IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
No. 93,013
MATTHEW PATRICK SALL, by and through his natural parents,
guardians, and conservators, KAY SALL and DAVID SALL,
and KAY SALL and DAVID SALL individually,
Appellants,
v.
T'S, INC., d/b/a/ SMILEY'S GOLF COMPLEX,
Appellee.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive issues in the case. On appeal, we apply the same rules and where we find reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment must be denied.
2. In a negligence action, summary judgment is proper if the only questions presented are questions of law. To recover for negligence, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a duty, breach of that duty, injury, and a causal connection between the duty breached and the injury suffered. Whether a duty exists is a question of law. Whether the duty has been breached is a question of fact.
3. The Court of Appeals sits not as a finder of fact but as an appellate court. In this case, its majority's conclusion that if a duty existed under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1964), it was not breached based upon its own factfinding is inconsistent with its function as an appellate court. Moreover, its conclusion was erroneous since it did just the opposite of what an appellate court must do in reviewing the grant of a summary judgment: resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought.
4. The question to be asked in regard to an analysis under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 is not one concerning whether the facts of the case establish or fail to establish negligence but rather whether there are facts in the record to warrant application of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323.
5. Under the facts of this case, material factual issues remain on the issue of whether Smiley's Golf Complex negligently performed the duty it assumed under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 to monitor weather conditions and warn its patrons to come in off the golf course when the manager on duty deemed it prudent.
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 34 Kan. App. 2d 296, 117 P.3d 896 (2005). Appeal from Johnson district court; LARRY McCLAIN, judge. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded. Opinion filed June 23, 2006.
Bryson R. Cloon, of the Cloon Law Firm, of Leawood, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellants.
Steve R. Fabert, of Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, L.L.P., of Topeka, argued the cause, and Patrick G. Copley, of the same firm, and Richard T. Merker, of Wallace, Saunders, Austin, Brown & Enochs, Chtd., of Overland Park, were with him on the briefs for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DAVIS, J.: Plaintiffs Matthew Patrick Sall (Patrick), by and through his natural parents, guardians, and conservators, Kay Sall and David Sall, and Kay Sall and David Sall, individually (collectively the Salls), brought a negligence action against defendant T's, Inc., d/b/a Smiley's Golf Course (SGC) for injuries Patrick sustained after being struck by lightning while on the grounds of the defendant's golf course. The district court granted summary judgment to SGC, and the Court of Appeals in a split decision affirmed, concluding that SGC owed no duty to protect its patrons from lightning strikes. Sall v. T's, Inc., 34 Kan. App. 2d 296, 307, 117 P.3d 896 (2005). We granted the Salls' petition for review and reverse and remand for trial.
On June 14, 2001, Patrick and his friend, Christopher W. Gannan (Chris), decided to go golfing. However, by that afternoon, the sky had turned stormy.
On June 14, Thad Borgstadt, the morning manager for SGC, opened the golf complex as usual. Because the noon television forecast indicated possible storms moving into the area, Borgstadt checked the weather periodically by walking outside and visually checking. Borgstadt testified that he visually checked the weather every 10 to 15 minutes because that was SGC's policy. At approximately 1:15 p.m., Borgstadt noticed dark clouds in the sky and decided to close the complex.
Due to the severe weather, the complex remained closed at 3 p.m. when Jeff Tull, the afternoon manager, replaced Borgstadt. By 3:50 p.m. Tull noticed the skies were clearing, and radar images on the computer in the pro shop showed the thunderstorms were moving out of the area. In another 5 to 10 minutes, the sun came out and Tull opened SGC to the public at 4 p.m.
Patrick and Chris also noticed the weather had cleared. Patrick called SGC to verify that the complex was open. When Patrick's mother questioned him about playing golf after thunderstorms had been in the area, he replied, "'Mom, don't worry; they wouldn't be open if it wasn't safe.'"
Chris estimated they paid their green fees at approximately 4:45 p.m. and arrived at the first tee shortly before 5 p.m. The pair noticed it had started to sprinkle while they walked to the second tee. According to Chris, they discussed whether storms might be moving back into the area. They also discussed the fact that SGC would blow an air horn as a signal to return to the clubhouse in the event of dangerous weather. Chris was familiar with SGC's method of warning golfers because he had been called back to the clubhouse by the sound of an air horn on at least one prior occasion.
By the time Patrick and Chris started putting on the second green, it started raining a little harder. Chris saw a lightning bolt off to the west, but it was far enough away that they were not concerned. According to Chris, it was understood between them that they would finish the hole and start walking back to the clubhouse.
