Campbell v. Cline

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 119,734

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

MATTHEW CAMPBELL,
Appellant,

v.

SAM CLINE, Warden,
Appellee.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Leavenworth District Court; GUNNAR A. SUNDBY, judge. Opinion filed March 1,
2019. Affirmed.

Joseph A. Desch, of Law Office of Joseph A. Desch, of Topeka, for appellant.

Sherri Price, legal counsel and special assistant attorney general, of Lansing Correctional
Facility, for appellee.

Before BRUNS, P.J., SCHROEDER and GARDNER, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Matthew Campbell appeals the district court's dismissal of his
petition for writ of habeas corpus. He alleges the district court erred in finding his
manuscript was subject to the one-ounce rule and that Lansing Correctional Facility
violated his due process rights by destroying the manuscript. We find no error and affirm.

In May 2017, Lansing Correctional Facility received a package addressed to
Campbell containing a manuscript written on three legal pads. The manuscript was in
Campbell's own handwriting, unpublished, and mailed from a family member outside
Lansing Correctional Facility to protect Campbell's copyright. Lansing's staff told
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Campbell he could not have the package because it was a book that had not come from an
authorized vendor or publisher as required by K.A.R. 44-12-601(g)(1) (2018 Supp.).
Lansing told Campbell he could pay to have the manuscript mailed to someone outside of
Lansing or they would destroy it as contraband. Lansing later destroyed the manuscript
because Campbell did not opt to mail it out.

In September 2017, Campbell filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging
Lansing staff wrongfully seized his mail. He sought delivery of his manuscript, damages
of $2,000, and an order that his remaining six manuscripts be delivered to him when
Lansing received them.

The district court issued the writ, and Cline filed a motion to dismiss. Cline
alleged Lansing did not wrongfully seize Campbell's property because K.A.R. 44-12-
601(g) (2018 Supp.) provides that "[o]nly books, newspapers, and periodicals received
directly from a publisher or a vendor shall be accepted," and the manuscript did not come
from a publisher or vender.

The district court held a hearing on Cline's motion to dismiss. Campbell argued his
previous prison gave him his manuscripts and Lansing should be required to do likewise.
He also argued Lansing improperly destroyed his manuscript instead of preserving it for
his hearing.

Cline argued the manuscript violated the one-ounce rule—a portion of K.A.R. 44-
12-601(g)(1) (2018 Supp.) which states "an inmate shall be permitted to receive printed
material, including newspaper and magazine clippings, if the material is included as part
of a first-class letter that does not exceed one ounce in total weight."

After hearing argument, the district court granted the motion to dismiss. It found
the manuscript was not a book from a publisher or vendor. The district court found it was
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reasonable for Lansing to "limit letters or handwritten documents" to one ounce, and the
legal pads exceeded one ounce. The district court also found Campbell filed a grievance
within Lansing, and it gave him two options—pay to mail the manuscript to someone
outside of the facility or Lansing would destroy the manuscript. The district court found
Campbell did not advise Lansing to send the manuscript out, instead he asked Lansing to
save the manuscript for court.

ANALYSIS

Right for wrong reason

An appellate court reviews a district court's decision on a K.S.A. 60-1501 petition
to determine whether the district court's factual findings are supported by substantial
competent evidence and are sufficient to support the court's conclusions of law. Rice v.
State, 278 Kan. 309, 320, 95 P.3d 994 (2004); Hooks v. State, 51 Kan. App. 2d 527, 530,
349 P.3d 476 (2015). The district court's conclusions of law are subject to de novo
review. Rice, 278 Kan. at 320; Hooks, 51 Kan. App. 2d at 530. Similarly, interpretation
of a statute or regulation is a question of law subject to de novo review. In re Tax Appeal
of LaFarge Midwest, 293 Kan. 1039, 1043, 271 P.3d 732 (2012). Here, there is no
disagreement about the facts; the parties only argue about the legal conclusions drawn
from those facts.

