Busch v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 114,672

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STEFFAN BUSCH,
Appellant,

v.

KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Ellis District Court; GLENN R. BRAUN, judge. Opinion filed July 1, 2016. Affirmed.

Michael S. Holland II, of Holland and Holland, of Russell, for appellant.

John D. Shultz, deputy general counsel, Kansas Department of Revenue, for appellee.

Before MCANANY, P.J., HILL and BRUNS, JJ.

Per Curiam: Steffan Busch was stopped by the police for speeding. The officer
detected the odor of alcoholic beverage on Busch's breath and noticed Busch's eyes were
bloodshot and his speech was slurred. The officer found alcoholic beverages in Busch's
car. Busch admitted consuming alcohol but refused a preliminary breath test and field
sobriety tests. He was arrested for driving under the influence, and the officer served him
with the DC-27 form.

Busch requested an administrative hearing. The officer who certified the DC-27
form appeared, but Busch did not. Following the administrative hearing, the hearing
officer affirmed the suspension of Busch's driving privileges.
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Busch sought judicial review, claiming the officer lacked reasonable grounds to
request testing under the Kansas Implied Consent Law. Busch did not subpoena the
arresting officer, so the officer was not present at the district court's evidentiary hearing.
Neither was Busch. The district court admitted into evidence, over Busch's objection, the
DC-27 form certified by the officer under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 8-1002(b). The district
court affirmed the suspension of Busch's driving privileges, and Busch appeals.

Busch cites in his brief several pages of what he characterizes as a transcript of the
proceedings before the district court. None of this is included in the record on appeal, so
we disregard it. We confine our consideration to matters contained in the record on
appeal. Romkes v. University of Kansas, 49 Kan. App. 2d 871, 886, 317 P.3d 124 (2014).
More importantly, the colloquy cited in Busch's brief does not even involve his case. He
has cited proceedings from an entirely different case.

As his sole claim of error, Busch argues the district court erred in admitting the
DC-27 form into evidence without the certifying officer being present to provide
foundation testimony and be subject to cross-examination. We have unlimited review
over the adequacy of the legal basis for a district court's ruling on the admissibility of
evidence. State v. Bowen, 299 Kan. 339, 349, 323 P.3d 853 (2014). Further, we have
unlimited review over the interpretation of a statute. Neighbor v. Westar Energy, Inc.,
301 Kan. 916, 918, 349 P.3d 469 (2015).

K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 8-1002(b) provides:

"For purposes of this section, certification shall be complete upon signing, and no
additional acts of oath, affirmation, acknowledgment or proof of execution shall be
required. The signed certification or a copy or photostatic reproduction thereof shall be
admissible in evidence in all proceedings brought pursuant to this act, and receipt of any
such certification, copy or reproduction shall accord the department authority to proceed
as set forth herein. Any person who signs a certification submitted to the division
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knowing it contains a false statement is guilty of a class B nonperson misdemeanor."
(Emphasis added.)

The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the
legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. Neighbor, 301 Kan. at 918. We
discern that intent through the statutory language used by the legislature, giving common
words their ordinary meanings. Cady v. Schroll, 298 Kan. 731, 738, 317 P.3d 90 (2014).
When a statute is plain and unambiguous, we do not speculate about legislative intent
behind that clear language and refrain from reading something into the statute that is not
readily found in its words. 298 Kan. at 738-39.

At the district court level, a licensee is entitled to a trial de novo at which the
licensee has the burden to show the KDR's order should be set aside. K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
8-1020(q). Busch makes the curious argument that in these civil proceedings the State has
the burden of providing the licensee with witnesses to enable the licensee to meet the
burden of proof. But the officer who certified the DC-27 form is not required to testify at
the administrative hearing, unless his testimony is requested by the licensee. K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 8-1020(g).

Busch misplaces reliance on Kempke v. Dept. of Revenue, 281 Kan. 770, 133 P.3d
104 (2006). Contrary to Busch's assertion, the court in Kempke did not find that the
certifying officer is required to testify at a licensee's trial de novo. In Kempke, the Kansas
Supreme Court considered whether a licensee is deprived of due process of law by the
evidentiary restrictions imposed at the administrative hearing level. The Kempke court
held the Kansas Implied Consent Law does not deprive a licensee of due process because,
by appealing to the district court, a licensee is assured a full due process hearing before
any final action on the licensee's driving privileges. 281 Kan. at 799-800. At that hearing
the licensee has "the opportunity to call relevant witnesses and to cross-examine
witnesses." (Emphasis added.) 281 Kan. at 796.
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Busch had the opportunity to call the certifying officer to testify but chose not to
do so. The Kansas Department of Revenue was under no obligation to call witnesses or
present evidence for the purpose of satisfying Busch's burden of proof before the district
court. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 8-1020(q); Huelsman v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 267
Kan. 456, 463, 980 P.2d 1022 (1999) ("[T]he burden is on the licensee in the
administrative action and subsequent appeal of that action."); Henke v. Kansas Dept. of
Revenue, 45 Kan. App. 2d 8, 13, 246 P.3d 408 (2010).

State v. Baker, 269 Kan. 383, 387, 2 P.3d 786 (2000), involved the foundational
requirements for admission of blood alcohol test results in a criminal trial. In deciding the
matter the Kansas Supreme Court stated: "The DC-27 form contains the certifications
required by K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 8-1002. Once the certification requirements are
completed, the DC-27 form is admissible as evidence to prove the statements contained
therein. See K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 8-1002(b)." (Emphasis added.) Moore v. Kansas Dept. of
Revenue, No. 107,810, 2013 WL 5925901 (Kan. App. 2013) (unpublished opinion), is
one of many unpublished opinions of our court putting to rest the claim Busch makes in
this appeal. The Moore court stated:

"We find K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 8-1002(b) is plain and unambiguous. It states the
legislature's determination that an officer's DC–27 certification shall be admissible as
evidence in all proceedings provided for in the Implied Consent Act relating to alcohol
testing for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. This would include a trial de
novo, like the one under review, requested by a licensee who files a petition for review of
the KDR's order to suspend driving privileges." 2013 WL 5925901, at *5.

We conclude that the district court properly admitted the DC-27 form as evidence
to prove the statements contained therein without the certifying officer's testimony.
Busch could have called the certifying officer to testify but chose not to.

Affirmed.