261 Kan. 17
(927 P2d 466)
No. 74,394
KANSAS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM,Plaintiff- Appellee, v. REIMER & KOGER ASSOCIATES, INC., KENNETH H. KOGER, and BRENT A. MESSICK, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, and GAGE & TUCKER, L.C., Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
No. 74,395
KANSAS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COHEN, BRAME & SMITH, P.C.; ROGER C. COHEN; REIMER & KOGER ASSOCIATES, INC.; and KENNETH H. KOGER, et al., Defendants-Appellees, and GAGE & TUCKER, L.C., Defendant-Appellant.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and it is a function of this court to interpret a statute to give it the effect intended by the legislature. The fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all others are subordinate, is that the intent of the legislature governs.
2. In determining legislative intent, courts are not limited to a mere consideration of the language employed but may properly look into the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the purposes to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under various suggested constructions. A statute should never be given a construction that leads to uncertainty, injustice, or confusion if possible to construe it otherwise. In construing a statute, words and phrases should be construed according to context and the approved usage of the language, and words in common use are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning.
3. Legislative history attending the enactment of K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a clearly states that the protection afforded settling parties does not apply to "a contractual right of indemnity"; the statute does not interfere with the rights and obligations created by such contract between the parties.
4. Consistent with legislative intent, historical background, the purpose to be accomplished, and the language used, K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a differentiates between noncontractual indemnity and rights and obligations created by contract between parties. Under the terms of the statute a judicially approved settlement discharges the settling party from all liability for contribution or noncontractual indemnity but provides no discharge for claims based on a contract or agreement between parties.
5. The constitutionality of a statute is presumed. All doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity, and before the act may be stricken down, it must clearly appear that the statute violates the constitution. In determining constitutionality, it is the court's duty to uphold a statute under attack rather than defeat it. If there is any reasonable way to construe a statute as constitutionally valid, that should be done. A statute should not be stricken down unless the infringement of the superior law is clear beyond substantial doubt.
6. There is no common-law right of contribution between joint tortfeasors in Kansas.
7. Contribution in Kansas is governed by statute (K.S.A. 60-2413), and the legislature is free to alter the effects of such statute by a subsequent enactment. In this case, it did so in 1994 by discharging the settling party from all liability for contribution. K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a. Such legislative action does not violate § 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.
8. The legislature can modify a common-law remedy so long as it provides an adequate quid pro quo or substitute remedy for the right infringed or abolished.
9. K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a(2), by granting nonsettling parties the right of setoff, provides a remedy of value which did not exist at common law. K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a(1) and (3) confer a valuable benefit upon any person or entity potentially liable who settles and obtains court approval with prior notice to those parties affected.
10. The State has a legitimate interest in resolving KPERS litigation. K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a directly addresses this concern by promoting settlement of claims. Under the statutory provisions, nonsettling and settling parties receive real and substantial benefits nonexistent at common law. Such benefits provide an adequate quid pro quo for the common-law remedy of noncontractual indemnity.
11. A cause of action for indemnity does not accrue until the indemnitee suffers actual loss or damage by paying money for which the indemnitee seeks indemnification. A condition precedent to indemnification is that the indemnitee must actually have paid on the obligation for which he or she seeks indemnification.
12. The standards to be applied in deciding whether a statute violates the Equal Protection Clause are stated and applied.
13. K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a(4) applies to any settlement judicially approved after the effective date of the statute regardless of the date on which KPERS suffered any injury, loss, or damage or the date on which any claim or cause of action of KPERS arose or accrued. This retroactivity is constitutionally permissible and does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers because the claims for contribution or noncontractual indemnity filed are not vested rights.
Appeal from Shawnee district court, FRANKLIN R. THEIS, judge. Opinion filed December 6, 1996. Reversed.
Jerome W. Pope, of Winston & Strawn, of Chicago, Illinois, argued the cause, and Dan K. Webb and Kurt L. Schultz, of the same firm, and Mark L. Bennett, of Bennett & Dillon, of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for appellant Gage & Tucker, L.C.
