In re M.B

1
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

Nos. 121,356
121,357
121,358
121,359
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
In the Interests of M.B., M.L.B., R.B., and B.B.,
Minor Children.

MEMORANDUM OPINION


Appeal from Butler District Court; DAVID A. RICKE, judge. Opinion filed December 13, 2019.
Affirmed.


Chris J. Pate, of Pate & Paugh, LLC, of Wichita, for appellant natural father.



Cheryl M. Pierce, assistant county attorney, for appellee.



Stephany L. Hughes, of Stephany L. Hughes, LLC, of El Dorado, guardian ad litem.



Before ATCHESON, P.J., BRUNS, J., and BURGESS, S.J.



PER CURIAM: The natural father (Father) of M.B., M.L.B., R.B., and B.B. appeals
the ruling of the Butler County District Court terminating his parental rights to all four
children. Father contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he was an unfit
parent and that his unfitness is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Father also
claims the district court abused its discretion in determining that termination was in the
best interests of the children. We find no error in the district court's decision and affirm.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND


In July 2017, Mother gave birth to M.B., who tested positive for marijuana upon
delivery. Mother disclosed that she had used marijuana throughout her pregnancy and
had used methamphetamine two weeks before delivery. Mother also reported that Father
had physically abused her. Mother and Father both later tested positive for amphetamine,
methamphetamine, and marijuana.


The State filed a petition in the district court to have M.B. and her siblings B.B.
(DOB: 2014), R.B. (DOB: 2015), and M.L.B. (DOB: 2016) declared children in need of
care (CINC). The district court placed the children in the temporary custody of the
Kansas Department for Children and Families (DCF). Father and Mother appeared at an
adjudication hearing in November 2017, where they stipulated to the State's petition, and
the district court adjudicated the children to be CINC. The district court ordered the
children to remain in DCF custody subject to visitation with Father and Mother at the
discretion of St. Francis Community Services (St. Francis). The district court also ordered
the parents to complete case plan tasks designed to reintegrate the children with Father
and Mother, which included participation in drug and alcohol treatment, gaining and
maintaining employment, and paying monthly child support to DCF.


The parties appeared at review hearings in February and May 2018 where the
district court ordered Father and Mother to continue following case plan tasks. By July
2018, the district court determined that reintegration was no longer a viable option,
changed the goal of the case to adoption, and directed the State to move for termination
of parental rights.


Thereafter, the State filed a motion to terminate Father's and Mother's parental
rights. The district court later accepted Mother's relinquishment of her parental rights.
3
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the termination of Father's
parental rights in February 2019. The following evidence was presented.


• Mother testified that Father regularly used methamphetamine, cocaine, and
marijuana around the children. Mother said that Father was often violent or
angry as a result of his drug use and claimed that he raped, punched,
shoved, and yelled at her in front of the children.


• When the children were taken into DCF custody, their hair follicles each
tested positive for one or more illegal substances. As a result, DCF opened
a physical abuse investigation. A child abuse pediatrician diagnosed the
children with polysubstance exposure and child neglect/endangerment. The
children also exhibited various health issues and developmental delays. The
pediatrician testified that young children who are mobile are particularly
vulnerable to drug exposure and that drug exposure can alter a child's brain
chemistry and growth. According to the pediatrician, parents who use drugs
are often unable to meet their children's needs. The pediatrician explained
that due to a lack of parental supervision in an environment where parents
use drugs, children are at risk for physical abuse, sexualized behaviors, and
developmental delays.


• Father was given the opportunity to have supervised visits with the children
beginning in August 2017. These visits continued until February 2018. By
all accounts, the visits went well and the children appeared happy to see
Father.


• After the children were placed in foster care, B.B. began acting out sexually
and exhibited aggressive behaviors with R.B. and other children in the
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foster homes. B.B. made several statements to a clinical therapist which
suggested that Father had sexually abused B.B.


