State v. Brown

1

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 116,492

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

ABIGAIL KRISTINE BROWN,
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Saline District Court; PATRICK H. THOMPSON, judge. Opinion on remand filed
January 11, 2019. Affirmed.

Heather Cessna, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Amy E. Norton, assistant county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before HILL, P.J., MALONE, J., and MERLIN G. WHEELER, District Judge, assigned.

PER CURIAM: Abigail Brown (Abigail) appeals her convictions of three counts of
possession of a controlled substance and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia.
Abigail claims the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress the evidence.
Our court initially affirmed the district court's judgment in an opinion filed December 15,
2017. State v. Brown, No. 116,492, 2017 WL 6395901 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished
opinion). Abigail filed a petition for review. On November 30, 2018, the Kansas Supreme
Court filed an order that summarily vacated our court's original decision and remanded
for reconsideration in light of State v. Jimenez, 308 Kan. 315, 420 P.3d 464 (2018); State
v. Schooler, 308 Kan. 333, 419 P.3d 1164 (2018); and State v. Lowery, 308 Kan. 359, 420
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P.3d 456 (2018). After considering these recent decisions and applying them to our facts,
we again uphold the district court's decision to deny the motion to suppress.

We begin by reciting the facts in our original opinion:

"On November 20, 2015, Norris, a deputy for the Saline County Sheriff's Office,
was on duty by himself with his drug K-9 on Interstate 70, where the posted speed limit
was 75 miles per hour. Soon after midnight, Norris clocked a car traveling 87 miles per
hour, and he proceeded to pull the car over. Alexandra Brown (Alexandra) was driving
the car, and her sister, Abigail, was a passenger.
"While approaching the car from the passenger side, Norris observed that the car
had multiple air fresheners hanging from the rearview mirror. He also observed that the
car had a 'lived-in' appearance, meaning that the car contained lots of trash in the form of
empty drinks and empty bags of food. Norris asked the women where they were going,
and they indicated they had been driving for about 15 hours from Ohio where they had
traveled to see their father. Norris discovered that the car was a rental car, and the
Browns provided Norris with the rental agreement. Alexandra told Norris that her
grandmother had rented the car for them because they did not have credit cards. While
reviewing the rental agreement, Norris noticed that the rental car was past due.
"Norris asked the Browns for their driver's licenses, which they provided him.
Norris took the driver's licenses and the rental agreement back to his vehicle for further
investigation. When Norris got back to his vehicle, he requested that Deputy Jay Martin
come to their location. Norris requested backup so that Martin could complete the
speeding citation while Norris performed an exterior sniff search with his K-9.
"When Martin arrived, Norris had just begun typing the digiticket. After Norris
briefly informed Martin of the situation, Martin began completing the citation in Norris'
vehicle. Norris asked the Browns to exit the car so his K-9 could perform the sniff search.
Following some resistance from Alexandra, the Browns exited their vehicle. Norris and
his K-9 then conducted the exterior sniff search of the rental car, and the K-9 alerted in
front of the passenger side door.
"Based on the K-9's alert, Norris searched the car. In two bags inside the car,
Norris found marijuana, a glass pipe, a metal pipe, and prescription medication:
dextroamphetamine and oxycodone, which were not prescribed to Alexandra or Abigail.
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Norris' body camera recorded his entire encounter with the Browns. Martin's body
camera also recorded his involvement with the traffic stop. For simplicity, we will
summarize the timeline of events in accordance with Norris' and Martin's body cameras:
 At 12:09, Norris approached the Browns' rental car.
 At 12:11, Norris obtained the Browns' driver's licenses and rental agreement.
 At 12:12, Norris returned to his vehicle and began reviewing the rental
agreement.
 At 12:13, Norris radioed Martin for backup.
 At 12:14, Norris radioed dispatch to run a status and warrants check on
Alexandra.
 At 12:15, Norris completed his relay of Alexandra's information to dispatch.
 At 12:17, dispatch radioed its findings on Alexandra to Norris.
 Between 12:15 and 12:17, while corresponding with dispatch, Norris reviewed
the rental agreement and the driver's licenses.
 At 12:18, Norris radioed dispatch to run a status and warrants check on Abigail.
 At 12:19, dispatch radioed its findings on Abigail to Norris; she had no
outstanding warrants.
 At 12:20, Martin arrived on the scene and Norris can be heard typing out the
citation.
 From 12:20 to 12:21, Norris informed Martin of the situation and instructed him
to complete the citation.
 At 12:21, Norris instructed the Browns to exit the car so he could perform an
exterior sniff search.
 At 12:22, Norris got his dog out of his vehicle.
 At 12:23, the dog alerted at the passenger side door, indicating that contraband
was in the car.
 At 12:24, the dog sniff was complete.
"Based on these events, the State charged Abigail with three counts of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance and one count of possession of drug use
paraphernalia. Abigail subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence. In the
motion, Abigail argued, among other things, that Norris unnecessarily prolonged the stop
without reasonable suspicion of any crime other than the speeding violation.
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"On February 11, 2016, the district court held a hearing on Abigail's motion to
suppress. Both Norris and Martin testified at the hearing, and a DVD of the stop was
admitted into evidence. In addition to the above facts, Norris testified that normally it
takes approximately 15 minutes from the time of an initial traffic stop to the time
required to complete a citation. That estimation was based on Norris writing between 250
to 300 citations and warnings a year and also on Norris having worked with his
department's computerized citation format for three years.
"After hearing the evidence, the district court made detailed factual findings
about the law enforcement investigation and the duration of the traffic stop. The district
court found that the entire traffic stop, from the time the stop was initiated until the dog
sniff search was completed, occurred within 15 minutes. From these findings, the district
court concluded that Norris diligently pursued his investigation and did not purposely
prolong the stop. The district court also concluded that Norris did not measurably extend
the duration of the traffic stop in order to perform the K-9 sniff search. Accordingly, the
district court denied the motion to suppress.
"On April 11, 2016, the case proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated facts. Based
on the stipulated evidence, the district court found Abigail guilty on all counts. On June
27, 2016, the district court imposed a controlling sentence of 11 months' imprisonment
and placed Abigail on probation for 12 months. Abigail timely appealed her convictions."
2017 WL 6395901, at *1-2.

