IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
No. 97,848
STATE OF KANSAS
Appellant,
v.
KARIN J. MORTON,
Appellee.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. When reviewing a district court's decision on a motion to suppress, an appellate court determines, without reweighing the evidence, whether the facts underlying the district court's decision were supported by substantial competent evidence. The district court's legal conclusions drawn from those facts are reviewed de novo.
2. A two-part inquiry is used to determine whether an interrogation is custodial for purposes of Miranda. The first prong is: what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation? We review that determination under a substantial competent evidence standard. The second prong of the inquiry is: under the totality of those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave? That determination is reviewed de novo.
3. The following factors are to be considered in analyzing the circumstances surrounding the interrogation: (1) when and where the interrogation occurred; (2) how long it lasted; (3) how many police officers were present; (4) what the officers did and the defendant said; (5) the presence of actual physical restraint on the defendant or things equivalent to actual restraint such as drawn weapons or a guard stationed at the door; (6) whether the defendant is being questioned as a suspect or a witness; (7) how the defendant got to the place of questioning, that is, whether he or she came independently in response to a police request or was escorted by police officers; and (8) what happened after the interrogation–whether the defendant left freely, was detained, or was arrested. These factors are not to be applied mechanically or treated as if each factor bears equal weight. Each case is to be analyzed on its own facts; some factors will be present in one case and not in another, and the importance of each factor may vary from case to case.
4. The question of whether an interrogation is custodial must be determined based on an objective standard of how a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would perceive his or her circumstances. Courts must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and determine how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action.
5. The determination of "custody" for purposes of Miranda depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.
6. Unwarned inculpatory statements obtained through noncustodial interrogation, although not barred by Miranda, may nevertheless be inadmissible if they were obtained in violation of the due process voluntariness requirement.
7. In determining whether a defendant's confession is voluntary, the essential inquiry is whether the statement was the product of the free and independent will of the accused. In making this determination, the court considers the following specific factors: (1) the accused's mental condition; (2) the manner and duration of the interrogation; (3) the ability of the accused to communicate with the outside world; (4) the accused's age, intellect, and background; (5) the fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogation; and (6) the accused's fluency in the English language.
8. A law enforcement officer's false statements to a suspect about the evidence implicating the suspect do not, by themselves, render the suspect's confession involuntary. Rather, they must be viewed in conjunction with the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession to determine whether it was voluntarily made.
9. Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, the General Services Administration agent's conduct that included telling the defendant that she did not need an attorney for the interview, because it was not "that kind" of interview, rendered her statement involuntary and, thus, inadmissible.
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed July 20, 2007. Appeal from Franklin District Court; JAMES J. SMITH, judge. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed. Opinion filed July 3, 2008.
Heather R. Jones, county attorney, argued the cause, and Paul J. Morrison, attorney general, was with her on the brief for the appellant.
Pantaleon Florez, Jr., of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROSEN, J.: The district court suppressed statements Karin J. Morton made in an interview with a criminal investigator for the Government Services Administration (GSA), for failure to provide Miranda warnings and because of unfair conduct that rendered her statements involuntary. The State filed an interlocutory appeal. In an unpublished decision filed July 20, 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that Miranda warnings were not required because the interview was not custodial. We granted Morton's petition for review. Although the Court of Appeals correctly determined that Miranda warnings were not required because the interview was not custodial, we hold that the agent's conduct rendered Morton's statements involuntary and thus inadmissible. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals, and affirm the judgment of the district court.
FACTS
Factual background
Morton worked for the Ottawa Recreation Commission (ORC), a taxpayer-funded entity that provides recreation services for the community of Ottawa. As part of her job duties, Morton was authorized to purchase federal surplus government property for the ORC. Federal surplus property is not available to the general public and is subject to use restrictions, including that personal use of the property is prohibited for a set period of time.
In early 2004, Morton purchased several travel trailers through the federal program. Paul Schwartz, director of the federal surplus property program, spoke with Morton when she purchased the trailers and advised her of the restrictions. Morton told Schwartz the ORC intended to use the trailers to store equipment and for concessions. Schwartz, being an impassioned guardian entrusted with safeguarding the transfer and subsequent utilization of government-owned surplus property, began investigating ORC's use of the trailers after receiving a letter alleging that some of the surplus property was not being used in compliance with the program restrictions. Schwartz' intuition led him straight to Morton's residence, where he spotted one of the trailers.