• Mother separated from Father in February 2018 because she believed that
he was keeping her from getting the children back. Mother testified that
Father was still using marijuana and methamphetamine daily, was not
going to counseling or therapy, and had lost his job. Mother was also
concerned that Father was sexually abusing B.B. Although Mother later
recanted this allegation after getting back together with Father, DCF
suspended Father's visitation with the children pending an investigation.
Father's visitation had not yet resumed at the time of the termination
hearing.


• Despite Father's inability to visit the children, St. Francis case workers
encouraged Father to maintain his sobriety and follow through with the
case plan tasks so that he could move forward after the investigation was
complete. Father failed in this regard.


• Father's initial drug tests at the start of the case indicated high or constant
use, and he continued to use illegal drugs after the children were removed
from his home. From July 2017 to July 2018, Father never submitted a
clean urinalysis (UA) or hair follicle test. Father submitted to 16 tests
during this time, and they all tested positive for some combination of
methamphetamine, cocaine, amphetamine, or marijuana. Father did not
submit to testing on several other occasions. Most recently, Father's
November 29, 2018 UA tested positive for THC and his hair follicles tested
positive for methamphetamine and marijuana. After three attempts, Father
did eventually complete a drug and alcohol evaluation, but he never
successfully completed an outpatient drug and alcohol treatment program.
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• Father completed a parenting class. Father completed a mental health
assessment which recommended no further services. Father was required to
complete a 12-week anger management/batterer intervention program.
Father only completed a one-day class, claiming he did not know that he
was required to complete a multi-week program.


• Father stopped communicating with St. Francis in July 2018, despite
numerous attempts to reach him in person and by letter, telephone, and text.


• Father had intermittent employment during the pendency of the case and
was not employed at the time of the termination hearing. Father's criminal
history—which included felony convictions for forgery, aggravated battery,
burglary, and theft—made it difficult for him to obtain and maintain
employment. Father had paid child support to DCF but was not doing so at
the time of the hearing because he was unemployed.


• Father was required to provide proof of stable housing to St. Francis. At the
time of the termination hearing, St. Francis did not know where Father was
living. Father testified that he was currently living in Oaklawn, a Wichita
suburb, with a male friend. Father claimed that the home had adequate
space for the children, but he would move out and get another home if he
regained custody of the children. Father estimated that he could find
another home within 60 days once he found a job. Father admitted that he
had not informed St. Francis about his current living situation or contacted
St. Francis to do a walk-through of the home.


• Several of Father's relatives testified that they had no concerns about the
children's behavior or with Father's interactions with the children. Father's
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relatives testified that as long as Father stayed clean, it would be best for

Father to be in the children's lives.



• Father admitted that he and Mother argued but denied physically abusing
her. Father denied that he had sexually abused B.B. or any of his children
and also denied that B.B. had ever exhibited sexual behavior in his presence.
Father admitted to his drug addiction and stated that he had last used
marijuana a week before the termination hearing. Father testified that if he
submitted to UA and hair follicle testing, he would test positive for
marijuana and would "probably" test positive for methamphetamine. Father
said that he had missed certain drug tests, had not sought drug treatment,
and had stopped communicating with St. Francis because he was depressed
after losing custody of the children and was frustrated after losing his
visitation rights. Father expressed willingness to complete a drug treatment
program and claimed that he had received no response after informing St.
Francis that he needed inpatient treatment. Father testified that the "number
one thing" he needed to address was depression because it was the cause of
his drug usage.