According to Tull, SGC's policies or procedures for inclement weather call for the manager on duty to monitor the local television stations, radar images on the Internet, and visually inspect the weather by stepping outside. SGC also has a weather radio. Although there is no policy concerning the frequency with which the managers check weather conditions, Tull admitted that it is checked more frequently when storms are in the area. If the manager determines it is necessary to bring golfers in off the course, the procedure is to sound an air horn.
At approximately 4:50 to 4:55 p.m., Tull checked the weather on the Internet. While he waited for the radar image to load on the computer, an employee informed him a television news teaser had just reported that storms were moving back into the area. Tull returned to the computer screen which showed storms to the southwest of SGC. Tull walked outside to visually check the weather and noticed dark clouds and lightning to the southwest of the complex. He immediately walked back inside, grabbed the air horn, stepped outside, and sounded the horn for two 7- or 8-second periods. Tull estimated he sounded the air horn at approximately 4:57 to 4:58 p.m. At the time Tull sounded the horn, there were three golfers on the course: Patrick, Chris, and a sole golfer, Toby Mills.
Chris was holding the flag for the second hole when he saw a second bolt of lightning in the same location where he had seen the first lightning bolt. About the same time, Chris and Patrick heard the air horn. Patrick finished his putt, Chris replaced the flag, and they started walking back to the clubhouse. According to Chris' deposition testimony, this all occurred in a matter of seconds. As the pair were walking on the second green, Chris saw a flash and heard a loud boom. Chris was knocked unconscious for an unknown length of time. When he came to, he saw Patrick laying face down and unresponsive. Chris returned to the clubhouse for help; however, he estimated it took him 5 to 10 minutes to get back to the clubhouse because of his own injuries. When Chris arrived at the clubhouse, he asked someone to call 911. The 911 call was received between 5:16 and 5:17 p.m. Patrick never fully recovered from his injuries, and he now requires total care.
The Salls brought a negligence action against SGC. After full discovery, SGC filed a motion for summary judgment. In its ruling from the bench, the district court found there were questions of fact as to whether SGC was negligent; however, the case turned on whether SGC had a duty to protect its patrons from lightning-related injury, a legal question. The court determined a business has no duty to protect or warn patrons of lightning because a lightning strike is not foreseeable. The court also alluded to cost considerations for businesses versus the risk involved. Regarding an assumption of duty under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1964), the judge stated: "I struggled with the Section 323 issue frankly, but I need to make a finding and I find that the facts in this case are insufficient to invoke the benefits of Section 323." The district court granted SGC's motion for summary judgment.
The Salls appealed from this decision, and a majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed in Sall v. T's, Inc., 34 Kan. App. 2d 296. The majority determined: (1) lightning is not a foreseeable risk; (2) SGC did not breach any standard of care by failing to have a lightning detection system; (3) SGC had no duty to foresee lightning but, if it had a duty, there was no breach because SGC provided approximately 10 minutes' notice; Patrick and Chris saw the lightning themselves yet chose to remain on the golf course, and there was no evidence the air horn was not sounded early enough; and (4) because SGC was not negligent, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 is inapplicable. 34 Kan. App. 2d at 300-08.
Judge Patrick D. McAnany dissented. In his opinion, SGC undertook the duty to sound a warning and there remained questions of fact whether SGC did so in a timely fashion or in an untimely, negligent fashion. 34 Kan. App. 2d at 310-11 (McAnany, J., dissenting).
In their petition for review to this court, the Salls raised three issues: (1) The Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 did not apply under the facts of this case; (2) the Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that a lightning-related injury was not foreseeable as a matter of law and thus SGC owed no duty to Patrick Sall; and (3) the Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that the evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish the existence of a local industry standard that required the use of lightning detection equipment.
The primary issue in this case is whether SGC has a duty to protect its patrons from the harm caused by lightning strikes on its premises. As set forth below, this question is one of law and our standard of review is de novo just as is our review of the summary judgment entered in this case. Without a duty there can be no negligence, which is the gist of Sall's cause of action. The issue of whether SGC exercised due care only arises if it is determined that SGC owed a duty to its patrons. Both the district court and the Court of Appeals determined that there was no duty as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals further concluded that if a duty existed, SGC did not breach its duty. Thus, we examine the question of whether a duty existed, and if it did exist, whether the facts in the case are disputed requiring that we reverse and remand to the district court.
Did SGC have a duty to protect its patrons (Patrick Sall) from the harm caused by lightning strikes on its premises?