Presumably noting that Morton's residence appeared to be a curious location for a publicly-operated concessions stand and/or storage facility, Schwartz sent a compliance check form to the ORC, requesting information regarding the location and current use of the surplus property. Morton completed and signed the form, attesting that all of the trailers were located at the Ottawa ballfields and were being used for concessions stands and quarters for staff and officials.
His duty served, Schwartz then handed the matter over to the GSA and local law enforcement. Officer Weingartner of the Ottawa Police Department began investigating the matter. Officer Weingartner found one of the travel trailers at Morton's residence. Later, he interviewed Morton. Morton was represented by an attorney at the interview. The officer provided Miranda warnings and the interview was recorded.
After the Ottawa Police Department completed its report of the investigation, the GSA began its own investigation. The matter was assigned to Special Agent John Pontius, a criminal investigator with the GSA. Agent Pontius reviewed the police report and determined that additional facts were needed about the compliance form. Agent Pontius decided to do a follow-up interview to ask questions about the form.
Agent Pontius got in touch with Morton, and she agreed to meet him at the Ottawa Police Department. Agent Pontius did not provide Morton with Miranda warnings prior to questioning her. During the interview, Morton admitted receiving the compliance form, admitted that she filled out the form, and identified her handwriting and her signature on the form.
Agent Pontius sent a summary of his interview to the county attorney's office and to his headquarters. Subsequently, Morton was charged with one count of making a false information under K.S.A. 21-3711, a severity level 8 nonperson felony.
The suppression hearing
Prior to trial, Morton filed a motion to suppress her statements to Agent Pontius, contending that the failure to provide her with Miranda warnings required suppression. The State filed a response, contending that Morton was not in custody and, therefore, no Miranda warnings were required. The State also argued that Morton's statements were voluntarily made and, therefore, were admissible.
The trial court held a hearing on the suppression motion. Both Agent Pontius and Morton testified. Their respective versions of events differ somewhat.
Morton's testimony
Morton testified that several months after the Ottawa Police Department investigation was completed, her attorney left a message that a representative from the GSA had contacted his office and said a GSA agent wanted to talk to her about the trailer. She tried to call her attorney back, but he never returned her calls. After several weeks she used the GSA website to obtain Agent Pontius' phone number and left a message for him at his office.
Agent Pontius returned her call. He told her it was an informal interview and asked her if there was some alternative to the local police department where they could meet. She could not think of anyplace private enough, so they agreed on the police department. Morton testified she asked Agent Pontius if this was something she would need her attorney for. Agent Pontius told her, "[n]o, no, it's not that kind of interview. Some people bring their attorneys but it's nothing you'll need an attorney for."
According to Morton, at the time she agreed to meet with the agent she believed the criminal investigation was over. She had read in the paper that the county attorney had declined to prosecute, and her attorney had told her it was over. Morton testified she anticipated there would be a meeting with the GSA because the GSA was the surplus property oversight agency, and it would be deciding whether it would recover the trailer.
Agent Pontius and another special agent met her at the police station at the agreed upon time. He introduced himself and the other agent as "special agents." Morton testified that in her mind, a "special agent" was someone who works for the government and was not synonymous with "criminal investigator." They went into a break room. Before the interview started, Agent Pontius told Morton she was not under arrest; she did not have to answer their questions; and she could leave at any time. She was not handcuffed or physically restrained in any way.
Toward the end of the interview, Agent Pontius asked her, "Are you aware that this has been returned to the county attorney's office?" She replied that she was not. He asked her, "No one from the county attorney's office has called you?" She said, "No." He then said, "Well, it's back. It's back at her office." Morton testified that Agent Pontius told her that was part of the reason for the interview–to clarify some items on behalf of the county attorney because he was going to forward his report to the county attorney. After the interview, Agent Pontius told her he would have his report on the county attorney's desk in about 2 to 3 weeks.
Morton testified that she was not aware the interview was part of a criminal investigation until the end of the interview. Morton testified that she would have had counsel present at the interview if she had known the county attorney was considering criminal charges again. She said her attorney had advised her that if someone wanted to talk to her as part of the criminal investigation, she should agree, but arrange to have him present.
