State v. Smith-Parker (Corrected December 31, 2014)

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

Nos. 105,918
105,919

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

WILLIE JEROME SMITH-PARKER,
Appellant.


SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.
To establish guilt on the basis of aiding and abetting, the State must show that the
defendant knowingly associated with the unlawful venture and participated in such a way
as to indicate that he or she facilitated the success of the venture. Testimony of witnesses
that placed the defendant in this case at the scene of the crime shortly before the crime's
commission along with other witness testimony placing the defendant with the fruits of
the crime was sufficient to establish that the defendant was present during the
commission of the crime. In addition, forensic evidence tending to show that the victim
did not provoke his assailant and witness testimony tending to show that the victim may
have been targeted because he possessed large amounts of marijuana contributed to
sufficient evidence of the defendant's premeditation, at least as an aider and abettor.

2.
Kansas' aiding and abetting statute outlines the proper assignment of criminal
responsibility; it does not create distinct elements or alternative means of the crimes to
which it is applied. State v. Betancourt, 299 Kan. 131, 139, 322 P.3d 353 (2014).

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3.
K.S.A. 22-3202(1) permits crimes to be charged in one complaint—and, thus,
under K.S.A. 22-3203, permits consolidation of complaints—when "the crimes
charged . . . are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or
transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts
of a common scheme or plan." The "connected together" phrase from the third statutory
condition precedent is applicable in three situations: (1) when the defendant provided
evidence of one crime while committing another; (2) when some of the charges were
precipitated by other charges; or (3) when all of the charges stemmed from a common
event or goal. An appellate court cannot rely on mere temporal proximity or similar
witnesses to support a district judge's consolidation decision under the third statutory
condition. But where ballistics evidence indicates that the same gun was used in the
commission of two different crimes, the two crimes are sufficiently connected together to
satisfy the third statutory condition precedent.

4.
The State has no right to challenge hearsay statements based on the Confrontation
Clause under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177
(2004).

5.
A victim's statement to his significant other that she and the kids would "never
have to see him again" was not offered for the literal truth of the matter asserted and was
not hearsay.

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6.
It is clear error to provide a jury with an instruction stating: "If you do not have a
reasonable doubt from all the evidence that the State has proven murder in the first
degree on either or both theories, then you will enter a verdict of guilty." Although a
criminal jury should not be instructed on its inherent power of nullification, a jury
instruction telling the jury it "must" or "will" enter a verdict is too close to directing a
verdict for the State. The contrary holding of State v. Lovelace, 227 Kan. 348, 354, 607
P.2d 49 (1980), is overruled.

7.
When a juror is replaced after deliberations have begun, the district judge must
instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew.

8.
If a juror alleges that his or her removal and replacement was successfully sought
by other jurors because of a disagreement over voting position, and that version of events
differs from that of the presiding juror, a district judge must recall at least those two
jurors to testify live. Without such live testimony, the factual dispute cannot be resolved
nor the credibility of the jurors weighed.

9.
Cumulative error meriting reversal exists if the evidence against a defendant is
weak and multiple serious procedural defects taint the trial.

Appeal from Saline District Court; JEROME P. HELLMER, judge. Opinion filed December 24,
2014. Reversed and remanded.

Samuel D. Schirer, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and Lydia Krebs, of
the same office, was on the brief for appellant.
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Christina Trocheck, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Ellen Mitchell, county
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BEIER, J.: This is defendant Willie Smith-Parker's direct appeal from two
prosecutions joined for a single jury trial. The first case arose from a burglary/homicide
on the morning of June 13, 2009, and the second arose from a fatal shooting on the
morning of June 19, 2009. Smith-Parker was convicted of first-degree premeditated
murder in the death of Alfred Mack, second-degree intentional murder in the later death
of Justin Letourneau, theft, and aggravated assault. The jury acquitted Smith-Parker of
two aggravated burglary counts.

Smith-Parker raises 10 issues in this appeal: (1) whether the evidence of
premeditation of Mack's murder was sufficient; (2) whether aiding and abetting is an
alternative means crime; (3) whether the two cases should have been consolidated for
trial; (4) whether the district judge abused his discretion by excluding a statement made
by Letourneau; (5) whether the mandatory wording of an instruction requires reversal for
clear error; (6) whether the district judge erred by failing to tell jurors to begin their
deliberations anew when an alternate juror was substituted; (7) cumulative error; (8)
whether the district judge abused his discretion by refusing to recall the jury; (9) whether
the district judge violated Smith-Parker's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, as articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), by sentencing him to a harsher
penalty based on his criminal history; and (10) whether the district judge violated Smith-
Parker's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as articulated in Apprendi, by
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sentencing Smith-Parker to the highest sentence in the range in the applicable Kansas
Sentencing Guidelines Act presumptive grid box.

We conclude that four of Smith-Parker's allegations of error have merit and that
they cumulatively require reversal of all of his convictions, and we remand the case for
further proceedings. Given this result, we need not reach either of his two sentencing
issues; but we observe in passing that each has been finally resolved against him in our
Kansas courts. See State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, Syl., 41 P.3d 781 (2002) (reliance on
criminal history permissible); State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, Syl. ¶ ¶ 5-6, 190 P.3d 207
(2008) (highest sentence in grid box permissible).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Smith-Parker's numerous appellate issues, including sufficiency of evidence to
support his conviction for premeditated first-degree murder, require a recitation of factual
and procedural background more lengthy and comprehensive than the norm.

Mack Death

In June 2009, Benjamin Friedman and his roommate lived in Apartment B at 1012
Johnstown Avenue. On the morning of June 13, Friedman's alarm woke him, and he
heard someone running down the stairs outside of his apartment. He also heard a loud
noise, which he would later describe as similar to a car backfiring. Two other residents of
nearby apartments also reported having heard a loud noise at about the same time,
describing it as a "great big bang" or a gunshot.

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After Friedman got out of bed, he went into the living room of his apartment and
noticed that his television was missing. A Sony PlayStation and various movies and video
games also were missing.

Friedman went outside and observed that one of the screens to a lower apartment
had been removed. Friedman went back into the building and checked the downstairs
apartments. He noticed splintering on the door of Apartment C. Friedman could hear a
television inside the apartment, but nobody answered the door when he knocked on it.

Friedman then called 911.

When Officer Glen Soldan arrived at the apartments, he observed that the door to
Apartment C "had been kicked open and it wasn't quite shut." When he knocked on the
door it swung open, and Soldan could see "a large black male lying on his back, feet
towards [the door], obviously not breathing." The man was later identified as Mack.

Soldan entered the apartment to make sure that no one else was in it, and he
noticed an empty .22 casing lying on the floor.

When investigators arrived, they found and photographed a partial footprint on a
split-rail fencepost just below the deck to Friedman's apartment. Later enhancement of
the image would show that the word "Servus" was imprinted on the sole.

Ron Styles, an investigator, would later testify that it appeared Mack had been
sitting in a chair watching television and, based on the angle the bullet entered his body,
was in the process of standing up when he was shot. The blood splatter pattern in the
apartment indicated that Mack probably lived 1 to 2 minutes before collapsing into the
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kitchen. According to Styles, it was likely Mack was shot from the doorway of the
apartment.

Dr. Altaf Hossain conducted Mack's autopsy, which determined that the cause of
death was bleeding from a penetrating gunshot wound to the chest. Based on the location
of the gunshot wound and information provided by law enforcement, Hossain would
testify at trial that Mack had been shot from more than 2 feet away.

Investigators did not have any immediate leads or suspects.

Letourneau's Death

A little after 6 on the morning of June 19, 2009, Darci Davis was standing outside
the Salina Regional Health Center when she noticed a white four-door car "coming down
the street towards the hospital from the right and it squealed into the parking lot across
the street . . . and then it squealed around and . . . stopped right beside" her. The driver of
the car, later identified as Smith-Parker, asked Davis for directions to the emergency
room. Davis noticed that the car's passenger, later identified as Letourneau, was leaning
on the driver and had blood on him and that "there was blood on the window, . . . blood
on the door, [and] just . . . a lot of blood." Davis provided directions, and Smith-Parker
drove off in the direction of the emergency room.

The first nurse to respond found Letourneau in the passenger seat of the car. His
airway was "pretty much closed"; he was not responsive; he had vomit all over him; and
appeared to have a head trauma. Another nurse would later testify that there was a
"penetration wound to [the victim's] right temple and there was blood and emesis on the
patient and in the car and on us." One of the nurses asked Smith-Parker who had shot the
passenger. Smith-Parker replied: "I don't know."
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A 911 call was placed from the emergency room of the hospital at 6:23 that
morning to report a shooting victim.