Anne Lamborn Baker, of Wright, Henson, Somers, Sebelius, Clark & Baker, L.L.P., of Topeka, argued the cause, and Thomas E. Wright, of the same firm, was with her on the brief for defendant-appellees Cohen, Brame & Smith, P.C., and Roger C. Cohen.
Brian G. Boos, of Yeretsky & Maher, L.L.C., of Shawnee Mission, argued the cause, and Gregory F. Maher and James M. Yeretsky, of the same firm, and Kathleen A. Hardee, of Gilliland & Hayes, of Kansas City, Missouri, were with him on the brief for defendant-appellees/cross-appellants Reimer & Koger Associates, Inc., Kenneth H. Koger, and Brent A. Messick.
Frank M. Rice, of Schroer, Rice, P.A., of Topeka, argued the cause, and Gene E. Schroer and Charles D. McAtee, of the same firm, and Eugene I. Pavalon and Geoffrey L. Gifford, of Pavalon & Gifford, of Chicago, Illinois; Barry J. Freeman, Robert S. Atkins, Timothy K. McPike, and Bess Schenkier, of KPERS Litigation Group, of Chicago, Illinois; Robert F. Coleman, Eugene J. Schiltz, Kenneth Philip Ross, and Jerry S. Menge, of Robert F. Coleman & Associates, of Chicago, Illinois; and Robin R. LaFollette, Donald H. Loudon, Jr., and James L. Ungerer, of KPERS Litigation Group, of Shawnee Mission, were on the brief for appellee Kansas Public Employees Retirement System.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DAVIS, J.: This interlocutory appeal involves the construction and constitutional validity of the recently enacted Kansas Public Employees Retirement System (KPERS) settlement statute, K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a. The question posed is whether the cross-claims for "contribution and noncontractual indemnity" filed by Reimer & Koger Associates, Inc., (Reimer & Koger) against appellants are discharged under the provisions of K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a(1). We conclude that such claims are discharged and that K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a is constitutional. We, therefore, reverse the decision of the trial court.
Facts
This appeal involves two consolidated cases from the Shawnee County District Court in which KPERS sued to recover for losses suffered in direct placement investments. In 92 CV 805, KPERS sought recovery for investment losses in Sharoff Food Service, Inc., (Sharoff) from Reimer & Koger and certain of its present or former directors, officers, or agents; the law firm of Gage & Tucker, L.C. (Gage & Tucker); and the law firm of Cohen, Brame, & Smith, P.C., (Cohen & Brame) and partner Roger C. Cohen (Cohen). In 93 CV 588, KPERS sought recovery for investment losses in Tallgrass Technology Corporation (Tallgrass) from Reimer & Koger.
In count 2 of 92 CV 805, KPERS alleges that Reimer & Koger was an investment advisor having discretion to invest KPERS money. In June 1987, Reimer & Koger invested $6.4 million of that money in Sharoff, primarily in subordinated ventures. In August 1988, Reimer & Koger made an additional $1.5 million unsecured investment of KPERS' money in Sharoff. At the time of each of the investments, Reimer & Koger, according to the allegations contained in KPERS' petition, knew or should have known that Sharoff was having severe financial difficulties and was in danger of failing. According to the petition, at the time of the $1.5 million unsecured investment, Reimer & Koger knew that Sharoff was in violation of covenants contained in the purchase agreement for the initial investment and that Sharoff and its principal, Gary Fox, had made misrepresentations in connection with the initial investment. Nevertheless, according to the petition, Reimer & Koger failed to exercise the remedies available for the covenant violations, waived those violations, and proceeded with a second investment. Finally, according to the petition, after both investments were made, Reimer & Koger continued to receive information indicating that Sharoff was having severe financial difficulties and was in danger of failing but again failed to exercise any of the covenant remedies. Reimer & Koger's acts and omissions constituted, according to the petition, reckless conduct, gross negligence, and a violation of their contractual and fiduciary duties to KPERS.
