Beckford v. State

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 115,865

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

LAROY BECKFORD,
Appellant,

v.

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Leavenworth District Court; GUNNAR A. SUNDBY, judge. Opinion filed June 16,
2017. Affirmed.

Heather Cessna, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Todd Thompson, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before ATCHESON, P.J., MALONE and POWELL, JJ.

Per Curiam: In his second appeal to us concerning his motion filed pursuant to
K.S.A. 60-1507, Laroy Beckford complains the district court erred by denying him relief.
Beckford was arrested for and convicted of aggravated robbery. After his conviction was
affirmed by our court, he filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion alleging he received ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial. The district court denied the motion after a nonevidentiary
hearing; on appeal, our court affirmed most of the allegations but remanded the case for
an evidentiary hearing on whether trial counsel sufficiently investigated a mental disease
or defect defense. After a hearing, the district court again denied Beckford relief. We
affirm.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In August 2005, Laroy Beckford was charged with the aggravated robbery of the
Commander's Inn Hotel in Leavenworth, Kansas. Shortly thereafter, a competency
evaluation was ordered, Beckford was deemed incompetent to stand trial, and he was
committed to Larned State Hospital. "Nine months later, the court reassessed Beckford
and declared him competent to proceed. On April 24, 2007, a jury found Beckford guilty
of aiding and abetting in the aggravated robbery" of the hotel. Beckford v. State, No.
108,693, 2013 WL 5870047, at *1 (Kan. App. 2013) (unpublished opinion).

Beckford filed a direct appeal, and our court affirmed his conviction in State v.
Beckford, No. 100,077, 2009 WL 401003 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished opinion).

"Following his direct appeal, Beckford filed a timely K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.
The district court appointed counsel, held a nonevidentiary hearing, and denied the
motion. The district court found that Beckford's direct appeal had already addressed
many of his claims, that Beckford's contentions were merely conclusory and speculative,
and the only evidence Beckford proposed to offer was his own testimony as set forth in
an affidavit. The district court held that Beckford failed to show ineffective assistance of
counsel and was not entitled to relief under K.S.A. 60-1507." 2013 WL 5870047, at *1.

Our court generally affirmed the district court's denial of relief but found that it
was unclear if Beckford's trial attorney sufficiently investigated whether there was
evidence upon which a mental capacity defense could have been crafted and remanded
the case for an evidentiary hearing on this issue. 2013 WL 5870047, at *4-6.

Because Beckford's attorney was awaiting additional information at the time the
K.S.A. 60-1507 hearing was set, the hearing was bifurcated—trial counsel testified on
July 29, 2014, and all other witnesses testified on February 17, 2015. At the close of the
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second hearing, the district court concluded that Beckford failed to prove that trial
counsel had provided him ineffective assistance and again denied him relief.

Beckford now appeals.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN DENYING BECKFORD'S K.S.A. 60-1507 MOTION?

Beckford argues the district court erred when it denied him relief after an
evidentiary hearing on his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, claiming he received ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial. Claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel present
mixed questions of fact and law; consequently, we review the underlying factual findings
for support by substantial competent evidence and the legal conclusions de novo. State v.
Bowen, 299 Kan. 339, 343, 323 P.3d 853 (2014).

Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance in a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is highly deferential and requires consideration of all the evidence before the
judge or jury; the reviewing court must strongly presume that counsel's conduct fell
within the broad range of reasonable professional assistance. See State v. Kelly, 298 Kan.
965, 970, 318 P.3d 987 (2014). "To prevail on [a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel], a criminal defendant must establish (1) the performance of defense counsel was
deficient under the totality of the circumstances" and (2) the defendant was prejudiced by
counsel's error. Sola-Morales v. State, 300 Kan. 875, 882, 335 P.3d 1162 (2014). To
establish prejudice, the defendant must show "that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for the deficient performance, the [outcome of the proceeding would have been
different]. [Citations omitted.] A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome" of the proceeding. Miller v. State, 298 Kan. 921,
934, 318 P.3d 155 (2014).