Crystal Gile was the first law enforcement officer to arrive at the hospital. She
found a white Chevy Cavalier parked under the awning of the emergency room. She
pulled Smith-Parker aside, and she would testify at trial that Smith-Parker was very
emotional during their conversation.

Smith-Parker identified Letourneau, and Gile asked, "What happened to Justin?"
Smith-Parker responded, "I killed him." Gile then asked Smith-Parker to explain what
had happened. After initially saying that Letourneau had been "beatin' his son momma,"
Smith-Parker said, "Justin told me he was gonna kill me." Smith-Parker then said that this
had happened "on the road." After mentioning a gun, Gile asked Smith-Parker if there
was a gun in the car. Smith-Parker did not know where the gun was. Gile then took
Smith-Parker into custody and transported him to the Salina Police Department.

Investigators determined that the Cavalier Smith-Parker had driven to the hospital
was registered to Tiffany Wellman and Victor Gonzales, and they obtained a search
warrant for Wellman's home. During the search, officers found a shoebox on the top shelf
of a hallway closet. In it was a cloth, zippered gun case, and inside it was a box of
Winchester .38 Special ammunition, some loose Super X .22 shells, and a sock that had
more shells inside of it. Investigators also found several DVDs and a backpack, which
contained a PlayStation and video cords. A check of the serial number from the
PlayStation revealed that it had been reported stolen from Friedman's apartment.

Clayton Hardaway was dispatched to do a welfare check at Letourneau's home.
Letourneau's stepbrother, Travis Graham, was inside and Kendra Yanik-Ducharme was
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outside; a baby was sleeping on the floor. Yanik-Ducharme told Hardaway that
Letourneau was her boyfriend. Hardaway asked Yanik-Ducharme when she had last seen
Letourneau, and Yanik-Ducharme said she had not seen him since the previous evening.
Hardaway informed Yanik-Ducharme that Letourneau had been shot.

While investigators were at Letourneau's, Yanik-Ducharme consented to a search
of her car. On the floor of the passenger side of the car, investigators found a gun, which
Yanik-Ducharme identified as belonging to Letourneau. The gun was a .38 Colt Cobra
pistol.

Letourneau was flown to a Wichita hospital, where the decision was made on June
20 to remove him from life support.

Investigators impounded the Cavalier and searched it. They found a white cotton
glove with a Dillon's sack inside it under the driver's seat. Inside the sack was .38
ammunition. A Super X .22 cartridge case was found on the right front floor.

The gun used to shoot Letourneau was never recovered.

Dr. Ronald F. Distefano performed Letourneau's autopsy. Distefano concluded
that Letourneau had a single gunshot wound on the right side of his head. Distefano later
testified at trial that, based on "stippling" of the skin around the wound, the gun was "a
few inches up to possibly a foot" from Letourneau when fired. The direction of the bullet
"was from right to left, somewhat from front to back, and slightly downward." At trial,
Distefano also testified that, in his opinion, the death was a homicide and not a suicide or
accident. But he admitted that he could not make this determination from looking at the
body alone. The "findings of the wound show[ed] closeness[, but] they do not show
whether [Letourneau] shot himself or whether someone else did." Distefano relied on
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information provided by the police in reaching his conclusion that the death was a
homicide. According to Distefano, based on the information he had received, everything
pointed toward homicide and nothing suggested suicide.

Ballistics testing conducted on the .22 casing recovered from Mack's apartment
and the Super X .22 casing recovered from the floor of the Cavalier had been ejected
from the same gun.

On June 23, 2009, the State filed a Complaint/Information in case No. 09 CR 633,
charging Smith-Parker with three counts: aggravated assault of Letourneau, second-
degree intentional murder of Letourneau, and criminal possession of a firearm.

Approximately 4 months later, the State filed a Complaint/Information in case No.
09 CR 1047, charging Smith-Parker with five counts: first-degree premeditated murder
and first-degree felony murder in the death of Mack, two counts of aggravated burglary
of Mack's and Friedman's apartments, and one count of theft of items from Friedman's
apartment.

Pretrial Motions

The State requested the two cases be tried together, and the district judge initially
set the two cases for a joint trial. Smith-Parker then filed a motion to sever. At a hearing
on the motion, the district judge concluded that the two cases could not be tried together,
noting that the only evidence tying the crimes together was the ballistics testing on the
.22 casings.

When the State filed a motion to reconsider the severance, the district judge
reversed his previous ruling and allowed the cases to be consolidated. He stated:
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"The court is struck by the fact that all of the individuals in both of these cases are well
acquainted to each other, their activities, their behaviors, their families, their homes, their
connections, their history of sharing experiences together, including the serving of time
together, are so inextricabl[y] tied to each other the testimony, quite frankly, is clear that
these individuals considered themselves to be brothers, not just friends. They were so
close to each other that they viewed each other as relatives, not as just simply
acquaintances or people who might have grown to know each other over some period of
time.

"They shared common concerns about family members, about children, about actions
toward family members, particularly the wife or significant other of Mr. Letourneau
concerns raised by Mr. [Smith-Parker], they had their disagreements, they had the
common theme of being involved apparently in the allegations and concerns being raised
on activity involving residential burglaries and thefts, they had the commonality of the
issues of perhaps drug involvements in these matters.

"[B]ut when you look at the totality of the information that has been presented by the
State, recognizing that [its] burden remains beyond a reasonable doubt to tie this together
and present it coherently to a jury, which is a different standard, this court is faced with
the reality that we do have the connection in these matters, are they same or similar in
character.

"We have a death of two individuals, we have burglaries, we have common
communication between the parties in this matter discussing that particular activity,
discussing the concerns about the character or the person of Mr. Mack discussing Mr.
Letourneau, the same act or transaction it is difficult for the court to separate this
particular scenario into any one particular act or transaction when you look at this in the
sequence of events as presented by investigation, it flows, it flows from one party to
another party to the same event to the same house, to the same persons, to the same
activities, in that extent it does have the same feel of the same act or transaction.

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"Are there two or more acts or transactions that are connected together? When search
warrants are executed and suddenly we find stolen property in the residence of someone
who is closely related to the individuals charged in this matter. We find that a weapon is
located in the same location. We find again that the ballistic matches to the death of both
parties.

"There seems to be no significant interruption in the behavior and actions on the part of
these individuals throughout these transactions which lead to the death of both
individuals and the timeline is so close together within a week we have two individuals
who have died as a result of fatal gunshots. Looking at all these cases as set forth and the
State's argument that they would be subjected to double jeopardy and the issue of
compulsory joinder and the issue of 60-455, quite frankly, and if the State were to present
these in two separate proceedings, quite frankly, it may be impossible if not impractical
for them to proceed in both cases."

In a journal entry summarizing the hearing, the district judge stated:

"After hearing arguments of counsel, the Court finds that pursuant to K.S.A. 22-
3203, the above-captioned cases should be tried together. The Court finds that alleged in
offenses in each case are the same general character, require the same mode of trial and
the same kind of evidence, and occurred in the same jurisdiction within a short period of
time. The Court further finds that the above-captioned cases involve offenses that are the
same or similar character or part of a common scheme or plan."

Voir Dire

During voir dire, the district judge asked members of the venire if anyone had any
hardships that needed to be discussed with the court in chambers. At this point, juror N.B.
said, "It's not a hardship[. I]t's just English is not my first language."

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While in chambers, N.B. disclosed that he was a librarian at the Salina Public
Library and that he had a master's degree in library science from Emporia State
University. When asked about his language skills N.B. stated, "I have no problem with
communicating with people." But he said he sometimes had trouble following what was
being said on television shows, such as CSI. N.B. said he might have to ask people to
repeat what had been said, and he reiterated that he did "know the language[;] I read
books."

After further discussion, the district judge stated that N.B. was qualified to serve
on Smith-Parker's jury. Before N.B. left chambers, the district judge asked N.B. if he
would have any problems inquiring if something was said by the court or a witness that
he may have misunderstood. N.B. replied that he did not have any problem asking other
people if he did not understand something.

Trial

At trial, Friedman testified that he knew Graham, Smith-Parker's stepbrother that
officers had found sleeping on the couch at Yanik-Ducharme's home the morning of
Letourneau's shooting. According to Friedman, Graham had been in his apartment on
multiple occasions.

Roommates Nathanial Johnson and Donyell Smith lived in the apartment below
Friedman's. Both Johnson and Smith testified that they had seen Thomas Jenkins, a friend
of both Smith-Parker and Letourneau, at the apartment complex on the morning of the
Johnstown apartments crimes.

Johnson testified that he had seen a person he thought was Thomas on the
sidewalk outside of the apartment complex. Johnson knew Thomas because the two had
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gone to school together. Johnson called out to Thomas and briefly spoke to him. Johnson
then went outside to speak with him. After the conversation, Thomas walked away
toward the complex' carport.