The district court erred when it found "it is a reasonable rule that [Lansing] limit
letters or handwritten documents to be limited to one ounce" because there is no such
limit to correspondence. Instead, the one-ounce rule applies to printed materials included
as part of a first-class letter. K.A.R. 44-12-601(g)(1) (2018 Supp.) states:

"Inmates may receive books, newspapers, and periodicals as permitted by the
internal management policies and procedures of the department of corrections. All books,
newspapers, and periodicals shall be purchased through account withdrawal requests.
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Only books, newspapers, and periodicals received directly from a publisher or vender
shall be accepted. However, an inmate shall be permitted to receive printed material,
including newspaper and magazine clippings, if the material is included as part of a first-
class letter that does not exceed one ounce in total weight." (Emphasis added.)

Nonetheless, Campbell is not entitled to relief. If a district court reaches the
correct result, its decision will be upheld even though it relied upon the wrong ground or
assigned erroneous reasons for its decision. Gannon v. State, 302 Kan. 739, 744, 357 P.3d
873 (2015). Here, the district court reached the correct result, despite erroneously
implying the one-ounce rule applied to all correspondence.

Campbell contends the district court erred because the manuscript on three legal
pads was personal correspondence, not a publication. He asserts the one-ounce rule does
not apply to personal correspondence. As a result, Campbell argues the district court
erred since he is entitled to receive unlimited correspondence—with no restriction on
length—from family and friends. Citing various dictionaries' definitions of "book" and
"manuscript," Cline contends the legal pads were not "personal correspondence." He
argues the district court did not err because the book was not received from a vendor or
publisher. Despite Campbell's arguments otherwise, the manuscript written on three legal
pads was not personal correspondence.

Although K.A.R. 44-12-601(g)(1) (2018 Supp.) does not define personal
correspondence or a manuscript, appellate courts give these words their ordinary meaning
when interpreting statutes. See Ullery v. Othick, 304 Kan. 405, 409, 372 P.3d 1135
(2016).

Webster's New World College Dictionary 334 (5th ed. 2014) defines
correspondence as, in relevant part, "a) communication by exchange of letters b) the
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letters received or written." The legal pads were not letters; they were Campbell's
manuscript.

Webster's New World College Dictionary 890 defines manuscript as "a book or
document written by hand, esp. before the invention of printing . . . a written or
typewritten document or paper, esp. the copy of an author's work that is submitted to a
publisher or printer." It defines a book as "a number of sheets of paper, parchment, etc.
with writing or printing on them, fastened together along one edge, usually between
protective covers." Webster's New World College Dictionary 170.

Campbell's manuscript is a book. K.A.R. 44-12-601(g)(1) (2018 Supp.) prohibits
Campbell from receiving his manuscript because "only books, newspapers, and
periodicals received directly from a publisher or vender shall be accepted." Since the
package contained a book, the district court correctly granted Cline's motion to dismiss.
See Gannon, 302 Kan. at 744.

No due process violation

Campbell contends Cline violated his due process right because Lansing failed to
follow its grievance procedures and, ultimately, destroyed the manuscript. Whether due
process has been afforded is a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited
review. Hogue v. Bruce, 279 Kan. 848, 850, 113 P.3d 234 (2005). Alleged violations of
procedural due process require a two-step analysis. First, the appellate court must decide
whether Cline or Lansing deprived Campbell of life, liberty, or property. If a deprivation
was completed through State action, we must next determine the extent and nature of the
process which is due. Hogue, 279 Kan. at 850-51.

Lansing destroyed Campbell's manuscript, thus depriving him of his property.
Cline asserts Lansing did not deny Campbell due process because he had an opportunity
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to resend the manuscript out of the facility to an address of his own choosing. Cline's
argument is more persuasive.

Lansing gave Campbell two options—he could pay to have the manuscript mailed
to someone he chose, or they would destroy it. Campbell could have opted to send his
manuscript elsewhere, but he chose not to. Instead, he asked Lansing to hold the
manuscript "as evidence for court." Had Campbell elected to send the manuscript
elsewhere, there would be no deprivation whatsoever. Lansing provided Campbell with
two options. He failed to respond. Due process was provided. The district court did not
err in dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Affirmed.