State v. Booker

1

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 113,846

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

ROBERT H. BOOKER, III,
Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION


Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; BRUCE C. BROWN, judge. Opinion filed September 16,
2016. Affirmed.

Sam Schirer, of the Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before LEBEN, P.J., PIERRON and MCANANY, JJ.

Per Curiam: A jury convicted Robert H. Booker, III, of aggravated sexual battery.
Booker appeals his conviction arguing the district court failed to rule on his pretrial
motion to proceed pro se; and the district court erred in not ordering another competency
evaluation on the first day of trial.

The State charged Booker with alternative counts of attempted rape and
aggravated sexual battery. The district court appointed the Sedgwick County Public
Defender Office to serve as Booker's counsel. On February 12, 2013, Booker filed a
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motion to dismiss his attorney, Lacy Gilmour, and appoint a new attorney. On February
22, 2013, the court held a hearing on Booker's motion. Booker claimed Gilmour was
involved in a conspiracy "to execute the extinction of [his] existence." Booker claimed
the relationship between Gilmour and himself could not be mended due to her failure to
properly represent him. Booker told the court he had been diagnosed with bipolar
disorder and schizoaffective disorder, and he felt Gilmour should do more to help him get
treatment. The court denied his motion.

On February 28, 2013, Booker filed another motion to dismiss Gilmour as his
counsel. At a hearing on the motion on March 25, 2013, Booker claimed Gilmour had
made continuances against his wishes and the two were unable to communicate. He again
accused Gilmour of conspiring with the State. Gilmour noted that Booker's mental health
condition had worsened since the last time she had seen him. The court ultimately
granted Booker's motion.

Booker's next two appointed attorneys served as counsel for a short period of time.
He filed a motion to dismiss one of these attorneys. On May, 28, 2013, the court
appointed Kevin Loeffler as Booker's attorney.

On July 24, 2013, Loeffler filed a motion to determine Booker's competency. On
July 25, 2013, over Booker's objection, the district court granted the motion and ordered
COMCARE, a Sedgwick County mental health organization, to conduct a competency
evaluation.

In an evaluation report dated August 7, 2013, Dr. Constance Gaston found Booker
was competent to stand trial. The report noted Booker reported he had a prior diagnosis
of bipolar disorder. His current diagnosis was "Unspecified Depressive Disorder with
Schizoaffective Disorder." He sometimes heard voices when he was in a manic phase of
his bipolar disorder. Booker had not taken psychotropic medication for 13 months but
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had been able to "function well." Dr. Gaston concluded his difficulties with his attorneys
"stem[med] more from different expectations regarding legal representation and the court
process rather than from symptoms of untreated mental illness." Based on the report, the
court found Booker competent and set a trial date.

On August 6, 2013, Booker filed a motion to dismiss Loeffler. At the hearing on
his motion on September 20, 2013, Booker accused Loeffler of conspiring against him,
adding:

"I want it to be documented for the record, too, that I'm being set up for a modern-day
institutionalized lynching. It doesn't matter. The powers above from Jehovah through his
son Jesus Christ and Jehovah's Army are getting ready to oust this false government that
you people succumb to and that you people have sold your souls to."

After a short recess, the court granted Booker's motion and dismissed Loeffler. The court
appointed Steven Mank a week later.

On March 24, 2104, Booker filed a motion to dismiss Mank and asking the district
court to allow him to represent himself. At the hearing on the motion, Booker reiterated
his desire to represent himself. After a brief colloquy with Booker about why he wanted
to dismiss Mank, the court asked for Mank's opinion. Mank told the court he had "serious
concerns" about Booker's competency and suggested COMCARE evaluate Booker before
the court allowed Booker to represent himself. After further discussion with Booker and
Mank, the court ordered another competency evaluation. The court stated it would not
rule on Booker's motion to dismiss Mank until it had addressed Booker's competency
issues.

