IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
No. 101,746
In the Matter of THOMAS O. ROST,
Respondent.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed July 17, 2009. Disbarment.
Stanton A. Hazlett, disciplinary administrator, argued the cause and was on the brief for the petitioner.
Dan E. Turner, of Turner & Turner, of Topeka, argued the cause for respondent, and Phillip L. Turner, of same firm, was with him on the brief, and Thomas O. Rost, respondent, argued the cause pro se.
Per Curiam: This case is an original, contested disciplinary action against Thomas O. Rost, who was admitted to practice law in this state on February 16, 1966, but who has registered with the Kansas Supreme Court as being on retired status since October 1, 2005. The formal complaint filed by the office of the Disciplinary Administrator contained two counts, designated as Cases Nos. DA9925 and DA10014. The overarching allegation is that Rost continued to actively practice law while on retired status. See Supreme Court Rule 208(a) and (f)(1) (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 307) (attorney registered as retired not permitted to practice law in this state).
Rost's current retired status was the result of three prior disciplinary complaints, DA8437, DA8440, and DA8946. In those cases, the Disciplinary Administrator agreed to recommend that Rost receive an informal admonishment in exchange for Rost's agreement to retire from the practice of law by October 1, 2005. As part of a June 6, 2005, "settlement" agreement with the Disciplinary Administrator, Rost agreed to immediately begin the transition of all of his pending "cases, guardianships and conservatorships[,] and other legal business" to a Kansas licensed attorney and to file petitions to obtain court approval to resign from any active guardianships and/or conservatorships. The review committee accepted the agreement, and the Disciplinary Administrator informally admonished Rost for violating Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 1.5 (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 448) (attorney fees) and KRPC 8.4 (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 586) (misconduct). Rost took retired status with the Clerk of the Appellate Courts effective October 1, 2005.
Apparently in conjunction with his "retirement," Rost entered into an agreement to sell his "client base and files" to Eric Kjorlie, an attorney who rented office space in Rost's law office building. The purchase price was "five times his net earnings from the 2004 practice of law," payable solely from "the proceeds of [Rost's] client base." The parties agreed "to share expenses on agreed items such as copier, stamp machine, etc." and Rost agreed to provide "administrative assistance" to Kjorlie. Kjorlie testified that, pursuant to the agreement, he retained one-half of any fee generated from Rost's client base to utilize for expenses, giving Rost the other half as payment upon the agreement. The Disciplinary Administrator did not challenge the propriety of this agreement, and any issue in that regard is not currently before the court.
After retiring, Rost began a self-described consulting business at the same location where he had practiced law, and where he had previously been associated with his father in the practice of law. Rost changed the sign in front of the building from "Rost & Rost Attorneys at Law" to "Rost & Rost Consulting, Incorporated," albeit there was no other Rost associated with the new business.
The count designated as case DA9925 emanated from a complaint filed with the Disciplinary Administrator by Shawnee County District Judge Frank Yeoman, who was presiding over certain conservatorship cases in which Rost was involved, after his retirement. The judge was particularly concerned about an April 14, 2006, letter signed by Rost, which was on "Rost & Rost Attorneys at Law" letterhead, and which explained that a delay in filing a conservatorship final accounting was due to the illness of Rost's paralegal. The judge noted that, even after his retirement, Rost had "continued to identify himself with name and [attorney] registration number" in all of the documents filed in the conservatorship cases and that it appeared to the judge that Rost continued "to maintain the same staff, work out of the same office, and even . . . use the same letterhead identifying him as an attorney." The judge expressed his concern that a client might not be able to discern that Rost was no longer permitted to actively practice law.
The count designated DA10014 arose from a complaint letter from James G. Chappas, a Kansas attorney hired by Mr. David Lloyd to find out what Rost had done to earn the fees Lloyd had paid to Rost. Chappas was unable to obtain an itemization and documentation of the work performed for those fees. Rost's relationship with Lloyd began prior to Rost's retirement but continued thereafter.