Smith testified that she saw Thomas as she was going downstairs to the apartment
she shared with Johnson. Smith also knew Thomas from school; she said "hi" to him and
then continued to the apartment and went to bed. Smith testified that she saw two men
with Thomas, one white and one black. Letourneau was white, and Smith-Parker is black.

Kendra Jenkins, Thomas' wife, testified that she came home at approximately 2
a.m. on the night of the Johnstown apartment crimes. She said Thomas was the only one
at her home when she arrived, even though she had earlier told investigators that she saw
Smith-Parker and Letourneau with Thomas that night. Kendra also testified that she left
her home again that night when her son's father picked her up to retrieve her car. She did
not return home until approximately 6:30 a.m. Both Thomas and Smith-Parker were at
the home when she returned.

Kendra also testified that Thomas took her somewhere in the country east of
Salina a couple of days after the Johnstown apartment burglaries. Thomas had taken a
pair of rubber boots with him and he burned them. When Kendra was shown a
photograph of a particular brand of boots, she identified the boots as the type Thomas had
burned. The brand name of the boots was "Servus."

Wellman testified at trial that Smith-Parker was staying at her home in June 2009.
Approximately 1 week before Letourneau's death, Wellman testified, Smith-Parker
brought a gun into her home. She recalled waking up one morning about that time and
seeing Letourneau, Smith-Parker, and an unidentified third man in the living room of her
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home. Wellman testified that either that day or in the next couple of days several items
started showing up: a television, some movies, and a PlayStation.

Yanik-Ducharme testified that she saw Smith-Parker and Letourneau on the
morning of the Johnstown apartment crimes. According to her, Letourneau woke her up
that morning when he and Smith-Parker came to her home. Although she wanted to go
back to sleep, Letourneau wanted to show her something. When she went downstairs, she
saw a big flat-screen television. She also saw a PlayStation. The two items stayed in her
home only for a couple of days before Letourneau loaded them into her car, and he and
Smith-Parker left together with them.

According to telephone records admitted into evidence, Thomas, Graham,
Letourneau, and Smith-Parker had all been communicating with each other by phone in
the early hours on the morning of the Johnstown apartment crimes. The last call among
members of the group occurred at 3:56 a.m.

Xavier Matthews, a close friend of Letourneau, testified that Letourneau had told
Matthews that he had robbed Mack. According to Matthews, Mack sold marijuana.
Matthews testified that when "they" robbed Mack, Letourneau took a safe, and Matthews
believed the safe contained a large amount of marijuana. According to Matthews,
Letourneau had told him that they also had taken a gun from Mack.

According to trial testimony, the chain of events leading up to Letourneau's death
began the night before he was shot. Graham, Letourneau, and Smith-Parker attended a
rap contest at a club in Salina on the night of June 18, 2009, and then went to a party
Matthews was hosting.

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Matthews, as well as other witnesses, testified that both Smith-Parker and
Letourneau attended his party. Matthews believed that both Letourneau and Smith-Parker
were armed that night. According to Matthews, Letourneau had shown him a gun, which
Matthews thought was a .357. Although Matthews did not actually see Smith-Parker with
a gun, he believed that he was armed because "when he was dancing around my house he
had a bulge in his pants." Matthews testified that he told both men to take the guns out to
their car, and both complied with his request.

Matthews also testified that he had previously seen the two carrying guns at his
house on "multiple occasions." He had seen them with two different weapons—one he
believed to be a .22 and the other a .357. Matthews also believed that Letourneau and
Smith-Parker regularly traded the two guns between themselves.

Yanik-Ducharme testified that she and Letourneau got into an argument while at
Matthews' party. She then left. When Yanik-Ducharme arrived home, Smith-Parker,
Graham, and Letourneau were there waiting for her to unlock the door. She unlocked the
door, and Graham and Letourneau went inside.

Yanik-Ducharme then went to her neighbor's for a moment, before returning
home. Once home, she and Letourneau argued again on their front porch; at some point
during the argument, Letourneau hit her. Yanik-Ducharme walked back to the neighbor's,
passing Smith-Parker, who was sitting in his car, in the process. Yanik-Ducharme told
Smith-Parker what had happened.

Smith-Parker then got out of his car and began arguing with Letourneau. The
argument ended with Smith-Parker getting into his car and leaving. Yanik-Ducharme and
Letourneau again began to argue, and then Smith-Parker returned.

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Smith-Parker and Letourneau yelled at each other, and, according to Yanik-
Ducharme, each had a gun. Yanik-Ducharme approached Smith-Parker and convinced
him to leave. She heard Smith-Parker ask Letourneau, "'Why he would put his hands on
his wife'" and "'Why [he would] want to treat her like that[. A]ll she does is try to provide
a home for you and these kids.'"

Smith-Parker left again, and Letourneau asked Yanik-Ducharme to drive him to
Wellman's home, where Smith-Parker was staying. Yanik-Ducharme did so. She testified
that it was probably close to 6 a.m. by this point.

When the pair reached Wellman's, Yanik-Ducharme parked a house or two down
the street. Letourneau got out and walked up to Wellman's door, while Yanik-Ducharme
waited in the car.

Smith-Parker answered the door, and he and Letourneau again began to argue.
During this phase of the argument, Yanik-Ducharme saw Smith-Parker throw a gun on
the ground before he went back inside. Letourneau then walked back to the car.

Letourneau opened the door of the car but did not get in. According to
investigators, Yanik-Ducharme told them that she heard Smith-Parker say, "'You really
want to take it there?''' and that Letourneau should "'[g]o and get his guns.'" Yanik-
Ducharme said Letourneau did not get anything out of the car.

Smith-Parker came back out of the house and got in his car. Letourneau then left
Yanik-Ducharme's car and walked to Smith-Parker's car and got in. The two then drove
off. Yanik-Ducharme tried to follow but eventually lost them.

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During cross-examination at trial, Yanik-Ducharme was asked whether
Letourneau's behavior had changed during the week before his death. She said he "just
wasn't acting like hi[m]self at all or he was, I don't know, he just, his mood was different
and he was real secretive and didn't really spend much time with me and the kids
anymore[. H]e just . . . seemed like a different person." Yanik-Ducharme also was asked
about statements Letourneau made to her. Before she could answer, the State lodged a
hearsay objection.

The district judge dismissed the jury before proceeding. Defense counsel then read
Yanik-Ducharme's responses to a similar line of questioning during Smith-Parker's
preliminary hearing:

"'Q. When he said he was leaving what did that mean to you, just getting away because
[of] the argument or what?

"'A. He said that me and the kids we'll never—we'll never have to see him again.

"'Q. Okay and did he seem like he was elated about the fact or sad or upset or what if you
observed it?

"'A. He seemed like upset really weird he wasn't acting like himself.'"

The State argued that admission of the "never have to see him again" comment
would mean that the State could admit other hearsay, specifically, Letourneau's statement
to Yanik-Ducharme that Smith-Parker had killed Mack. According to the State, it would
not be "fair that certain portions of hearsay from Justin Letourneau who is not here to
confront those statements would come in."

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As the discussion continued, the district judge summarized the State's argument as
a "Crawford issue basically." See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354,
158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004) (Confrontation Clause issue). The State responded, "Right, it
doesn't matter if it's a sworn statement, hearsay is hearsay, we still don't have an
opportunity to cross examine him, we don't have an opportunity to even confront him
about that." Defense counsel argued that the statement Smith-Parker sought to admit was
"not going to the truth of the matter, it's going to basically what his state of mind was but
it is a sworn statement that she testified to previously. . . . And now she says that he didn't
say anything and she just went home." This colloquy followed:

"THE COURT: Well, the major issue we have is we have no ability under Crawford for
confrontation.

"[THE STATE]: Right, right, either party does.

"THE COURT: It's a Crawford question is what we are dealing with.

. . . .

"THE COURT: Versus a hearsay per s[e].

"[THE STATE]: Unless there is some exception which I'm not sure what that would be.

"THE COURT: Well Crawford has a number of exceptions but not in this particular
[situation].

. . . .

"THE COURT: The objection will be sustained. The court will permit you however to
inquire of the witness if her statement on this date would be different without saying Mr.
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Letourneau said, i.e., she can certainly be questioned about whether he made a statement
to her. Today she says he doesn't make a statement."

Wellman also testified about the early morning of Letourneau's shooting. She said
that Smith-Parker lay in bed when he returned from Letourneau's residence. At some
point, Wellman saw a gun in his possession. Smith-Parker told Wellman that she needed
to pack the kids up and leave for a few days because he and Letourneau were arguing.
When Wellman later heard a knock on her door, she took her children into a back
bedroom and shut the door.