Standard of Review
"Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive issues in the case. On appeal, we apply the same rules and where we find reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment must be denied. [Citation omitted.]" Bracken v. Dixon Industries, Inc., 272 Kan. 1272, 1274-75, 38 P.3d 679 (2002).
"'In a negligence action, summary judgment is proper if the only questions presented are questions of law. To recover for negligence, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a duty, breach of that duty, injury, and a causal connection between the duty breached and the injury suffered. Whether a duty exists is a question of law. Whether the duty has been breached is a question of fact.'" Schmidt v. HTG, Inc., 265 Kan. 372, 396-97, 961 P.2d 677, cert. denied 525 U.S. 964 (1998) (quoting Honeycutt v. City of Wichita, 251 Kan. 451, Syl. ¶ 8, 836 P.2d 1128 [1992]).
See also South v. McCarter, 280 Kan. 85, 94, 119 P.3d 1 (2005); Roe v. Kansas Dept. of SRS, 278 Kan. 584, 592, 102 P.3d 396 (2004).
Duty of Care
In its summary judgment, the trial court determined that no duty existed and SGC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In arriving at its decision, the trial court considered the duty that may arise from SGC being a possessor of land, governed by Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(3) (1964), and the duty that may arise by SGC assuming the duty to warn its patrons from harm caused by lightning, governed by Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1964). Because we resolve this legal issue under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323, we do not discuss the question of whether SGC owed its patrons a duty as a possessor of land under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(3).
SGC's Assumption of Duty Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1964)
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323--Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Render Services, provides:
"One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he [or she] should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his [or her] failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his [or her] undertaking, if,
(a) his [or her] failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking."
The trial judge resolved this issue in favor of SGC but not without some difficulty:
"With respect to the Restatement of Torts Section 323, I struggled with the Section 323 issue frankly, but I need to make a finding and I find that the facts in this case are insufficient to invoke the benefits of Section 323."
In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals rejected the application of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 to the facts of this case. However, the basis upon which the Court of Appeals rejected § 323 was erroneous. In its majority opinion, the Court of Appeals concluded that if a duty existed, it was not breached, based upon its own findings of fact:
"By all accounts, SGC provided its customers with approximately 10 minutes' notice that lightning had been seen in the area. Gannon and Patrick saw the lightning themselves and chose to remain on the golf course. There is no evidence that SGC's horn was not sounded early enough to allow all golfers to reach the safety of the clubhouse. Such action does not make SGC negligent." 34 Kan. App. 2d at 306.
Later in its opinion when discussing the application of § 323, the Court of Appeals, relying on its own factfinding, concluded:
"At the onset, we note that § 323 is, at its heart, focused on theories of negligence. We have already determined that SGC did not act negligently. Consequently, an individual must fail to exercise reasonable care before the Restatement may be applied to the particular facts of a case. In this aspect, we agree with the trial court that there are insufficient facts here to invoke the protections of § 323, as SGC did not fail to exercise reasonable care." (Emphasis added.) 34 Kan. App. 2d at 307.
The Court of Appeals sits not as a finder of fact but as an appellate court. In this case, its majority conclusion that if a duty existed under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 it was not breached based upon its own factfinding is inconsistent with its function as an appellate court "to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought." Bracken, 272 Kan. at 1275. Other instances are discussed more fully below where the majority of the Court of Appeals makes findings of fact contrary to the required standard of review.
The error by the Court of Appeals' majority in concluding that if a duty existed SGC was not negligent accounts for its conclusion that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 did not apply. Its conclusion that negligence must be found before § 323 may be applied is an incorrect statement of law. Judge McAnany in his dissent highlights the reason why:
"[I]f one must show negligence before the Restatement rule [§ 323] applies, the Restatement rule becomes utterly meaningless since to establish negligence there must be the breach of a duty. To the contrary, the Restatement rule is simply a vehicle for recognizing a duty which, but for the conduct of the defendant, the law would otherwise not impose." 34 Kan. App. 2d at 311.
The question to be asked in regard to an analysis under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 is not one concerning whether the facts of the case establish or fail to establish negligence but rather whether there are facts in the record to warrant application of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323.
In his dissent, Judge McAnany concluded that SGC did undertake the task to warn its patrons of the impeding severe storm and that the real question was whether SGC did so in a timely fashion or in an untimely, negligent fashion. He further stated:
"I am not a proponent of an expansion of the common law at the margins by imposing an absolute duty upon golf course operators to protect their patrons from lightning strikes. However, there is a clear, logical place in the interstices of the common law for applying the Restatement to the facts before us. That was done in Maussner when the court announced: 'We find that when a golf course has taken steps to protect golfers from lightning strikes, it owes the golfers a duty of reasonable care to implement its safety precautions properly.' [Maussner v. Atlantic City Country Club, Inc.,] 299 N.J. Super. [535, 553, 691 A.2d 826 (1997)].
