State v. Boldridge

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 118,805

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

BRYAN CURTIS BOLDRIDGE,
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Atchison District Court; ROBERT J. BEDNAR, judge. Opinion filed February 15,
2019. Affirmed.

John W. Fresh, of Farris & Fresh Law Office, of Atchison, for appellant.

Gerald R. Kuckleman, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before GARDNER, P.J., HILL and SCHROEDER, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Bryan Curtis Boldridge is a beneficiary of the Elsworth Boldridge
Trust, which owns real property in Atchison County, Kansas. Ethel Campbell is
Boldridge's aunt and the trustee of the Elsworth Boldridge Trust. In 2017, Campbell
called the sheriff to report Boldridge for trespassing on the trust property after she found
him on that property. She relied on a 2012 court order from a civil case which prohibited
him from entering the property. After a bench trial, the district court convicted Boldridge
of criminal trespass finding that Campbell was still the trustee of the Elsworth Boldridge
Trust and that the 2012 court order was still in effect.
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On appeal, Boldridge claims that insufficient evidence supports his conviction. He
relies on his stated belief Campbell had been removed as trustee, that she no longer had
authority to prevent him from entering the property, and that the court order was no
longer in effect. He claims these beliefs prevented him from knowing he was not
authorized to go on the land, as is required by the criminal trespass statute, K.S.A. 2017
Supp. 21-5808. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree and affirm.

Factual and procedural background

Campbell claims to be the sole trustee of the Elsworth Boldridge Trust. Campbell
testified that she has been the trustee continuously since October 1993, when her father
passed away. Bryan Curtis Boldridge is Campbell's nephew and is one of the
beneficiaries of the trust. A court order from 2012 in civil case 12 CV 21 prohibited
Boldridge from entering the property. In 2016, Campbell sent Boldridge a letter
instructing him not to enter the property and attaching a copy of the 2012 court order.

In September 2017, Campbell saw Boldridge pull into the driveway of the trust
property with two others in his truck. Boldridge testified that he went to the property
because one of his other aunts had asked him to clean up the property. Campbell
approached Boldridge and he told her was going to clean up the property. Campbell
warned him that he was not supposed to be on the property but Boldridge insisted that
was not true. Campbell left, called the sheriff, and reported Boldridge for trespassing.

Deputy Adam Potts responded to Campbell's call. Campbell showed Potts the
2012 court document prohibiting Boldridge from entering the property. Boldridge, along
with others, were cleaning up the property when Potts arrived. Potts told Boldridge that
they needed to leave the property due to the court order. But Boldridge disputed the
order, telling Potts that more recent court documents said otherwise and that Campbell
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was no longer the trustee. When Potts again told Boldridge that he needed to leave the
property, Boldridge complied.

Boldridge testified that he and his siblings had voted to remove Campbell as
trustee in March or April 2016. He claimed that this was in accordance with the terms of
the trust and that they had notified Campbell by mail of her removal. Campbell
acknowledged having received a letter saying as much from one of the Boldridge
brothers. Boldridge testified that although he was aware of the 2012 court order, he did
not think it was effective after Campbell was removed. Boldridge testified that he did not
believe another trustee was in place yet but that he, his brother, and his aunt were serving
as interim trustees.

The State charged Boldridge with one count of criminal trespass in violation of
K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5808(a)(1)(B), a class B misdemeanor. After hearing the testimony
at the bench trial, the district court took the matter under advisement. The district court
reviewed the evidence and took judicial notice of other files including the civil case
involving the trust. It found that Campbell remained the trustee and that the court order
prohibiting Boldridge from entering the property without permission or consent of the
trustee was still in effect and had not been modified. The district court found Boldridge
guilty of criminal trespass and imposed a 30-day suspended jail sentence with one year of
unsupervised probation. Boldridge timely appeals.

Does sufficient evidence support Boldridge's conviction for criminal trespass?

Boldridge raises only one issue on appeal. He argues that he could not be guilty of
criminal trespass because he honestly believed he was authorized to enter the property.

When, as here, the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, our
standard of review is whether, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
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the State, we are convinced that a rational fact-finder could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In doing so, we do not reweigh evidence, resolve
evidentiary conflicts, or evaluate the credibility of witnesses. State v. Chandler, 307 Kan.
657, 668, 414 P.3d 713 (2018).

Boldridge was charged with criminal trespass, defined in K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-
5808:

"(a) Criminal trespass is entering or remaining upon or in any:
(1) Land . . . by a person who knows such person is not authorized or
privileged to do so, and:
(A) Such person enters or remains therein in defiance of an order not to
enter or leave such premises or property personally communicated to such person
by the owner thereof or other authorized person."

Boldridge does not dispute that he entered the trust property. Instead, he claims
that he did not have the required mental state of knowing he was not authorized to enter
the land. To the contrary, he testified he believed he was authorized to enter the property
and that Campbell had no authority to tell him otherwise because she had been removed
as trustee. He claims that he "clearly believed that any prior direction from [Campbell]
for him not to enter the property and any prior Court Order admonishing him not to enter
the property because [Campbell] was opposed to him doing so, were of no further effect."

Boldridge thus relied on a mistake of fact as a defense—he honestly believed he
was authorized to enter the property. The defense of mistake of fact or ignorance is
applicable when more than mere general intent (the defendant knew what physical
actions he or she was taking) is at issue. State v. Langston, No. 115,552, 2017 WL
4558573, at *10 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion). Here, the statute required not
only that he enter the property, but that he enter knowing he was not authorized to enter.
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Even if we assume that this defense could apply here, the district court found it
unpersuasive.

Boldridge erred in believing that he had the right to be on the property despite the
court order. Boldridge acknowledged that no further court proceedings had occurred,
either to reflect a change in the trustee or to rescind the 2012 court order. Boldridge does
not show what section of the trust he believes authorizes a change in trustee by a vote
unaccompanied by court order. The district court reviewed the civil case file and
determined that there had been no change in trustee or other modifications to the trust,
and it took judicial notice of the civil case file which included the order against
Boldridge. It did not agree that Boldridge believed that the court order was ineffective
without further court action or documentation.

Boldridge next argues that because of "such a dispute in place as to who actually
had authority to control the trust property," a rational fact-finder could not have found
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But Boldridge fails to take into consideration the
2012 court order, which he admitted he was aware of, or our duty to view the facts in the
light most favorable to the State.

This court does not reweigh the evidence or evaluate witness credibility. We
instead look only to the evidence to determine whether a rational fact-finder could find
that Boldridge trespassed on the Elsworth Boldridge Trust property. Evidence at trial and
in the judicially noticed civil case indicated that Campbell was the trustee, that she was
authorized to exclude Boldridge from the property, and that the 2012 court order
prohibiting Boldridge from entering the property was still in effect. Nothing of record
supports Boldridge's bald assertion that he or other beneficiaries could effect a change in
the trustee without a court order. Boldridge entered the property in defiance of the court
order and of Campbell's orders. The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the
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State, shows beyond a reasonable doubt that Boldridge committed criminal trespass under
K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5808.

Affirmed.