Mangus v. Stump

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No. 105,040

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

DANNY MANGUS,
Appellee,

v.

HARL G. STUMP, M.D. and
VICTOR M. EDDY, M.D.,
Appellants.


SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.
A district court's decision on a motion to dismiss is subject to a de novo standard
of review.

2.
An appellate court reviews the district court's application of the unique
circumstances doctrine using a bifurcated standard of review. Whether the unique
circumstances doctrine is available to the court as an equitable remedy in a given
situation is a question of law subject to de novo review. If the unique circumstances
doctrine is available as an equitable remedy, then whether the district court properly
applied the doctrine to the facts of a particular case is subject to an abuse of discretion
standard of review.

3.
The unique circumstances doctrine is one of specific and limited application. The
doctrine cannot be applied to confer jurisdiction upon a court where jurisdiction
otherwise does not exist. In other words, the unique circumstances doctrine cannot be
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applied to circumvent jurisdictional requirements, no matter how unfair or unjust the
result may be.

4.
The proper application of the unique circumstances doctrine depends upon such
concepts as equity, the interests of justice, good faith, estoppel, or nonparty error.

5.
Subject matter jurisdiction is vested by statute and establishes the court's authority
to hear and decide a particular type of action. Parties cannot confer subject matter
jurisdiction by consent, waiver, or estoppel, and parties cannot convey subject matter
jurisdiction on a court by failing to object to the court's lack of jurisdiction.

6.
In Kansas, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be proved
and pled by a defendant or else the defense is waived. Whether a lawsuit is filed within
the applicable statute of limitations has nothing to do with the district court's subject
matter jurisdiction to hear a particular type of case.

7.
Under the facts of this case, the district court properly applied the unique
circumstances doctrine to prevent the plaintiff's cause of action from being barred by the
statute of limitations.

Appeal from Ellis District Court; EDWARD E. BOUKER, judge. Opinion filed June 3, 2011.
Affirmed.

Michael R. O'Neil and Shannon L. Holmberg, of Gilliland & Hayes, P.A., of Hutchinson, for
appellants.

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Debra Egli James, of Hampton & Royce, L.C., of Salina, for appellee.

Before MALONE, P.J., PIERRON and ARNOLD-BURGER, JJ.

MALONE, J: This is an interlocutory appeal filed by Harl G. Stump, M.D., and
Victor M. Eddy, M.D., challenging the district court's decision to apply the unique
circumstances doctrine to prevent a cause of action filed by Danny Mangus from being
barred by the statute of limitations. Although we recognize that the unique circumstances
doctrine is one of specific and limited application, we affirm the district court's utilization
of the doctrine under the facts of this case.

On May 29, 2008, Mangus filed a petition against Stump and Eddy (defendants)
alleging medical negligence. The petition claimed the defendants negligently performed a
laparoscopic cholecystectomy on Mangus on or about June 2, 2006. On April 27, 2009,
Mangus' petition was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. Mangus refiled his petition
on October 23, 2009, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-518.

On January 19, 2010, Mangus filed a motion for extension of time to serve process
upon defendants under K.S.A. 60-203. In an effort to show good cause for a 30-day
extension of time to serve the defendants, Mangus alleged the following: (1) His
attorney's daughter faced serious medical issues from mid-September 2009 to late
December 2009; (2) his attorney was involved in the trial of two separate cases in
December 2009; (3) his attorney's legal assistant took a 5-week leave of absence to take
care of a sick relative in October 2009; and (4) his attorney's law firm experienced a
computer server crash that resulted in a substantial loss of data in November 2009.

On January 20, 2010, the district court issued an ex parte order granting Mangus
an additional 30 days to serve the defendants. The order indicated the extension of time
was granted by the district court after "reviewing [Mangus'] Motion, and being fully
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advised in the premises." Thereafter, summons was served upon Stump on February 10,
2010, and upon Eddy on February 12, 2010, within the 30-day extension of time.

On March 9, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to K.S.A. 60-
212(b)(6) due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. In their motion to dismiss, the
defendants argued that Mangus failed to establish good cause for an extension of time to
serve process because he did not attempt to serve the defendants prior to requesting the
extension of time. Thus, the defendants contended that the order allowing Mangus an
additional 30 days to serve process was improperly granted. As a result, the defendants
asserted that Mangus' cause of action was not timely commenced and was barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.