The Disciplinary Administrator assigned Scott Hesse to investigate the complaints. Hesse interviewed Judge Yeoman, Lloyd, Chappas, and the respondent, Rost. During his 2006 interview with Rost, Hesse observed that Rost's law school diploma and certificates of bar admission issued by the Kansas Supreme Court and the Kansas federal district court were displayed on the office walls. Hesse also noticed a check on Rost's desk that was payable to "Rost and Rost, Attorneys at Law."
In the interview with Hesse, Rost labeled himself a "paralegal." Rost related that he would go to court with his former clients and their new attorney and explain what was going on in the case, so that the new attorney would not need to look through a thick case file. Also during the interview, Hesse did an internet search of Rost's name and discovered three websites identifying Rost as an attorney actively practicing criminal law, one of which had been updated in March 2006. Rost denied knowingly advertising on those websites.
In answering the formal complaint, Rost asserted that the hearing panel did not have jurisdiction to discipline a retired attorney. In response, the panel scheduled a prehearing conference, at which Rost was instructed to file a formal motion challenging jurisdiction. Rost's May 13, 2008, formal motion to dismiss was overruled by the panel, and Rost sought relief from that ruling from the Supreme Court. On July 14, 2008, this court overruled Rost's motion, finding that the Supreme Court and the Disciplinary Administrator had jurisdiction to consider the disciplinary complaints, notwithstanding Rost's retired status. Thereafter, the hearing panel proceeded with the formal hearing, with Rost continuing to object to jurisdiction.
Following the hearing, the panel filed a final hearing report on January 12, 2009, in which it found that Rost had violated KRPC 5.5(a) (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 565) (unauthorized practice of law); KRPC 8.4(d) (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 586) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); and Kansas Supreme Court Rule 208(a) (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 307) (only attorneys registered as active may practice law in Kansas). Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 212 (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 327), Rost filed exceptions to the panel's findings and submitted a brief to this court. Accordingly, we set forth the panel's factual findings:
"FINDINGS OF FACT
"16. The Hearing Panel finds the following facts, by clear and convincing evidence:
"17. Thomas O. Rost (hereinafter 'the Respondent') is an attorney at law, Kansas Attorney Registration No. 6297. His last registration address with the Clerk of the Appellate Courts of Kansas is 827 Southwest Topeka Boulevard, Topeka, Kansas 66612. The Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in the State of Kansas on February 16, 1966.
"18. In 2001 and 2003, three disciplinary complaints were filed against the Respondent, DA8437, DA8440, and DA8946. The Review Committee of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys directed that a Hearing Panel conduct a Formal Hearing regarding the three complaints.
"19. Prior to the hearing, the Disciplinary Administrator and the Respondent entered into an agreement regarding the resolution of the three complaints. Specifically, the Disciplinary Administrator agreed to recommend to the Review Committee that it direct that the Respondent be informally admonished by the Disciplinary Administrator for the rule violations in the three disciplinary cases in return for the Respondent's agreement to retire from the practice of law. The Disciplinary Administrator and the Respondent submitted the agreement to the Review Committee.
"20. The Review Committee accepted the agreement of the parties and directed that the Disciplinary Administrator informally admonish the Respondent for the rule violations contained in DA8437, DA8440, and DA8946. The Respondent registered with the Clerk of the Appellate Courts as retired, as of October 1, 2005.
"21. In an undated agreement, the Respondent agreed to sell his practice to Eric Kjorlie.
"22. The Respondent and Mr. Kjorlie shared the fees that were received pursuant to the agreement. At the hearing on this matter, Mr. Kjorlie testified regarding this subject, as follows:
'Q. [By Mr. Hazlett] Do you have any–did you have any agreement with how you would handle fees under those circumstances?
'A. [By Mr. Kjorlie] Those fees would be brought in, I would put it into an account, and then we would split it out so we could maintain the office operation there in terms of sharing the fax machines, the company machines, the scanning machines, and that kind of an arrangement.
'Q. As a practical matter let's say somebody came in that was a client of Mr. Rost's and let's say this happens after October 1st of 2005, pays you a $2,000 retainer, how would that be split up?
