State v. Andelt

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 98,665
No. 98,699

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

RANDY WAYNE ANDELT,
Appellant.


SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.
Interpretation of sentencing statutes is a question of law over which an appellate court
exercises unlimited review.

2.
When courts are called upon to interpret statutes, the fundamental rule governing that
interpretation is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. The
legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the language of the statutory scheme
it enacted. For this reason, when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts need
not resort to statutory construction. Instead, when the language is plain and unambiguous, an
appellate court is bound to implement the expressed intent. Only where the face of a statute
leaves its construction uncertain does the court look to the historical background of the
enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the
effect the statute may have under the various constructions suggested.

3.
Sentences that fall within the sentencing grid are presumptive sentences under the Kansas
Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), K.S.A. 21-4701 et seq., and are not subject to appeal.


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4.
K.S.A. 21-4729 establishes a nonprison sanction of commitment to a certified drug abuse
treatment program for certain offenders sentenced on or after November 1, 2003. If an offender
meets the requirements of that statute, "[t]he sentencing court shall commit the offender to
treatment in a drug abuse treatment program until determined suitable for discharge by the court
but the term of treatment shall not exceed 18 months." K.S.A. 21-4729(c).

5.
K.S.A. 21-4729 does not establish a presumptive sentence within the meaning of the
KSGA.

6.
K.S.A. 21-4603d(f)(1) applies to presumptive sentences, not to sentencing dispositions
mandated by the legislature.

7.
The plain language of K.S.A. 21-4729 and K.S.A. 21-4603d make certified drug abuse
treatment programs mandatory for individuals who qualify for such programs under K.S.A. 21-
4729. A district court does not have discretion to sentence an offender otherwise qualifying for a
certified drug abuse treatment program to imprisonment.

8.
The question of postrelease supervision only arises when an offender has been sentenced
to prison.

9.
A defendant incurs an obligation for the Board of Indigents' Defense Services (BIDS)
application fee when he or she applies for appointed counsel, long before sentencing. A court's
subsequent assessment of costs at sentencing therefore includes a previously ordered, but unpaid,
BIDS application fee. Thus, a journal entry does not deviate from the court's pronouncement at
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sentencing if it includes a requirement to pay the BIDS application fee even if that requirement
was not specifically explained at the defendant's sentencing hearing.

Case No. 98,699

Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 40 Kan. App. 2d 796, 195 P.3d 1220 (2008). Appeal
from the Marshall district court; JAMES A. PATTON, judge. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district
court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions. Opinion filed
October 9, 2009.

Christina M. Waugh, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and Michelle Davis, of the
same office, was with her on the briefs for appellant.

Brian S. Carroll, county attorney, argued the cause, and Steve N. Six, attorney general, was with him on the
brief for appellee.

Case No. 98,665

Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed September 19, 2008.
Appeal from Washington district court; THOMAS M. TUGGLE, judge. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming
the district court on the issues subject to our grant of review is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Judgment of the
district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded with directions. Opinion filed
October 9, 2009.

Christina M. Waugh, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and Michelle Davis, of the
same office, was on the briefs for appellant.

Elizabeth A.B. Hiltgen, county attorney, and Jason E. Brinegar, former county attorney, and Steve N. Six,
attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

DAVIS, C.J.: The question we must resolve today is whether a defendant convicted of a
felony drug offense qualifying for a certified drug abuse treatment program under K.S.A. 21-
4729 may be sentenced to prison under K.S.A. 21-4603d(f)(1), which authorizes a departure
prison sentence where the underlying offense was committed while the defendant is on felony
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parole. We hold that the provisions of K.S.A. 21-4729 requiring a defendant to be committed to a
certified drug abuse treatment program are mandatory.

FACTS

In January 2007, Randy Andelt pleaded no contest in Marshall County, Kansas, to
possession of methamphetamine. In February 2007, Andelt pleaded no contest in Washington
County, Kansas, to possession of methamphetamine in an unrelated case. Both offenses were
violations of K.S.A. 65-4160 and were thus severity level 4 felonies. At the time that Andelt
committed both of these offenses, he was on parole in Nebraska for a conviction of felony theft.