After considering the evidence and oral argument from the parties, the district

court took the case under advisement and later issued a written ruling terminating Father's
parental rights. Ultimately, the district court found by clear and convincing evidence that
Father was unfit by reason of conduct or condition which rendered him unable to
properly care for the children and that the conduct or condition was unlikely to change in
the foreseeable future. The district court also considered the physical, mental, and
emotional health of the children, and determined that termination of Father's parental
rights was in the children's best interests. Father filed this timely appeal.
7
LEGAL ANALYSIS


We begin with some general principles governing proceedings under the Revised
Code for Care of Children, K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2201 et seq. A parent has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in the relationship with his or her child. See
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 758-59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599
(1982); In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. 686, 697-98, 187 P.3d 594 (2008). Given the inherent
importance and unique character of that relationship, the right has been deemed
fundamental. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. Accordingly, the State may extinguish the legal
bonds between parent and child only upon clear and convincing proof of parental
unfitness. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(a); In re R.S., 50 Kan. App. 2d 1105, Syl. ¶ 1, 336
P.3d 903 (2014).



As provided in K.S.A. 2018 Supp.38-2269(a), the State must prove the parent to be
unfit "by reason of conduct or condition" making him or her "unable to care properly for a
child" and that the circumstances are "unlikely to change in the foreseeable future." The
statute contains a nonexclusive list of 13 conditions that singularly or in combination
would amount to unfitness. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b), (c).


In reviewing a district court's determination of unfitness, an appellate court must be
convinced, based on the full evidentiary record considered in a light favoring the State as
the prevailing party, that a rational fact-finder could have found that decision "highly
probable, i.e., [supported] by clear and convincing evidence." In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. at
705. The appellate court cannot weigh conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of
witnesses, or otherwise independently decide disputed questions of fact. 286 Kan. at 705.
In short, any conflicts in evidence must be resolved to the State's benefit.


Having found unfitness, the district court must then decide whether termination of
parental rights is "in the best interests of the child." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(g)(1). As
8
directed by the language of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(g)(1), the district court gives
"primary consideration to the physical, mental and emotional health of the child." The
district court makes that determination based on a preponderance of the evidence. See In
re R.S., 50 Kan. App. 2d at 1116. The best-interests issue is essentially entrusted to the
district court acting within its sound judicial discretion. 50 Kan. App. 2d at 1115-16. An
appellate court reviews those sorts of decisions for abuse of discretion. A district court
exceeds that broad latitude if it rules in a way no reasonable judicial officer would under
the circumstances, if it ignores controlling facts or relies on unproven factual
representations, or if it acts outside the legal framework appropriate to the issue. See
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Services Co., 296 Kan. 906, 935, 296 P.3d
1106 (2013); State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 3, 256 P.3d 801 (2011).



In the present case, the district court found seven statutory factors had established

Father's unfitness:



• K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(1)—"Emotional illness, mental illness,
mental deficiency or physical disability of the parent, of such duration or
nature as to render the parent unable to care for the ongoing physical,
mental and emotional needs of the child;"


• K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(3)—"the use of intoxicating liquors or
narcotic or dangerous drugs of such duration or nature as to render the
parent unable to care for the ongoing physical, mental or emotional needs
of the child;"


• K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(4)—"physical, mental or emotional abuse or
neglect or sexual abuse of a child;"
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• K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(5)—"conviction of a felony and
imprisonment;"


• K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(7)—"failure of reasonable efforts made by
appropriate public or private agencies to rehabilitate the family;"


• K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(8)—"lack of effort on the part of the parent
to adjust the parent's circumstances, conduct or conditions to meet the
needs of the child;" and


• K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(9)—"whether, as a result of the actions or
inactions attributable to the parent and one or more of the factors listed in
subsection (c) apply." Here, the district court found K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-
2269(c)(3) applicable—"failure to carry out a reasonable plan approved by
the court directed toward integration of the child into a parental home."


Father challenges the district court's findings under each factor, as well as the court's
finding that his unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.


K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(1)


In finding that Father was unfit under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(1), the
district court held: "While not officially diagnosed, the court finds that [Father]
acknowledges that he does suffer from a degree of mental and/or emotional illness. If
unchecked, this illness would interfere with his abilities to effectively parent."