In 1989, Sharoff's primary secured lender foreclosed, and Sharoff was placed in bankruptcy. KPERS' entire investment in Sharoff, approximately $9 million dollars, was lost.
Counts 1 and 3 of KPERS' petition are directed against Cohen & Brame and further allege misconduct by Fox. KPERS alleges, among other things, that the Cohen & Brame firm was Sharoff's attorney. Cohen was also an officer of Sharoff. It is alleged that Sharoff, Fox, and Cohen & Brame induced Reimer & Koger to invest KPERS' money in Sharoff by fraudulently misrepresenting such matters as Sharoff's financial condition, business plans, and other available sources of financing. Further, the petition alleges that Fox misused Sharoff's and KPERS' investments in Sharoff for his own personal benefit to the detriment of KPERS.
Count 4 of KPERS' petition is directed against Gage & Tucker, which had been hired by Reimer & Koger to represent KPERS. The principal allegation against Gage & Tucker is that in 1988, as to the second investment only ($1.5 million), and in early 1989, as to both of KPERS' investments in Sharoff, Gage & Tucker knew or should have known and failed to disclose to KPERS the Sharoff covenant violations, the remedies available for those violations, and Reimer & Koger's failure to exercise those remedies. The petition further alleges that Gage & Tucker failed to advise KPERS that the initial investment in Sharoff was impaired and that the second investment was imprudent.
Case 93 CV 588 arises out of KPERS' investment in Tallgrass. The defendants named in KPERS' petition are Reimer & Koger and certain of its present or former officers, directors, and/or agents. In a long, complex series of transactions spanning a period of several years, Reimer & Koger invested a total of $14.5 million of KPERS' money in Tallgrass.
The petition alleges that Tallgrass was a financially troubled company and that each of the investment transactions was, under the circumstances, imprudent; that Reimer & Koger continued to invest KPERS' money in Tallgrass, failed to take any action to protect or reduce KPERS' investment, and failed to disclose facts regarding Tallgrass and the investments to KPERS. By that conduct, the petition alleges, Reimer & Koger breached its contractual and fiduciary duties to KPERS and caused the loss of KPERS' investment in Tallgrass.
Gage & Tucker was not named as a defendant in KPERS' Tallgrass case 93 CV 588. However, KPERS provided Gage & Tucker with a draft petition that includes certain claims against Gage & Tucker arising out of the Tallgrass investment transactions. The principal allegation is that Gage & Tucker, employed by Reimer & Koger to represent KPERS, drafted the documents and otherwise assisted Reimer & Koger in consummating the Tallgrass transactions even though Gage & Tucker allegedly knew or should have known that Reimer & Koger was making bad investments, and that Gage & Tucker had failed to disclose that fact to KPERS. Gage & Tucker allegedly participated in the Reimer & Koger business decisions regarding the making and management of Tallgrass investments. Reimer & Koger allege that by its alleged acts and omissions, Gage & Tucker committed legal malpractice and assisted in any breach of trust committed by Reimer & Koger.
In May 1994, the Kansas Legislature enacted the KPERS settlement statute, K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a, which provides protection for a defending party who enters into a settlement agreement with KPERS and obtains judicial approval of the settlement. The settling defendant is protected because the court's approval discharges the settling party from "all liability for contribution or noncontractual indemnity" as to any other individual or entity. K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a(1).
In September 1994, Gage & Tucker entered into a settlement agreement with KPERS as to KPERS' claim against the law firm in these two cases and other cases not subject to this appeal. Under the agreement, Gage & Tucker agreed to pay KPERS a total of $10 million, with $2.5 million allocated to the Tallgrass case and $1 million to the Sharoff case. The trial court found the settlement agreement to have been negotiated at arm's length by experienced counsel for the firm and KPERS and approved in a public meeting of the KPERS Board of Trustees. The court found that the agreement was a valid one supported by consideration. No appeal has been taken from this aspect of the case. The settlement agreement was expressly conditioned on the court's entry of orders in both cases approving the agreement and barring and dismissing all claims against Gage & Tucker for contribution or noncontractual indemnity in accord with K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a.