Agent Pontius' testimony
Agent Pontius testified that he wanted to interview Morton to clarify facts about the federal documents that the local police did not ask during their interview. He considered Morton a suspect, and he was conducting a criminal investigation.
Before he contacted Morton to set up an interview, the agent called the attorney who had represented her during her previous interview with the police. According to the agent, the attorney's office said they were not sure they were going to be representing her, so he called Morton at home and left a message. When she called him back, they discussed the interview.
The agent testified that Morton voluntarily met him at the Ottawa Police Department Building. Another agent from his office was present. Before asking any questions, the agent told Morton that she was not under arrest; she was not being detained; the interview was not mandatory; she could stop talking to them at any time; and she could leave whenever she wanted.
The agent explained that he did not give Miranda warnings because they are only required when the individual is in custody. Agent Pontius testified that at no time was Morton handcuffed and the door to the interview room was not locked. She was not deprived of bathroom breaks, food, or water for a significant period of time and was free to leave at any time. After the interview, Morton was not arrested and she was allowed to leave.
Agent Pontius denied telling Morton she did not need an attorney for the interview. Agent Pontius testified he told her he was conducting an investigation, he identified himself as a criminal investigator, and he told her he wanted to ask her some questions concerning the matter she had been interviewed about. He also testified that as a rule, GSA special agents identify themselves with their credentials, which state they are criminal investigators.
The suppression ruling
The trial court granted the motion to suppress. The basis for the trial court's decision is difficult to discern, but the ruling appears to have been based on two grounds: the agent's failure to provide Miranda warnings and the court's conclusion that the agent's conduct was unfair, rendering Morton's statements involuntary.
The State filed an interlocutory appeal. A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision. State v. Morton, No. 97,848, unpublished opinion filed July 20, 2007. The panel held that Morton was not in custody and, therefore, Agent Pontius was not required to provide Miranda warnings. Morton filed a petition for review, arguing that the Court of Appeals failed to address the district court's determination that the agent's conduct required suppression. We granted review.
Discussion
Our standard of review is well-established. We review a decision suppressing evidence under a mixed standard of review. We determine, without reweighing the evidence, whether the facts underlying the trial court's decision are supported by substantial competent evidence. We then conduct a de novo review of the district court's legal conclusion drawn from those facts. State v. Jones, 283 Kan. 186, 192, 151 P.3d 22(2007).
1. Does the failure to provide Miranda warnings require that Morton's statements be suppressed?
As this court recently explained in State v. Jones, 283 Kan. at 192, the Miranda rule was designed to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by reducing the risk of a coerced confession:
"The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right against self-incrimination, including the right to have a lawyer present during custodial interrogation and the right to remain silent. '[T]o reduce the risk of a coerced confession and to implement the Self-Incrimination Clause' (Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 790, 155 L. Ed. 2d 984, 123 S. Ct. 1994 [2003] [Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part]), the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), concluded that states may not use statements stemming from a custodial interrogation of a defendant unless the State demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards to secure the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination."
Miranda warnings are not required whenever police question someone. "'Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.'" Jones, 283 Kan. at 192-93 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714, 97 S. Ct. 711 [1977]). This limitation arises out of the basis for the rule itself--concern for the compelling pressures inherent in a custodial interrogation:
"To dissipate 'the overbearing compulsion . . . caused by the isolation of a suspect in police custody,' [citation omitted] the Miranda Court required the exclusion of incriminating statements obtained through custodial interrogation unless the suspect fails to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege after being suitably warned of his right to remain silent and of the consequences of his failure to assert it. [Citation omitted.] We have consistently held, however, that this extraordinary safeguard 'does not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations for which it was designed.'" Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430, 79 L. Ed. 2d 409, 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984).
See also Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 (stating that it is the coercive environment of the custodial interrogation "to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited").
A two-part inquiry is used to determine whether an interrogation is custodial for purposes of Miranda. The first prong is: what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation? We review that determination under a substantial competent evidence standard. The second prong of the inquiry is: under the totality of those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave? We apply a de novo standard of review to that determination. State v. Jones, 283 Kan. at 194.
