Douglas v. State

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 114,828

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

ANTHONY DOUGLAS,
Appellant,

v.

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JAMES R. FLEETWOOD, judge. Opinion filed October 7,
2016. Affirmed.

Michael P. Whalen, and Krystle M.S. Dalke, of Law Office of Michael P. Whalen, of Wichita, for
appellant.

Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt,
attorney general, for appellant.

Before MALONE, C.J., SCHROEDER, J., and WALKER, S.J.

Per Curiam: Anthony D. Douglas appeals the district court's summary denial of
his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. In his motion, Douglas sought to have his municipal court
conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) overturned, arguing that the Sedgwick
County jail's policy of detaining anyone arrested for DUI for a minimum time before
allowing them to post bail violated his state constitutional rights. The district court denied
his motion, finding that K.S.A. 60-1507 does not apply to municipal cases.

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On appeal, Douglas argues that the district court should have reviewed his motion
under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-1501. But even if the district court had done so, it would
have lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the claim because Douglas had not filed
the motion in the proper court. Thus, we affirm the district court's judgment.

FACTS

In November 2012, Douglas was arrested and charged with DUI, second offense.
He ultimately pled no contest to the charge and was sentenced to serve 180 days in jail.
The sparse record on appeal does not suggest that Douglas appealed his conviction to the
district court.

On August 27, 2014, Douglas filed a motion in Sedgwick County District Court
for habeas corpus under K.S.A. 60-1507 to have his sentence vacated and his conviction
set aside in the DUI case. The motion stated that Douglas "is currently being detained at
the Hutchinson Correctional Facility" in Reno County. The motion claimed that soon
after Douglas was arrested for DUI, he had requested a phone call to make arrangements
to post bail. According to Douglas, Sedgwick County jail staff denied his request because
jail policy required that anyone arrested on suspicion of DUI serve a mandatory
minimum number of hours in jail before being allowed to post bail or otherwise be
released. Relying on State v. Cuchy, 270 Kan. 763, 772, 19 P.3d 152 (2001), Douglas
argued that the jail policy violated clear Kansas Supreme Court precedent that mandatory
minimum detention periods for those arrested for DUI are unlawful and violate the state
constitutional right to make bail. Douglas' motion asserted that the unlawful detention
impacted his ability to prepare a defense because he was unable to contact a lawyer for
assistance or to have additional lab testing to show he was not intoxicated.

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The district court denied Douglas' motion without holding a hearing, concluding
that the motion addressed a municipal court conviction and "K.S.A. 60-1507 does not
apply to municipal cases." Douglas timely appealed to this court.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Douglas argues that the district court erred in not interpreting his pro se
K.S.A. 60-1507 motion as a K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-1501 motion. The State counters that
even if the district court had reviewed his motion under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-1501, the
district court would have lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of Douglas' claim
because the motion was not filed in the proper court.

Kansas courts liberally construe pro se pleadings and motions based on the
document's content rather than the labels and forms used by the defendant. A defendant's
failure to cite the correct statutory grounds for his or her claim is immaterial. In
determining whether the district court correctly interpreted a pro se pleading, this court
independently reviews the matter, with no required deference to the district court's
conclusion. State v. Gilbert, 299 Kan. 797, 802, 326 P.3d 1060 (2014) (citing State v.
Kelly, 291 Kan. 563, 565, 244 P.3d 639 [2010]). Whether jurisdiction exists is a question
of law, which this court reviews independently. Norris v. Kansas Employment Security
Bd. of Review, 303 Kan. 834, 837, 367 P.3d 1252 (2016).

Section 8 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights guarantees the right to seek a
writ of habeas corpus. That right is codified at K.S.A. 60-1501 et seq. A person may seek
habeas corpus relief under two provisions, which serve different purposes: K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 60-1501 or K.S.A. 60-1507. Generally, prisoners use K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-1501
to challenge the mode or conditions of their confinement, including administrative
actions by the prison or other penal institution; K.S.A. 60-1507 is typically used to
challenge a prisoner's conviction or sentence. Safarik v. Bruce, 20 Kan. App. 2d 61, Syl.
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¶ 5, 883 P.2d 1211, rev. denied 256 Kan. 996 (1994); Yancey v. State, No. 111,003, 2015
WL 770204, at *2 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion).