In her original brief to our court, Abigail argued that Norris measurably extended
the duration of her traffic stop longer than normally required for the issuance of a
citation. She argued that Norris purposely delayed his execution of the citation while
waiting for backup, so he could take his drug-sniffing K-9 around the car. This way,
Abigail asserted, Norris made it appear as though the traffic stop was not extended
beyond the issuance of her citation. In addition, Abigail contended that Norris did not
gain a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to extend the scope of the stop.

In its initial brief, the State argued that Norris did not delay the traffic stop beyond
the normal time to issue a citation. The State contended that when considering the totality
of the circumstances, Norris did not unreasonably extend the duration of the stop to
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perform the K-9 sniff search. The State also argued that Norris had reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity to extend the scope of the stop beyond the issuance of a citation.

An appellate court applies a bifurcated standard of review of a district court's
decision on a motion to suppress. The appellate court reviews the district court's factual
findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence.
State v. Patterson, 304 Kan. 272, 274, 371 P.3d 893 (2016). The district court's ultimate
legal conclusion is reviewed using a de novo standard. 304 Kan. at 274. When the
material facts to the district court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence are not in
dispute, the question of whether to suppress is a question of law over which an appellate
court has unlimited review. State v. Cleverly, 305 Kan. 598, 604, 385 P.3d 512 (2016).

In our initial decision, we agreed with the district court that Norris did not
measurably extend the duration of the traffic stop in order to perform the K-9 sniff
search. 2017 WL 6395901, at *4. We also found from the evidence that Norris diligently
pursued his investigation and did not purposely prolong the traffic stop so that he could
conduct his search. 2017 WL 6395901, at *4-5. We concluded that because Norris
conducted the K-9 sniff search and located the contraband without measurably extending
the duration of the initial traffic stop, we did not need to address whether he had
reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity to extend the scope of the stop. 2017
WL 6395901, at *5. As ordered by our Supreme Court, we will reconsider our original
decision in light of the later rulings in Jimenez, Schooler, and Lowery.

