IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
No. 80,181
STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,
v.
VICKIE LUMLEY,
Appellant.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. The admissibility of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Our standard of review regarding a trial court's admission of evidence, subject to exclusionary rules, is abuse of discretion.
2. Judicial discretion is abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. If reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion. Judicial discretion must thus be considered as exercisable only within the bounds of reason and justice in the broader sense and be considered abused only when it plainly overpasses those bounds.
3. One who asserts that the court has abused its discretion bears the burden of showing such abuse of discretion.
4. Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact. For evidence of collateral facts to be competent, there must be some material or logical connection between them and the inference or result they are designed to establish.
5. When a question arises as to whether evidence at trial is unfairly prejudicial, the trial court has an obligation to weigh the probative value of the evidence. When the prejudicial effect of the evidence on the trier of fact outweighs the probative value of the evidence, the evidence should be excluded.
6. A reviewing court must scrutinize each case on its particular facts to determine whether a trial error is harmless error or prejudicial error when viewed in the light of the trial record as a whole, not whether each isolated incident viewed by itself constitutes reversible error.
7. Where a proper question is asked, and an improper answer given, the only remedy of the aggrieved party is by motion to strike. It is impossible for the court to exclude in advance an improper answer to a proper question. The propriety of the answer cannot, in the nature of things, be determined before it is given.
8. Evidence of prior acts between a defendant and a victim are admissible independent of K.S.A. 60-455 if the evidence is to establish the relationship between the parties, the existence of a continuing course of conduct between the parties, or to corroborate the testimony of the complaining witness as to the act charged. Case law has allowed prior conduct to be admitted into evidence where a family relationship existed.
9. When self-defense is asserted, evidence of the cruel and violent nature of the deceased toward the defendant is admissible.
10. In a case of marital homicide, evidence of a discordant marital relationship and a wife's fear of her husband's temper is relevant as bearing on the defendant's motive and intent.
11. A point not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. It is well established that a party may not assert error based upon the erroneous exclusion of evidence in the absence of a proffer of that proposed evidence.
12. The analysis of the effect of a prosecutor's allegedly improper remarks in closing argument is a two-step process. First, the appellate court determines whether the remarks were outside the considerable latitude the prosecutor is allowed in discussing the evidence. This analysis commences with the holding that in criminal trials, the prosecution is given wide latitude in language and in manner or presentation of closing argument as long as it is consistent with the evidence adduced. Second, each case must be scrutinized on its particular facts to determine whether a trial error is harmless error or prejudicial error when viewed in the light of the trial record as a whole, not whether each isolated incident viewed by itself constitutes reversible error.
13. Improper remarks made in closing argument are grounds for reversal only when they are so gross and flagrant as to prejudice the jury against the accused and deny him or her a fair trial. In deciding whether improper remarks by the prosecution during closing argument constitute harmless error, the reviewing court must be able to find that the error had little, if any, likelihood of changing the result of the trial. Such a belief must be declared beyond a reasonable doubt.
14. Before an objectionable statement made by a prosecutor on matters outside the record will entitle the accused to a reversal of his or her conviction, it first must appear that it was injurious to the accused and was likely to affect the jurors to the accused's prejudice.
15. Reversible error cannot be predicated upon a complaint of misconduct of counsel during closing argument where no contemporaneous objection is lodged.
16. If a prosecutor's statements rise to the level of violating a defendant's right to a fair trial and, thus, deny a defendant his or her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, reversible error occurs despite the lack of a contemporaneous objection.
Appeal from Stevens district court; TOM R. SMITH, judge. Opinion filed March 5, 1999. Affirmed.
Debra J. Wilson, assistant appellate defender, argued the cause, and Jessica R. Kunen, chief appellate defender, was with her on the brief for appellant.
Wayne R. Tate, special prosecutor, argued the cause, and Carla J. Stovall, attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ABBOTT, J.: This is a direct appeal by defendant Vickie Lumley from her conviction of intentional second-degree murder of Robert Guerrero in violation of K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 21-3402(a).