Smith-Parker also testified at trial. He told the jury that he and Letourneau were
best friends, like brothers to each other.

Smith-Parker also testified to the events surrounding Letourneau's shooting. He
said that he, Letourneau, and Graham had to wait for Yanik-Ducharme to arrive at the
home she shared with Letourneau after Matthews' party. When Yanik-Ducharme arrived,
Letourneau and Graham got out of Smith-Parker's car, while Smith-Parker remained in it.
As he waited there, Yanik-Ducharme walked by and told him that "'Justin had pulled a
gun out.'"

Smith-Parker said he then got out of the car and walked up to Letourneau's
apartment. When he got to the door, he could see Letourneau coming up out of the
basement. According to Smith-Parker, he confronted Letourneau and asked him why he
was pulling a gun on his wife. Yanik-Ducharme then came up onto the porch where the
two men were standing, and, according to Smith-Parker, Letourneau "reached around and
slapped her upside the head and [Smith-Parker] grabbed [Letourneau's] arms and told
him to '[s]top beating on his wife.'" Then Letourneau jerked back away from Smith-
21



Parker and went back toward the basement. This "concerned [Smith-Parker] a little bit"
because Letourneau "normally kept a firearm" downstairs. Smith-Parker then left.

During cross-examination, Smith-Parker admitted that he then went home to get
his gun. He also admitted that the gun he retrieved was a .22. At other times, he said, he
had been in possession of both a .22 and a .38.

Smith-Parker testified that he eventually returned to Letourneau's apartment
complex. When he did, Letourneau was sitting in Yanik-Ducharme's car and Yanik-
Ducharme was standing by it. Smith-Parker said he got out of his car and Yanik-
Ducharme came up to talk to him. At some point, Smith-Parker began "hollering at
[Letourneau,] asking him, 'Why he was beating on his wife and why he wanted to treat
her like that.'" While Smith-Parker was yelling at Letourneau, Yanik-Ducharme was
trying to get Smith-Parker to get into his car and leave. Eventually, Yanik-Ducharme
convinced him that she would be okay.

Smith-Parker testified that when he got home, he locked the door and went into
the bedroom, where he sat and talked with Wellman. According to Smith-Parker, he told
her that Letourneau had been "'beatin[g] on his baby mom'" and that, until he stopped,
she should not "'let him back in the house.'" During this time, Smith-Parker told Wellman
that she needed to leave with the children for a couple of days and not to answer if
anyone came to the door.

When Letourneau's knock came, Smith-Parker went to the door and took his gun
with him. When he stepped outside after seeing Letourneau through the peephole, the two
men began arguing again. Smith-Parker testified that he told Letourneau: "'You know I
love you more than I love myself'" and that he threw his gun on the ground after he
22



realized Letourneau did not have one with him. Smith-Parker then went back into the
house to look for his keys, as Letourneau walked to Yanik-Ducharme's car.

Once Smith-Parker found his keys, he testified, he went back outside and got into
his car. Letourneau walked up and got into the car with him, which surprised Smith-
Parker because he thought Letourneau was leaving with Yanik-Ducharme. Smith-Parker
again had the .22 with him, because he had picked it up from the ground. He placed it by
the gear shift between the two front seats. During cross-examination, Smith-Parker was
asked why he would put the gun within reach of Letourneau if he was concerned about
his potential for violence. Smith-Parker said that he did not know Letourneau would be
getting into the car.

Smith-Parker then began driving; Letourneau directed him where to drive.
According to Smith-Parker, he and Letourneau ended up in the country outside of Salina.

Smith-Parker testified that he parked the car and started talking with Letourneau.
According to Smith-Parker, he again told Letourneau, "'You know you got to quit
beatin[g] on your baby mom.'" During this conversation, according to Smith-Parker,
Letourneau began playing with the gun, at first, just pointing it out the window of the car.

But then Letourneau made a comment that prompted Smith-Parker to reply: "'You
talking stupid right now.'" Although Smith-Parker did not testify to the substance of
Letourneau's comment, Smith-Parker's parole supervisor did. She said Smith-Parker had
told her while he was awaiting trial that Letourneau had begun "talking about shooting
himself like someone named Ronnie did." Smith-Parker testified that the gun discharged
shortly after his "talking stupid" statement to Letourneau:

23



"[Letourneau] just had like a little smile after he made another comment to me had like a
little smile like and then when he—when he pointed I told him, 'Don't point the gun,'. . . .

. . . .

". . . I told him to, 'Stop fucking pointing the gun at your head,' and he didn't do it and
then I told him again and then from that point I went—I went by the thing and I went like
this to try to yank the gun down and it went off."

According to Smith-Parker, he was standing outside of the car when the gun discharged.
Letourneau was sitting in the front seat, and Smith-Parker had reached into the window.

Smith-Parker then described the aftermath: "[W]hen the gun went off, you know,
he sat up and then I seen his eyes they crossed and then I seen blood come out his head
and so then I ran around beside the car and jumped in the driver's seat and started going
toward the hospital."

On the ride to the hospital, Smith-Parker testified, Letourneau was vomiting and
kept falling over toward Smith-Parker. Smith-Parker said he was driving very fast and
flashing his lights to alert someone that he needed help. Meanwhile, Letourneau was
moaning and rubbing his chest. Once at the hospital, Smith-Parker ran inside, grabbed a
wheelchair, and told the desk clerk his "bro" had been shot.

When asked whether he felt responsible for what had happened, Smith-Parker said
yes.

"Yeah, I felt responsible for what happened because, you know, it's like if I never had the
gun in the car, you know, then—you know then the accident probably wouldn't have
happened in the first place, this wouldn't have took place, you know, if I wouldn't have
had the gun in the car, but that's why—that's why I felt responsible for what happened to
24



him. See what I'm saying, cause this is my best friend and we had this stupid argument
and then here we are and then I lose him almost like this—I lose him like this so, yeah I
feel responsible for what happened."

Smith-Parker said that he did not consider Letourneau's death a suicide and that
Letourneau was not suicidal. He also denied that he intentionally killed his friend.

During cross-examination, Smith-Parker was confronted with the statements he
had made to Gile. When asked why he told her that he had killed Letourneau, Smith-
Parker repeated that he felt responsible for Letourneau's death. He also said that he had
told Gile he shot Letourneau because of Letourneau's violence toward Yanik-Ducharme
and because he was trying to explain what had happened. He also responded to a question
on why he changed his account of the shooting from one attributing it to Letourneau's
violence against Yanik-Ducharme to one attributing it to Letourneau threatening Smith-
Parker. Smith-Parker said he did not remember doing so.

Smith-Parker also was asked why he stopped on the way to the hospital to dispose
of the gun, if his sole concern was getting Letourneau speedy medical attention. Smith-
Parker said that he had not stopped, instead throwing the gun out the window while he
was driving.

In addition to these questions, the State attempted to get Smith-Parker to admit
that Letourneau had actually been shot outside of Wellman's apartment. But Smith-Parker
insisted that the events had occurred as he described during his direct testimony.

At the conclusion of evidence, the jury was given an instruction for first-degree
murder in the death of Mack. The written instruction included the following:

25



"If you do not have a reasonable doubt from all the evidence that the State has proven
murder in the first degree on either or both theories, then you will enter a verdict of
guilty.

"If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant as to the crime of murder
in the first degree, then you must consider whether the defendant is guilty of murder in
the second degree." (Emphasis added.)

Another jury instruction defined reasonable doubt.

"The test you must use in determining whether the defendant is guilty or not
guilty is this: If you have a reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the claims required
to be proved by the State, you must find the defendant not guilty. If you have no
reasonable doubt as to the truth of each of the claims required to be proved by the State,
you should find the defendant guilty."

The jury also was provided with the following jury instruction on aiding and
abetting:

"A person who, either before or during its commission, intentionally aids, abets, advises,
hires, counsels, procures, another to commit a crime with intent to promote or assist in its
commission is criminally responsible for the crime committed regardless of the extent of
the defendant's participation, if any, in the actual commission of the crime."

All of the instructions also were read aloud to the members of the jury in open court.

Within 90 minutes of beginning deliberations, the jury sent four communications
to the district judge in rapid succession. The fourth communication stated: "We have an
issue with one (male) juror and his ability to understand the instruction presented. Can we
o[r t]he court remove him?"
26




The district judge and counsel believed that the juror in question was N.B., who
had raised a concern about English being his second language during voir dire. The
district judge and counsel for both sides agreed that it would be best to replace a juror
earlier rather than later in deliberations, but they first confirmed with the presiding juror
that the issue arose as to N.B. After the presiding juror confirmed to the district judge and
both parties that they had correctly identified the person that other jurors had inquired
about, the district judge stated:

"Alright, counsel have believed that to be the circumstances and they have stipulated that
the Court may remove this individual. At this point the procedure will be that we will call
the panel back into the jury box, we will [bring alternate juror V.W.] into the gallery area,
I will excuse [N.B.] . . ., we will not permit any discussion or comments to be made and
then we will have [V.W.] take his seat and you may return back to deliberations at that
point."