Dr. Gaston performed a second evaluation of Booker on April 25, 2014. She
concluded that Booker was not competent to stand trial. His current diagnosis was
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"Psychotic Disorder Not Specified and Mood Disorder Not Otherwise Specified." She
noted that "[Booker] made grandiose and delusional statements about his legal status and
his 'future.' He also stated his intentions to represent himself in court and described in
detail how he would proceed." She later added that his plan for representing himself in
court was "inappropriate," and "[h]is expectations for the outcome of his trial were not
realistic."

The district court held a competency hearing on April 29, 2014. Booker declared
he was his own counsel and he was competent to stand trial. Based on Dr. Gaston's
evaluation, however, the court found Booker was not competent and ordered further
evaluation and treatment at Larned State Hospital.

On October 6, 2014, Dr. Steven Walters completed a Larned evaluation report. Dr.
Walters diagnosed Booker with "Bipolar I Disorder, Most Recent Episode Manic,
Moderate, With Mood Congruent Psychotic Features." Booker's medications included
Depakote for mood stabilization and Zyprexa Zydis for psychosis. Dr. Walters concluded
Booker was competent to understand the nature of the charges against him and possessed
the basic and fundamental capacity to participate in his own defense. Dr. Walter noted
Booker had "scored above average on all competency scales of the competency test
administered." He also observed that Booker's medication regimen likely helped in
diminishing his symptoms and "recommended the current medication regimen remain in
effect in order to maintain his competent state." On October 29, 2014, the court found
Booker competent to stand trial based on Dr. Walters' report, and again set the case for
trial.

Approximately 2 weeks later, on the morning of a scheduled jury trial, Mank again
raised the issue of Booker's competency. Mank told the district that Booker had not been
taking his medication. At Mank's request, the court ordered another COMCARE
evaluation.
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Dr. Gaston performed a third evaluation on Booker on November 20, 2014, and
concluded Booker was competent to stand trial. She noted he had previously been
diagnosed with "Schizoaffective Disorder Bipolar Type" but his current diagnosis was
"Unspecified Depressive Disorder." She reported Booker had been prescribed Depakote
and Zyprexa, but he had not been taking his medication since leaving Larned State
Hospital. Nevertheless, Booker was not psychotic at the time of the evaluation. Based on
this report, the district court found Booker competent on December 2, 2014, and again set
a date for trial.

On December 20, 2014, Booker's case was set to for trial. Just before voir dire,
Mank raised concerns about Booker's competency again. The deputy who had brought
Booker to the courthouse, Ann Wenzel, had told Mank that Booker reported hearing
voices.

The district court called Deputy Wenzel as a witness. She testified Booker asked
her if the trial was going to go that day and she replied that it probably would. Booker
told Deputy Wenzel he had not been taking his medication but had not told his attorney
because he did not want his attorney to be mad at him. Deputy Wenzel told Booker he
would be able to speak with his attorney soon. Booker then told her he had been hearing
the voices of angels, was unable to concentrate, and had not been able to prepare for trial.

After Deputy Wenzel finished testifying, Mank noted on the record that Booker
had been mumbling to himself during her entire testimony. He also emphasized that
Booker had not been taking his medication, and Dr. Walter's report had recommended
Booker do so to stay competent.

After reviewing Dr. Gaston's most recent evaluation, the district court declined to
order another competency evaluation. The court noted that Dr. Gaston had evaluated
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Booker approximately 1 month before when he was not on medication and found him
competent. The court also observed that Booker had not had any problems "until the eve
of trial." To the court, this suggested Booker was simply trying to delay the proceedings
and "there [was] no mental health issue in terms of competency."

The jury convicted Booker of aggravated sexual battery. After releasing the jury,
the district judge stated:

"At the very beginning of trial yesterday, we had a competency hearing. During that
competency hearing that took place in the law library the defendant was muttering and
talking under his breath continually, rocking back and forth in his chair, not making eye
contact with the participants; however as soon as he got in the courtroom and the trial
began, the defendant's demeanor drastically changed.
"He acted throughout this proceeding in an appropriate manner, he was making
eye contact with the witnesses, attorneys, the participants, there was no muttering, no
talking under his breath, as he had been doing before, no rocking back and forth. He has
shown himself to be attentive, engaged and focused on these proceedings and the
witnesses.
"I would periodically note him quietly and appropriately talking and discussing
matters with his attorney and observed him from time to time going through paperwork.
He comported himself absolutely normal during the trial phase.
"There's absolutely no question in my mind that the defendant is competent, that
he understands, understood the nature of the proceedings against him and to assist in
making his defense."

