction sua sponte.

Did the district court err in denying Church's motion for a mistrial?

Church argues that the district court erred in denying his requests for a mistrial
after the jury heard evidence implying that he had a criminal history and after a juror
reportedly used his or her cell phone during the trial.

Although Church attempts to refute the applicable standard of review, the law
surrounding the district court's decision here is well settled. We review the district court's
application of the two-step process provided in K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c) for mistrials under
an abuse of discretion standard. Judicial discretion is abused if the judicial decision: (1)
is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) is based on an error of law; or (3) is based on
an error of fact. State v. Moyer, 306 Kan. 342, 355-56, 410 P.3d 71 (2017).

In evaluating a motion for mistrial under K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c), the district court
must first decide if there is prejudicial conduct, inside or outside of the courtroom,
resulting in a fundamental failure in the proceeding. If so, the district court must next
decide whether the conduct makes it impossible to continue the trial without injustice or
whether the prejudicial conduct's damaging effect can be removed or mitigated by an
admonition, jury instruction, or other action. Moyer, 306 Kan. at 356; see State v.
Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, 118-19, 378 P.3d 1060 (2016).

To determine whether an error makes it impossible to proceed with the trial
without injustice and requires a mistrial, a court must assess whether the fundamental
failure affected a party's substantial rights under the harmless error statutes, K.S.A. 2018
Supp. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105, if a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution
is not implicated; but if a constitutional right is implicated, the error must be assessed
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under the constitutional harmless error standard in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
23, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967). State v. Logsdon, 304 Kan. 3, 39, 371 P.3d
836 (2016).

The first instance of alleged prejudicial activity at trial occurred when the State
was questioning Detective Derek Purcell, the lead detective in this case. The State
inquired how Purcell first contacted Church after V.R.'s account was reported to the
police. Purcell responded, "[V.R.] would refer to Steven as Zero so I started checking
police department records looking for the identifying information she had given to find
someone that matched that description. That was how I came up with Steven Church."
The State then asked what form of communication the detective used to contact Church
and if a meeting with him was scheduled. It was at this point that Church's counsel
objected to the State's use of the police records on the basis that they violated a pretrial
motion in limine. The district court had previously granted Church's oral motion in limine
and in a handwritten minute order had barred admission of "information re [Church's]
prior bad acts or convictions." Church also moved for a mistrial. The district court denied
Church's request after finding that the detective "did not mention any sort of criminal
conviction or any sort of criminal history or anything like that. . . . It did not in my eyes
violate the order in limine."

The second occasion of alleged prejudice Church complains about came soon after
the first. The State showed the jury the video recording of Church's interview with
Detective Purcell. In the video, Purcell mentioned Church's previous mug shots. Church
objected again, arguing that the discussion regarding mug shots also violated the district
court's order in limine because it implied that Church had a prior criminal history. Church
again requested a mistrial. The district court agreed with Church that the reference to the
mug shots violated the order in limine but held that the reference did not merit a mistrial.
The district court also noted that Church's counsel admittedly had reviewed the video
before trial but did not object to the video after doing so. Before proceeding, however, the
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district court reviewed the remainder of the video to ensure that no other prejudicial
material was contained in it. After reviewing it, the parties agreed that five additional
redactions were required. Those redactions were made before the jury viewed the
remainder of the video.

Finally, during the trial Church objected to a juror's conduct but ultimately did not
request a mistrial based on the juror's action. Church's counsel was apparently notified
that a juror was texting while evidence was being presented. Church notified the district
court but only requested that the jurors be admonished. The court agreed and addressed
the jury as a whole, reminding them that cell phones usage of any kind was not permitted
during trial.

Church argues that each of these instances required the district court to declare a
mistrial because the evidence was overly prejudicial. Church further argues that the juror
misconduct impeded his constitutional right to a fair trial. In response, the State asserts
that we should deny Church's claim here because he waited until two additional questions
were asked before making an objection to the evidence. Thus, according to the State,
Church failed to make a timely objection. The State also suggests that Church's
arguments are nothing more than unsupported, conclusory statements that also lack merit.
But even if we disregard the timeliness of Church's objection, as noted below, we have
ultimately concluded that the evidence does not support Church's assertion that the
district court abused its discretion in denying his requests for a mistrial.

The State cites two significant cases in support of the district court's decision not
to declare a mistrial, State v. Trotter, 245 Kan. 657, 783 P.2d 1271 (1989), and State v.
Childs, 198 Kan. 4, 422 P.2d 898 (1967). In Trotter, our Supreme Court addressed the
State's reference to mugshots and held that the issue of prejudice must be decided on a
case-by-case basis. 249 Kan. at 662. In Trotter, a detective testified regarding the manner
in which his photograph lineup identifying the defendant was compiled. The detective
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testified that mug shots from the bureau's identification system were used to find the
defendant's photo. Our Supreme Court held that "the reference to 'mug shots' was brief
and not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial." 245 Kan. at 662. Likewise, in
Childs, our Supreme Court held that a witness' reference to the defendant's mug shots was
not reversible error. Instead, the court held that the proper remedy for the defendant was
to move to strike. 198 Kan. at 12.