Father argues that in finding unfitness under this factor, the district court erred in
giving more weight to Father's self-diagnosed depression than the fact that he was never
ordered to participate in mental health treatment as part of his case plan.
10
Father testified that he had been struggling with depression after losing custody of
the children and that his depression had increased after losing his visitation rights. Father
specifically testified that he needed to address his depression because it was the cause of
his substance abuse issues. Although Father did complete a mental health assessment, it
did not recommend the need for any mental health services, Father admitted that he had
completed the assessment before losing his visitation rights and that he was not
struggling with depression as much at the time of the assessment.



K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(3)


In finding that Father was unfit under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(3), the
district court found that Father


"has used the dangerous drugs of marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine his entire
adult life, and that the long duration of his drug use and the nature of the polysubstance
abuse render the father unable to care for the physical, mental, or emotional needs of any
of his children. Further, his possession and use of these controlled substances has
exposed his children to these addictive and harmful drugs; they too were positive for
multiple controlled substances upon being taken into custody. His own impairment,
coupled with the exposure of his children to harmful substances, renders him unable and
unfit to parent them."


Father acknowledges his struggle with drug addiction, but argues that the State
failed to establish that his drug use rendered him unable to care for the physical, mental,
or emotional needs of the children. Father claims that the district court ignored evidence
which showed that he was an effective parent and that his visits with the children were
positive.


The evidence before the court established that Father was a daily user of
controlled substances, and that he had exposed the children to the effects of the illegal
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drugs he was ingesting. The evidence also suggested that Father became angry and

violent after using drugs. Even after the children were removed from Father's custody, his
drug use remained constant, as evidenced by the fact that he tested positive for one or
more controlled substances each time he submitted to drug testing during this entire case.
Father even admitted that he would test positive for marijuana and would probably test
positive for methamphetamine on the day of the termination hearing. The district court
also heard testimony about the harmful effects of drug exposure on children and the risks
to children of living in an environment where they are exposed to drugs and drug use.


K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(4)


The district court found that despite evidence of B.B.'s sexualized behavior, the
evidence was insufficient to conclusively determine that Father had sexually abused B.B.
or any other child. The court did find, however, that the evidence supported a finding that
Father and Mother "constantly and consistently exposed all four children to the chemical
effects of dangerous controlled substances, and that such polysubstance exposure
constituted child neglect and endangerment."


Father appears to concede that this factor weighs in favor of unfitness by
acknowledging his long-term addiction to drugs, only challenging the district court's
finding under this factor that his unfitness in this regard would be unlikely to change in
the foreseeable future.


K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(5)


In finding that Father was unfit under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(5), the
district court noted that Father had been convicted of six felonies that involved
dishonesty and violence, including forgery, burglary, theft, and aggravated battery. The
district court concluded:
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"Even though the evidence in this case does not indicate that the felony
convictions themselves have directly interfered with [Father]'s ability to parent, the
convictions indicate a pattern of criminal behaviors over a period of 10 years which are
separate and distinct from all of his ongoing illegal drug possession and use. Analysis of
this factor, quite obviously, does not cast favorable light upon [Father] as an appropriate
parental figure."


Father argues that the district court's reliance on this factor was improper, as his
most recent felony conviction was in 2009, he was not incarcerated during the pendency
of the present case, and the convictions did not interfere with his ability to parent.


Although Father's convictions may not have directly affected his ability to parent
the children, Father testified that he had a difficult time obtaining and maintaining
employment due to his criminal record. Father's inability to maintain employment very
clearly reflects on his ability to provide a stable, suitable home for the children.


K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(7)


The district court found that DCF, through St. Francis, formulated a case plan
designed to facilitate the goal of reintegration with Father and Mother. The court found
that despite St. Francis' reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the family, those efforts failed
due to Father's failure to "diligently pursue the reintegration tasks that were made known
to him."