In his response to the motion to dismiss, Mangus conceded the fact that he did not
attempt to serve the defendants prior to requesting the extension of time. However,
Mangus argued that a finding of good cause to obtain an extension of time was not
contingent upon Mangus having made an attempt to serve process on the defendants.
Mangus also asserted that the unique circumstances doctrine should be applied to save his
cause of action should the district court reverse its good-cause finding because he had
relied in good faith on the district court's order.

On April 15, 2010, the district court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. On
June 21, 2010, the district court issued a memorandum decision. The district court
determined that an attempt to serve process prior to requesting an extension of time is not
a sine qua non of good cause, but it is one crucial factor to consider. The district court
revisited the good-cause issue, and after hearing full argument from each side, the district
court found "that good cause did not, in fact, exist at the time the Court signed the Order
of Extension."

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The district court next considered Mangus' request to apply the unique
circumstances doctrine to prevent his cause of action from being barred by the statute of
limitations. The district court noted that when it issued the order extending time, Mangus'
attorney still had 2 days to effect service on the defendants. The district court found there
was substantial reason to believe that Mangus' attorney could have obtained service of
process on the defendants before the initial deadline expired, but "she was deprived of
that opportunity by relying on the Court's order." The district court also found that
"resolution of the good cause issue in this case [was] not so obvious that [Mangus']
counsel should have disregarded the Court's order." The district court concluded:

"What was [Mangus'] counsel to do here? She had informed the Court in detail,
in writing, of the matters she relied upon for good cause. There was no dishonesty or
negligent misrepresentation. The Court made an independent, fully informed (given that
the court had access to its file) decision concerning her Motion. That the Court was
incorrect, in hindsight, in doing so deprived [Mangus] of two days in which to attempt
service. The Court finds that, given what she offered the court in support of good cause,
[Mangus'] counsel was justified in relying upon the Court's Order.
"The Court further finds that application of the unique circumstances doctrine
serves the interest of justice, in that failure to apply it here would deprive [Mangus] of his
cause of action, due in large part to the Court reversing its initial ruling by reasons not
strictly caused by [Mangus] or his counsel. Finally, the circumstances here are, indeed,
unique.
"Therefore, the Court finds the unique circumstances doctrine should be applied
here to allow her service of process upon the defendants to have the effect of
commencing [Mangus'] cause of action within the period of limitation."

The district court subsequently made the necessary findings under K.S.A. 2010
Supp. 60-2102(c) to allow the defendants to seek an interlocutory appeal. The defendants
filed a timely application for an interlocutory appeal, which this court granted.

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On appeal, the defendants argue that the district court erred by applying the unique
circumstances doctrine to prevent Mangus' cause of action from being barred by the
statute of limitations. Mangus responds by first arguing there is no requirement for a
plaintiff to attempt to serve process prior to requesting an extension of time under K.S.A.
60-203(a); thus, the district court erred when it set aside its order extending time for
service of process. However, Mangus did not cross-appeal this adverse ruling by the
district court, so the issue of whether the district court erred when it set aside the order
extending time for service of process has not properly been raised on appeal. See K.S.A.
2010 Supp. 60-2103(h). In the alternative, Mangus argues that the district court properly
applied the unique circumstances doctrine in order to prevent his cause of action from
being barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

A district court's decision on a motion to dismiss is subject to a de novo standard
of review. Wachter Management Co. v. Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 282 Kan. 365, 368, 144
P.3d 747 (2006). Further, the defendants' arguments on appeal involve the interpretation
of statutory language. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which an
appellate court has unlimited review. Unruh v. Purina Mills, 289 Kan. 1185, 1193, 221
P.3d 1130 (2009). Finally, this court must determine whether the unique circumstances
doctrine should be applied. The Kansas Supreme Court has held that the unique
circumstances doctrine is one of specific and limited application, and whether it applies is
a question of law subject to de novo review. Finley v. Estate of DeGrazio, 285 Kan. 202,
Syl. ¶ 1, 170 P.3d 407 (2007); In re Tax Appeal of Sumner County, 261 Kan. 307, 316,
930 P.2d 1385 (1997).