Thus, our first task is to determine whether the district court's findings of fact concerning the circumstances surrounding the interrogation are supported by substantial competent evidence. The following factors are to be considered in analyzing the circumstances surrounding the interrogation:
"'(1) when and where the interrogation occurred; (2) how long it lasted; (3) how many police officers were present; (4) what the officers and defendant said and did; (5) the presence of actual physical restraint on the defendant or things equivalent to actual restraint such as drawn weapons or a guard stationed at the door; (6) whether the defendant is being questioned as a suspect or a witness; (7) how the defendant got to the place of questioning, that is, whether he came completely on his own in response to a police request or was escorted by police officers; and (8) what happened after the interrogation–whether the defendant left freely, was detained, or was arrested.'" Jones, 283 Kan. at 195 (quoting State v. Deal, 271 Kan. 483, 495, 23 P.3d 840 [2001], abrogated on other grounds by State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 214, 145 P.3d 1 [2006]).
These factors are not to be applied mechanically or treated as if each factor bears equal weight. As we said in Jones, each case needs to be analyzed on its own facts; some factors will present in one case and not in another, and the importance of each factor may vary from case to case. Jones, 283 Kan. at 195.
Morton contends the following factors support a finding of custody: (1) what the agent and the defendant said and did; (2) whether the defendant was being questioned as a witness or suspect; and (3) what happened after the interview.
What the agent and the defendant said and did
Morton contends that while she believed the interview was administrative in nature, the agent's actual purpose was to provide additional information for the county attorney. According to Morton, Agent Pontius' statements that the interview was informal and not the kind of interview she would need any attorney for were deceptive, leading her to believe that the interview was not a criminal investigation when it was.
It appears the district court found it significant that the purpose of the interview was to obtain and provide the county attorney with additional information to aid in pursuing criminal charges, while Morton believed the criminal investigation was over. Substantial competent evidence supports the conclusion that the purpose of the interview was criminal in nature and that Morton was unaware of that fact until the conclusion of the interview.
The district court did not make any specific finding of fact on the disputed matter of whether the agent told Morton she did not need a lawyer because it was not that kind of interview. The district court did, however, conclude that the agent's conduct was unfair, thus requiring suppression. When we apply the mixed standard of review, we do not reweigh testimony or pass on the credibility of witnesses. Instead, we accept as true the evidence and all inferences to be drawn therefrom that support the findings of the trial court and disregard any conflicting evidence or other inferences that might be drawn therefrom. State v. Orr, 262 Kan. 312, 322, 940 P.2d 42 (1997). Thus, we accept Morton's version of events as true.
Whether the defendant was being questioned as a suspect or witness
As Morton notes, there is no dispute Agent Pontius considered her to be a suspect, not a witness. The district court's decision appears to be based, in part, on the fact that Morton was the focus of the investigation. Accordingly, substantial competent evidence supports the finding that Morton was being questioned as a suspect.
What happened after the interview
On this factor, Morton points out the evidence established that Agent Pontius told her he would be sending a copy of his report of the interview to the county attorney. Subsequently, the criminal case was filed and she surrendered herself to law enforcement in lieu of a formal arrest. The district court did not make any findings concerning what happened after the interview. It is obvious, however, that this criminal case was initiated not long after the agent's interview. Accordingly, substantial competent evidence supports this factor.
In summary, we find the following circumstances surrounding the interrogation are supported by substantial competent evidence. Morton believed the criminal investigation had concluded with no criminal charges to be filed. When she was contacted by Agent Pontius, she believed his involvement was administrative in nature. The agent was conducting a criminal investigation, and Morton was a suspect. The agent told Morton the interview was informal, and when she asked whether she would need a lawyer for the interview, the agent told her no, it was not that kind of interview. Morton agreed to meet Agent Pontius at the police department. She drove herself to the interview, which was held at the police department. The interview took place in a break room, not in a regular interview room. There were two agents present. Miranda warnings were not given. Before questioning began, Morton was told she was not under arrest; she could refuse to answer questions; and she could terminate the interview and leave at any time. The room was not locked; Morton was not handcuffed; and she was not physically restrained in any way. After the interview, the agent told Morton the matter was back at the county attorney's office, and that he would be providing a copy of his report to the county attorney. Morton was allowed to leave the interview. Later, Morton was prosecuted.