The jury then returned to the courtroom. The district judge read the jury question
aloud and confirmed with the presiding juror that he had read it correctly. The presiding
juror was then asked to identify the juror in question. The presiding juror identified N.B.

"THE COURT: Okay, the Court has had the opportunity to confer with counsel in this
matter and with the Defendant present in chambers in regard to the question that has been
propounded by the jury in this matter and presented by the presiding juror in this case.

"It is not uncommon and it is unfortunate that there are occasions when the information
and material that are presented to jurors are such that it's not a good fit for a particular
individual on the jury.

"We note from the Voir Dire responses in this matter that that would have been an
indication given to us by the individual named in this case."

27



. . . .

"And, ladies and gentlemen, we now have the full compl[e]ment of 12 jurors and you are
now instructed to return to the jury room and continue your deliberations and include
[V.W.] into your deliberation process.

"And again you may take as much time as you need so that [V.W.] may be a participant
in this matter."

Posttrial Proceedings

N.B. was dismissed from Smith-Parker's jury on October 29, 2010, the same day
as the verdicts were returned. The following day, N.B. wrote a letter to the district judge
in which he said that he was the only juror who did not believe Smith-Parker was guilty
of first-degree murder of Mack at the beginning of deliberations and that he also believed
Smith-Parker was guilty only of involuntary manslaughter of Letourneau. According to
N.B., the presiding juror used language difficulties as a pretext to remove him from the
jury.

On November 2, the district judge responded to N.B.'s letter with a letter
explaining that he could not provide legal advice or comment on pending or impending
proceedings and that N.B.'s letter would be forwarded to counsel.

After receiving a copy of N.B.'s letter, defense counsel moved for new trial based
on jury misconduct and false representation to the court; counsel also moved to recall the
jury.

At a hearing on the defense motions, the district judge admitted N.B.'s letter and
an affidavit from the presiding juror into evidence. He advised Smith-Parker that no
28



additional testimony would be admitted, and Smith-Parker's counsel voiced no further
objection to this procedure.

The presiding juror's affidavit stated that N.B.'s removal had nothing to do with
N.B.'s opinions on guilt or innocence. It also said that the other jurors were having
difficulty explaining definitions of words to N.B. and that the jury started deliberations
over, once N.B. was removed and the alternate juror seated.

After reviewing the evidence, the district judge noted that "[t]he clear questions by
this jury begin with language issues." He ruled:

"This is not an issue of [N.B.'s] opinion or his belief or his determination of how he
would vote in the case; this is a clear issue of inability to serve as a juror, based upon a
language barrier in this matter. It is not a matter of several hours of deliberation, but
several hours of deliberation only began after the alternate juror was seated and they
again began the deliberation anew as stated in the affidavit of the presiding juror in this
matter.

. . . .

"[T]he court's removal of [N.B.] had nothing to do with his opinion, the court, nor
counsel, nor defense, were made aware of anything of this nature until he filed his letter
and affidavit after the fact. . . .

. . . .

"The court found only that N.B. would be unable to perform his duties and counsel
acknowledged, counsel have waived that argument by the stipulation that he should be
removed and the court acquiesced in that stipulation and so removed [N.B.] for cause in
this matter.

29



"The court would find on that basis that the Motion for New Trial on the basis of juror
misconduct is simply not supported by the evidence as presented, the affidavits that are of
the record in this matter, the court finds that there was good cause shown in the record to
replace [N.B.] and there is no prejudice to the defendant in that the defendant had time to
visit with counsel, outside the hearing of court and the State and in response to that
stipulated on the record he as well as his attorney would ask that this juror be removed
and stipulated [to] that removal along with the State in this matter."

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of Evidence on Premeditated First-Degree Murder

Smith-Parker argues that the State's evidence of premeditation in the Mack murder
was insufficient, regardless of whether he was convicted as a principal or an aider and
abettor.

Our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a
criminal case is

"whether, after reviewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the
reviewing court is convinced a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary
conflicts, or make determinations regarding witness credibility." State v. Lloyd, 299 Kan.
620, Syl. ¶ 3, 325 P.3d 1122 (2014).

We begin with the proposition that "premeditation, like other elements, can be
proven by circumstantial evidence." State v. Hollister, 300 Kan. 458, 470, 329 P.3d 1220
(2014). This court has looked at five factors to evaluate circumstantial proof of
premeditation: "(1) the nature of the weapon used; (2) the lack of provocation; (3) the
defendant's conduct before and after the killing; (4) threats and declarations of the
30



defendant before and during the occurrence; and (5) the dealing of lethal blows after the
deceased was felled and rendered helpless." 300 Kan. at 470. Not all factors must be
present, State v. Marks, 297 Kan. 131, 140, 298 P.3d 1102 (2013), and, in some cases,
one factor, standing alone, may be sufficient, State v. Cook, 286 Kan. 1098, 1102, 191
P.3d 294 (2008). But premeditation cannot be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon
alone. State v. Cosby, 293 Kan. 121, 134, 262 P.3d 285 (2011).

The majority of our cases dealing with sufficiency of the evidence with respect to
premeditation have involved strong evidence to support the defendant's personal
performance of the actus reus of the crime. See Cosby, 293 Kan. at 134 (eyewitnesses
saw defendant shoot victim); State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, 616, 186 P.3d 755 (2008)
(eyewitnesses saw defendant shoot victims); Cook, 286 Kan. at 1099 (defendant did not
dispute he had shot, killed victim); State v. Morton, 277 Kan. 575, 582, 86 P.3d 535
(2004) (defendant admitted shooting victim); State v. Scott, 271 Kan. 103, 106, 21 P.3d
516 (defendant admitted to physical altercation with victim), cert. denied 534 U.S. 1047
(2001); State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 319, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (eyewitness testified
defendant shot victim).

In this case, the identity evidence on who fired the .22 that killed Mack is
considerably less strong. In addition, only two factors on our list of those tending to show
premeditation are present. A gun is unquestionably a deadly weapon. And the forensic
evidence is certainly capable of supporting a reasonable inference that Mack's assailant
was not provoked: There was a forced entry through Mack's front door; the shot was
likely fired from the doorway; Mack was seated or possibly in the process of standing up;
and there was no evidence of a physical altercation or struggle.

The State's evidence that Smith-Parker participated in the burglaries and the
murder of Mack included: Johnson's testimony that he had seen Thomas Jenkins at
31



Mack's apartment complex on the morning of the Johnstown apartments crimes, Smith's
testimony that she had seen Thomas Jenkins at the complex that morning and that he was
with two other men, whose descriptions were consistent with Smith-Parker and
Letourneau; Kendra Jenkins' testimony that she had seen her husband with Smith-Parker
and Letourneau on the morning Mack was killed; Yanik-Ducharme's testimony that
Smith-Parker and Letourneau brought a big screen television and a PlayStation into her
home the same morning; Wellman's testimony that Smith-Parker and Letourneau brought
DVDs, a PlayStation, and a television into her home about the time of Mack's shooting;
forensic evidence of a shoeprint at the apartment complex with the word "Servus"
imprinted on it; Kendra Jenkins' testimony that she accompanied her husband when he
destroyed a pair of Servus boots; Matthews' testimony that "they," meaning Letourneau
and at least one other person, had robbed Mack of a safe, that Mack sold marijuana, and
that Letourneau had been in possession of marijuana after Mack's murder; forensic
evidence that the same gun had been used in the deaths of Mack and Letourneau;
witnesses' testimony that Smith-Parker had possessed a gun of the same type on the night
of Letourneau's death that was of the type used in Mack's murder.

Given all of this interlocking evidence, we conclude that Smith-Parker's jury could
draw a reasonable inference that he was guilty of first-degree premeditated murder of
Mack, at least as an aider and abettor. To establish guilt on the basis of aiding and
abetting, see K.S.A. 21-3205, the State was required to show that Smith-Parker
knowingly associated with the unlawful venture and participated "in such a way as to
indicate that he facilitated the success of the venture." State v. Robinson, 293 Kan. 1002,
1038, 270 P.3d 1183 (2012) (quoting State v. Baker, 287 Kan. 345, 366, 197 P.3d 421
[2008]). The State amassed and presented sufficient circumstantial proof that the killing
of Mack was premeditated and that Smith-Parker participated "in such a way as to
indicate that he facilitated the success of the venture." See Robinson, 293 Kan. at 1038.
Matthews' testimony, in particular, when combined with the forensic evidence of the
32



shooter's and Mack's positions in the room when Mack was shot, could lead to the
inference that those who committed the crime entered the apartment with the intention of
killing Mack or, at a minimum, leaving no witnesses.

