State v. Arnett (Court of Appeals)

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 112,572


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

TAYLOR ARNETT,
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; MICHAEL A. RUSSELL, judge. Opinion on remand filed
May 4, 2018. Affirmed.

Samuel Schirer, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Alan T. Fogelman, assistant district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek
Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before ATCHESON, P.J., SCHROEDER, J., and HEBERT, S.J.

PER CURIAM: After granting a petition for review in this case, the Kansas
Supreme Court held that restitution may be ordered against a defendant in a criminal case
if the loss to the victim was proximately caused by the crime of conviction. State v.
Arnett, 307 Kan. 648, Syl. ¶ 7, 413 P.3d 787 (2018). The court reversed this panel's
decision that the State failed to show a sufficient causal connection for restitution
between Defendant Taylor Arnett's plea to and conviction for conspiracy to commit
burglary and the financial loss to two victims whose homes were burglarized by her
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coconspirators, who stole a substantial amount of personal property. See State v. Arnett,
No. 112,572, 2015 WL 6835244 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion). The court
found both that the panel applied too strict a causation standard and that the Wyandotte
County District Court made sufficient factual determinations to establish proximate cause
supporting its restitution order for $33,248.83. 307 Kan. at 654-56.

Because the panel reversed the restitution order on causation grounds, it did not
address Arnett's alternative arguments against the order. 2015 WL 6835244, at *3. The
Supreme Court has remanded the case for the panel to now consider those arguments: (1)
The State failed to establish the amount of the property loss at the restitution hearing; (2)
the statutory restitution scheme violates § 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights; and
(3) the scheme cannot be reconciled with a criminal defendant's right to have a jury find
certain facts enhancing punishment as required by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). Arnett, 307 Kan. at 656.

We now take up those points and find them unavailing. We, therefore, affirm the
district court's restitution order.

As to the first, Arnett did not dispute the amount of requested restitution at the
district court hearing. She, therefore, cannot do so for the first time on appeal. See State
v. Thach, 305 Kan. 72, 81, 378 P.3d 522 (2016).

As to the second, Arnett cites § 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights
recognizing "[t]he right of trial by jury shall be inviolate." She argues that at common
law, crime victims could seek compensation from defendants only through civil actions
for damages. Under the common law, as outlined by Arnett, the victims would be entitled
to have juries hear those actions, and the defendants would have a correlative right to
request a jury trial. Arnett contends restitution impermissibly compromises that right and
provides no "quid pro quo" substitute, thereby violating § 5 of the Bill of Rights.
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The argument fails. First, restitution does not legally supplant civil actions. A
crime victim may still file a civil suit against a criminal defendant to recover money
damages. Most don't simply because few criminal defendants have ready assets (or
realistic prospects for acquiring assets) sufficient to make the effort worthwhile. Either
party, however, could request a jury trial.

More generally, Arnett's argument fails because the substitute remedy or quid pro
quo requirement applies when the Legislature extinguishes or substantially curtails a
common-law cause of action for damages, thereby implicating both § 5 and § 18 of the
Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. Section 18 provides: "All persons, for injuries
suffered in person, reputation, or property, shall have remedy by due course of law, and
justice administered without delay." In tandem, those provisions require that the
Legislature provide an adequate substitute remedy for the curtailment or elimination of a
common-law claim. See Miller v. Johnson, 295 Kan. 636, 654-55, 289 P.3d 1098 (2012).
The prototypical example has been the State's workers compensation system that replaced
common-law tort actions for employment related injuries with an administrative process
largely aimed at providing prompt, if more limited, recompense without regard to fault or
negligence. See Injured Workers of Kansas v. Franklin, 262 Kan. 840, 852, 942 P.2d 591
(1997). Workers compensation was deemed a constitutionally adequate substitute
remedy, despite the elimination of jury trials, because it afforded financial relief to a
significantly greater number of injured workers than did fault-based negligence law.

Arnett has no grounds to assert a constitutional deprivation of any of her rights
otherwise protected in §§ 5 and 18 as a result of the district court's restitution order. In
short, restitution does not deprive Arnett of a remedy for any injury she has suffered.
Here, Arnett inflicted the injury. The Legislature was not obligated to provide her or any
other criminal defendant with some quid pro quo or substitute remedy when it required
payment of restitution. If restitution had been enacted as the sole remedy for crime
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victims seeking compensation from convicted perpetrators, those victims might have an
argument their rights under § 5 and particularly under § 18 had been impermissibly
curtailed. But Arnett—as a convicted criminal defendant—can make no corresponding
argument that a restitution order violates her constitutional rights.

Finally, Arnett contends Apprendi and its application in Alleyne v. United States,
570 U.S. 99, 103, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), prohibit judicially imposed
restitution as a violation of her right to jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and her right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Those cases recognize that a fact used to impose a punishment greater than either a
statutory mandatory minimum punishment or a statutory maximum punishment must be
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 103; Apprendi, 530 U.S.
at 476. Arnett's argument fails for two reasons.

First, restitution is not considered punishment in the same way incarceration or a
fine paid to the State would be. Rather, it is a rehabilitative and compensatory tool
designed to aid both convicted criminals and their victims. See State v. Huff, 50 Kan.
App. 2d 1094, 1100, 336 P.3d 397 (2014); State v. Heim, No. 111,665, 2015 WL
1514060, at *2 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion) ("Restitution is intended to fairly
compensate crime victims and to further the rehabilitation of defendants by instilling in
them some sense of the costs their wrongdoing has inflicted."). Although a district court
typically enters a restitution order during a sentencing hearing, that doesn't make the
order a form of punishment.

Even if restitution were considered punitive and, thus, punishment, Arnett's
argument fails. The Kansas statutes governing restitution impose neither mandatory
minimum amounts nor maximum amounts. See K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6604(b)(1); K.S.A.
2017 Supp. 21-6607(c)(2). A mandatory minimum would be a specified amount a
convicted defendant would have to pay a victim even if the victim had little or no
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financial loss. The statutes require no such obligation. The statutes, likewise, impose no
cap or upper limit on restitution that might be exceeded only in exceptional
circumstances or upon proof of statutorily identified facts. So even if restitution were
punitive, the scheme does not entail mandatory minimums or maximums triggering the
protections set out in Alleyne and Apprendi.

Arnett has presented no arguments that undercut the district court's restitution
order.

Affirmed.