Holt v. State

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 113,196

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STANTON HOLT,
Appellant,

v.

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Geary District Court; MARITZA SEGARRA, judge. Opinion filed January 15, 2016.
Affirmed.

Sam S. Kepfield, of Hutchinson, for appellant.

Steven L. Opat, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before MALONE, C.J., HILL and STANDRIDGE, JJ.

Per Curiam: Stanton Holt appeals the district court's decision to summarily deny
his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion without an evidentiary hearing.

In 1994, Holt was convicted by a jury of over 60 offenses, including two counts of
first-degree murder. He was ordered to serve two consecutive life sentences plus 123 to
355 years in prison. Holt appealed his sentence. The Kansas Supreme Court ultimately
affirmed his convictions. State v. Holt, 260 Kan. 33, 917 P.2d 1332 (1996).

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Since his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, Holt has sought
postconviction relief on several occasions without success.

"[Holt] has filed four pro se habeas corpus motions under K.S.A. 60-1507; two pro se
motions to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504; a letter to the district court,
which was treated as a motion for reconsideration; and the motion for new trial under
K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 22-3501 . . . . He has also filed two habeas corpus motions under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 in United States District Court for the District of Kansas." State v. Holt,
298 Kan. 469, 470-71, 313 P.3d 826 (2013).

In July 2014, Holt filed another K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. In it, he asserted (1)
ineffective assistance of his first K.S.A. 60-1507 counsel, (2) defective complaint/
information, (3) change of venue, (4) trial judge bias, (5) jury foreman bias, (6) DNA
inconsistencies, and (7) ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court found
Holt's motion was successive and that no intervening changes in the law justified granting
the motion.

When a district court summarily denies a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, an appellate
court conducts de novo review to determine whether the motion, files, and records of the
case conclusively establish that the movant is not entitled to relief. Sola-Morales v. State,
300 Kan. 875, 881, 335 P.3d 1162 (2014). A movant bears the burden of showing he or
she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Even if that showing is made, however, district
courts are not required to entertain a second or successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion
requesting similar relief on behalf of the same defendant. See K.S.A. 60-1507(c); State v.
Trotter, 296 Kan. 898, 904, 295 P.3d 1039 (2013); Supreme Court Rule 183(d) (2015
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 271). "A movant in a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is presumed to have
listed all grounds for relief"; thus, the prohibition against successive motions does not
only bar claims raised in prior motions, it also prohibits any claims that could have been
raised in a prior motion. Trotter, 296 Kan. 898, Syl. ¶ 2.

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Upon review of Holt's motion here, we find six of the seven issues raised have
been raised before. Although the record does not include most of Holt's previous
postconviction motions, the previous appellate decisions related to those motions provide
sufficient information from which to conclude that the six issues in Holt's current motion
have been raised before and thus are successive. The only issue that was not previously
raised was Holt's assertion that the attorney appointed to assist him with his first K.S.A.
60-1507 motion provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Although it is unclear
whether Holt previously raised this issue, we decline to address the merits because we
find it also is successive; Holt could have raised it in any of the previous motions he filed
after his initial motion. See Trotter, 296 Kan. 898, Syl. ¶ 2.

Despite the successive nature of Holt's motion, Holt argues the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 182 L. Ed. 2d
272 (2012), constituted an intervening change in the law that justifies consideration of his
motion at an evidentiary hearing. In Martinez, the United States Supreme Court noted
that federal courts generally will not review the merits of a claim attacking the
constitutionality of a state prisoner's conviction and sentence if the state court has already
declined to hear the claim due to the prisoner's failure to abide by state procedural rules.
132 S Ct. at 1316. The Martinez Court, however, created an exception to this rule in cases
where (1) a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in a collateral
proceeding and (2) the prisoner was not provided counsel for the initial collateral
proceeding or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective. In such cases, a mere
procedural default by the prisoner in state court will not bar a federal habeas court from
hearing the merits of that claim. 132 S. Ct. at 1320.

Relying on Martinez, Holt argues the attorney appointed to assist him with his first
K.S.A. 60-1507 motion was ineffective in that the attorney acquiesced to the State's
motion to dismiss the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion; thus, he is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on his current motion. We find Holt's argument unconvincing for two reasons.
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First, the Martinez holding applies only to cases brought in federal court. 132 S Ct. at
1320. Therefore, Martinez does not impact the manner in which Kansas courts interpret
and apply their own procedural rules. Holt acknowledges this in his brief but nonetheless
argues that Martinez should apply to the facts of this case.

Second, even if the logic of Martinez applied, Holt was still required to provide an
evidentiary basis to establish he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. To do that, Holt had to allege facts to establish that "(1)
counsel's performance was deficient and (2) counsel's deficient performance was
sufficiently serious to prejudice the defense and deprive the defendant of a fair trial."
Edgar v. State, 294 Kan. 828, 837, 283 P.3d 152 (2012). Holt argues the mere fact that
his initial K.S.A. 60-1507 counsel acquiesced to the dismissal of his motion constituted
deficient performance. Such a conclusory allegation is insufficient to avoid summary
denial of the motion currently before this court.

Affirmed.