Our result is reinforced by our decisions in at least two prior cases. In State v.
Hoge, 276 Kan. 801, 806, 80 P.3d 52 (2003), we ruled that evidence of the number and
location of shots fired in the victim's bedroom, coupled with the presence of the target of
the robbery, led to an inference the perpetrators broke into the victim's house for the
purpose of killing him or preventing him from being a witness against them. In the more
recent State v. McBroom, 299 Kan. 731, 754-59, 325 P.3d 1174 (2014), we ruled that
sufficient evidence placed the defendant at the scene of a homicide because the defendant
admitted to being with his accomplice; witnesses testified to seeing a car similar to the
accomplice's car in the vicinity of the crime scene at the relevant time; and the
accomplice's DNA was found on a cigarette butt inside the victim's home.

Aiding and Abetting

Smith-Parker next argues that the instruction to the jury on aiding and abetting
created alternative means of aiding and abetting.

We recently noted that such an argument raised "an interesting theoretical
question," but declined to address the issue because the instruction at issue addressed
only aiding, not abetting. State v. Brown, 299 Kan. 1021, 1032-33, 327 P.3d 1002 (2014).
Interesting theoretical question or not, we also recently have ruled that acting as a
principal and acting as an aider and abettor do not constitute alternative means of
committing first-degree murder. State v. Betancourt, 299 Kan. 131, 137-41, 322 P.3d 353
(2014). The aiding and abetting statute outlines the proper assignment of criminal
responsibility; it does not create distinct elements of the crimes to which it is applied. 299
33



Kan. at 139; see K.S.A. 21-3205. The rationale of Betancourt is sound, and it dictates that
this issue is without merit.

Consolidation

We review a district judge's decision to consolidate multiple cases in three steps;
each step requires us to apply a different standard of review:

"First, the court considers whether K.S.A. 22-3203 permitted consolidation. Under that
statute, multiple complaints against a defendant can be tried together if the State could
have brought the charges in a single complaint. K.S.A. 22-3202(1) spells out the three
conditions permitting the joining of multiple crimes in a single complaint. Whether one
of the conditions is satisfied is a fact-specific inquiry, and the appellate court reviews the
district court's factual findings for substantial competent evidence and the legal
conclusion that one of the conditions is met de novo. Second, because K.S.A. 22-3202
provides that charges "may" be joined, a district court retains discretion to deny a request
to consolidate even if a statutory condition is met. This decision is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. Finally, if an error occurred in the preceding steps, the appellate court
considers whether the error resulted in prejudice, i.e., whether it affected a party's
substantial rights." State v. Hurd, 298 Kan. 555, Syl. ¶ 1, 316 P.3d 696 (2013).

K.S.A. 22-3202(1) permits crimes to be charged in one complaint—and, thus,
under K.S.A. 22-3203, permits consolidation of complaints—when "the crimes
charged . . . are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or
transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts
of a common scheme or plan." The district judge's oral statements and journal entry
indicate he concluded that each of the three statutory conditions was met.

His articulated factual findings can be summarized in the following list: Smith-
Parker and Letourneau had a close relationship, close to the point of considering
34



themselves brothers, and they had common concerns about family members; evidence
would support the involvement of both Smith-Parker and Letourneau in the burglaries at
the apartment complex; both cases ended in the death of an individual; the events
surrounding the first crime flowed into the events surrounding the other crime with "no
significant interruption in the behavior and actions" of the involved individuals; law
enforcement's execution of a search warrant related to Letourneau's death led to the
discovery of items stolen during the burglaries; ballistics evidence demonstrated the same
gun was used in each killing; the same police officers and lay witnesses would testify in
each case; and the compulsory joinder rule could hamper the prosecution's ability to
pursue the second case after the first was tried.

Neither party challenges the existence of substantial competent evidence to
support each of these findings. Instead, on the first step of the analysis outlined above,
each party focuses on whether the findings satisfied one of the conditions precedent in
K.S.A. 22-3202(1) as a matter of law.

On the first statutory condition, crimes of the same or similar character, we note
that earlier Kansas cases that have held consolidation or joinder to be appropriate have
generally had multiple commonalities, not merely the same classification of one of the
crimes charged. See State v. Carr, 300 Kan. 1, 101-04, 331 P.3d 544 (2014) (victims
identified defendants; aspects of modus operandi consistent between crimes); State v.
Cruz, 297 Kan. 1048, 1055, 307 P.3d 199 (2013) (both victims leaving nightclub at
closing time; both accosted before reaching vehicle; both had little warning before shot
repeatedly; same gun used; defendant identified in both cases; both cases charged first-
degree murder, criminal possession of firearm); State v. Gaither, 283 Kan. 671, 687, 156
P.3d 602 (2007) (both victims drug dealers; defendant on quest for drugs during both;
both victims shot with 9 mm handgun; both occurred in private dwellings; 5-day time
span); State v. Barksdale, 266 Kan. 498, 506-10, 973 P.2d 165 (1999) (both crimes
35



murder; victims killed in similar manner; robbery common motive); State v. Crawford,
255 Kan. 47, 48, 53-54, 872 P.2d 293 (1994) (both crimes robbery; victims identified
defendant; similar modus operandi).

Here, although each case involved a single homicide, the homicides lacked many
other similarities. The murder of Mack was tied to a burglary, apparently targeted at a
large amount of marijuana in his possession. Mack was apparently shot suddenly from
across the room while he was seated or in the process of standing up to face at least one
of the burglars. In contrast, Letourneau and Smith-Parker, as the district judge found,
were so close that they considered themselves brothers, and had spent much of several
days in one another's company. Letourneau's death followed an argument between him
and Smith-Parker over Letourneau's treatment of Letourneau's girlfriend. Whether that
argument provided a motivation for the fatal shooting or the shooting was accidental or a
suicide was disputed. On this slim record, we cannot say as a matter of law that the first
statutory condition for consolidation or joinder was met.

It is plain that the second statutory condition—the cases or crimes were based on
the same act or transaction—is inapplicable.

We therefore move to consideration of the third statutory condition—whether the
cases or crimes were based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.

We agree with the defense that certain of the district judge's factual findings
should have contributed little to his legal analysis of this statutory condition.

In Hurd, 298 Kan. at 562, the district judge had said: "'[T]he temporal proximity
of these two charges are closely related, and it appears the witnesses would be mostly the
36



same as well, at least some of the same witnesses, and based upon the court calendar,
these two cases will be consolidated and are consolidated for trial.'"

We clarified that the "connected together" phrase from the third statutory
condition precedent would be applicable in three situations: (1) when the defendant
provided evidence of one crime while committing another; (2) when some of the charges
were precipitated by other charges; or (3) when all of the charges stemmed from a
common event or goal. 298 Kan. at 562 (citing State v. Donaldson, 279 Kan. 694, 699-
700, 112 P.3d 99 [2005]).

We rejected the notion that a trial court's calendar was a valid consideration for
consolidation. We then turned to the remaining two rationales articulated by the district
judge to support the third statutory condition, including the judge's reliance on the
defendant's father providing evidence of one of defendant's crimes while reporting
defendant's commission of another crime. 298 Kan. at 562-63.

We rejected the idea that temporal proximity and similar witnesses were sufficient
bases for joinder or consolidation under the third statutory condition precedent. 298 Kan.
at 563. And we rejected the idea that the defendant's father's evidence satisfied the
"connected together" statutory condition because it was available only if the "defendant
provides evidence of one crime while committing another." 298 Kan. at 563. In Hurd, the
defendant's father's evidence was not sufficient. See 298 Kan. at 563; see also State v.
Anthony, 257 Kan. 1003, 1016-17, 898 P.2d 1109 (1995) (police taped conversation
between defendant, informant to whom defendant was selling cocaine; during
conversation, defendant provided direct evidence of his involvement in robbery, murder;
sale of cocaine charge thus connected with robbery, murder charges).

37



Thus, under the guidance of Hurd, we cannot rely on mere temporal proximity or
similar witnesses to support the district judge's consolidation decision under the third
statutory condition in this case. Nor can we rely on the fact that officers found items
stolen during the burglaries while searching for evidence related to Letourneau's death.
Smith-Parker did not personally provide "evidence of one crime while committing
another crime." See 298 Kan. at 563.

There are, however, sufficient other ties between Smith-Parker's two cases to
support the judge's legal conclusion under the third statutory condition.