The district court sentenced Booker to 55 months in prison with lifetime
postrelease supervision. Booker appeals.

Booker first argues he unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation and
the district court erred in never addressing his request. The State argues the court did in
fact address Booker's motion. Furthermore, because Booker was incompetent at the time
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he made the request, there was no need for the court to issue a formal ruling on his
motion.

The extent of the right to assistance of counsel is a question of law subject
to de novo review. State v. Jones, 290 Kan. 373, 376, 228 P.3d 394 (2010).

Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a criminal
defendant has the right to defend himself or herself at trial. A criminal defendant also has
the right to self-representation if an unequivocal request to proceed pro se is accompanied
by a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. Jones, 290 Kan. at 376.
Because of the importance of the right to counsel and the loss of the fundamental rights
accompanying a waiver of that right, an appellate court must indulge every reasonable
presumption against finding a waiver of the right to counsel and will not presume mere
acquiescence in the loss of such a fundamental right. State v. Vann, 280 Kan. 782, 793,
127 P.3d 307 (2006).

The right to self-representation is not absolute. A court may deny a defendant the
right for a number of reasons, including incompetency. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S.
389, 396, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993) ("A criminal defendant may not be
tried unless he is competent . . . and he may not waive his right to counsel . . . unless he
does so 'competently and intelligently.'"). In order to be competent enough to proceed pro
se, a defendant must at least be competent enough to stand trial. See Indiana v. Edwards,
554 U.S. 164, 178, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 171 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2008).

Booker claims the district court did not properly address his request to represent
himself, and his case is materially indistinguishable from Vann. Vann filed a number of
pretrial pro se motions, including a motion to proceed pro se. The district court did not
address the motions before trial, and he did not remind the court that he had filed a
motion to represent himself until after the jury had reached a verdict. Our Supreme Court
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found that once Van clearly and unequivocally invoked the right to self-representation, he
did not need to reassert the right to keep from waiving it. 280 Kan. at 795. Because the
district court failed to address Vann's pretrial motion to proceed pro se, the Supreme
Court reversed his conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. 280 Kan. at 795.

Contrary to Booker's assertion, his case is distinguishable from Vann. For one, the
district court in Vann failed to address Vann's motion to proceed pro se at all. In the
present case, the district court held a hearing on Booker's motion to dismiss his attorney
and proceed pro se. At this hearing, the court questioned Booker regarding the problems
he had with Mank. More importantly, though, Vann's competency was not at issue in
Vann. This has significant consequences for how a district court addresses a defendant's
motion to proceed pro se.

The facts of this case are closer to United State v. Boigegrain, 155 F.3d 1181 (10th
Cir. 1998). In Boigegrain, the defendant filed a pro se motion to have his federal public
defender dismissed, but the court did not release the public defender. Approximately a
week later, the public defender moved for a determination of the defendant's competency
to stand trial. Due to the defendant's numerous failures to show up for appointments and
court dates, the competency hearing did not take place until 5 months later. At the
hearing, the court explained that despite the defendant's right to waive counsel and
proceed pro se, the court had not ruled on the motion because there was no way to
determine if a defendant was competent to waive counsel until one determined if a
defendant was competent to stand trial. The defendant was found incompetent to stand
trial at the hearing, and he continued to be represented by counsel. The court later found
him competent, and he entered into a plea agreement. The court appears to never have
explicitly denied his motion to proceed pro se, but rather to simply have found the
defendant incompetent to stand trial. Furthermore, when the defendant was later found
competent, the court did not address his motion anew.