K.S.A. 21-4729, which was adopted as part of the comprehensive amendments to the
Criminal Code contained in Senate Bill 123 in 2003, provides that when a person is convicted
under K.S.A. 65-4160 (or K.S.A. 65-4162) and meets certain criteria in terms of criminal history
score and crime severity level, the sentencing court "shall commit the offender to treatment in a
drug abuse treatment program until determined suitable for discharge by the court but the term of
treatment shall not exceed 18 months." K.S.A. 21-4729(c); L. 2003, ch. 135, sec. 1; see K.S.A.
2008 Supp. 75-52,144 (regarding certified drug abuse treatment programs, requirements,
presentence drug abuse assessments, certified providers, and program costs).

In both cases, Andelt's criminal history score E, combined with the severity level of his
offenses, qualified him for the nonprison sanction of commitment to a certified drug abuse
treatment program established by K.S.A. 21-4729. See K.S.A. 21-4729(a)(1) (listing offenders
convicted of a violation of K.S.A. 65-4160 in the 4-E gridbox of the Kansas Sentencing
Guidelines as persons qualified for the program).

Although both of the district courts conducting Andelt's sentencing hearings noted that
K.S.A. 21-4729 would ordinarily apply to the respective offenses, each court imposed sentences
of 20 months' imprisonment due to the fact that Andelt had committed the offenses while on
felony parole. These sentences were based on the standard term in K.S.A. 21-4705(a) (drug
grid), with a dispositional departure to imprisonment under K.S.A. 21-4603d(f)(1) (court may
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sentence offender to imprisonment even when the crime of conviction presumes a nonprison
sentence when the current crime was committed while offender was on felony parole).

The two sentences were not identical in all respects. In addition to the 20-month prison
term, the Marshall County District Court imposed a 12-month term of postrelease supervision for
the offense committed in that jurisdiction. And because the Washington County District Court
held Andelt's sentencing hearing after the Marshall County sentencing, the Washington County
journal entry indicated that Andelt's sentence must be served consecutive to his sentence for the
Marshall County offense. The Washington County journal entry of sentencing also indicated
that Andelt must reimburse the Board of Indigents' Defense Services (BIDS) $525 for attorney
fees and pay the $100 BIDS application fee.

Andelt filed appeals from both sentences.

In the appeal from his Marshall County sentence, Andelt claimed that the imposition of a
prison sanction in lieu of commitment to a certified drug abuse treatment program and the
imposition of a 12-month postrelease term violated K.S.A. 21-4729 and K.S.A. 21-4603d(n).

The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's sentence in a published opinion,
concluding that the district court has discretion under K.S.A. 21-4603d(f)(1) to impose a prison
sanction in a presumptive probation case when an underlying offense was committed on felony
parole. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was no conflict between this provision and
the certified drug abuse treatment programs established by K.S.A. 21-4729. State v. Andelt, 40
Kan. App. 2d 796, 798-99, 195 P.3d 1220 (2008). The court also found Andelt's claims relating
to postrelease supervision to be without merit. 40 Kan. App. 2d at 798-99. Because the court
found Andelt's sentence to be within the presumptive sentencing range under the Kansas
sentencing guidelines, it dismissed Andelt's appeal. 40 Kan. App. 2d at 799-800.

In the appeal from his Washington County sentence, Andelt claimed (as he had in the
Marshall County case) that the imposition of a prison sanction in lieu of commitment to a
certified drug abuse treatment program violated K.S.A. 21-4729 and K.S.A. 21-4603d(n).
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Andelt also claimed that the district court erred when it ordered reimbursement of BIDS attorney
fees without first making findings regarding his ability to pay those fees and that he should not
be required to pay the BIDS application fee when reimbursement of that fee was ordered by the
journal entry of sentencing but not mentioned during the sentencing hearing.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Andelt's Washington County prison sentence for the same
reasons addressed in the Marshall County appeal. State v. Andelt, No. 98,665, unpublished
opinion filed September 19, 2008, slip op. at 5-6. The court also upheld the order that Andelt
pay the BIDS application fee, finding this court's recent decision in State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614,
625-26, 186 P.3d 755 (2008), to be controlling. Andelt, slip op. at 2-4. The court reversed on the
question of reimbursement of BIDS attorney fees under State v. Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 132
P.3d 934 (2006), and K.S.A. 22-4513(b), and remanded the case to the district court for findings
regarding Andelt's ability to pay those fees. Andelt, slip op. at 2.