Just as in Trotter and Childs, the references to Church's arrest record and mug
shots were also very short. Here, the jury only was briefly notified that Detective Purcell
identified Church using police reports. Although the jury also heard a reference to mug
shots in Church's interview with police, these were brief instances and were quickly
identified and resolved. But we also are mindful that we need to exercise great care
before concluding that there was no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying a
mistrial.

Our Supreme Court has warned against giving blanket approval of similar
situations in Childs:

"We specifically condemn the tactics often employed by overzealous witnesses of
injecting clearly incompetent testimony, not otherwise admissible, which implies the
accused has a prior criminal record, in an obvious effort to create prejudice in the minds
of the jury. Decisions in which the admission of such testimony has been held not to have
resulted in prejudicial error must be confined to the specific facts of each case rather than
an indication of carte blanche approval of the practice." 198 Kan. at 12.

Still, Church's argument here is ultimately unpersuasive to us. The district court
responded quickly and appropriately in dealing with all three of the instances where
potentially prejudicial conduct occurred. We cannot find that any of these alleged lapses
during the trial amounted to a fundamental failure in the proceeding. And in our opinion
the district court's prompt actions in response to defense objections certainly mitigated
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any damaging effects resulting from the violation of pretrial orders in limine. Based upon
our conclusions, Church has failed to establish an abuse of discretion on the part of the
district court in denying various defense motions for mistrial.

As a final note, we believe Church's argument regarding the alleged juror
misconduct is misplaced and is also unpersuasive. The State correctly notes that Church
requested that the juror be admonished for his or her actions. Requiring reversal here
would ignore that Church invited the alleged error. Once again, Church has failed to
show how the district court's decision was an abuse of discretion.

Did the district court err in denying Church's motion to suppress?

In his final issue on appeal, Church argues that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress his statements to Purcell.

A dual standard is used when reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion to
suppress a confession. First, we review the factual underpinnings of the decision under a
substantial competent evidence standard. Second, the ultimate legal conclusion drawn
from those facts is reviewed de novo. In this process we do not reweigh the evidence,
assess the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicting evidence. State v. Dern, 303
Kan. 384, 392, 362 P.3d 566 (2015).

Church argues that he was not subjected to overt coercion but that his statements
were nevertheless involuntary. Church's argument is mostly grounded on testimony given
by his wife regarding his mental capacity and how it affected his ability to answer the
detective's questions without coercion. In this regard, Church claims that his

"free will was overborne by a combination of the nature of the detention and
interrogation along with the fact that [Church] suffers from certain learning disabilities
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and was unable to read beyond a rudimentary level . . . , had difficulty comprehending
certain concepts, gets confused easily . . . and had a tendency to simply agree with people
in stressful circumstances."

The State has the burden to prove the voluntariness of a confession by a
preponderance of the evidence—that the statement was the product of the defendant's free
and independent will. Dern, 303 Kan. at 392. In determining the issue, the district court
looks at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession and determines its
voluntariness by considering the following nonexclusive factors: (1) the accused's mental
condition; (2) the manner and duration of the interrogation; (3) the ability of the accused
to communicate on request with the outside world; (4) the accused's age, intellect, and
background; (5) the fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogation; and (6) the
accused's fluency with the English language. State v. Woods, 301 Kan. 852, 867, 348
P.3d 583 (2015); see Dern, 303 Kan. at 392.

"'These factors are not to be weighed against one another with those favorable to
a free and voluntary confession offsetting those tending to the contrary. Instead, the
situation surrounding the giving of a confession may dissipate the import of an individual
factor that might otherwise have a coercive effect. Even after analyzing such dilution, if
any, a single factor or a combination of factors considered together may inevitably lead to
a conclusion that under the totality of circumstances a suspect's will was overborne and
the confession was not therefore a free and voluntary act.' [Citation omitted.]" State v.
Mattox, 305 Kan. 1015, 1043, 390 P.3d 514 (2017).

Before trial, Church filed a motion to suppress, arguing his statements to law
enforcement were coerced and involuntary. Church's motion hinged on his low intellect
and his inability to read, write, or do math at more than an elementary level. The district
court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter.

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Only Detective Purcell and McCabe testified at the hearing on the motion to
suppress. Purcell testified that he set up an interview with Church and McCabe. They
arrived on the same date and at the same time. He asked that Church wait in one of the
interviewing rooms while he questioned McCabe first. Purcell testified that the door to
the interview room where Church was waiting was locked but that he told Church to
simply knock if he needed anything. According to Purcell, Church waited about 50
minutes to an hour in the locked interview room before his interview began and that he
was in the interview room for a total of six hours. Purcell estimated that only three of the
six hours were used to actually question Church about the allegations against him. Purcell
further testified that Church was not handcuffed or shackled during his interview and that
Church seemingly followed and understood the conversation.