The ballistics evidence is the strongest among those ties. It demonstrated that the
gun used to shoot Mack was the same gun used to shoot Letourneau. Shell casings at both
crime scenes matched. The district judge specifically made a factual finding that the
ballistics evidence tied the two crimes together. That finding alone is sufficient to satisfy
the third statutory condition.

Our conclusion is further bolstered by the evidence that ultimately came out at
trial. Smith-Parker admitted he had been in possession of the gun after Letourneau was
shot and had disposed of it during his race to the hospital. His choice to dispose of the
gun when his friend was bleeding from a head wound was particularly damaging
evidence for the defense. And other evidence reinforced that a .22 had been seen in the
possession of Smith-Parker and Letourneau in the period of time covering both crimes.

In short, the evidence supporting Smith-Parker's conviction of the second crime
also tended to support his conviction of the first crime. The ballistics evidence from the
scenes and Smith-Parker's admission of possession and disposal of the gun used in the
second crime, along with witnesses' observations of such a gun being traded
contemporaneously between him and Letourneau, helped to place Smith-Parker at the
38



scene of and participating in Mack's murder. The two crimes—and the two cases that
arose out of them—were sufficiently "connected together" to satisfy K.S.A. 22-3202(1).

Having determined that one of the statutory conditions was present as a matter of
law, we turn to whether the district judge abused his discretion by choosing to
consolidate the cases for trial. See Hurd, 298 Kan. 555, Syl. ¶ 1.

Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action

"(1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the trial court; (2) is based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided
by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., substantial
competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion
of law or the exercise of discretion is based." State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d
801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012).

The burden of demonstrating error is on the party alleging the abuse. State v. Burnett, 300
Kan. 419, 449, 329 P.3d 1169 (2014); see also State v. Tague, 296 Kan. 993, 1002, 298
P.3d 273 (2013) (burden of showing abuse of discretion on party claiming error).

Smith-Parker's arguments do not focus clearly on this step; the only portion that
could be construed as addressing it is his argument that consolidation led to prejudicial
admission of other-crimes evidence under K.S.A. 60-455. But "'Kansas case law and the
provisions of K.S.A. 22-3202(1) make it clear that joinder is not dependent upon the
other crimes being joined meeting the admissibility test set forth in K.S.A. 60-455.'''
Gaither, 283 Kan. at 688 (quoting Barksdale, 266 Kan. at 510).

39



We hold that the district judge's consolidation of the two cases against Smith-
Parker was not error. We need not reach the third step under Hurd, i.e., whether any error
in consolidation demands reversal.

Letourneau's Out-of-Court Statement

At trial, Smith-Parker sought to introduce a statement Letourneau made to Yanik-
Ducharme in the hours before his death. According to Yanik-Ducharme, Letourneau told
her that "[she] and the kids we'll never—we'll never have to see him again." The district
judge ruled that the statement was inadmissible and said that it would pose a
Confrontation Clause issue under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354,
158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), and no hearsay exception applied.

The district judge's Confrontation Clause ruling was based on a faulty premise—
that the State has a right of confrontation equal to that of a defendant. This is not the case.
Crawford held that "a witness' testimonial statements against a defendant are
inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable to testify
at trial, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." (Emphasis added.)
State v. Bennington, 293 Kan. 503, 508, 264 P.3d 440 (2011); see Crawford, 541 U.S. at
42 ("The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that, '[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.'" [Emphasis added.]).

The admissibility of Letourneau's statement therefore should have been analyzed
only under our hearsay statutes.

Hearsay is any statement "which is made other than by a witness while testifying
at the hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated." K.S.A. 60-460.
40




Smith-Parker argues that the Letourneau statement was not offered for the truth of
the matter asserted, i.e., that Letourneau would literally never see Yanik-Ducharme or the
children again, but instead to demonstrate Letourneau's state of mind, i.e., that
"Letourneau was so riddled with guilt over his treatment of Yanik-Ducharme that he
would contemplate suicide."

"Ordinarily a statement offered merely to show the declarant's state of mind is
admissible. This is true either because it is not offered to show the truth of the matter
asserted and therefore does not qualify as hearsay in the first place, see [State v.]
Boldridge, 289 Kan. [618,] 634, [215 P.3d 585 (2009)]; or, even if it qualifies as hearsay,
it fits under a statutory exception for statements describing the then-existing state of mind
of the declarant, see K.S.A. 60-460(l)." State v. Cosby, 293 Kan. 121, 128, 262 P.3d 285
(2011).

In State v. Becker, 290 Kan. 842, 847, 235 P.3d 424 (2010), we held that
statements, such as: "'[T]hey shut the door and said if anybody comes out of here we're
going to shoot them,' and 'They told me that they were going to be back at 5:00 a.m. and I
better have drugs or money or they were going to kill me'" did not constitute hearsay
"because they were not presented to prove the truth of the assertions." We noted that "[i]t
is irrelevant and unnecessary to know, for example, whether [defendant's two
accomplices] really would have shot anyone who attempted to leave the back bedroom
while they interrogated [two victims]." 290 Kan. at 847. We drew a contrast between the
statements in issue there and the one in issue in State v. Harris, 259 Kan. 689, 699, 915
P.2d 758 (1996),"where the out-of-court threatening statement was offered to prove" the
truth of the threat communicated in order to demonstrate "premeditation in the killing of
the person about whom the threat was made." Becker, 290 Kan. at. 847. In Becker, "the
threats were offered as explanations for why the people who heard the threats responded
as they did—staying in a room, for example, or leaving for another town." 290 Kan. at
41



847. In other words, the threats were admitted to demonstrate the effect they had on those
who heard them, not their literal truth.

Similar to the statements in Becker, the literal truth of the statement in this case
was irrelevant to Smith-Parker's defense. Whether Yanik-Ducharme and the children
would see Letourneau again had no bearing on the case. But the fact that Letourneau said
it could be revealing about why he would shortly thereafter wave a gun around recklessly
and point it at his own head. It was error for the district judge to exclude Yanik-
Ducharme's testimony about Letourneau's statement.

Because this is not the only error we detect in Smith-Parker's trial, we defer our
discussion of reversibility to our cumulative error discussion section below.

Jury Instruction

Smith-Parker next argues that the jury instruction on alternative first-degree
murder theories contained a misstatement of law with respect to reasonable doubt. The
instruction read: "If you do not have a reasonable doubt from all the evidence that the
State has proven murder in the first degree on either or both theories, then you will enter a
verdict of guilty." (Emphasis added.) According to Smith-Parker, the instruction should
have been identical to the general reasonable doubt instruction that was also given. That
instruction said: "If you have no reasonable doubt as to the truth of each of the claims
required to be proved by the State, you should find the defendant guilty." (Emphasis
added.)

Because Smith-Parker did not object to the jury instruction he now complains of
on appeal, we review this issue for clear error. See K.S.A. 22-3414(3).

42



"To determine whether an instruction or a failure to give an instruction was
clearly erroneous, the reviewing court must first determine whether there was any error at
all. To make that determination, the appellate court must consider whether the subject
instruction was legally and factually appropriate, employing an unlimited review of the
entire record."

"If the reviewing court determines that the district court erred in giving or failing
to give a challenged instruction, then the clearly erroneous analysis moves to a
reversibility inquiry, wherein the court assesses whether it is firmly convinced that the
jury would have reached a different verdict had the instruction error not occurred. The
party claiming a clearly erroneous instruction maintains the burden to establish the degree
of prejudice necessary for reversal." State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, Syl. ¶ ¶ 4, 5, 286
P.3d 195 (2012).

This court addressed a similar instruction challenge in State v. Lovelace, 227 Kan.
348, 607 P.2d 49 (1980). The questioned Lovelace instruction told jurors that they "must"
find defendant guilty if they did had no reasonable doubt on the elements of the crime.
227 Kan. at 354. This court rejected Lovelace's argument that "must" commanded the
jury to find the defendant guilty and noted that "should" and "must" could be used
interchangeably in criminal instructions. 227 Kan. at 354. Smith-Parker acknowledges
this precedent but argues that it was wrongly decided. We agree with him and overrule
the Lovelace holding.

Although we have rejected a defense argument that a criminal jury should be
instructed on its inherent power of nullification, see State v. Naputi, 293 Kan. 55, Syl. ¶
4, 260 P.3d 86 (2011) (juries possess power to decide case contrary to applicable facts
and law, i.e., power of jury nullification, but defendant not entitled to instruction on
power), the district judge's instruction in this case went too far in the other direction. It
essentially forbade the jury from exercising its power of nullification. Cf. State v.
McClanahan, 212 Kan. 208, Syl. ¶ 3, 510 P.2d 153 (1973) ("Although it must be
43



conceded that the jurors in a criminal case have the raw physical power to disregard both
the rules of law and the evidence in order to acquit a defendant, it is the proper function
and duty of a jury to accept the rules of law given to it in the instructions by the court,
apply those rules of law in determining what facts are proven and render a verdict based
thereon."). Both the wording of the instruction at issue in Lovelace—"must"—and the
wording at issue here—"will"—fly too close to the sun of directing a verdict for the State.
A judge cannot compel a jury to convict, even if it finds all elements proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.