Lumley raises a number of issues on appeal that fall into three categories: (1) The trial court erred in not sustaining an objection and admonishing the jury to disregard a witness' comment that Lumley had been bailed out of jail; (2) the trial court erred in limiting the evidence of her tumultuous relationship with Guerrero and his acts of violence towards her; and (3) the trial court improperly allowed the prosecutor to ask questions which assumed facts not in evidence and to make improper comments during closing argument.
Lumley was charged with intentional second-degree murder in connection with the December 12, 1996, death of Guerrero. A jury found Lumley guilty as charged. Intentional second-degree murder is an off-grid crime, with a sentence mandated by statute, and Lumley was sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 21-4706(c).
Lumley and Guerrero lived together in a common-law marriage. A few years before his death, Lumley and Guerrero began living in a mobile home in rural Stevens County, Kansas. The mobile home did not have a telephone. Lumley characterized her relationship with Guerrero as "up and down" and said that when Guerrero was drinking heavily, the relationship was bad, otherwise it was good. Lumley testified that after Guerrero's father died in December 1993, he developed problems with his temper, and his violence towards her prompted her to move out of the mobile home several times. In May 1996, Lumley moved out of the mobile home, but she returned in June. She subsequently moved out again but returned in September 1996, upon reconciliation.
Lumley testified that in early November 1996, she and Guerrero had a violent argument and he was angry and throwing things. She further stated that he yelled at her two sons, who lived with them, and threw her against the bedroom wall and then against the living room wall. Guerrero took her to the emergency room in Hugoton with bruises on her chest and arms and pulled muscles in her upper body. Lumley testified that later in November 1996, another episode of violence occurred when Guerrero punched holes in the bedroom wall and "he kind of pitched me around."
Tyler Lumley, Lumley's 13-year-old son, testified that at times he was afraid of Guerrero and had seen him act violently. Justin Lumley, Lumley's 12-year-old son, testified that Guerrero had thrown a table, chairs, and a buffet out the door of the mobile home in early November. Neither son was present when the second November episode occurred.
On December 11, 1996, the day before his death, Guerrero and Lumley again argued. Lumley testified that Guerrero was angry because she had been subpoenaed to testify in a forgery case and he did not want her involved. She said that Guerrero did not come home that night but returned at approximately 8:30 a.m. on December 12, 1996. As she was leaving the house that morning, he told her that they would deal with their disagreement when he got home that night.
Justin returned home from school at about 4 p.m. on December 12, 1996, and Lumley took him to Hank and Karen Plummer's house to pick up Tyler. Lumley usually stayed with Karen Plummer when Tyler played basketball in town. Lumley brought some beer to the Plummers' house. When Hank came home from work shortly before 5 p.m., another 6-pack of beer was purchased. Guerrero arrived at the Plummers' house at about 6:30 p.m. According to Hank, Guerrero wanted to speak with Lumley, but Lumley did not want to speak with him. Guerrero said, "okay" and went outside to his car to leave but came back in and told Lumley that he "was going home, if there was anything that she needed." Hank stated that Lumley responded, "Gas in the car, and you can go pick up my son at the game."
Guerrero then left to get the gas and to pick up Tyler. While Guerrero was gone, Karen broached the subject of a telephone bill and asked how Lumley and Guerrero planned to pay back $100 they owed the Plummers for the calls made using their phone. Guerrero returned to the Plummers' house with Tyler and the gas within 45 minutes. Hank testified that Guerrero came in the house and again asked Lumley if he could speak with her. When Lumley again said, "No," Guerrero announced that "he was going home and going to bed" and left at about 8:30 p.m. Lumley testified that he appeared very angry when he left and she did not want to get into a fight with him.
After Guerrero left, Hank told Lumley that he did not want her or Guerrero to use their telephone anymore. Lumley became angry because she thought Guerrero had paid the phone bill. According to Hank, Lumley suspected that Guerrero was calling another woman who lived in Liberal. However, there were also phone calls to Lumley, who had worked in Liberal while she was living with her brother during her separation from Guerrero in the summer of 1996. Lumley and Karen disagreed about who had made the telephone calls in question, and Hank became angry as well. Karen claimed that Lumley threw a glass down and shoved Karen as she was leaving. Lumley, however, testified that Karen physically tried to stop her from going home by blocking her and she merely pushed Karen aside to leave.