State v. Jimenez

In Jimenez, Officer Nicholas Blake performed a traffic stop on a vehicle driven by
Jimenez. After obtaining driver's licenses from Jimenez and her passenger, Blake asked
Jimenez to go with him to his patrol vehicle, saying "he likely would only issue a
warning citation." 308 Kan. at 318. Once they were inside the patrol vehicle, Blake
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questioned Jimenez for four and one-half minutes about her travel plans. After these
questions, and about five and one-half minutes into the traffic stop, Blake called the
driver's license information into dispatch. He then deployed his police dog to perform a
search around the car. Six minutes and 49 seconds into the traffic stop, the dog alerted. A
search of the automobile revealed about $50,000 in cash, and "[t]he State charged
Jimenez with criminal transportation of drug proceeds and, in the alternative, criminal
transfer of drug proceeds." 308 Kan. at 318-19.

In the district court, Jimenez moved to suppress the traffic stop evidence. The
district court granted the motion, finding that the initial stop was supported by reasonable
suspicion, but that "Blake measurably extended the stop with travel plan questioning
unrelated to the traffic violation," and "no articulable facts supported a reasonable
suspicion that other criminal activity was occurring to justify the delay." 308 Kan. at 319-
20. The State appealed, and this court reversed the district court, holding that minimal
travel plan questions are always within the scope of a traffic stop. 308 Kan. at 320.

Jimenez petitioned for review and the question before our Supreme Court was
"limited to whether the four-and-a-half minutes Blake questioned Jimenez about her
travel plans rendered the stop's duration unreasonable." 308 Kan. at 322. Our Supreme
Court examined relevant traffic stop jurisprudence, noting that "during a stop an officer
may not conduct non-consensual inquiries unrelated to the [traffic-stop] mission in a way
that prolongs the stop—without the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify
detaining an individual." 308 Kan. at 323-24. The court also explained that officers

"must be attentive to how and when they conduct what may be viewed as unrelated
inquiries. They must be especially careful to ensure nonconsensual inquiries occur
concurrently with the tasks permitted for such stops so they will not measurably extend
the time it would otherwise take. . . . If not, the unrelated inquiries must be supported by
reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or consent. Without this, the detention becomes
unconstitutional." 308 Kan. at 326.
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Applying this jurisprudence, our Supreme Court rejected the State's argument that
all travel plan inquiries are per se routine incidents of traffic stops. 308 Kan. at 326-30.
Instead, "questioning into matters unrelated to the initial infraction—like those about
travel plans—is permissible so long as it does not extend the stop's duration." 308 Kan. at
330. Under the facts before it, our Supreme Court affirmed the district court, noting that
Blake's travel plan questions impermissibly prolonged the traffic stop "because Blake was
doing nothing in the interim to process the traffic violation," and he had no "colorable,
independent justification for the portions of the detention attributable solely to the
unrelated inquiries." 308 Kan. at 331.

Finally, our Supreme Court noted the following statement from this Court of
Appeals' decision: "'[T]he entire stop from beginning until the dog alerted, was 6
minutes and 49 seconds. This was not an unreasonable amount of time.'" 308 Kan. at 331.
In response to this finding, our Supreme Court stated:

"We highlight this out of concern the panel was alluding to a standard expressly rejected
by Rodriguez [v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 191 L. Ed. 2d 492 (2015)],
i.e., a rule-of-thumb approach, under which the time taken during the stop is compared to
what would be 'ordinary' for a similar encounter.
"Granted, Rodriguez contains the statement, 'Authority for the seizure thus ends
when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—
completed.' (Emphasis added.) But the decision makes clear this phrasing was not
signaling a stop's reasonable duration is to be judged by a hypothetical 'ordinary' stop.
[Citations omitted.]" Jimenez, 308 Kan. at 332.

State v. Schooler

Schooler also addressed whether a traffic stop was impermissibly extended. In that
case, Sheriff's Deputy Justin Stopper initiated a traffic stop after noticing that the license
plate on the pickup Shaun Schooler was driving was partially obstructed by snow. While
Schooler was gathering his driver's license and rental agreement for the truck, Stopper
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asked where Schooler was coming from. Schooler stated he had initially flown into
Kansas City, rented the truck, driven to Denver to ski and to drop off a 16-foot trailer,
and was heading back to Kansas City to fly home to California.