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On appeal, the Boigegrain court found:

"[T]he court waited to rule on the defendant's motion to dismiss the public defender until
the issue of the defendant's competency to stand trial had been resolved. That was the
most appropriate course because '[l]ogically, the trial court cannot simultaneously
question a defendant's mental competence to stand trial and at one and the same time be
convinced that the defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.'
United States v. Purnett, 910 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir.1990). Although that common sense
statement almost resolves this matter on its own, a more recent case from the Supreme
Court, Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993),
clarifies it completely. In Godinez, the Court held that the degree of competence
necessary to waive the right to counsel is identical to the degree of competence necessary
to stand trial. . . . Therefore, it was impossible for the district court to allow the defendant
to waive counsel before determining whether he was competent to stand trial. Before
resolving the first question, the court had to resolve the second." 155 F.3d at 1186.

Similarly, in Hauck v. State, 2001 WY 119, 36 P.3d 597 (2001), a defendant
requested to proceed pro se at a competency hearing. The district court summarily denied
his request. The court later found the defendant competent but did not readdress his
request to proceed pro se. On appeal, the defendant claimed the court had erred in
denying his request without a hearing. The Supreme Court of Wyoming upheld the
district court's denial, noting it would have been a "logical impossibility" to "[find] his
self-representation request knowing and intelligent before his competency was
determined or once he was found incompetent." 36 P.3d at 602.

In the present case, Booker unequivocally invoked his right to proceed pro se by
filing a motion. At the hearing on his motion, he reiterated his desire to represent himself.
At this same hearing, however, Mank raised concerns about Booker's competency. The
court could not rule on Booker's motion to proceed pro se without first establishing his
competency. Booker was later found incompetent to stand trial. Since the standard for
competency to stand trial is the same or lower than the standard of competency to waive
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the right to counsel, Booker was also not competent to waive his right to counsel and
proceed pro se. While the court did not explicitly rule on his motion, the finding that
Booker was not competent to stand trial effectively denied his motion. Even if the court
had addressed Booker's motion, the only possible action it could take was to deny it.
Furthermore, when the court later found Booker competent, he did not renew his motion
to proceed pro se.

Admittedly, our Supreme Court has held that once a defendant had invoked the
right to self-representation, he or she does not need to reassert that right to avoid waiver.
This is true when a request to proceed pro se has been conclusively denied or even when
the defendant may believe it has been denied based on the court's actions. State v. Lowe,
18 Kan. App. 2d 72, 78, 847 P.2d 1334 (1993). What would distinguish Booker's case is
that at the time he made his request, he was not competent to do so. Thus, Booker could
reasonably be expected to reassert his right once he was found competent.

Additionally, the right to self-representation is not absolute and courts should
presume against waiver of the right to counsel. Given this presumption and Booker's
incompetence, the district court's failure to explicitly rule on his request to proceed pro se
was not error. Instead, the court's finding that Booker was not competent to stand trial
was sufficient to establish that he could not invoke his right to self-representation, at least
at that time.

Booker also argues a reasonable judge would have doubted his competency to
stand trial, thus, the district court erred in not ordering another competency evaluation.
Booker contends his long history of mental illness and his failure to take medication
should have indicated to the court that his competency was in question. He claimed he
had begun hearing voices the morning of trial. Faced with this evidence, Booker believes
the court abused its discretion in not ordering another competency evaluation.

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The State argues the district court did not err in proceeding to trial rather than
ordering another competency evaluation. The State points out that Booker's competency
had been evaluated a month prior, and he had been found competent to stand trial. The
only new condition that Booker claimed was auditory hallucinations. The court, however,
made specific findings that Booker's claims of hallucinations were an attempt to delay
trial. The State contends the court made a reasonable decision not to order another
competency evaluation based on observation and thus did not abuse its discretion.

Traditionally, a district court's decision on whether to order an additional
competency hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Perkins, 248 Kan.
760, 769, 811 P.2d 1142 (1991). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if the
action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) is based on an error of law; or (3) is
based on an error of fact. State v. Mosher, 299 Kan. 1, 3, 319 P.3d 1253 (2014).