Karen testified that Lumley drank a lot of beer that afternoon and evening and that she thought Lumley was too drunk to drive home. Karen said that she tried to convince Lumley to remain at her house, but she would not. Lumley agreed, however, that her sons could stay at the Plummers' house. Lumley testified that she left her boys with the Plummers and went home by herself because the boys did not want to go home since Guerrero was so mad.
Tyler testified that on the night of December 12, 1996, Guerrero picked him up from a basketball game and he could smell alcohol in the car, but "he acted pretty nice to me, but I don't know if he was mad." After Guerrero brought him to the Plummers' house, Tyler watched television with his brother and the Plummers' son, James. Guerrero came into the Plummers' house briefly but left again, and Lumley, Hank, and Karen sat at the kitchen table talking and drinking. When asked to describe how his mother was acting that night, Tyler said that he thought she was upset when she left, but he did not know why. Tyler stated that about 45 minutes after Guerrero left, his mother
"told us to get in the car, and we went out. And my brother got in the back seat, and I sat in the front seat. And my mom got in, and she--and I told her we didn't want to go back out to the house, we wanted to spend the night with James. And so she said, 'Fine.' And then we got out, and we went back in the house, and then she left."
When questioned why he wanted to spend the night with James, Tyler stated:
"[M]y brother told me that he'd already been thinking about it because, like, her and Robert [Guerrero] were both pretty upset, and I know that, like, either they were going to get into an argument or something out at the house or that, like, she was going to run into a ditch or something."
Justin testified to essentially the same version of events as Tyler.
Sheriff Russ DeWitt testified that he interviewed Lumley at about 2:30 a.m. on December 13. DeWitt testified that Lumley related the following regarding Guerrero's death:
"[S]he entered the west door of the trailer, said she looked left to see if he was in the kitchen, living room area, and he wasn't there. So she stepped to the right, to the south, into the bedroom, and he was sitting at a southeast corner of the bedroom in a chair, and said he was in his underwear and had a knife that he used occasionally to clean his fingernails, toenails. Said they began arguing, he stood up, and they met at the foot of the bed. They began struggling, they fell on the bed. When they hit the bed, she was on the bottom, he was on the top. As they rolled off the bed, she said as they began to roll off the bed, she noticed blood on his chest, and when they hit the floor, Robert was on the bottom, she was on the top. She said that she saw this knife in his chest, upper left chest area, she pulled it out, closed the blade, tossed it on the bed, and put her hands over the wound to try to stop the blood. She said Robert told her about then he was hurt bad and, 'Go get help.'"
Detective Ted Heaton of the Stevens County Sheriff's Department testified that he had a conversation with Lumley at the scene of the mobile home and that Lumley gave him the same version of events that she gave to DeWitt at 2:30 a.m. Lumley told Heaton that during the argument Guerrero had a knife in his hand. When Heaton questioned Lumley again at the Sheriff's Department, she told the same version of events several times. Two officers then took Lumley to the hospital at about 12:30 a.m. on the morning of December 13, 1996. The cut on Lumley's arm required stitches, and she was returned to the Sheriff's Department about 1 a.m.
Lumley told the police that after Guerrero told her to get help, she left the mobile home and drove to the Perry residence. Although no one was living at the Perry residence, she knew there was a telephone in the house. She kicked in the back door to enter and called 911, as well as the Plummers, and told them that Guerrero had cut or stabbed himself. Deputy Purcell picked Lumley up as she ran down the road towards her house. Lumley had crashed her car into a tree in the Perrys' driveway and could no longer drive it. Purcell stated that Lumley was panicky, hurried, and hysterical.
When Purcell and Lumley reached the mobile home, Purcell found Guerrero lying on his back on the bedroom floor. He was near the bed wearing only a pair of underwear. He had a 2- to 3-inch cut on his upper left chest which was approximately 1/2-inch wide and there was blood by the wound "and some smeared down his lower body and a little bit on his legs." Guerrero's arms were by his side, the wound was open, and he did not appear to be breathing. Purcell performed CPR on Guerrero until the EMTs arrived.
Hank called the Sheriff's Department after Lumley called him from the Perry residence. He then went to the mobile home. Guerrero was on the floor and Lumley was hysterical and crying.