As with the erroneous exclusion of Letourneau's out-of-court statement, we do not
proceed to analysis of whether this instructional error required reversal standing alone.
Rather we consider it with other identified errors in our cumulative error discussion
section below.

Failure to Instruct Jury to Begin Deliberations Anew

After juror N.B. had been dismissed and replaced by alternate V.W., the district
judge told the members of Smith-Parker's jury: "[Y]ou are now instructed to return to the
jury room and continue your deliberations and include [V.W.] into your deliberation
process." (Emphasis added.)

When a juror is replaced after deliberations have begun, the district judge must
instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew. See State v. Cheek, 262 Kan. 91, Syl. ¶ 1,
936 P.2d 749 (1997) ("The substitution of an alternate juror for an original juror after
deliberations have begun is constitutionally permissible where good cause has been
shown and the jury has been instructed to begin deliberations anew."). The parties agree
that the district judge erred by not instructing the jury to begin its deliberations anew in
this case. See 262 Kan. 91, Syl. ¶ 3.
44




Again, we defer our analysis of this error's reversibility to our cumulative error
discussion section below.

Motion to Recall Jury

Smith-Parker argues that the district judge erred in not granting his motion to
recall the jury after N.B. had alleged that the other jurors requested that he be removed
based on his voting position. Our review of a district judge's decision on a motion to
recall is limited to abuse of discretion. State v. Jenkins, 269 Kan. 334, 338, 2 P.3d 769
(2000).

"However, '[i]f a defendant's constitutional right has been violated during a trial, a judge's
discretion to deny a motion . . . to recall a jury is limited. At this point, there is greater
reason for the judge to articulate the reasons for his or her "discretionary" decision.'
Jenkins, 269 Kan. at 338. Whether a defendant's due process rights were violated is a
question of law over which this court exercises unlimited review. Hemphill v. Kansas
Dept. of Revenue, 270 Kan. 83, 89, 11 P.3d 1165 (2000)." State v. Kirkpatrick, 286 Kan.
329, 351, 184 P.3d 247 (2008), overruled on other grounds by State v. Sampson, 297
Kan. 288, 301 P.3d 276 (2013).

The State argues that any error in failing to recall the jury in this case qualifies as
invited, because it was Smith-Parker's counsel who suggested replacing N.B. when the
presiding juror asked if N.B. could be removed. Smith-Parker's counsel did ultimately
agree to the replacement, but our review of the record on appeal persuades us that the
State was the first to suggest that removing N.B. and replacing him would be appropriate.
Be that as it may, the judicial ruling Smith-Parker now challenges on appeal is not the
removal and replacement during deliberations, but the failure to recall any of the
45



members of the jury to testify live once N.B. raised the issue of jury misconduct in his
letter to the judge after the trial. The invited error argument misses this mark.

With respect to the propriety of recalling the jury, this court has said:

"Jurors may be recalled for post-trial hearings only by order of the court after a
hearing on a request to recall the jury. A recall of the jury is not a routine matter. Jury
service is a public duty of citizens and recall of jurors after their service has ended to
testify as to events occurring in the jury room during deliberations is a serious step. That
step is to be undertaken only for just cause. The procedure should never be utilized as a
fishing trip upon a losing party's hope that jury misconduct might surface if the jurors
could be questioned under oath. The burden is upon the party seeking an order to recall
the jurors to show the necessity for the order. Walters v. Hitchcock, 237 Kan. 31, 36, 697
P.2d 847 (1985)." State v. Ruebke, 240 Kan. 493, 513, 731 P.2d 842 (1987).

This court has also stated:

"Where a party alleges jury misconduct, the trial judge is required to recall the
jury if the judge cannot determine that the evidence supporting the other party is
substantial and that the jury misconduct did not relate to a material issue in dispute. When
the jury is recalled, a juror may be questioned or evidence received as to physical facts,
conditions, or occurrences of a juror's misconduct, either within or without the jury room,
which were substantially material to the issues being determined." Saucedo v. Winger,
252 Kan. 718, Syl. ¶ 3, 850 P.2d 908 (1993).

In this case, the defense did not initially claim jury misconduct. Rather, the
possibility of its existence and magnitude sufficient to fatally pollute Smith-Parker's
convictions came to the district judge's and the parties' attention because of N.B.'s post-
trial letter to the judge. In that remarkably literate document, N.B. asserted that his fellow
jurors had sought his dismissal because of his leanings toward the defense rather than his
46



inability to understand his second language of English as it was used in the jury's
instructions.

N.B.'s unsolicited letter contradicted at least the impression left, if not deliberate
misinformation imparted, by the presiding juror during trial and in a posttrial affidavit.
Although N.B.'s voir dire responses may also have contributed to a context ripe for
misunderstanding by the district judge, they did not resolve the contradiction between his
later letter and the presiding juror's later representations. Indeed, we see no way the
contradiction could have been resolved short of calling N.B. and the presiding juror back
into the courtroom to testify live about events during deliberations. Their competing
versions of those events could then be fully explored, their credibility fully evaluated, and
a factual determination made as to whether any jury misconduct occurred. This was what
the defense sought, and it was entitled to it. Failure to recall at least N.B. and the
presiding juror was error.

We need not address whether this error was harmless or reversible standing alone,
because we take up the issue of reversibility in our cumulative error discussion section
below.

Cumulative Error

We have found four errors: the exclusion of Letourneau's out-of-court statement,
the faulty jury instruction, the failure to instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew
after N.B. was replaced with an alternate juror, and the denial of Smith-Parker's motion to
recall at least N.B. and the presiding juror to investigate the allegation of jury
misconduct.

47



"Cumulative error, considered collectively, may be so great as to require reversal
of a defendant's conviction. The test is whether the totality of the circumstances
substantially prejudiced the defendant and denied him or her a fair trial. No prejudicial
error may be found under the cumulative error doctrine if the evidence against the
defendant is overwhelming. State v. Dixon, 289 Kan. 46, 71, 209 P.3d 675 (2009)." State
v. Hart, 297 Kan. 494, 513-14, 301 P.3d 1279 (2013).

"In a cumulative error analysis, an appellate court aggregates all errors and, even
though those errors would individually be considered harmless, analyzes whether their
cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial is such that collectively they cannot be
determined to be harmless." State v. Tully, 293 Kan. 176, 205, 262 P.3d 314 (2011).

"In making the assessment of whether the cumulative errors are harmless error,
an appellate court examines the errors in the context of the record as a whole considering
how the district court dealt with the errors as they arose (including the efficacy, or lack of
efficacy, of any remedial efforts); the nature and number of errors committed and their
interrelationship, if any; and the strength of the evidence." 293 Kan. at 205-06.

"'The test is whether the totality of the circumstances substantially prejudiced the
defendant and denied him or her a fair trial.'" State v. Magallanez, 290 Kan. 906, 926,
235 P.3d 460 (2010).

The State's evidence against Smith-Parker cannot be characterized as
overwhelming. The evidence of Smith-Parker's premeditation in the murder of Mack was
purely circumstantial. The evidence of exactly how Letourneau came to be shot in the
head was conflicting, far from conclusive. The district judge's erroneous exclusion of
Yanik-Ducharme's testimony about Letourneau's statement prevented Smith-Parker from
presenting one of the few pieces of evidence he had to corroborate at least one of his
versions of the events.

48



In addition, the three other errors we have identified are serious. Each calls into
question the fairness of the trial that Smith-Parker received. The instruction error and the
failure to tell the jury to begin its deliberations anew with the alternate juror incorrectly
informed the jury about how to pursue its deliberations. The failure to recall N.B. and the
presiding juror to testify live prevented a full investigation of whether jury misconduct
occurred.

Under these circumstances, we must reverse Smith-Parker's convictions under the
cumulative error doctrine. The combination of the overall weakness of the evidence
against him and multiple serious procedural defects tainting the process mean Smith-
Parker was substantially prejudiced under the totality of the circumstances and denied a
fair trial. See Magallanez, 290 Kan. at 926. The consolidated cases must be remanded to
the district court for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION

Cumulative error requires reversal of all of Smith-Parker's convictions and remand
to the district court for further proceedings.

MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned.1



1REPORTER'S NOTE: Senior Judge Malone was appointed to hear case Nos. 105,918
and 105,919 to fill the vacancy on the court created by the appointment of Justice Nancy
Moritz to the United States 10th Circuit Court of Appeals.