In October 1994, KPERS moved for entry of orders approving the agreement in both cases. Reimer & Koger filed objections to the approval of the settlement in the Tallgrass case. Gage & Tucker filed a motion in the Tallgrass case for leave to intervene to support KPERS' motion to approve the settlement. On December 15, 1994, the court allowed Gage & Tucker to intervene in the Tallgrass case as a defendant.
On December 30, 1994, the trial court granted Reimer & Koger's request for leave to file a cross-claim against Gage & Tucker in the Tallgrass case. The cross-claim consists of two counts, both of which assert claims against Gage & Tucker for indemnity, contribution, and legal malpractice. The legal malpractice claim is not a part of this appeal.
In asserting its contribution and indemnity claims, Reimer & Koger argues that these cases are governed, at least in part, by Kansas law as it existed before July 1, 1987, when the Kansas comparative negligence statute (K.S.A. 60-258a) was made applicable to economic loss. Specifically, Reimer & Koger expressly characterize its theory of recovery against Gage & Tucker as one based on active/passive indemnity. Gage & Tucker argues that even if these cases are governed by law prior to the comparative negligence statute, the court should approve the settlement agreement and dismiss Reimer & Koger's claims asserted in its cross-claim for active/passive indemnity as claims for "noncontractual indemnity" pursuant to K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a. Reimer & Koger objected to the approval of the settlement, alleging that if the settlement was approved, the statute would bar a remedy that had been available in 1861 when the Kansas Constitution was adopted and would, therefore, violate § 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. Reimer & Koger further contends that barring its claims would violate due process, equal protection, and the doctrine of separation of powers.
After receiving briefs and hearing oral argument, the trial court filed its 101-page memorandum opinion and entry of judgment. The court approved the settlement in both cases but found that Reimer & Koger's claims for indemnity against Gage & Tucker were actually claims "arising by reason of contract" and, therefore, held that such claims for noncontractual indemnity are not discharged under K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a. Thus, the court did not dismiss Reimer & Koger's cross-claim for contribution and indemnity against Gage & Tucker. The court also concluded that if K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a discharged Reimer & Koger's noncontractual indemnity claims, the statute would violate § 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.
Gage & Tucker filed a motion to amend, asking the court to dismiss Reimer & Koger's contribution and indemnity cross-claim as barred by K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a. Gage & Tucker timely filed a notice of appeal in both cases from the trial court memorandum opinion and from the trial court order denying the motion to amend the judgment. Gage & Tucker timely filed its appeal, and Reimer & Koger timely filed its cross-appeal, contending that K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a violated § 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights and violated due process, equal protection and the doctrine of separation of powers. Both the primary appeal and the cross-appeal were initially taken to the Kansas Court of Appeals. These cases were consolidated and transferred from the Court of Appeals to this court.
K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a
Before discussing the issues raised by the appeal and cross-appeal, we set forth the full text of the settlement statute, K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a:
"(1) A judicially approved settlement of any claim or cause of action of the Kansas public employees retirement system against any party for any injury, loss or damage shall discharge the settling party from all liability for contribution or noncontractual indemnity to any other individual or entity that is or may be liable, in whole or in part, for the same injury, loss or damage, irrespective of whether or not such individual or entity has been joined as a party to any suit brought by the Kansas public employees retirement system, provided such individual or entity is notified, in any manner approved by the court, of the proceeding to approve the settlement not less than 20 days prior thereto. As used in this section, the term "noncontractual indemnity" includes indemnity between active and passive tortfeasors and indemnity based on principles of vicarious liability but does not include indemnity which arises by reason of contract.
"(2) When a release, covenant not to sue or agreement not to enforce a judgment is given in good faith by the Kansas public employees retirement system, the release, covenant not to sue or agreement not to enforce a judgment does not discharge any nonsettling party from liability, unless the terms of the release, covenant not to sue or agreement not to enforce a judgment so provide. However, nonsettling parties shall be entitled to a setoff against any claims that are made against them by the Kansas public employees retirement system and that are not covered by K.S.A. 60-258a and amendments thereto in the amount stated in the release, covenant not to sue or agreement not to enforce a judgment, or the amount of the consideration actually paid for it, whichever is greater.