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Beckford specifically argues the district court erred when it concluded that trial
counsel's decision not to pursue a mental disease or defect defense was reasonable and
made after a thorough investigation into Beckford's mental health history. In reaching its
decision, the district court made extensive findings about Beckford's mental health and
trial counsel's performance, including:

 Based on the reports of the mental health professionals at Larned State
Hospital, there was no indication that Beckford lacked the ability to form
criminal intent at the time he participated in the robbery of the motel.
 Trial counsel read the reports from Larned and spent time interacting with
Beckford. Based on the reports, the conversations she had with Beckford,
and her experience, she came to believe that she would be unable to find an
expert to contradict the conclusion that Beckford was capable of forming
criminal intent.
 At Larned, Beckford was diagnosed with mild mental retardation,
substance abuse, antisocial behavior, and aggressiveness.
 The reports from Larned contained facts that would have been unflattering
to Beckford and would have made his defense more difficult because these
facts would have come into evidence had a mental defect defense been
pursued. These facts included a note indicating that evaluators believed
Beckford manipulated the results of his initial evaluation in which he was
found incompetent and warning that if he again behaved "in a manner that
provides information which appears he does not comprehend, it should be
regarded as a purposeful effort" to manipulate; the conclusion that he was
able to form criminal intent at the time of the robbery; and information
regarding his history of antisocial and aggressive behavior.
 Trial counsel concluded—based upon her experiences and after
investigation—that a mental disease or defect defense would not be the best
defense to pursue.
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The district court then concluded that Beckford failed to prove the first prong of the
ineffective assistance of counsel test—error—and denied his requested relief.

There is substantial competent evidence in the record to support the district court's
findings. Trial counsel testified that prior to being assigned to Beckford's case, she had
experience working with other defendants who exhibited indications that they had some
mental issue that prevented them from being able to form the mens rea necessary to be
convicted of the crimes with which they were charged. She testified that in this case she
read through the discharge records from Larned and spent time interacting with Beckford
before coming to the conclusion that a mental disease or defect defense was not her best
trial strategy. According to Beckford, trial counsel also received and reviewed
information from the Leavenworth Guidance Center about the treatment and diagnoses he
had received there, and he had discussed his mental health history with her. Based on
what she knew, trial counsel testified that she did not think she would be able to find an
expert to testify in support of this defense and she was concerned that attempting such a
defense would allow the State to bring in unflattering information about Beckford that
would be compromising.

Trial counsel's testimony was supported by Beckford's records from Larned. While
Beckford was initially found unfit to stand trial, the same report indicated that based on
the information available, there was no sign that Beckford "behaved in a bizarre,
demented or psychotic manner which would have indicated he suffered symptoms of a
mental disease (mental defect) to indicate he lacked the mental state required as an
element of the offenses charged" at the time of the robbery. The report concluded that
Beckford did not understand the trial process well enough to assist his attorney with his
own defense and thus was incompetent to stand trial, but he exhibited no other
indications of a psychiatric disorder which would have warranted prescribing
psychotropic medications. Although Beckford testified at the K.S.A. 60-1507 hearing that
he regularly had blackouts, may have been having a blackout during the time of the
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robbery, and had multiple blackouts while at Lansing Correctional Facility, there is no
mention of such a condition in the records from Larned.

The second report cleared Beckford to stand trial, noted his propensity to break
rules and behave violently while at Larned, and concluded that in the future if Beckford
appeared not to understand the trial process, such behavior should be regarded as a
purposeful effort and not due to psychiatric problems.

The district court's factual findings support the legal conclusion that trial counsel
did not provide Beckford with ineffective assistance at trial. Attorneys have broad
discretion to make strategic trial decisions, and they will only be found ineffective based
on a strategic decision if the decision was made after a less than comprehensive
investigation. Even then,

"'strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to
the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.
In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any
ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for
reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to
counsel's judgments.'" State v. Cheatham, 296 Kan. 417, 437, 292 P.3d 318 (2013)
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674 [1984]).

As Beckford points out, trial counsel did not contact all of the former mental
health professionals who treated him prior to determining not to use a mental disease or
defect defense. This, however, was reasonable based on the information trial counsel did
have: a report speculating that Beckford was capable of forming the necessary mens rea
at the time of the robbery; a report cautioning those involved in the case to view any
further indications that Beckford was unfit to stand trial as an attempt to manipulate the
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system; records indicating that Beckford had a history of aggressiveness and antisocial
behavior; and the knowledge that if she attempted to pursue a mental disease or defect
defense, all medical records would have been admissible. In light of the many negative
facts contained in the Larned reports that would have caused a jury to question
Beckford's veracity and character and the scarcity of evidence that would have provided a
basis for a defense, it was reasonable for Beckford's trial counsel not to further pursue an
investigation into a mental disease or defect defense. The record supports the district
court's denial of Beckford's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

Affirmed.