The vehicle rental agreement stated that it had been rented in California a few days
earlier and was due back there a few days later. When Stopper expressed disbelief about
Schooler's alleged travel plans, Schooler offered to produce airline tickets and began
searching for them, but he never produced them. Stopper also noticed the truck contained
a large duffel bag, several cell phones, and "debris" in the passenger compartment, and it
smelled of air fresheners. Stopper suggested that he and Schooler return to the patrol car
because it was cold; they did, and Stopper texted for a drug dog.

Once in the patrol car, Stopper reviewed Schooler's driver's license and rental
documents and entered information into the vehicle's mobile data terminal, all while
continuing to question Schooler's alleged travel plans and finding the answers suspicious.
About six minutes into the stop, Stopper learned from his data terminal that Schooler was
on federal supervised release, but Schooler was reluctant to explain why. About 7
minutes and 30 seconds into the stop, Stopper called in Schooler's driver's license
information to dispatch. While waiting for a reply, Stopper continued questioning
Schooler about "'pretrial status and stuff.'" 308 Kan. at 337. Schooler explained that he
had gotten in trouble for having a "'very little'" bit of cocaine on a federal base. 308 Kan.
at 338. Stopper questioned whether Schooler was being truthful and continued to ask
about his travel plans and his supervised release.

At about 13 minutes into the stop, Stopper called in to dispatch with "variations in
the vehicle license tag numbers, noting the snow was obscuring some letters and numbers
and some might have been reported incorrectly earlier." 308 Kan. at 338. Dispatch
responded with additional information about Schooler's criminal history, and Stopper
asked additional questions about the crime underlying the federal supervision. At almost
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15 minutes into the stop, Stopper conveyed additional license plate variations to dispatch.
At 17 minutes into the stop, Stopper told Schooler he was going to give him a warning
ticket and that Schooler was "good to go." 308 Kan. at 339.

Almost immediately, however, Stopper asked if he could ask Schooler "'a couple
more questions,'" and when Schooler stated he wanted to "'get back on the road,'" Stopper
asked if there were contraband, large amounts of money, or firearms in the truck. 308
Kan. at 339. Schooler said no, and he also denied a request to search the truck. Stopper
stated that he was detaining Schooler because "'[y]our story's garbage. I believe criminal
activity is afoot.'" 308 Kan. at 339. At this point, the stop had lasted 18 minutes and 30
seconds. Eleven minutes later, a drug dog arrived; it alerted, and a subsequent search
revealed drugs and scales.

Schooler was charged with drug crimes and moved to suppress the evidence seized
in the search of the truck. The district court granted the motion, finding that the traffic
stop's original mission ended when Stopper said Schooler was "good to go" and in fact
"'would have been completed for an additional several minutes prior to the drug dog
arriving had . . . Stopper been diligent in his records check.'" 308 Kan. at 342. The district
court found that Stopper had initially exceeded the scope of the traffic stop without
reasonable suspicion of other crimes, Schooler's responses to questioning did not provide
reasonable suspicion to detain him, Stopper informing Schooler that he was free to leave
was a concession that there was no reasonable suspicion to continue to detain him, and
Stopper had no reasonable suspicion to detain Schooler to wait for a drug dog. 308 Kan.
at 342. On appeal by the State, this court affirmed the district court's judgment. 308 Kan.
at 342-43.

On a petition for review, our Supreme Court reiterated the explanation by the
United States Supreme Court that "an officer's 'mission' during [traffic] stops typically
includes ordinary inquiries to (1) check the driver's license; (2) determine whether there
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are outstanding warrants against the driver; and (3) inspect the vehicle's registration and
proof of insurance." 308 Kan. at 345-46 (citing Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615). The
Schooler court noted its holding in Jimenez that an officer may not conduct
nonconsensual inquiries during a traffic stop that are unrelated to the mission of the stop
in a way that prolongs the stop unless the officer has reasonable suspicion to justify the
detention of the individual. 308 Kan. at 346. That said, the Schooler court also noted that
an officer need not "'disregard information which may lead him or her to suspect
independent criminal activity during a traffic stop.'" 308 Kan. at 346-47.