A brief review of Kansas rules of civil procedure and limitations of action will
help establish the framework for this appeal. K.S.A. 60-203, which governs the
commencement of a civil action, provides in part as follows:

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"(a) A civil action is commenced at the time of: (1) Filing a petition with the
clerk of the court, if service of process is obtained or first publication is made for service
by publication within 90 days after the petition is filed, except that the court may extend
that time an additional 30 days upon a showing of good cause by the plaintiff; or (2)
service of process or first publication, if service of process or first publication is not made
within the time specified by provision (1)."

In 2010, the legislature made some minor clerical changes which did not affect the
substance of the statute. In any event, the 2010 amendments did not go into effect until
after the district court's ruling in this case. Under K.S.A. 60-203(a)(1) a civil action is
commenced upon filing a petition if service of process is obtained within 90 days after
the petition is filed, except the court may extend that time an additional 30 days upon a
showing of good cause. Assuming the process is served within the time parameters of the
statute, the civil action is deemed commenced and relates back to the date the petition is
filed. If service of process is not made within the time specified by the statute, the civil
action is deemed commenced when service of process is completed. K.S.A. 60-203(a)(2).

Pursuant to K.S.A. 60-513(a)(7), a cause of action alleging medical negligence
must be commenced within 2 years of the date of injury or the time the injury is
reasonably ascertainable in order to satisfy the statute of limitations. Mangus alleges the
defendants negligently performed a surgical procedure on June 2, 2006, and the parties
agree the applicable statute of limitations expired on June 2, 2008. Mangus originally
filed his petition on May 29, 2008, and his original lawsuit was timely commenced
against both defendants.

Pursuant to K.S.A. 60-518, if any action is commenced before the applicable
statute of limitations has expired, the plaintiff may dismiss the cause of action without
prejudice for any reason other than upon the merits and the plaintiff may commence a
new action within 6 months. Here, Mangus dismissed his original petition without
prejudice on April 27, 2009. He refiled his petition on October 23, 2009, within the 6-
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month deadline provided in K.S.A. 60-518. Although Mangus met the deadline for
refiling his petition, he still needed to obtain service of process on the defendants within
the time parameters of K.S.A. 60-203(a) in order for his civil action to be commenced
within the applicable statute of limitations. In Mangus' case, he needed to properly serve
the defendants by January 21, 2010, unless this deadline was extended for an additional
30 days upon a showing of good cause, in order for his lawsuit to be commenced within
the applicable statute of limitations.

As we have already stated, Mangus filed an application for a 30-day extension of
time on January 19, 2010, and the district court granted the application the following day
for good cause shown. Thereafter, summons was served upon Stump on February 10,
2010, and upon Eddy on February 12, 2010, within the 30-day extension of time. The
district court later reversed its good-cause finding and set aside the order for extension of
time. This ruling was critical to the statute of limitations issue. If Mangus properly
obtained a 30-day extension of time for service of process, his cause of action relates
back to the date the petition was refiled on October 23, 2009. This date is within the
statute of limitations under the savings statute. See K.S.A. 60-515. If Mangus did not
properly obtain a 30-day extension of time for service of process, as the district court
ultimately ruled, his cause of action is deemed commenced when service of process was
completed in February 2010. See K.S.A. 60-203(a)(2). But unfortunately for Mangus,
this date is beyond the applicable statute of limitations.

The parties devote a good portion of their respective briefs arguing whether the
district court erred in ultimately ruling that Mangus did not show good cause to obtain an
extension of time to serve process. As we previously indicated, Mangus did not cross-
appeal the district court's adverse ruling on this issue. Therefore, we lack appellate
jurisdiction to decide whether the district court erred when it reversed its ruling on the
good-cause issue. See K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-2103(h).

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This brings us to whether the unique circumstances doctrine is applicable, in the
appropriate situation, to prevent a cause of action from being barred by the statute of
limitations. The United States Supreme Court developed the unique circumstances
doctrine in Harris Truck Lines v. Cherry Meat Packers, 371 U.S. 215, 83 S. Ct. 283, 9 L.
Ed. 2d 261 (1962), overruled by Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213-15, 127 S. Ct.
2360, 168 L. Ed. 2d 96 (2007). In Harris, the Supreme Court concluded that because the
petitioner relied on the trial court's erroneous finding that Rule 73(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure allowed for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, the
petitioner's appeal should not be dismissed. 371 U.S. at 217. The Supreme Court applied
the doctrine in a similar fashion in Thompson v. I.N.S., 375 U.S. 384, 84 S. Ct. 397, 11 L.
Ed. 2d 404 (1964), overruled by Bowles, 551 U.S. 205. The Court again focused on the
fact that the appellant relied on the district court's action, which purportedly tolled or
extended the time period for filing a notice of appeal. 375 U.S. at 387.