"Similarly, although the court in Seelbinder v. County of Volusia, 821 So. 2d 1095, 1097 (Fla. 2002), found no liability based on a lack of causation (the storm that produced the lightning was not the storm the defendant undertook to warn against), the court recognized: 'If any duty to warn exists, it arises from the County's having undertaken to provide warnings of lightning to beachgoers. Having undertaken this responsibility, the County was obliged to exercise reasonable care in so doing.'
. . . .
"Finally, the majority opinion concludes that the Restatement rule does not apply because SGC is not negligent. I confess I am not wise enough to arrive at this conclusion regarding negligence without the opportunity to weigh the credibility of the witnesses on the various conflicting factual contentions and expert opinions. I defer to the jury on those issues, and so should the district court. Further, if one must show negligence before the Restatement rule applies, the Restatement rule becomes utterly meaningless since to establish negligence there must be the breach of a duty." 34 Kan. App. 2d at 310-11. (McAnany, J., dissenting).
This court recently discussed the requirements for an undertaking under § 323 in South v. McCarter, 280 Kan. at 94 and Cunningham v. Braum's Ice Cream & Dairy Stores, 276 Kan. 883, 891, 80 P.3d 35 (2003).
In South, plaintiff Isaac South was injured during a physical altercation with Joshua Mills and James McCarter in the mobile home park where South and McCarter lived with their parents. South's parents brought suit against the mobile home park, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the park reasoning it was not negligent as a matter of law and was not the legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued in part that the mobile home park owed them a duty and was negligent in rendering the service it recognized as necessary for the protection of the South family under the rental agreement and mobile home community guidelines under both Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1964) and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1964). We found the rental agreement and community guidelines did not impose a duty on management to provide protection to the tenants and, therefore, they could not in themselves demonstrate an undertaking. 280 Kan. at 98-99.
The only evidence of any sort of undertaking was a letter that the mobile home park's attorney had sent to McCarter nearly 2 years prior to the altercation banning him from the premises. In determining whether the letter constituted an undertaking to render services, we explained:
"A defendant's agreement or affirmative act indicating a willingness to provide services is a threshold requirement for such a duty to arise. Cunningham, 276 Kan. at 894. The extent of the undertaking defines the scope of the duty. McGee v. Chalfant, 248 Kan. 434, 442, 806 P.2d 980 (1991).
"In making this determination, we have looked at how the 'undertaking' language is applied in both § 323 and § 324A cases. Aside from Circle Land [& Cattle Corp. v. Amoco Oil Co., 232 Kan. 418, 657 P.2d 532 (1983),] and Burgess [v. Perdue, 239 Kan. 473, 721 P.2d 239 (1986)], in most cases we have not found an undertaking sufficient to give rise to a duty. See, e.g., Roe v. Department of SRS, 278 Kan. 584, 595, 102 P.3d 396 (2004) (SRS undertaking to monitor services provided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and county mental health center was only a limited or incidental undertaking which did not give rise to a § 324A duty); Cunningham, 276 Kan. at 896 (emergency action plan was not a sufficient undertaking where it did not speak to the situation presented); Honeycutt v. City of Wichita, 251 Kan. 451, 466-67, 836 P.2d 1128 (1992) (school district's handbook that safety patrol should be stationed at railroad crossing as needed was not an affirmative assumption of a duty to provide safety patrol at railroad so as to constitute an undertaking); Geiger-Schorr v. Todd, 21 Kan. App. 2d 1, 901 P.2d 515 (1995) (KAAMCO had not undertaken to inform nondirectly insured physicians about certain malpractice coverage)." 280 Kan. at 109.
We concluded that no undertaking had occurred because there was no indication the purpose of the letter was to protect the residents from McCarter. The letter was not an undertaking to address the situation presented, i.e., to protect the mobile home residents from future physical harm by McCarter but, rather, was an undertaking in response to a complaint by a resident about noise in the mobile home park. 280 Kan. at 109-10.