Father argues that the agencies' efforts were not reasonable because he was
prohibited from having contact with the children after his visitation was suspended in
February 2018 pending the outcome of the sexual abuse investigation. Father concedes
that he did not complete all of his remaining case plan tasks, but claims that even if he
had been fully compliant he still would not have been able to see his children, which is a
critical element of reintegration.
13
The language in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(7) imposes an obligation upon the
relevant social service agencies to expend reasonable efforts toward reintegrating the
child with his or her parents. To that end, the social service agencies should attempt to
help the parent accomplish case objectives designed to correct the parent's conduct or
condition that caused removal of the child from the home. Contrary to Father's claim, the
record is replete with examples of St. Francis' reintegration efforts and management of
Father's case plan tasks, which included assisting with visitation, scheduling
appointments with different agencies, paying for intakes and evaluations, and monitoring
Father. Although Father lost the ability to visit the children in February 2018, the
evidence shows that he made no substantial progress on the case plan tasks at any time
before he lost his visitation rights. After Father could no longer visit the children, St.
Francis encouraged him to maintain his sobriety and follow through with the other case
plan tasks so that he could move forward after the investigation was complete. Father
failed to do so and stopped communicating with St. Francis in July 2018. Thereafter, St.
Francis continued its attempts to maintain contact with Father. The mere fact that St.
Francis could not facilitate visits with the children during the sexual abuse investigation
does not negate the numerous and reasonable efforts that were made for Father. Any
claim that DCF or St. Francis failed to make reasonable efforts to reintegrate Father and
the children is contradicted by the record.


K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(8) and (b)(9)


In finding that Father was unfit under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(8) and

(b)(9), the district court found that although Father had made some efforts to work toward
reintegration, he had failed to make adjustments and changes in certain critical areas. The
court found Father's failure to address his substance abuse problems was the most
concerning: "[Father]'s continuous, even daily use of marijuana while occasionally mixing
in cocaine and/or methamphetamine demonstrates an inability and failure to make
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the one fundamental change that absolutely must be made: to stop the pervasive
influence of drug abuse in the lives of [Father] and his children."


Father argues that the district court's reliance on these factors was improper
because he did complete certain case plan tasks and because visitation reports had all
been positive up until February 2018. Father reasserts his claim that it was impossible to
have a reasonable reintegration plan when he was prohibited from having contact with
the children. Father alleges that he was in a hopeless situation because he would not be
able to see his children regardless of the efforts he made on other case plan tasks.


Notably, the district court's decision to terminate was not based on Father's lack of
visitation with the children but instead was based primarily on Father's continued drug
use. In addition to Father's complete inability to stop using drugs, he also failed to
complete certain case plan tasks that did not depend on his ability to visit the children.
Namely, Father failed to complete the multi-week batterer intervention program, failed to
provide St. Francis with proof of employment and proof of stable housing, failed to appear
for multiple drug tests, and stopped communicating with St. Francis.


The district court made findings supported by clear and convincing evidence on
several statutory factors which may be considered in determining unfitness. Any number
of them standing alone could serve as a basis for a finding of unfitness. K.S.A. 2018
Supp. 38-2269(f). Looking at the district court's findings in total, the evidence of
unfitness was overwhelming. We conclude a rational fact-finder could determine to a
high probability that Father was unfit to parent the children at the time of the termination
hearing in all the ways identified by the district court under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-
2269(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(7), (b)(8), and (b)(9).



Likewise, we find support for the district court's determination that Father's
unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. A district court may look to a
15
parent's past conduct as an indicator of future behavior. See In re Price, 7 Kan. App. 2d

477, 483, 644 P.2d 467 (1982); In re M.T.S., No. 112,776, 2015 WL 2343435, at *8
(Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion). To that end, the district court found:


"[Father] has made some efforts to comply with the case plan tasks designed to
facilitate reintegration with a parent, but his never-ending use of controlled substances
such as marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine have substantially interfered with
those efforts. Father's unwillingness, or inability, to separate himself from drug use and
its harmful effects on a family unit indicates that he simply will not be able to adjust his
circumstances to adequately meet his children's needs. Given his failure to complete a
treatment program, coupled with his chronic and apparently unstoppable drug usage
during the 18 months that these CINC cases have been pending, there is no reason for the
court to believe that the father's situation will significantly improve in the foreseeable
future."