We granted Andelt's petitions for review of both of these decisions. The cases were
consolidated for our review on Andelt's motion.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF K.S.A. 21-4729 AND K.S.A. 21-4603d

Resolution of this case turns on our interpretation of three statutory provisions: K.S.A.
21-4729 (requiring a certified drug abuse treatment program for qualified offenders), K.S.A. 21-
4603d(n) (recognizing exceptions to the certified drug abuse treatment program and further
explaining the contours of that program), and K.S.A. 21-4603d(f)(1) (granting district courts
discretion to impose prison sentences in cases where the underlying offense was committed
while on felony parole). Interpretation of sentencing statutes is a question of law over which an
appellate court exercises unlimited review. State v. Walker, 280 Kan. 513, 515, 124 P.3d 39
(2005).

When courts are called upon to interpret statutes, the fundamental rule governing that
interpretation is that "the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. The
legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the language of the statutory scheme
7

it enacted." State ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 271 Kan. 355, 378, 22 P.3d 124 (2001). For this
reason, when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts "need not resort to
statutory construction." In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 53, 79, 169 P.3d 1025 (2007), cert. denied 172
L. Ed. 2d 239 (2008). Instead, "[w]hen the language is plain and unambiguous, an appellate
court is bound to implement the expressed intent." State v. Manbeck, 277 Kan. 224, Syl. ¶ 3, 83
P.3d 190 (2004). Only where the face of a statute leaves its construction uncertain does the court
"look to the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the
purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under the various constructions
suggested. [Citation omitted.]" Robinett v. The Haskell Co., 270 Kan. 95, 100-01, 12 P.3d 411
(2000).

Discussion and Analysis

The Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), K.S.A. 21-4701 et seq., establishes an
18- to 22-month sentence of presumptive probation for a conviction of a felony drug offense
with a criminal history score of 4-E. See K.S.A. 21-4705(a) (drug grid). Sentences that fall
within the sentencing grid are "presumptive" sentences under the KSGA and are not subject to
appeal. See K.S.A. 21-4703(q); K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1); see also State v. Ortega-Cadelan, 287
Kan. 157, 163-64, 194 P.3d 1195 (2008) (sentences for off-grid crimes are not presumptive
sentences within the meaning of K.S.A. 21-4703[q] because those sentences do not come from
the sentencing grid). Moreover, K.S.A. 21-4603d(f)(1) allows district courts to impose prison
sanctions in cases that would otherwise presume probation when the underlying offense was
committed while the offender was on felony parole. K.S.A. 21-4603d(f)(1) further indicates that
such a modification "does not constitute a departure."

If the district courts in Andelt's cases had the authority to impose 20-month prison
sentences under the KSGA and the other sentencing statutes (that is, if the sentencing grid was
applicable), Andelt's resultant sentences would not be subject to appellate review. The question,
however, is whether the district courts were permitted to impose gridbox sentences, given the
language of K.S.A. 21-4729.

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K.S.A. 21-4729 establishes a nonprison sanction of commitment to a certified drug abuse
treatment program for certain offenders sentenced on or after November 1, 2003. The nonprison
sanction is limited to adult offenders convicted of a violation of K.S.A. 65-4160 and K.S.A. 65-
4162 with the following additional requirements:

"(1) Whose offense is classified in grid blocks 4-E, 4-F, 4-G, 4-H or 4-I of the sentencing
guidelines grid for drug crimes and such offender has no felony conviction of K.S.A. 65-4142, 65-
4159, 65-4161, 65-4163 or 65-4164, and amendments thereto or any substantially similar offense
from another jurisdiction; or

"(2) whose offense is classified in grid blocks 4-A, 4-B, 4-C or 4-D of the sentencing
guidelines grid for drug crimes and such offender has no felony conviction of K.S.A. 65-4142, 65-
4159, 65-4161, 65-4163 or 65-4164, and amendments thereto, or any substantially similar offense
from another jurisdiction, if such person felonies committed by the offender were severity level 8,
9 or 10 or nongrid offenses of the sentencing guidelines grid for nondrug crimes and the court
finds and sets forth with particularity the reasons for finding that the safety of the members of the
public will not be jeopardized by such placement in a drug abuse treatment program." K.S.A. 21-
4729(a)(1) and (2).