"(3) Such settlement shall conclusively establish that the settling party has extinguished such settling party's share of the total liability and is not obligated for or entitled to pro rata contribution or noncontractual indemnity from any other individual or entity irrespective of whether or not such individual or entity has been joined as a party to the action and whose liability is not extinguished by the settlement.
"(4) The provisions of this act shall apply to any settlement judicially approved after the effective date of this act regardless of the date on which the Kansas public employees retirement system suffered any injury, loss or damage or the date on which any claim or cause of action of the Kansas public employees retirement system arose or accrued.
"(5) Except as provided in this act, the provisions of this act are not intended to alter the substantive law of Kansas relating to contribution, indemnity or comparative fault."
Principles of Statutory Interpretation
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and it is a function of this court to interpret a statute to give it the effect intended by the legislature. The fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all others are subordinate, is that the intent of the legislature governs. Cyr v. Cyr, 249 Kan. 94, Syl. ¶ 2, 815 P.2d 97 (1991). In State, ex rel., v. City of Overland Park, 215 Kan. 700, 713, 527 P.2d 1340 (1974), this court said:
"It is a primary rule of statutory construction that legislative intent be ascertained wherever possible. [Citation omitted.] In attempting to discover legislative intent, as it relates to a statute, we are not bound to an examination of the language alone but may look into the existing conditions--the causes which impelled its adoption and the objective sought to be attained. [Citations omitted.] In City of Emporia v. Norton, 16 Kan. 236, Mr. Justice Brewer, in speaking for the court, said:
'. . .[N]ow in determining the intent of the legislature we are not limited to a mere consideration of the language employed. We may properly look to the purposes to be accomplished, the necessity and effect of the enactment under the different constructions suggested. . . .' (p. 239.)
"Moreover, the law seems well established that the historical background of a legislative enactment, and the circumstances attending its passage, should be taken into account. [Citations omitted.]"
Jackson v. City of Kansas City, 235 Kan. 278, 319, 680 P.2d 877 (1984), perhaps best sums up our responsibility when we are called upon to interpret a legislative enactment:
"'In determining legislative intent, courts are not limited to a mere consideration of the language employed, but may properly look into the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the purposes to be accomplished and the effect the statute may have under various suggested constructions. Southeast Kansas Landowners Ass'n v. Kansas Turnpike Auth., 224 Kan. 357, 367, 582 P.2d 1123 (1978). A statute should never be given construction that leads to uncertainty, injustice, or confusion, if possible to construe it otherwise. In construing a statute words and phrases should be construed according to context and the approved usage of the language, and words in common use are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning. Coe v. Security National Ins. Co., 228 Kan. 624, Syl. ¶ 2, 620 P.2d 1108 (1980). It should be remembered that legislative interpretation is a question of law. Coleman v. Brotherhood State Bank, 3 Kan. App. 2d 162, 171, 592 P.2d 103 (1979)." 235 Kan. at 319.
Trial Court Decision
In its conclusions of law, the trial court keys upon the words of the settlement statute which purport to "discharge the settling party [Gage & Tucker] from all liability for contribution or noncontractual indemnity to any other individual or entity that is or may be liable, in whole or in part, for that same injury, loss or damage." K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a(1). It sought in a very scholarly manner to determine the meaning of the term "noncontractual indemnity" and concluded, after an examination of English common law, early and recent United States common law, and the law of Kansas, that noncontractual indemnity claims are contract claims. Since noncontractual indemnity claims are, according to the trial court, claims which arise by reason of contract (K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a[1]), the noncontractual indemnity claims of Reimer & Koger are not discharged under K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a.