When Heaton arrived at the scene at 10:08 p.m. that evening, Lumley and Hank were outside. Heaton went inside and saw Guerrero on the floor in his underwear. An EMT told him that there were no signs of life, so Heaton told him to leave and declared the area a "crime scene." Heaton stated that he did not see or find any bloody rags, towels, or anything that might have been used to stop the bleeding. He found a knife, however, on the bed under the EMT bag. Heaton then went outside and spoke with Lumley. He noticed that she had a cut on her arm which he wrapped in gauze.
Lumley gave the police permission to search her mobile home. Dewitt and Heaton made a videotape of Lumley's residence about 4 a.m. the morning after Guerrero was killed. They observed a 12-gauge shotgun pump standing up in the southwest corner of the bedroom. Heaton testified that there was a shotgun shell on the north side of the bed and a shotgun shell on one of the nightstands or dressers along the east wall. They also found a knife sheath under the bed.
After viewing the scene, Dewitt spoke again with Lumley and told her that since Guerrero had blood on his legs, he must have been standing when he was cut. Lumley told Dewitt that she had taken the knife away from him and thrown it and Guerrero must have been cut at that point. Dewitt then told Lumley that Guerrero's wound was caused by a downward stroke which was not consistent with throwing a knife. Lumley responded that she had taken the knife away; that she was tired of getting thrown around; and that she struck him with the knife to get him away from her.
Heaton testified that when he and Dewitt questioned Lumley again at about 6 a.m., her story changed slightly. The officers "indicated to her by question that it couldn't have happened that way. And from the first scenario that I gave you earlier to this particular time, she said, 'Well we got into a struggle, and I got a hold of the knife, and I threw it to get it away from me. And that must have been when I cut him.' And that was the change in the story." During this 6 a.m. interview, Lumley demonstrated for the officers what had happened, and she indicated that the knife was clearly in Guerrero's right hand. Heaton stated that when they questioned Lumley in the afternoon or early evening on December 13, her story changed again. Heaton related Lumley's version of events at that time as follows:
"He had the knife, and then she got the knife. However she got it, that's unclear. And then it changes there, that she stabbed him to get him away from her, not the part about trying to throw it away or fell to the bed and caused the wound."
When Lumley testified at trial, she stated that she had never told Heaton or DeWitt that she cut Guerrero with the knife while trying to take it away from him. She denied stabbing Guerrero. Dewitt was well acquainted with Guerrero and testified that he was a very strong man with good upper body strength.
Dr. Hubert Peterson, a pathologist in Liberal, Kansas, conducted the autopsy on Guerrero and determined that he had suffered a single stab wound to the upper left chest which had caused him to bleed to death. This wound went 5 1/2 to 6 inches into his body and reached his heart. The knife went parallel to the rib cage, and it would usually take a fair amount of force to make this wound. However, such penetration could occur fairly easily with a sharp knife. Blood splatters on Guerrero's body indicated that he was upright when he was stabbed, because the way the blood had travelled from the wound was not consistent with a body in the supine position. Most of Guerrero's bleeding was internal into his chest cavity.
Dr. Peterson further testified that Guerrero's wound could be consistent with him turning away from or turning towards the person with the knife, and it was not likely that he was directly facing a person with a knife when the wound was inflicted. Dr. Peterson also testified that it was possible that Guerrero's wound could have occurred as the result of a fall during a struggle, but it would have been difficult for him to have caused the wound himself while holding the knife in his right hand. Likewise, it would have been awkward for him to have caused the wound to himself with his left hand. When the prosecutor asked Dr. Peterson if "two people were fighting and fell on a bed flat, it would be next to impossible to--for the bed or the force of the bodies to insert the knife into Robert's chest [in] that direction?" Dr. Peterson responded that it would be difficult, but it could be possible.
Upon cross-examination, Dr. Peterson noted that Guerrero's wound "was unusual in that it was rather deep to be so oblique." He responded that Guerrero's wound could be consistent with the scenario that Lumley had a hold on Guerrero's hand and wrist, they were struggling, and in the struggle he fell on the bed. Defense counsel asked him "[I]f the body were placed in an upright position shortly after the injury, within a matter of seconds, would those types of bloodstains on the abdomen be consistent with that?" Dr. Peterson responded that "[i]t's conceivable it could be, yes."