The Kansas Supreme Court first embraced the unique circumstances doctrine in
Schroeder v. Urban, 242 Kan. 710, 750 P.2d 405 (1988). In Schroeder, the doctrine was
applied to permit an untimely appeal in which the delayed filing resulted from (1) the
appellant's good-faith and reasonable belief that the judicial action seemingly extending
the time for filing was valid; (2) the perceived extension was for no more than 30 days
and was made and entered prior to the expiration of the official appeal period; and (3) the
appellant filed the appeal within the extension. 242 Kan. at 713-14.

The Kansas Supreme Court reached a similar result and applied the unique
circumstances doctrine to save an untimely appeal in Johnson v. American Cyanamid
Co., 243 Kan. 291, 301, 758 P.2d 206 (1988). The court expanded the doctrine to include
situations involving untimely service of process in Slayden v. Sixta, 250 Kan. 23, 29-31,
825 P.2d 119 (1992). In In re Tax Appeal of Sumner County, 261 Kan. 307, 316, 930 P.2d
1385 (1997), the doctrine was applied to excuse an untimely petition for reconsideration
where the Board of Tax Appeals made an erroneous statement regarding the filing period.
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In Nguyen v. IBP, Inc., 266 Kan. 580, 587, 972 P.2d 747 (1999), the court found that the
doctrine could be applicable where a filing delay is the direct result of an error made in
an administrative law judge's office.

However, the United States Supreme Court substantially narrowed the application
of the unique circumstances doctrine in Bowles. In that case, the petitioner moved to
reopen the filing period for habeas corpus relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a)(6), which allows a district court to grant a 14-day extension under certain
conditions. The district court granted the petitioner's motion but inexplicably gave him 17
days to file his notice of appeal. The petitioner filed his notice within the 17 days allowed
by the district court, but after the 14-day period allowed by Rule 4(a)(6). The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the notice was untimely and that the court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the case. The United States Supreme Court affirmed and refused to
apply the unique circumstances doctrine to save the petitioner's appeal. The Supreme
Court held: "Because this Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to
jurisdictional requirements, use of the 'unique circumstances' doctrine is illegitimate."
551 U.S. at 214.

Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bowles, the Kansas
Supreme Court addressed the unique circumstances doctrine in Finley, 285 Kan. at 207-
13. In Finley, the plaintiff filed a medical negligence action against multiple defendants.
The plaintiff requested a 30-day extension of time to serve process against the defendants
by faxing a proposed order to the district court. A district judge signed the order, and the
plaintiff served all the defendants within the 30-day extension of time. The defendants
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff failed to establish "good
cause" for the extension of time and, as such, they were not properly served before the
expiration of the statute of limitations. The defendants specifically challenged paragraph
3 of the extension order, which stated: "'Plaintiff has through due diligence attempted
service upon this Defendant but her efforts have not been successful.'" 285 Kan. at 204.
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At a hearing before a different judge, the plaintiff's counsel admitted that she had
made no effort to serve the defendants prior to requesting the extension of time. She then
attempted to show "good cause" based upon facts that were not submitted to the district
court at the time she requested the extension. The district court determined that the order
was invalid because the plaintiff did not establish good cause at the time she initially
requested the extension of time. The district court further determined that the unique
circumstances doctrine did not apply to the facts of the case. The district judge
emphasized the fact that the plaintiff's counsel had included an untrue finding in the
proposed order: "'I will not go so far as to accuse plaintiff's counsel of purposely
misleading [the judge], but I feel it borders on a reckless disregard for the true facts of
this case.'" 285 Kan. at 205. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the plaintiff's
claims were barred by the applicable 2-year statute of limitations, and the district court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.

On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of unique
circumstances did not apply under the facts of the case. The court explained that the
application of the unique circumstances doctrine "depends upon such concepts as equity,
the interests of justice, good faith, estoppel, or nonparty error." 285 Kan. at 209. The
court held: "We conclude that [plaintiff's] counsel's untrue representations to the court,
which it clearly relied upon in signing the order as presented because it had no other
information from [plaintiff], are what prevent application of the doctrine of unique
circumstances." 285 Kan. at 209. The court briefly discussed the Bowles decision in its
opinion, solely to support the proposition that the unique circumstances doctrine is an
equitable exception. 285 Kan. at 210.