In Cunningham, the plaintiff customers of the defendant's ice cream store brought a negligence action against the defendant after its employees shooed them out of the store into the path of a tornado. They were injured while driving home when the tornado threw a truck into their car. The defendant's employees were aware at that time that a tornado warning was in effect and had heard reports of a tornado sighting in the area. Additionally, the defendant had an emergency action plan that "'if a tornado is sighted, or a Civil Defense warning sounds, anyone not wishing to leave should be directed to the "milk room."'" 276 Kan. at 885. The employees did not tell the plaintiffs about the tornado warning or the emergency action plan.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued in part that summary judgment was inappropriate because a duty arose under Restatement (Second) of Torts (1964), quoting § 323 but citing § 324A. We found there was no undertaking because the plan did not speak to the situation that occurred. Employees may have known of threatening weather some distance from the store, but a tornado was not sighted and there were no audible sirens. In this situation, the plan did not compel any particular action by the employees. 276 Kan. at 895. Regarding the requirement under § 323 that the physical harm resulting from failure to exercise reasonable care to perform an undertaking increase the risk of harm or harm is suffered because of another's reliance upon the undertaking, we concluded that because of the capricious nature of tornadoes, it could not be said that the plaintiffs were any safer in the milk room than somewhere else and there was no evidence the plaintiffs relied upon the emergency action plan. 276 Kan. at 896.
In this case, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, SGC had a policy or procedures in place which undeniably were for the protection of their patrons in the event of threatening inclement weather. Dennis Tull, the owner of SGC, gave deposition testimony that SGC has no training manual but it is the policy or procedure for SGC managers to monitor weather conditions by means of local television, a weather radio, Doppler radar images from the Internet, and visual inspection of the weather. It is up to the manager to determine when inclement weather requires sounding an air horn to bring golfers in off the grounds of the complex. There is also signage at the counter in the clubhouse and on the course explaining what golfers should do in the event of inclement weather.
Jeff Tull, the manager on duty at the time of the incident, gave deposition testimony that SGC had no instructional sheet or training manual on weather monitoring. He indicated SGC's weather warning system consisted of a weather radio, local television programing, checking the weather on the Internet, and going outside to visually check the weather. He stated the responsibility for checking the weather rests with the manager and, though there is no policy on how frequently to check the weather, if storms are in the area the managers do check the weather more frequently. Thad Borgstadt, the morning manager, gave deposition testimony that if there were storms moving into the area, it is policy to check the weather every 10 to 15 minutes. Borgstadt also gave a statement where he indicated that all managers are trained on SGC's inclement weather protocol and that there is a printed sheet with instructions.
SGC argues a voluntary undertaking never occurred because there was no agreement to provide weather forecasts to Patrick and there was no undertaking to use extraordinary methods of predicting and reporting the approach of inclement weather. SGC also maintains South and Cunningham stand for the proposition that no duty arises under § 323 without an enforceable contractual agreement or promise communicated to the patron.
As in Cunningham, there is no manual or printed instruction sheet regarding SGC's policy in the record on appeal. By all accounts, SGC had a policy in place which required the manager on duty to monitor weather conditions via a television, weather radio, Internet radar images, and human observation. It does not appear that there was a set frequency with which managers were to check the weather except when storms are in the area, and then the managers are to check the weather every 10 to 15 minutes or, at the minimum, they are to check the weather conditions more frequently. There is no evidence indicating any policy regarding when to signal golfers to return to the clubhouse in the event of threatening weather beyond the use of common sense.
SGC undertook to monitor weather conditions and warn golfers to come in off the course when the manager on duty deemed it prudent. There was no suggestion that SGC undertook to provide any weather forecast to their patrons, and the scope of their undertaking was limited to whatever affirmative acts SGC undertook. See South, 280 Kan. at 109. Unlike the situation in South and Cunningham, SGC's policy was undertaken to address the situation presented, protecting or warning golfers of inclement weather which included the threat of lightning. Because § 323 allows a voluntarily assumed undertaking, it would not follow that the duty could only arise from an enforceable contractual agreement or promise as SGC suggests. If there is any requirement for a communicated promise, it would flow from the requirement that the plaintiff relied on the undertaking to his or her detriment.
The Court of Appeals' majority stated that it did not believe any court in the country has relied on § 323 to impose liability for a golf course lightning injury, but then stated: "In Maussner, the club did not use reasonable care to implement its safety precautions and that is why the court found the club liable." (Emphasis added.) 34 Kan. App. 2d at 308. Implicit in the New Jersey court's decision was its reliance on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1964) and that a determination of whether the club was negligent in its undertaking was an issue for the jury. Maussner v. Atlantic City Country Club, Inc., 299 N.J. Super. 535, 556, 691 A.2d 826 (1997), stated:
"What is clear is that here the Club assumed a duty to warn its busine