Kelly Robbins, a blood analysis expert who worked in the Kansas Bureau of Investigation crime laboratory, testified regarding the blood stain analysis done on items from the scene. She stated that blood of both Guerrero and Lumley was found on the top cover of the bed. A blood sample taken from a sock was consistent with Guerrero's blood. She summarized that the knife used in the stabbing, a sheet beneath the bedspread, the sock, and the carpet showed only Guerrero's blood. The pants and shirt that Lumley was wearing the night of Guerrero's death were analyzed and showed only Lumley's blood and none of Guerrero's blood.
The State presented witnesses who testified that Lumley had made jealous threats against Guerrero. Lori Cole had been friends with both Guerrero and Lumley for about 2 years and worked part-time at the bar in Liberal where Lumley previously worked. Cole testified that her last conversation with Lumley was in Liberal about 2 weeks prior to Guerrero's death. Cole stated:
"We sat and had--I had a drink and she had a beer. She said things that did not--I did not believe at the time that she would actually do because she just always talked. She said that she would kill him, that she carried a knife in her purse, which I knew she always did anyway, from knowing her previously."
When the State questioned Cole regarding whether Lumley had indicated why she would make such a threat, Cole stated that Lumley had not said why and that Lumley did not mention anything to her about Guerrero dating other women.
Anna Aranda also testified for the prosecution. She had known Guerrero for about 13 years and Lumley for about 7 to 8 years. Anna described Guerrero and Lumley's relationship over the last 2 years as "[v]ery unstable, a lot of fighting, a lot of fighting on [Lumley's] part that I've witnessed."
Dana Jones, Lumley's brother, testified that in August 1996, his sister was "quite upset because some rumors had been flying around that Robert had slept with a girl named Mandy." He testified that Lumley was upset, but she never threatened to kill Guerrero.
In its rebuttal evidence, the State called Trinidad Aranda, Jr., Anna's husband. Junior stated that on August 14, 1996, Lumley ran into their backyard and said she was going to kill Robert and then kill Mandy. Junior was also present when Lumley came to the Aranda house in September 1996. When asked whether Lumley had made any threats against Guerrero, he stated that she had said "she was going to kill Robert, and Mandy was next."
Anna's daughter, Jessica, also testified regarding the August 14 incident and stated that Lumley said she had seen Guerrero at Mandy's residence and that "if she couldn't have him, no one else can." Jessica was also present when Lumley came to the Aranda house in September and said Lumley was irate that Guerrero was at Mandy's house. She testified that Lumley again threatened to kill Guerrero and Mandy.
Lumley denied making any of the threats referred to by the State's witnesses in their testimony. Lumley testified that (1) she did not believe that Guerrero was seeing other women in the fall of 1996, (2) she did not stab him, (3) she loved him, (4) he was a good person when he was not drinking, and (5) they had been together and helped each other for 8 years.
Lumley took the stand and testified on her own behalf. She related the following version of events that led up to Guerrero's death:
"I opened the back door, and I looked--I went in the house, I looked towards the living room, and I walked into the bedroom. Robert was sitting in his chair. . . . And he was already starting to get up out of the chair as I went to the bedroom. And he was very angry, and he was yelling at me. And he grabbed a hold of my arm, and he had the knife in his left hand, which would have been on my right side, and he was waving the knife around in front of me.
"And I had a scratch on the bottom of my chin. And I got really scared. And so I grabbed his hand that was around the knife. And he had kind of, you know, raised it up in the air because I was trying to get a hold of it. And I pushed it, I was trying to push it away from him, when I pushed it towards him. And he was jerking me around, and we fell on the bed. And then I--I heard him go 'Uh,' and his hand kind of loosened. So I was--I was trying to get out from underneath him, and I rolled him to the floor, and I come out on top of him. And I seen the knife stuck in his chest. So I pulled the knife out of his chest, and I--we fell into a really tight place between the bed and the dresser. So I stepped over him, and I got him around here [demonstrating], close to his armpits, around here, and I dragged him flat. And I put my hands over the wound to stop the bleeding. And he told me to go get help. So when I was going out the bedroom, I almost fell.