If an offender meets these requirements, "[t]he sentencing court shall commit the
offender to treatment in a drug abuse treatment program until determined suitable for discharge
by the court but the term of treatment shall not exceed 18 months." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A.
21-4729(c).

K.S.A. 21-4705(f) creates an exception to the nonprison sanction in K.S.A. 21-4729.
When a defendant is convicted of a third or subsequent felony under K.S.A. 65-4160 or K.S.A.
65-4162, K.S.A. 21-4705(f) provides that the sentence "shall be a presumptive term of
imprisonment" under the KSGA. The sentence imposed under K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 21-4705(f)
"shall not be considered a departure and shall not be subject to appeal."

Andelt argues that both district courts should have ordered him to participate in a
certified drug abuse treatment program under K.S.A. 21-4729 and K.S.A. 21-4603d(n), rather
than impose a prison sentence under K.S.A. 21-4603d(f), because such programs are mandatory
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in all cases that do not involve the application of K.S.A. 21-4705(f). Andelt claims that this
interpretation of the statutes should prevail because "(1) [s]pecial statutes prevail over general
statutes, (2) more recent statutes prevail, and (3) the rule of lenity" applies.

Rather than sentencing Andelt to a certified drug abuse treatment program under K.S.A.
21-4729, however, both district courts imposed prison sanctions under K.S.A. 21-4603d(f)(1).
This provision states in relevant part:

"When a new felony is committed while the offender is . . . on parole, . . . the court may
sentence the offender to imprisonment for the new conviction, even when the new crime of
conviction otherwise presumes a nonprison sentence. In this event, imposition of a prison
sentence for the new crime does not constitute a departure." K.S.A. 21-4603d(f)(1).

This section allows a district court to impose a prison sanction when a nonprison sentence
is "otherwise presume[d]." K.S.A. 21-4603d(f)(1). K.S.A. 21-4729 does not establish a
"presumptive" sentence within the meaning of the KSGA, however, because certified drug abuse
treatment programs are not part of the sentencing grid. See K.S.A. 21-4703(q); Ortega-Cadelan,
287 Kan. at 163-64. Rather, K.S.A. 21-4729 removes qualifying offenders from the applicable
gridbox and instead commits them to a certified drug abuse treatment program. Under the plain
language of K.S.A. 21-4603d(f)(1), that section only applies to presumptive sentences, not to
other dispositions mandated by the legislature.

Despite the plain language of K.S.A. 21-4603d(f)(1), the State argues that language in
subsection (n) of K.S.A. 21-4603d indicates that the felony-parole provision applies to cases that
would otherwise be sentenced to a certified drug abuse treatment program under K.S.A. 21-4729.
K.S.A. 21-4603d(n) states in relevant part:

"Except as provided by subsection (f) of K.S.A. 21-4705, and amendments thereto, in
addition to any of the above, for felony violations of K.S.A. 65-4160 and 65-4162, and
amendments thereto, the court shall require the defendant who meets the requirements established
in K.S.A. 21-4729, and amendments thereto, to participate in a certified drug abuse treatment
program, as provided in K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 75-52,144, and amendments thereto, including but not
limited to, an approved after-care plan."
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The State argues that the "in addition to any of the above" language in this subsection
should be read in conjunction with the previous "[e]xcept as provided in [K.S.A. 21-4705(f)]"
phrase to indicate that the legislature intended to allow courts discretion to sentence offenders
who would otherwise be subject to a certified drug abuse treatment program to any of the
dispositions previously discussed within K.S.A. 21-4603d. This interpretation was endorsed by
the Court of Appeals in both cases presently subject to our review. In Andelt's cases, the Court
of Appeals held that the first sentence of K.S.A. 21-4603d(n) laid out exceptions to the
otherwise-mandatory drug abuse treatment program of K.S.A. 21-4729 in both K.S.A. 21-
4705(f) (the repeat offender provision described previously) and all of the other provisions of
K.S.A. 21-4603d. Andelt, 40 Kan. App. 2d at 798; see Andelt, slip op at 5-6.