Father claims that his previous drug use does not establish that he would expose the
children to drugs in the foreseeable future. We examine the "foreseeable future" from the
perspective of a child. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2201(b)(4); In re M.H., 50 Kan. App. 2d
1162, 1170, 337 P.3d 711 (2014). Children and adults have different perceptions of time,
and a child has the right to permanency within a time frame that is reasonable to them. 50
Kan. App. 2d at 1170; see In re G.A.Y., No. 109,605, 2013 WL 5507639, at *1 (Kan.
App. 2013) (unpublished opinion) ("'child time'" differs from "'adult time'" in care
proceedings "in the sense that a year . . . reflects a much longer portion of a minor's life
than an adult's"). At the time of the hearing, B.B. was almost 5 years old, R.B. was
almost 4 years old, M.L.B. was 3 years old, and M.B. was 19 months old. The case had
been ongoing for more than 18 months, a significant portion of each child's life. We agree
with the district court's decision declining Father's request for additional time to work
toward reintegration.
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Finally, we consider the district court's finding that the children's best interests
would be served by terminating Father's parental rights. The district court is in the best
position to make findings on the best interests of the child, and we will not disturb its
judgment unless we find the determination amounts to an abuse of judicial discretion. In
re K.P., 44 Kan. App. 2d 316, 322, 235 P.3d 1255 (2010). Father argues that in making
its best interests finding, the district court focused only on Father's past and recent drug
use. Father claims the court failed to give adequate weight to his bond with the children,
the "hopeless situation" he was in after visitation was suspended, and evidence that he
was working toward reintegration by seeking employment and suitable housing for the
children and was willing to complete inpatient drug treatment.


We are not persuaded by Father's arguments. Instead, we are convinced that the
district court evaluated all the testimony and evidence before determining that it is in the
children's best interests that Father's parental rights are terminated. In reaching this
conclusion, the district court noted that the case had been pending for more than 18
months and that the children deserved to be in a stable and drug-free environment. A
reasonable person could have found the same and concluded that termination was in the
best interests of the children.


We are convinced that a rational fact-finder would have found it highly probable
that Father is unfit and that his unfitness is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that termination of Father's
parental rights is in the children's best interests.


Affirmed.



* * *

ATCHESON, J., concurring: I concur in affirming the district court's decision to
terminate the legal right of Father to parent his four children. The evidence amply
17
demonstrated Father's unfitness under several of the grounds identified in K.S.A. 2018

Supp. 38-2269(b), particularly based on Father's intractable addiction to illegal drugs.
Father also failed to secure adequate housing and had, at best, a spotty employment
history—material obstacles to raising children often directly linked to a parent's
unchecked substance abuse. Here, those circumstances, coupled with the unsuccessful
efforts of the assigned social service agencies to reintegrate the family, rendered Father
unfit under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(3) (continuing use of dangerous drugs);
K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(7) (failure of reasonable agency plans for family
rehabilitation); and K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b)(8) (lack of effort of parent to adjust
circumstances to meet children's needs). The district court so found, and any one of those
findings would be sufficient to support unfitness. I agree the evidence justified the district
court's determination that Father's unfitness on those grounds was unlikely to change in the
foreseeable future. Likewise, under the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding the best interests of the children favored termination of Father's
rights. See K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(a) (unfitness unlikely to change), (g)(1) (best
interests).


Although the district court discussed other statutory bases for termination under
K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2269(b) and outlined evidence bearing on them in its detailed
written ruling, I don't read the decision as finding Father legally unfit for those reasons.
The evidence rightfully gave the district court pause. But the district court did not rest its
legal conclusion on those grounds. As I have said, the reasons the district court did rely
on were well supported in the record and more than legally adequate to terminate Father's
parental rights.