The trial court noted:
"Thus, while the statute uses some definitional code words often seen in cases which really involve, once stripped of the improper verbiage, i.e., 'active and passive tortfeasors,' and which may involve thereby 'indemnity based on principles of [vicarious] liability,' that is, secondary liability, the firm common law indemnity relief accorded to a contract implied of fact, the statutory language expressly and properly excludes such character of contract, notwithstanding any improper verbiage, by removing from its parameters 'indemnity which arises by reason of contract' (emphasis supplied) which is the very principle underlying a contract implied of fact.
. . . .
"Therefore, it may correctly, reasonably, and enlightenly be said, and most importantly can be said without implicating due process concerns, that there can be no impact from K.S.A. 74-4904a if correctly interpreted and applied in terms of any probable claims for noncontractual indemnity in case 93 CV 588 and 92 CV 805 arising prior to July 1, 1987, the date, as noted, the Kansas comparative negligence statute was effective, as amended, to include economic loss."
Absent from the trial court's consideration is the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the purposes to be accomplished by the enactment, and the effect the enactment may have under the various suggested constructions. The trial court's interpretation frustrates legislative intent by failing to consider the causes which impelled the legislature to enact K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a, the objectives sought to be attained, the historical background of the legislative enactment, and in some instances, the language of the statute itself.
Discussion and Analysis
Historical Background
This appeal arises out of a settlement reached between KPERS and the law firm of Gage & Tucker in three of a number of suits filed by KPERS in the early 1990's as a result of substantial losses it suffered in its direct placement investment program. Twelve such cases are currently pending. Four of the 12 arose out of KPERS' investment in Home Savings Association of Kansas City, F.A. (Home Savings). Each of these cases was originally filed in the district court in Shawnee County, and three of the four were subsequently removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri after one or more of the defendants filed third-party claims against the Resolution Trust Corporation, the receiver of Home Savings. The fourth Home Savings case remains pending in the Shawnee County District Court, but the federal district court has enjoined KPERS from prosecuting it.
The other eight cases arise out of eight other direct placement investments and each of these suits is currently pending in the Shawnee County District Court. The settlement with Gage & Tucker that is at issue in this appeal arises out of the firm's alleged role as attorney for KPERS in three of these investments: Home Savings, Sharoff, and Tallgrass. The orders appealed from in this case were entered by the Shawnee County District Court in the Sharoff and Tallgrass cases; as of the filing of briefs in this case, the federal court had not yet ruled on the joint motion by KPERS and Gage & Tucker for approval of the settlement in the Home Savings cases. The losses sustained by KPERS in the two cases herein involve losses of $14.5 million in the Sharoff case and $9.5 million in the Tallgrass case. Based on the number of cases filed and the losses sustained in the two above cases, the litigation most probably will involve millions of dollars.
In May 1994, the Kansas Legislature enacted K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a. It provides protection for a defending party who enters into a settlement agreement with KPERS and obtains judicial approval of the settlement. The settling defendant is protected because the court's approval discharges the settling party from "all liability for contribution or noncontractual indemnity" as to any other individual or entity. K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a(1). The settlement statute defines noncontractual indemnity as including indemnity between active and passive tortfeasors and indemnity based on principles of vicarious liability but, as noted above, does not include indemnity which arises by reason of contract. K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a(1).
The circumstances surrounding the passage of this statute make it crystal clear that the legislature intended to facilitate settlement and avoid protracted litigation by relieving settling parties from contribution and noncontractual indemnity claims.
Legislative History
K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 74-4904a was initially proposed as S.B. 751. The bill was approved as amended according to the report of the Senate Committee on Judiciary. However, a virtually identical bill, H.B. 3098, was subsequently introduced and passed both the House and Senate as a whole, without committee hearings. That bill was enacted and became the KPERS settlement statute.
The records of the Senate Judiciary Committee include a summary of certain testimony given before the Committee in support of S.B. 751. This summary, presented to the trial court, reflects the testimony of Thomas V. Murray, legal counsel to the KPERS Board of Trustees.
Murray's summarized testimony is enlightening, and a number of passages are best reviewed as they appear in the original:
"The purpose of Senate Bill #751 is to aid KPERS in settling with defendants in the pending litigation involving losses to KPERS resulting from direct placement invest