Turning to the facts before it, the Schooler court noted that Stopper's initial travel-
plan questions "did not impermissibly extend the stop because the questioning occurred
concurrently with the tasks [Stopper] was performing to complete the stop and was
justified by discrepancies between Schooler's story and the rental agreement." 308 Kan.
at 347. The Supreme Court emphasized that both the district court and the Court of
Appeals had not considered whether Stopper's questions "overlapped" his performance of
the tasks necessary to complete the mission of the traffic stop. 308 Kan. at 349-50. Doing
so, the Supreme Court held:

"[U]p to the time [Stopper] advised Schooler of his detention, [Stopper] did not
impermissibly extend the traffic stop's duration. The recordings show [Stopper] was
continuously engaged with Schooler as [Stopper] processed the traffic stop while trying
to satisfy his suspicions about the conflicts in what he was observing and being told." 308
Kan. at 350.

After holding there was no legal impact in Stopper telling Schooler that he was
"good to go," the Schooler court turned to whether Stopper had reasonable suspicion at
that point to detain Schooler to wait for the drug dog. 308 Kan. at 350-53. Based on the
air freshener, several cell phones, discrepancies between Schooler's answers and the
rental document, Schooler's evasive answers about his travel plans, and ambiguous
answers to questions about his criminal history, the Supreme Court held that reasonable
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suspicion of other criminal activity existed when Stopper told Schooler he was free to go,
so Stopper's further detention of Schooler comported with the Fourth Amendment. 308
Kan. at 356. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the suppression of the evidence and
remanded for further proceedings. 308 Kan. at 356.

State v. Lowery

In Lowery, Officer Nicholas Blake initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle driven by
Derrick Lowery for following too closely. During the stop, Lowery accompanied Blake
to his patrol car. While Blake filled out the citation and called dispatch with Lowery's
license information, Lowery told Blake that he was going to Denver from Knoxville; he
was driving a car belonging to a friend because it was cheaper than flying; and his
passenger was going with him to "maybe get a job at a ski resort." 308 Kan. at 360. Blake
returned to the vehicle and asked Lowery's passenger about their travel plans; the
passenger stated they were only going to Colorado for a few days and then would return
to Knoxville, where the passenger had a job. At about 12 minutes into the stop, Blake
went back to his patrol car, received information from dispatch about Lowery, gave
Lowery a citation, and then told him he was free to go.

As Lowery got out of the patrol car but before he shut the door, Blake asked if
Lowery would answer more questions, and Lowery agreed. Lowery denied having
anything illegal in his car, but he also refused Blake's request to search it. Blake asked if
"Lowery would have a problem if a drug dog came," and Lowery asked if he had to wait
or if he could leave. 308 Kan. at 361. At that point, Blake detained Lowery and, when he
could not get a response to his request for a drug dog, Blake left the scene in the hands of
a backup officer and went to his own home where he retrieved his drug dog. About 35
minutes after the stop began, Blake ran his drug dog around the car and discovered "drug-
related evidence." 308 Kan. at 361.

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The State charged Lowery with various drug crimes, and he moved to suppress the
evidence found in the search. The district court granted the motion to suppress, finding
that Blake had unlawfully detained Lowery without reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. 301 Kan. at 362. On appeal by the State, this court affirmed. 308 Kan. at 363.

On a petition for review, the only issue before our Supreme Court was whether
there was reasonable suspicion to detain Lowery once the initial traffic stop ended. 308
Kan. at 366. Our Supreme Court reviewed the State's asserted basis for reasonable
suspicion: "(1) nervousness; (2) inconsistent travel plan statements; (3) operating a third-
party vehicle; (4) traveling to Colorado; (5) the vehicle's recent presence in Columbia,
Missouri"—Blake had learned from a Missouri state trooper during the traffic stop that
the vehicle had been in Columbia three times in the prior month—and (6) Blake's "online
research of airline prices" during the traffic stop, which revealed that all but one airline
offered tickets at prices cheaper than the cost of driving from Knoxville to Denver. 308
Kan. at 362, 367-70. Our Supreme Court held that the State had not met its burden to
show that the detention was lawful because Blake had not provided "'an objectively
reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was or is taking place'" when
he refused to allow Lowery to leave the patrol car. 308 Kan. at 370.

