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Status
Unpublished
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Release Date
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Court
Court of Appeals
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PDF
112462
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
No. 112,462
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,
v.
CURTIS N. ALLEGRUCCI,
Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; CHRISTOPHER M. MAGANA, judge. Opinion filed
September 4, 2015. Appeal dismissed.
Corrine E. Gunning, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt,
attorney general, for appellee.
Before PIERRON, P.J., BRUNS and SCHROEDER, JJ.
Per Curiam: Curtis N. Allegrucci appeals, claiming the district court erred when
it revoked his probation and did not give him credit against his 7-month prison sentence
for the time he was in inpatient treatment as a condition of his probation. Allegrucci has
now served all of his time in prison and been released from his postrelease supervision.
This matter is now moot, and the appeal is dismissed.
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FACTS
Allegrucci pled guilty to one count of burglary, a severity level 9 nonperson
felony. The district court sentenced Allegrucci to an underlying 7 months' imprisonment,
to run consecutive to any other case, with 12 months' postrelease supervision and then
placed him on probation for 12 months. As a condition of his probation, Allegrucci was
ordered to successfully complete inpatient drug and alcohol treatment.
In June 2014, Allegrucci's probation officer filed a warrant to revoke Allegrucci's
probation alleging he had violated the terms of his probation by threatening staff and
other residents with physical harm while confined at a mental health facility and by being
unsuccessfully discharged from both Protection Valley Manor and Osawatomie State
Hospital (Osawatomie) for acts of violence towards himself and others. At a hearing on
the probation violation warrant, Allegrucci admitted to the alleged violations. The district
court found Allegrucci violated the terms of his probation and was a danger to public
safety sufficient to override intermediate sanctions. The district court revoked
Allegrucci's probation and imposed his underlying sentence.
At the revocation hearing, Allegrucci argued he was entitled to receive jail time
credit for the time he spent in Osawatomie while on probation pursuant to State v.
Mackley, 220 Kan. 518, 552 P.2d 628 (1976). The State agreed with Allegrucci's
interpretation of Mackley and requested the district court give Allegrucci credit for the
time of 101 days. The district court disagreed with the State and Allegrucci's application
of Mackley and denied Allegrucci's request for jail time credit. Allegrucci timely
appealed.
Allegrucci completed his prison sentence on October 3, 2014, and was released
from postrelease supervision on July 21, 2015.
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Appeal is Moot
On appeal, Allegrucci argues the district court abused its discretion when it
revoked his probation, erred when it failed to give him credit for time served while in
inpatient treatment, and erred by imposing his underlying prison sentence because
alternative dispositions were more appropriate. On April 27, 2015, pursuant to Kansas
Supreme Court Rule 2.042 (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 18), the State notified this court of a
material change in Allegrucci's custodial status. Allegrucci was released from the
confinement portion of his sentence on October 3, 2014, and his projected sentence
discharge date was July 21, 2015. The State attached a copy of a letter from the Kansas
Department of Corrections Sentence Computation Unit evidencing Allegrucci's release
from custody. In light of this material change, the State contends Allegrucci's claim for
jail time credit is moot because he has already served his prison sentence in full.
Because mootness is a doctrine of court policy, which was developed through
court precedent, appellate review of the issue is unlimited. State v. Hilton, 295 Kan. 845,
849, 286 P.3d 871 (2012). "An appeal will not be dismissed for mootness, unless it is
clearly and convincingly shown the actual controversy has ended, the only judgment that
could be entered would be ineffectual for any purpose, and it would not impact any of the
parties' rights." McAlister v. City of Fairway, 289 Kan. 391, 400, 212 P.3d 184 (2009);
see State v. Montgomery, 295 Kan. 837, 840, 286 P.3d 866 (2012).
"Generally, Kansas appellate courts do not decide moot questions or render
advisory opinions. State v. McKnight, 292 Kan. 776, 778, 257 P.3d 339 (2011). This
court has previously described the mootness doctrine as a court policy, which recognizes
that the role of a court is to '"determine real controversies relative to the legal rights of
persons and properties which are actually involved in the particular case properly brought
before it and to adjudicate those rights in such manner that the determination will be
operative, final, and conclusive."' State v. Bennett, 288 Kan. 86, 89, 200 P.3d 455 (2009)
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(quoting Board of Johnson County Comm'rs. v. Duffy, 259 Kan. 500, 504, 912 P.2d 716
[1996])." Montgomery, 295 Kan. at 840.
In finding the appeal is now moot, this court accepts as accurate the information in
the letter from the Kansas Department of Corrections Sentence Computation Unit
attached to the notice provided by the State. "The reviewing court in its discretion may
take judicial notice of any matter specified in K.S.A. 60-409 whether or not judicially
noticed by the judge." K.S.A. 60-412(c).
The facts in the letter are easily verified by a search of the Kansas Department of
Corrections website which shows Allegrucci's sentence was discharged on July 21, 2015.
This court takes judicial notice of the material change in Allegrucci's custodial status per
K.S.A. 60-409(c) and K.S.A. 60-409(b)(4). Allegrucci has failed to respond to the State's
arguments that this appeal is moot. The actual controversy has ended and the only
judgment that could be entered would be ineffectual for any purpose. Allegrucci has been
discharged from postrelease supervision, and as such, even if this court found he was
entitled to jail time credit, there would be nothing against which to apply it. Once
Allegrucci's term of imprisonment ended, his argument for jail time credit became moot.
See State v. Gaudina, 284 Kan. 354, Syl. ¶ 1, 160 P.3d 854 (2007) (holding that "[a]
defendant who is resentenced after serving time in prison is not entitled to credit against a
postrelease supervision period for the amount of time served in prison in excess of the
prison time imposed at the resentencing"); State v. Johnson, 39 Kan. App. 2d 438, 441-
43, 180 P.3d 1084, rev. denied 286 Kan. 1183 (2008)
Because the only judgment that could be entered would be ineffectual for any
purpose and an idle act insofar as rights involved in the case are concerned, Allegrucci's
appeal is dismissed as moot and we decline to address the merits of Allegrucci's other
claims.
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Appeal dismissed.