McCabe testified that Church could not read or write and was "easily confused
when asked questions." McCabe further testified that Church had an extreme learning
disability but gave contradictory testimony as to whether Church had ever been formally
diagnosed.

McCabe also called Church's ability to comprehend information into question
before Church was interviewed by Purcell. In fact, she told Purcell that Church could not
read or write. Knowing this, Purcell offered to read through Church's Miranda rights as
he followed along. Church agreed and seemingly followed through the discussion of his
rights with Purcell's direction. Church indicated he understood those rights and asked no
questions before continuing to speak with Purcell.

While speaking with Purcell, Church initially denied ever touching V.R.
inappropriately. However, Church eventually confessed to having sexual contact with
V.R. As a result, Church was arrested after the interview was over.

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After reviewing the video of Church's interview and the arguments and evidence
presented at the hearing, the district court made its ruling. The district court found that
Church appeared to be sober and that he "respond[ed] appropriately to the detective's
questions." The district court also further stated:

"There is some evidence that Mr. Church is illiterate and that he can perhaps read and
write at a very primitive level and there is some evidence of a learning disability. That
evidence was provided by his wife.
. . . .
"While I realize that he may have a learning disability, I don't know the extent of that
learning disability. So all I have to go on is the evidence that I've seen on the interview
and the video and what's been explained by the people who have testified here in court.
"In the interview Mr. Church did not appear confused. He did not appear to be
unable to track the detective's questions. He did not respond repeatedly with I don't
understand or that doesn't make any sense or I can't follow the questions.
"If one watches the interview, he appears simply to be in a discussion with the
detective. So my evaluation of his mental condition, while he may suffer from some
learning disability, that he was able to participate adequately in the interview and answer
the questions appropriately."

The district court also noted that the six-hour interview was lengthy but that the extended
amount of time was in part due to the need to question Church's wife first. The district
court further found that Purcell "did not make any threats, promises or deceive [Church]
in any way." Based on this evidence, the district court found that the State met its burden
of proving Church's statements were made knowingly and voluntarily and were of his
own free will.

Viewing the totality of the circumstances here, we are convinced that the district
court properly denied Church's motion. Although McCabe testified that Church was
mentally disabled, no documentation was submitted to confirm her testimony. While it is
correct that Church was locked in an interview room for six hours, he was offered water
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and bathroom breaks, and he did take one bathroom break. Additionally, only three of
those hours were actually used to question Church.

Church was 33 years old at the time of his interview. He was read his Miranda
rights and did not make any indication that he did not understand those rights. Detective
Purcell testified that Church seemingly tracked the conversation and gave "rational
responses . . . appropriate to the questions [being asked]." After reviewing the video, the
district court agreed with Purcell and found that Church understood the questions and
answered appropriately. Our review of the video confirms the soundness of that finding.

The State cites State v. Walker, 283 Kan. 587, 153 P.3d 1257 (2007), to support its
argument that the district court properly denied Church's motion to suppress. In Walker,
our Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to allow the defendant's
confession into evidence despite the fact that the defendant was in the interview room for
almost 13 hours and confessed after 8 hours of questioning. 283 Kan. at 597, 603. The
State simply compares that time to the time frames relevant here in arguing that the
confession was voluntarily given. This comparison is somewhat applicable but does little
to actually assist our review of the issue presented. On the other hand, Church's brief does
not provide us with any factually similar cases and also does not address the majority of
the applicable factors for this analysis.

We note that our Supreme Court conducted a similar factual analysis in State v.
Woods, 301 Kan. 852, 348 P.3d 583 (2015). In Woods, a defendant on trial for murder
argued that his statements to police were involuntary because he was in the interview
room for six hours, had an IQ in the mild mental retardation range, wrongly believed he
had to speak with police to get information about his wife and children, and had
previously been diagnosed with schizophrenia. Our Supreme Court held that the
defendant's inculpatory statements were voluntarily given after noting that the defendant's
actual interview lasted only about 90 minutes; the defendant told police he had graduated
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from high school; and the defendant seemingly understood the questions as they were
posed and answered them appropriately. 301 Kan. at 867-68. Woods bears a significant
factual resemblance to the circumstances of Church's interview.

Ultimately, we believe that no one individual factor, standing alone, suggests that
Church's free will was overcome. Moreover, Church is required to "show he was coerced
into confession." Woods, 301 Kan. at 868; see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-
65, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986) (low intellect not basis for finding statement
involuntary if no coercion). We believe he has not met his burden to show such coercion.
Under the totality of the circumstances of the interview, we hold that Church's statements
were a product of his own free and independent will. Thus, the district court did not err in
denying the motion to suppress Church's statements during his interview with Detective
Purcell.

Affirmed.