The Finley decision has created a great deal of uncertainty regarding the continued
viability of the unique circumstances doctrine in Kansas. Several panels of this court have
discussed the Kansas Supreme Court's "surprising" decision to consider the doctrine in
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Finley without discussing the impact of Bowles. See, e.g., Board of Sedgwick County
Comm'rs v. City of Park City, 41 Kan. App. 2d 646, 658, 204 P.3d 648 (2009), rev.
granted 289 Kan. 1277 (2010) (pending) ("Despite its explicit recognition of Bowles'
holding, the Finley court, surprisingly, proceeded to consider the application of the
unique circumstances doctrine."); Rowland v. Barb, 40 Kan. App. 2d 493, 501, 193 P.3d
499 (2008) ("It appears the Finley court interpreted Bowles to permit application of the
unique circumstances doctrine only if equitable exceptions justify its application—when
in fact, Bowles ruled that courts have no authority to apply the doctrine 'to create
equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements.' [Citation omitted.]"); Le v. Joslin, 41
Kan. App. 2d 280, 288, 202 P.3d 677 (2009) ("Here, even if the unique circumstances
doctrine is still viable, no equitable exceptions justify its application.").

In Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, this court refused to apply the unique
circumstances doctrine to extend the appeal period for a party which erroneously relied
upon a trial court's unauthorized extension of the 10-day period for filing a posttrial
motion under K.S.A. 60-259(f). 41 Kan. App. 2d at 660. The Kansas Supreme Court has
granted a petition for review and presumably will shed more light on the application of
the unique circumstances doctrine in Kansas when that case is eventually decided. For
now, we must decide whether the unique circumstances doctrine can be applied, in the
appropriate situation, to prevent a cause of action from being barred by the statute of
limitations. We conclude the doctrine can be so applied for the following reasons.

In Bowles, the United States Supreme Court held that the unique circumstances
doctrine cannot be applied to confer jurisdiction upon a court where jurisdiction
otherwise does not exist. 551 U.S. at 214. In other words, the Bowles Court overturned
the use of the doctrine to circumvent jurisdictional requirements, no matter how unfair or
unjust the result may be. The Court chose an overly broad term when it declared that the
unique circumstances doctrine was "illegitimate." 551 U.S. at 214. Although the Bowles
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Court substantially narrowed the application of the unique circumstances doctrine, the
Court did not eliminate the doctrine from any possible use.

Following Bowles, the Kansas Supreme Court addressed the unique circumstances
doctrine in Finley and determined that the doctrine is an equitable exception that applies
to nonparty error. 285 Kan. at 209. The fact that the court considered the unique
circumstances doctrine at all in Finley is a clear signal that the doctrine is not dead in
Kansas. In Finley, the court emphasized that counsel's untrue representations to the court
in securing the 30-day extension of time for service of process prevented application of
the unique circumstances doctrine under the facts of that case. 285 Kan. at 209.

This court must follow the United States Supreme Court's holding in Bowles that
the unique circumstances doctrine cannot be applied to circumvent jurisdictional
requirements. But that is not how the doctrine is being applied here. The district court did
not apply the unique circumstances doctrine to confer either personal or subject matter
jurisdiction on the court. Instead, the district court applied the doctrine under the unusual
facts of this case to prevent Mangus' cause of action from being barred by the statute of
limitations.

A district court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant only when a lawsuit
is properly commenced. Pieren-Abbott v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 279 Kan. 83, 92-93,
106 P.3d 492 (2005). Here, the district court obtained personal jurisdiction over the
defendants when they were ultimately served with process in February 2010. See K.S.A.
60-203(a)(2). The only problem is that by that date, Mangus' cause of action was barred
by the statute of limitations. The district court applied the unique circumstances doctrine
to avoid the statute of limitations bar, but the district court did not apply the doctrine to
confer personal jurisdiction over the defendants when personal jurisdiction otherwise did
not exist.