Applying Jimenez, Schooler, and Lowery to Abigail's case

Returning to our facts, we conclude that Jimenez, Schooler, and Lowery do not
change the outcome of Abigail's case, although these decisions cause us to modify our
reasoning. In our original decision, we noted that Norris testified, based on his extensive
experience with traffic stops, that "it takes approximately 15 minutes from the time of an
initial stop to the time required to complete a citation" and that the evidence showed that
the K-9 alerted for drugs on Abigail's car within 15 minutes of the stop. 2017 WL
6395901, at *4. But in Jimenez, our Supreme Court emphasized that courts should not
determine whether traffic stops are impermissibly extended by comparing their duration
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to that of a "hypothetical 'ordinary' stop." 308 Kan. at 332. So the fact that the drug dog
alerted on Abigail's car within 15 minutes of the stop—which is the duration of an
ordinary traffic stop—does not control whether Norris measurably extended the duration
of the traffic stop.

That said, the evidence supports the district court's finding that Norris diligently
pursued his investigation and did not purposely prolong the traffic stop so that he could
conduct his search. Abigail's case does not involve extensive travel plan questioning that
we have in Jimenez, Schooler, and Lowery. Norris simply asked the women where they
were going, learned that the vehicle was a rental car, and immediately discovered that the
rental agreement had expired. Norris asked Abigail and her sister for their driver's
licenses, which they provided him. Norris took the driver's licenses and the rental
agreement back to his vehicle for further investigation. When Norris got back to his
vehicle, he requested that Deputy Martin come to their location as backup. While waiting
for Martin, Norris reviewed the rental agreement and driver's licenses and radioed
dispatch to run a warrants check on Abigail and her sister. Dispatch radioed its findings
that there were no outstanding warrants.

When Martin arrived a few minutes later, Norris had just begun typing the
digiticket. After Norris briefly informed Martin of the situation, Martin began completing
the citation in Norris' vehicle. Norris asked Abigail and her sister to exit the car so his K-
9 could perform the sniff search. Norris and his K-9 then conducted the exterior sniff
search of the rental car, and the K-9 alerted in front of the passenger side door.

The district court found that Norris obtained the Browns' information in a
reasonable amount of time. The district court found that Norris returned to his car and
began diligently reviewing the information, calling the information into dispatch after his
initial review. As soon as he heard back from dispatch, Norris immediately began typing
the citation. The district court noted that it heard Norris typing the citation from his body
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camera from the time he spoke to dispatch until Martin arrived. After Martin arrived, the
district court found that Martin began diligently working on the citation while Norris' K-9
performed an exterior sniff search of the rental car. Finally, the district court determined
that all of these activities occurred within 15 minutes of the initial car stop. Norris' body
camera video, admitted into evidence at the hearing without objection, corroborates all
the district court's findings.

All of Norris' activities were directly related to his "mission" during the traffic
stop, which typically includes ordinary inquiries to (1) check the driver's license; (2)
determine whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver; and (3) inspect the
vehicle's registration and proof of insurance. See Schooler, 308 Kan. at 345-46. Stated
differently, any amount of time it took for Norris to perform the sniff search "overlapped"
his performance of the tasks necessary to complete the mission of the traffic stop. See
308 Kan. at 350. Norris and Martin were "continuously engaged" in the routine duties of
the traffic stop up to the point that the dog alerted to drugs in Abigail's car. See 308 Kan.
at 350.

We again conclude Norris did not measurably extend the duration of the traffic
stop to conduct an exterior K-9 sniff search of Abigail's vehicle. Because Norris
conducted the K-9 sniff search and located the contraband without measurably extending
the duration of the initial traffic stop, we need not address whether he had reasonable
suspicion of additional criminal activity to extend the scope of the stop. For these
reasons, we conclude the district court did not err in denying Abigail's motion to suppress
the evidence.

Affirmed.