We reject the State's and Court of Appeals' interpretation in Andelt's cases because such
an interpretation is contrary to the plain language of K.S.A. 21-4729 and K.S.A. 21-4603d.

K.S.A. 21-4729(c) mandates commitment to a certified drug abuse treatment program for
all offenders who meet the requirements of that statute. K.S.A. 21-4603d(n) similarly states,
with the exception of the repeat offender provision in K.S.A. 21-4705(f) and in addition to other
sentencing dispositions described in the statute (such as fines and restitution), a court "shall
require the defendant who meets the requirements established in K.S.A. 21-4729, and
amendments thereto, to participate in a certified drug abuse treatment program." Thus K.S.A.
21-4603d(n)—like K.S.A. 21-4729(c)—makes the drug abuse treatment program mandatory for
qualifying offenders.

In contrast, K.S.A. 21-4603d(f)(1) gives district courts discretion to impose a prison
sanction when probation is presumed if an offender commits a new crime while on felony bond.
Not only does the language of this statute limit its application to cases involving presumptive
sentences, which Andelt's cases do not, but its discretionary nature cannot control over a clear
legislative mandate for commitment to a certified drug abuse treatment program.

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The "in addition to any of the above" language in K.S.A. 21-4603d(n) does not alter this
interpretation. In fact, to read the "in addition to any of the above" language as the State argues
(meaning, to read it as an additional exception) is contrary to the plain language of that statute. It
is not possible to impose both a prison sanction and a nonprison sanction as an offender's
primary sentence for the underlying crime. Thus, under the State's interpretation of K.S.A. 21-
4603d(n), a district court would not be imposing a prison sanction under subsection (f) in
addition to a probationary drug abuse treatment program, but rather it would be imposing a
prison sentence instead of drug abuse treatment. The phrases "in addition to" and "instead of"
have very different meanings, and we decline to read them as synonymous.

Furthermore, we note that K.S.A. 21-4603d, read as a whole, sets forth the various types
of sentences that a court may impose in a criminal case. These include, among other options,
commitment to imprisonment or placement on probation; imposition of restitution, fines, or other
costs; and assignment to house arrest or some drug treatment program. Throughout the statute,
the phrase "in addition to any of the above" (or some similar construction) is used to refer to the
discretionary options a district court may consider at sentencing, subject to other statutory
limitations. Thus, the plain language of K.S.A. 21-4603d(n) indicates that in addition to these
other options that may be imposed at sentencing, a district court must sentence an offender to a
certified drug abuse treatment program when that offender meets the qualifications of K.S.A. 21-
4729. See State v. Casey, 42 Kan. App. 2d 309, 211 P.3d 847 (2009) (rejecting the Court of
Appeals' interpretations of K.S.A. 21-4603d in both Andelt cases and endorsing the interpretation
described here).

This interpretation is similarly supported by the plain language of K.S.A. 21-4729. That
statute specifically sets forth which offenders are subject to drug abuse treatment programs and
specifically excepts certain offenders who would otherwise qualify under the statute. For
example, while offenders who commit drug crimes classified as 4-E, 4-F, 4-G, 4-H, and 4-I are
subject to such a program as long as they have no prior drug convictions under various statutes,
offenders who commit crimes under 4-A though 4-D only qualify for the program if the "person
felonies committed by offender were severity level 8, 9, or 10 or nongrid offenses . . . and the
court finds and sets forth with particularity the reasons for finding that the safety of the members
12

of the public will not be jeopardized by such placement in a drug abuse treatment program."
K.S.A. 21-4729(a)(2).

Likewise, K.S.A. 21-4729(h) specifically excepts certain offenders who otherwise "meet
the requirements of subsection (a)" from the drug abuse treatment program, including:

"(A) Offenders who are residents of another state and are returning to such state pursuant
to interstate corrections compact or the interstate compact for adult supervision; or

"(B) offenders who are not lawfully present in the United States and being detained for
deportation." K.S.A. 21-4729(h)(1).

Offenders who fall into one of these two exceptions (neither of which apply in this case)
"shall be sentenced as otherwise provided by law." K.S.A. 21-4729(h)(1). In such cases, the
resultant sentences" shall not be considered a departure and shall not be subject to appeal."
K.S.A. 21-4729(h)(2).

