Seawood v. Pryor

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 115,069

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

DENORVAL SEAWOOD,
Appellant,

v.

REX PRYOR, Warden,
Appellee.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Leavenworth District Court; GUNNAR A. SUNDBY, judge. Opinion filed January 20,
2017. Affirmed.

Michael G. Highland, of Bonner Springs, for appellant.

Sherri Price, legal counsel and special assistant attorney general, for Lansing Correctional
Facility, for appellee.

Before ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., PIERRON and MALONE, JJ.

Per Curiam: Inmates bringing K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-1501 claims must assert the
deprivation of some constitutionally protected interest to avoid summary dismissal of
their claims. Denorval Seawood was convicted of violating K.A.R. 44-12-311 and, as a
result, lost his prison job. Seawood argues that he has a constitutionally protected interest
in his employment. However, inmates do not have a constitutionally protected interest in
employment. Because Seawood does not assert a violation of his constitutional rights, it
was appropriate for the district court to dismiss his case.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

One day prison officials observed that Seawood was moving slower than normal,
seemed confused with conversation, and also had bloodshot eyes. As a result, Seawood
was convicted of violating K.A.R. 44-12-311 (being in a condition of drunkenness,
intoxication, state of altered consciousness), despite arguing that the bloodshot eyes were
a result of allergies. The prison ordered Seawood to serve 45 days of disciplinary
segregation and restricted Seawood's privileges for 30 days, but both of these
punishments were suspended. Because of his conviction, Seawood lost a private industry
job he held at the prison.

Seawood appealed to the Secretary of Corrections, who approved the disciplinary
board's decision. Seawood then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district
court which was granted. After a hearing, the district court dismissed Seawood's petition.
Noting that an inmate's claim under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-1501 must assert the
deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest, the district court held that Seawood
did "not assert a constitutionally protected interest of which he was deprived." The court
explained that "[w]hen an inmate's sanctions are suspended, then as a matter of law, there
is no deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest." Additionally, "confinement of a
prisoner in administrative segregation and restricting his privileges are not the type of
significant deprivations by which the State of Kansas might create a liberty interest."
Finally, the district court held that there was some evidence to support the hearing
officer's decision.

Seawood appealed.



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ANALYSIS

Seawood argues that his due process rights were implicated when he lost his
prison job as a result of his conviction. Seawood also argues that "[t]here was zero
evidence, much less 'some' evidence, that petitioner was intoxicated." Finally, Seawood
argues that he was denied his due process right to call witnesses at his disciplinary
hearing.

"To gain court review of a prison disciplinary sanction, the inmate's claim under
K.S.A. 60-1501 must assert the deprivation of some constitutionally protected interest.
Otherwise, the petition may be summarily dismissed." Hardaway v. Larned Correctional
Facility, 44 Kan. App. 2d 504, 504-05, 238 P.3d 328 (2010). Seawood claims that he has
a constitutionally protected due process interest in his prison job. The issue of whether
due process has been afforded is a question of law over which an appellate court
exercises unlimited review. Hogue v. Bruce, 279 Kan. 848, 850, 113 P.3d 234 (2005).

Inmates do not have a constitutionally protected interest in employment. Stansbury
v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 421, 960 P.2d 227 (1998) (citing Templeman v. Gunter, 16
F.3d 367, 370 [10th Cir. 1994]); Gilmore v. McKune, 23 Kan. App. 2d 1029, 1037, 940
P.2d 78 (1997). Furthermore, while the loss of his job was an indirect consequence of
Seawood's K.A.R. 44-12-311 conviction, it was not part of the direct sanctions imposed
on Seawood. The sanctions that the prison did impose and then suspend—disciplinary
segregation and restricted privileges—did not implicate Seawood's constitutional rights
because "[p]unishments never imposed do not implicate a protected liberty interest."
Hardaway, 44 Kan. App. 2d at 505. Additionally, "disciplinary segregation doesn't rise to
the level of a constitutionally protected interest." 44 Kan. App. 2d at 505.

Because Seawood did not assert the deprivation of a constitutionally protected
interest, we are unable to consider his claims regarding sufficiency of the evidence in his
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disciplinary hearing. The district court's dismissal of Seawood's writ of habeas corpus is
affirmed.

Affirmed.