Booker acknowledges that abuse of discretion is the traditional standard of review
for this issue but suggests recent Kansas Supreme Court caselaw establishes the standard
of review should be de novo. He cites to State v. Woods, 301 Kan. 852, 348 P.3d 583
(2015). In Woods, the defendant brought two claims: (1) his pretrial competency hearing
was inadequate; and (2) the district court should have moved sua sponte to hold a second
competency hearing. As Booker notes in his brief, the Woods court explicitly reviewed
the defendant's second challenge under an abuse of discretion standard. 301 Kan. at 860.
The analysis of defendant's first claim, though, appeared to be de novo. Booker suggests
the de novo standard is more sensible for these types of claims.

Booker's argument is without merit. First, the first claim in Woods required our
Supreme Court to determine if the district court's actions had complied with a statute.
This is a question of law not amenable to an abuse of discretion standard. Thus, the use of
a different standard was out of necessity, not a desire to change the overall standard of
review.
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Second, the Woods court explicitly used an abuse of discretion standard when
reviewing the defendant's claim that the district court should have ordered another
competency evaluation. If the Woods court wanted to change the standard of review for
such claims, then it could have done so, but it did not. Thus, Booker's claim will be
reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard.

In Kansas, a defendant is incompetent to stand trial if "he [or she] is charged with
a crime and, because of mental illness or defect is unable: (a) To understand the nature
and purpose of the proceedings against him [or her]; or (b) to make or assist in making
his [or her] defense." K.S.A. 22-3301(1); accord Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80
S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960) ("[The t]est must be whether [the defendant] has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding—and whether he has rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.").

The procedure for determining competency is outlined in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-
3302, which states:

"(1) At any time after the defendant has been charged with a crime and before
pronouncement of sentence, the defendant, the defendant's counsel or the prosecuting
attorney may request a determination of the defendant's competency to stand trial. If,
upon the request of either party or upon the judge's own knowledge and observation, the
judge before whom the case is pending finds that there is reason to believe that the
defendant is incompetent to stand trial the proceedings shall be suspended and a hearing
conducted to determine the competency of the defendant."

A district court may also order a psychiatric or psychological examination
of the defendant. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3302(3).

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There are two types of competency claims—substantive and procedural. In a
substantive competency claim, the defendant alleges he or she was tried and convicted
while incompetent. In a procedural competency claim, the defendant alleges the trial
court failed to hold a competency hearing or failed to hold an adequate competency
hearing. State v. Woods, 301 Kan. 852, 858, 348 P.3d 583 (2015) (citing McGregor v.
Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 952 [10th Cir. 2001]).

Booker raises a procedural competency claim. He argues the district court should
have ordered a fifth competency evaluation prior to proceeding to trial. His argument
rests on the assertion that "plain evidence" showed "[his] mental health tended to
deteriorate when he was not medicated, and a month of nonmedication had passed since
his most recent Comcare evaluation." In support of this assertion, Booker points out he
had a history of mental illness. After prolonged periods of nonmedication, his mental
health condition tended to worsen but improved when placed back on a medication
regime. According to Booker, Dr. Walters had noted Booker needed to take medicine to
stay competent. Finally, Booker claimed to be hearing angelic voices shortly before trial.

The record clearly establishes that Booker had mental health issues. The existence
or nonexistence of mental health issues is not the standard for competency to stand trial,
however. The standard is the defendant's ability to understand the nature of the
proceedings against him or her and the ability to assist in his or her defense.

In the present case, the district court reviewed Dr. Gaston's evaluation of Booker
from 1 month prior and found Booker competent to stand trial. The court noted his
diagnosis was depressive disorder with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. Booker was
able to communicate appropriately and was oriented as to date and time. He indicated he
had experienced hallucinations and psychotic symptoms in the past but not for a long
time. He showed an understanding of the charges against him and the criminal trial
process. The court also noted that Booker was not on medication at the time of the report,
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and Dr. Gaston had not concluded that Booker needed to be on medication to be or stay
competent. Based on this evaluation, Booker met the standard for competency to stand
trial.