As both of these examples illustrate, the legislature clearly understood that it could put
limitations on the scope of the drug abuse treatment program as a sentencing option or that it
could exclude certain offenders from the application of the program altogether and allow other
sentencing provisions to control. See also K.S.A. 21-4705(f) (indicating that repeat drug
offenders will be sentenced to imprisonment regardless of whether such offenders would
otherwise qualify for the drug abuse treatment program). The fact that the legislature
specifically exempted certain offenders from the certified drug abuse treatment program but did
not do so for offenders who committed a crime while on felony parole indicates that the latter
were still within the scope of the program.

Finally, we emphasize that our interpretation of these statutes does not render
meaningless the fact that an offense was committed while on felony parole. Rather, when the
previous felony conviction arises in this state, a court may still revoke the offender's parole for
the previous felony. Although the previous felony in this case was committed in Nebraska, that
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state is free to evaluate Andelt's sentence for his previous felony theft conviction under its own
sentencing laws.

We conclude that the plain language of K.S.A. 21-4729 and K.S.A. 21-4603d makes
certified drug abuse treatment programs mandatory for individuals who qualify for such
programs under K.S.A. 21-4729. A district court does not have discretion to sentence an
offender otherwise qualifying for a drug abuse treatment program to imprisonment. We reach
this conclusion on the basis of the statutory language, so we need not consider the principles of
statutory construction advocated by Andelt in his petitions for review.

For all of these reasons, the Marshall and Washington County District Courts erred when
the courts sentenced Andelt to 20 months' imprisonment instead of appropriate terms of drug
abuse treatment under K.S.A. 21-4729. We reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and
district courts with regard to Andelt's sentences, vacate those sentences, and remand to the
district courts with directions to resentence Andelt to appropriate terms in a certified drug abuse
treatment program under K.S.A. 21-4729.

Postrelease Supervision

Andelt also argues that the Marshall County District Court erred when it imposed a
requirement of 12 months' postrelease supervision to be completed after Andelt was released
from his 20-month prison sentence. We have concluded that the Marshall County District Court
should have committed Andelt to a certified drug abuse treatment program under K.S.A. 21-
4729, not a period of imprisonment, and have vacated the underlying sentence. The question of
postrelease supervision only arises when an offender has been sentenced to prison. See K.S.A.
22-3717(d). Because the Marshall County District Court did not have the authority to sentence
Andelt to prison, it also lacked the authority to impose a period of postrelease supervision. That
portion of Andelt's sentence is therefore also vacated.


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BIDS APPLICATION FEE

Andelt claims that the Washington County District Court erred by requiring him in the
journal entry of sentencing to reimburse the $100 BIDS application fee when the court did not
include the application fee in its pronouncement from the bench at the sentencing hearing. The
Court of Appeals found this claim to be without merit in light of this court's recent decision in
State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, 625-26, 186 P.3d 755 (2008).

In Scaife, this court held that because a defendant incurs the obligation to pay the BIDS
application fee when the application is completed, an order in a journal entry of sentencing to
pay an unpaid application fee—even if not pronounced from the bench—is not improper when
the district court references an assessment of costs at the sentencing hearing. 286 Kan. at 625-
26. This reasoning is sound. Because Andelt's arguments on appeal do not bring any new
dimension to this discussion, Scaife controls. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that his
claim is without merit. See State v. Andelt, No. 98,665, unpublished opinion filed September 19,
2008, slip op. at 2-4.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the Marshall County District Court in
Case No. 98,699 is reversed, and the judgment of the district court is reversed. We vacate
Andelt's prison sentence and accompanying postrelease supervision period and remand the case
to the Marshall County District Court with directions for resentencing under K.S.A. 21-4729.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the Washington County District Court in
Case No. 98,665 is affirmed with respect to its assessment of Andelt's BIDS application fee and
reversed with regard to Andelt's sentence. We note that the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the
case should be remanded for further findings under State v. Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 132 P.3d
934 (2006), and K.S.A. 22-4513(b), regarding Andelt's ability to reimburse BIDS attorney fees is
not before us. Therefore, that judgment remains in effect. The judgment of the district court is
affirmed in part and reversed in part. We vacate Andelt's prison sentence and remand the case to
the Washington County District Court with directions for resentencing under K.S.A. 21-4729.