"And I went straight to my car, and I went to Perry's house. And I was driving very, very fast because I was very, very scared, and I was upset. And that driveway--it's really dark out there, and I went to the north side of the driveway, and it kind of curves, and so my car started doing this [demonstrating], and it went against the tree."
I. EVIDENCE
The admissibility of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. In State v. Sims, 265 Kan. 166, 175, 960 P.2d 1271 (1998), the court stated that "'it is clear that our standard of review regarding a trial court's admission of evidence, subject to exclusionary rules, is abuse of discretion'" (quoting State v. Sims, 262 Kan. 165, 170, 936 P.2d 779 [1997]). In State v. Gardner, 264 Kan. 95, 103, 955 P.2d 1199 (1998), we noted that "[a] trial court's ruling regarding the admission of evidence is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review." (Citing State v. Vaughn, 254 Kan. 191, 204, 865 P.2d 207 [1993].) Further:
"'Judicial discretion is abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable . . . . If reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion. Judicial discretion must thus be considered as exercisable only within the bounds of reason and justice in the broader sense and be considered abused only when it plainly overpasses those bounds.' State v. Stallings, 262 Kan. 721, Syl. ¶ 6, 942 P.2d 11 (1997)." State v. Gardner, 264 Kan. at 104.
The Stallings court also noted that the "[o]ne who asserts that the court has abused its discretion bears the burden of showing such abuse of discretion." 262 Kan. 722, Syl. ¶ 7.
Under K.S.A. 60-401(b), relevant evidence is evidence "having any tendency [in reason] to prove any material fact. For evidence of collateral facts to be competent, there must be some material or logical connection between them and the inference or result they are designed to establish." State v. Walker, 239 Kan. 635, 644, 722 P.2d 556 (1986) (citing State v. Reed, 226 Kan. 519, 524, 601 P.2d 1125 [1979]).
Lumley argues that the trial court had the duty to exclude prejudicial evidence with little or no probative value. In State v. Benoit, 21 Kan. App. 2d 184, Syl. ¶ 11, 898 P.2d 653 (1995), the court noted that when a question arises "as to whether evidence at trial is unfairly prejudicial, the trial court has an obligation to weigh the probative value of the evidence. When the prejudicial effect of the evidence on the trier of fact outweighs the probative value of the evidence, the evidence should be excluded." Lumley asserts that Karen Plummer's testimony about Guerrero borrowing bond money to get her out of jail was irrelevant, yet highly prejudicial, and the trial court should not have permitted it. The following dialogue between the prosecutor and Karen about the money owed on the phone bill contains the complained-of statement:
"Q. [Mr. Tate] And approximately how much was owed on that bill to you?
"A. [Karen] Well, through, like, all summer and stuff, they owed me about a hundred, or more, plus the $200 for bond that we loaned him to get Vickie out of jail.
Mr. Kuharic: Objection, Your Honor, objection, Your Honor.
"A. So about 300."
Lumley correctly notes that the court never ruled on the objection. In State v. Lee, 263 Kan. 97, Syl. ¶ 3, 948 P.2d 641 (1997), the court stated that "[a] trial court's decision concerning the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion." In State v. Whitaker, 255 Kan. 118, 134, 872 P.2d 278 (1994), aff'd 260 Kan. 85, 917 P.2d 859 (1996), the court explained that the reviewing court must scrutinize each case "on its particular facts to determine whether a trial error is harmless error or prejudicial error when viewed in the light of the trial record as a whole, not whether each isolated incident viewed by itself constitutes reversible error." (Citing United States v. Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062 [2d Cir. 1970].)
Lumley contends that the complained-of evidence was not relevant; thus, it was not admissible. K.S.A. 60-401(b) provides that relevant evidence means "evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact." K.S.A. 60-407(f) states that "all relevant evidence is admissible." Lumley argues that the evidence indicating that she had been in jail before served no purpose other than to degrade her and had no bearing on any contested issues at trial.
In State v. Bradford, 219 Kan. 336, Syl. ¶ 1, 548 P.2d 812 (1976), the court held that "[w]hether inadmissable testimony constitutes harmless or reversible error depends upon the