Douglas brought his motion under K.S.A. 60-1507, which provides:

"(a) Motion attacking sentence. A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court
of general jurisdiction claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence
was imposed in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States, or the
constitution or laws of the state of Kansas, or that the court was without jurisdiction to
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may, pursuant to the time limitations
imposed by subsection (f), move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set
aside or correct the sentence." K.S.A. 60-1507(a).

The district court properly determined that it had no jurisdiction to consider
Douglas' motion because K.S.A. 60-1507 applies only in cases where a person is
attempting to vacate a sentence imposed by a court of general jurisdiction, and municipal
courts are not courts of general jurisdiction. See In re Habeas Corpus Application of
Gilchrist, 238 Kan. 202, 205-06, 708 P.2d 977 (1985); Markovich v. City of Manhattan,
No. 106,567, 2012 WL 718975, at *2 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 293
Kan. 1107 (2012). By comparison, K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-1501 applies more broadly to
"any person in this state who is detained, confined or restrained of liberty on any pretense
whatsoever." Defendants are entitled to assert constitutional claims in K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
60-1501 motions to challenge the validity of a municipal court judgment. See Gilchrist,
238 Kan. at 206-07; Markovich, 2012 WL 718975, at *3 (citing Paletta v. City of Topeka,
20 Kan. App. 2d 859, 860-61, 893 P.2d 280 [1995]).

On appeal, Douglas argues that the district court should have interpreted his pro se
K.S.A. 60-1507 motion as a K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-1501 motion because he was
necessarily challenging Sedgwick County jail's administrative policies and the conditions
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of his imprisonment. He cites Markovich v. City of Manhattan in support of his argument
that the district court erred in not doing so.

The facts in Markovich are almost identical to the facts herein. In Markovich, the
defendant filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion to challenge the validity of his municipal court
conviction and sentence on several grounds. The defendant filed the motion in Riley
County District Court although he was physically located in Reno County where he was
serving a prison sentence on other charges. This court held that the Riley County District
Court did not have jurisdiction to address the defendant's claims under K.S.A. 60-1507
because that habeas provision does not apply to municipal court convictions. However,
this court agreed with the defendant that the district court should have reviewed his
motion to determine if he was entitled to habeas corpus relief under K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
60-1501. 2012 WL 718975, at *2. Nevertheless, this court ultimately held that even if the
district court had considered the defendant's habeas corpus motion under K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 60-1501, the motion was properly dismissed as being filed in the wrong county
because a motion for relief under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-1501 must be filed in the county
where the petitioner is being restrained. 2012 WL 718975, at *3-4.

Under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-1501, the petitioner must bring his or her motion "in
the supreme court, court of appeals or the district court of the county in which such
restraint is taking place." See also Safarik, 20 Kan. App. 2d 61, Syl. ¶ 5 (K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 60-1501 motion is "properly filed in the county of confinement."). Here, Douglas
was in prison in Reno County but brought his motion in Sedgwick County District Court.
Consistent with the holding in Markovich, even if the district court had reviewed
Douglas' motion under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-1501, the motion was properly dismissed
because it was filed in the Sedgwick County District Court while Douglas is serving a
prison sentence in Reno County. See Markovich, 2012 WL 718975, at *4. Moreover, a
petition under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-1501 would only be appropriate if Douglas was
challenging the mode or conditions of his confinement at the Hutchinson Correctional
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Facility. Douglas is attempting to challenge the detention policy of the Sedgwick County
jail, but the record reflects that he is no longer being confined in that institution.

In summary, the district court herein correctly determined that it had no
jurisdiction to hear Douglas' motion pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507. Even if the district court
had considered Douglas' habeas corpus motion under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-1501, the
motion was properly dismissed as being filed in the wrong county. If a district court
reaches the correct result, its decision will be upheld even though it relied upon the wrong
ground or assigned erroneous reasons for its decision. State v. Murray, 285 Kan. 503,
533, 174 P.3d 407 (2008).

Affirmed.