Having determined the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, our next task is to determine whether, under the totality of those circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interview and leave. Jones, 283 Kan. at 194. We use an objective standard in determining whether an interrogation is custodial:
"The question of whether an interrogation is custodial must be determined based on an objective standard of how a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would perceive his or her circumstances. Courts must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and determine how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action." 283 Kan. 186, Syl. ¶ 3.
Our task is made difficult by the fact that neither Morton nor the State argue this prong of the inquiry. Morton argues only that had she been given Miranda, and had she been told that the interview was a criminal investigation for the purpose of providing additional information to the county attorney, she would have had an attorney present. Under these circumstances, Morton argues, the failure to give Miranda warnings was fundamentally unfair.
The problem with Morton's argument is that her beliefs about the nature of the interview and the subjective intentions of the agent are only relevant to the custody inquiry if they would have caused a reasonable person to believe he or she was not free to terminate the interview and leave. As we noted in Jones, custody "'depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.'" Jones, 283 Kan. at 193 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293, 114 S. Ct. 1526 [1994]).
Under this standard, an officer's intent, purpose, and views concerning the nature of the interrogation and whether the individual is a suspect are relevant to the determination of custody only if they were communicated to or otherwise made known to the individual being questioned and if they would have affected how a reasonable person would have perceived his or her freedom to leave:
"It is well settled then, that a police officer's subjective view that the individual under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, does not bear upon the question whether the individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda. [Citation omitted.] The same principle obtains if an officer's undisclosed assessment is that the person being questioned is not a suspect. In either instance, one cannot expect the person under interrogation to probe the officer's innermost thoughts. Save as they are communicated or otherwise manifested to the person being questioned, an officer's evolving but unarticulated suspicions do not affect the objective circumstances of the interrogation or interview, and thus cannot affect the Miranda custody inquiry. 'The threat to a citizen's Fifth Amendment rights that Miranda was designed to neutralize has little to do with the strength of an interrogating officer's suspicions.' [citation omitted.]" Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. at 324-25.
See also Jones, 283 Kan. at 193 (discussing the objective standard under Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 104 S. Ct. 3138 [1984]; Stansbury); State v. Fritschen, 247 Kan. 592, 597-603, 802 P.2d 558 (1990) (discussing the development of the objective standard and holding that the fact a suspect is the focus of the investigation is relevant under the objective standard only if the suspect was aware he or she was the focus and a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have felt that because of this he or she was in custody); State v. James, 276 Kan. 737, 752, 79 P.3d 169 (2003) (existence of an out-of-state felony warrant that required the defendant be detained, which was known to the officers but not the defendant, did not convert interview into a custodial interrogation because the custody test is based on an objective standard).
Under this objective standard, Agent Pontius' focus on Morton as a suspect, his purpose in conducting the interview, and his intent to reinstigate charges are relevant to the determination of custody for purposes of Miranda only if they were communicated to or otherwise made known to Morton and would have affected how a reasonable person would have perceived his or her freedom to terminate the interview and leave. The evidence establishes that Morton was unaware of any of that until the end of the interview. Accordingly, Agent Pontius' subjective knowledge, purpose, plan, and intent are not relevant to the objective custody inquiry.
Similarly, Morton's subjective beliefs concerning the nature of the interview have no bearing on the custody inquiry. The determination of custody for purposes of Miranda is determined by the objective circumstances, not by the subjective view harbored by the person being questioned. Jones, 283 Kan. at 193. In Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938, 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004), the Supreme Court held that a suspect's prior experience with law enforcement is not a relevant factor in the custody inquiry. The Court distinguished the objective Miranda custody inquiry from other types of inquiries, like the voluntariness of a confession, that are based on the mindset and characteristics of the particular suspect. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 667-68. An objective test "furthers 'the clarity of [the Miranda] rule, [citation omitted] ensuring that the police do not need 'to make guesses as to [the circumstances] at issue before deciding how they may interrogate the suspect. [Citation omitted.]'" Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 667. Allowing the suspect's individual characteristics to be a part of the custody analysis, even if styled as an objective test--what would a reasonable person of the suspect's age, experience level, etc. have believed--would ruin this clarity, as it would require police officers to consider a suspect's mindset when faced with deciding whether they are required to give