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Likewise, the district court did not apply the unique circumstances doctrine to
confer subject matter jurisdiction to the court. Subject matter jurisdiction is vested by
statute and establishes the court's authority to hear and decide a particular type of action.
Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by consent, waiver, or estoppel, and
parties cannot convey subject matter jurisdiction on a court by failing to object to the
court's lack of jurisdiction. Kingsley v. Kansas Dept of Revenue, 288 Kan. 390, 395, 204
P.3d 562 (2009).

Here, the district court applied the unique circumstances doctrine to prevent
Mangus' cause of action from being barred by the statute of limitations. In Kansas, the
statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be proved and pled by a
defendant or else the defense is waived. K.S.A. 60-208(c); Diversified Financial
Planners, Inc. v. Maderak, 248 Kan. 946, 948, 811 P.2d 1237 (1991); Ternes v. Galichia,
43 Kan. App. 2d 857, 863, 234 P.3d 820 (2009). Whether a lawsuit is filed within the
applicable statute of limitations has nothing to do with the district court's subject matter
jurisdiction to hear a particular type of case. In this instance, the district court certainly
had subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mangus' medical negligence case, and the district
court did not apply the unique circumstances doctrine to confer subject matter jurisdiction
on the court where subject matter jurisdiction otherwise did not exist. Thus, the district
court's application of the unique circumstances doctrine was not contrary to the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Bowles.

Now that we have established that the unique circumstances doctrine is still viable,
in the appropriate situation, to prevent a cause of action from being barred by the statute
of limitations, the question then becomes whether it was proper for the district court to
apply the doctrine to the facts of this case. The Kansas Supreme Court has repeatedly
stated that whether the unique circumstances doctrine applies is a question of law subject
to de novo review. Finley, 285 Kan. at 207; In re Tax Appeal of Sumner County, 261
Kan. at 316. However, we suggest that appellate courts should apply a bifurcated
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standard of review. Whether the unique circumstances doctrine is available to the court
as an equitable remedy in a given situation is a question of law subject to de novo review.
If the unique circumstances doctrine is available as an equitable remedy, then whether the
district court properly applied the doctrine to the facts of a particular case is subject to an
abuse of discretion standard of review.

The facts herein are similar to the facts in Finley where the Kansas Supreme Court
found it was inappropriate to apply the unique circumstances doctrine. However, the facts
herein are distinguishable from Finley in one important respect. In Finley, the plaintiff's
counsel made untrue representations to the court in order to secure the 30-day extension
of time. The Finley court emphasized this misrepresentation in determining that it was
inappropriate to apply an equitable exception to the facts of that case. 285 Kan. at 209.
Here, Mangus' counsel did not misrepresent any facts to the district court in order to
obtain the 30-day extension of time.

The Finley court stated that the unique circumstances doctrine applies to nonparty
error. 285 Kan. at 209. Here, the district court found, in hindsight, that it erred by
granting the 30-day extension of time. The district court also found that Mangus' counsel
relied to her detriment on the court's error. The district court noted that counsel checked
with the court on the morning of January 20, 2010, to make sure the order was signed.
The district court specifically found that had the order not been signed, there was
substantial reason to believe that Mangus' attorney could have obtained service before the
initial deadline expired.

The defendants argue that a careful review of the law should have alerted Mangus
that the district court lacked the authority to grant an extension of time based upon the
facts Mangus presented in his application. This is an issue we are not resolving in this
appeal. However, the district court specifically found that resolution of the good-cause
issue was not so obvious that Mangus' counsel should have disregarded the court's order.
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It is worth noting that the plain language of K.S.A. 60-203(a) does not require an
attempt by the plaintiff to serve process prior to requesting an extension of time for good
cause. Mangus was aware that he needed to show good cause in order to obtain an
extension of time to serve process on the defendants. His attorney set forth several
reasons in an effort to show good cause for the time extension, followed up closely to
make sure the order was signed, and then relied on the order to obtain additional time to
serve the defendants.

This case presents a situation where Mangus relied in good faith on the district
court's order extending the time for service of process, and this reliance played a
substantial role in causing Mangus to miss the statute of limitations. There was no
dishonesty or negligent misrepresentation by Mangus to the court. The district court
carefully weighed the equities and found that application of the unique circumstances
doctrine served the interests of justice. We conclude the district court properly applied the
unique circumstances doctrine to the facts of this case to prevent Mangus' cause of action
from being barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the district court did not err
in denying defendants' motion to dismiss.

Affirmed.