The only changes in Booker's symptoms or behavior were that he claimed to hear
angelic voices; and he was muttering to himself in the courtroom. As for the
hallucinations, the court found Booker had no indications of problems with hallucinations
until shortly before trial. The court additionally found the hallucinations were an attempt
to delay trial, and not a "mental health issue in terms of competency." Even if Booker
was experiencing hallucinations, that alone does not establish he was incompetent. See
State v. Edwards, No. 106,278, 2012 WL 6061554, at *5 (Kan. App. 2012) (unpublished
opinion) (finding defendant possibly experiencing hallucinations not enough to warrant
finding of incompetency). Booker did not demonstrate any signs of confusion about the
proceedings and did not appear to be having communication problems.

The district court did not specifically address Booker's muttering. Booker's
behavior was similar to the defendant's in State v. Harkness, 252 Kan. 510, 516, 847 P.2d
1191 (1993). In Harkness, the defendant brought a claim that the district court should
have ordered a competency evaluation sua sponte based on defendant's behavior in court,
which included: attacking a court reporter, showing confusion, having difficulty making
decisions, and twiddling his thumbs. Our Supreme Court rejected the defendant's
argument, noting these behaviors were not necessarily signs of incompetency and had
other plausible explanations. 252 Kan. at 516. Similarly, muttering to oneself is not
necessarily a sign of incompetency, but could be the result of anger, boredom, or a
number of other causes.

Booker also argues the district court erred in finding he was attempting to delay
the proceedings as part of its competency determination. Booker is correct that a
malingering defendant is not necessarily competent. A district court, however, may
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consider whether a defendant's actions are or appear to be volitional in determining
whether he or she is competent to stand trial. State v. Barnes, 263 Kan. 249, 948 P.2d 627
(1997) (upholding district court's decision that defendant was competent and any
expressed confusion over trial process was result of malingering); State v. Perkins, 248
Kan. 760, 811 P.2d 1142 (1991) (finding district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding defendant was competent and disruptive behavior was volitional). Admittedly, in
Barnes and Perkins, competency evaluations supported the courts' decisions that the
defendants' behaviors were intentional. Barnes, 263 Kan. at 258-59; Perkins, 248 Kan. at
769. In this case, Booker's evaluations do not suggest he would intentionally try to delay
trial. On the other hand, the court's competency determination rested primarily on
Booker's final evaluation and did not "hinge" on the court's assessment of his
hallucinations. Additionally, the timing of Booker's hallucinations supports the court's
conclusions that they were intended as a stall tactic.

As for the district court's comments regarding Booker's behavior at trial, events
that occur after a competency hearing are irrelevant to a determination of whether a court
abused its discretion in finding a defendant competent to stand trial. Woods, 301 Kan. at
861. Based on the evidence available to the court at the time, however, the court did not
abuse its discretion. Dr. Gaston had found Booker competent to stand trial a month prior
to the first day of trial. Although he was not on medication at the start of trial, he had also
not been on medication at the time he was found competent. The competency evaluation
demonstrated Booker had the ability to understand the nature of the proceedings and
assist in his defense. While he may possibly have developed hallucinations the morning
of the trial, nothing suggested these hallucinations rendered him legally incompetent.
Furthermore, the timing of the hallucinations suggested Booker was attempting to delay
the proceedings. Because a reasonable person could agree with the court's findings, the
court did not abuse its discretion and it did not err in refusing to order another
competency evaluation.

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In conclusion, while Booker unequivocally invoked his right to proceed pro se, he
was incompetent at the time he did so. Because his competency was at issue at the time
he brought the motion, and he was later found incompetent to stand trial, his motion for
self-representation was effectively denied. Furthermore, before the start of trial, Booker
had been found competent, and a reasonable person could agree that Booker did not
exhibit any new conditions which would cause a reasonable person to believe he was no
longer competent. Thus, the district court did not err by not ordering another competency
evaluation.

Affirmed.