'A. Well, if it was a client that come [sic] in on that type of a referral I would put the money into the 8227 account. Half would come in to maintain operations and expenses I could draw from that, the other half would go into this agreement and that's basically how we operated.
'Q. So half would go to the payment of this exhibit–your obligations under this exhibit 12 agreement?
'A. Right.'
"23. Prior to the Respondent's retirement, the Respondent practiced at 827 Southwest Topeka Boulevard, Topeka, Kansas. The Respondent's paralegal was Tonya McConnell. Located in front of the Respondent's building was a sign that read, 'Rost & Rost, Attorneys at Law.' During his father's lifetime, the Respondent practiced with his father.
"24. Following the Respondent's retirement, he continued to work at 827 Southwest Topeka Boulevard, Topeka, Kansas. The Respondent had the sign changed to read, 'Rost & Rost Consulting, Inc.'
DA9925
"25. On April 14, 2006, the Respondent sent a letter to the Honorable Frank Yeoman, Jr., in case number 91GC126, In re Jeffrey Dusseault. The letter was prepared on the Respondent's law firm letterhead and identified the Respondent as an attorney. The letter provided:
'This letter is in response to Mr. Hehtmanek's letter of April 13, 2006. Please be advised that within the next 14 days the final accounting for the above referenced case will be filed with the Clerk of the District Court.
'My office has been short staffed due to my paralegal having surgery and being out for 6 weeks and now back only part time.'
The Respondent's letter would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the Respondent is an active practicing attorney.
"26. On April 25, 2006, the Respondent filed a Petition for the Approval of Eighth and Final Annual Accounting in the Dusseault case. The Respondent also filed an Order for Hearing and a Notice of Hearing. The documents were signed by the Respondent and the Respondent included his attorney registration number.
"27. Judge Yeoman wrote to the Disciplinary Administrator's office regarding his observations of the Respondent. W. Scott Hesse was assigned to investigate Judge Yeoman's complaint. During the course of his investigation, Mr. Hesse called the Respondent's office to schedule an interview. When Mr. Hesse called the Respondent, the Respondent answered the telephone and stated, 'Rost & Rost.'
"28. Mr. Hesse scheduled an interview with the Respondent in the Respondent's office. When Mr. Hesse went to the Respondent's office, he observed the Respondent's law license hanging on the wall. Additionally, Mr. Hesse observed a check at the Respondent's office titled, Rost & Rost, Attorneys at Law.
"29. During the interview, the Respondent stated that he was retired from the practice of law and considered himself a paralegal. The Respondent told Mr. Hesse that he continues to meet with clients but that if a client wanted to go to court, he would refer the client to another attorney. The Respondent stated that he would also go to court with the client and the attorney so that he could assist the attorney handling the case.
"30. The Respondent told Mr. Hesse that his client base for Rost & Rost Consulting, Inc. was the same client based as Rost & Rost, Attorneys at Law. The Respondent informed Mr. Hesse that he intended to advise his clients on business issues, including farming, real estate, military matters, and other matters.
DA10114 "31. William Fish, a veteran, was declared incompetent by the Veterans Administration. Judge Yeoman appointed David Lloyd, a friend of Mr. Fish, as curator for Mr. Fish, so that Mr. Lloyd could manage Mr. Fish's financial matters.
"32. At the time the curatorship was initiated, Robert Coulthard represented Mr. Lloyd in his capacity as Mr. Fish's curator. Because Mr. Coulthard was unable to appear with Mr. Fish at a hearing held August 4, 2004, at Mr. Coulthard's request, Mr. Kjorlie appeared with Mr. Lloyd. At that time, and continuing to today, Mr. Kjorlie rents office space in the Respondent's building.
"33. On March 30, 2005, Mr. Lloyd came to the Respondent's office and requested that the Respondent assist him in reconstructing the records relating to the first seven months of Mr. Fish's curatorship. At that time, Mr. Lloyd paid the Respondent $600.00 from Mr. Fish's account. In the memo line, Mr. Lloyd indicated that the check was for 'Legal Fee's VA.'
"34. On March 31, 2005, Mr. Lloyd and the Respondent continued working together on reconstructing the records relating to Mr. Fish's curatorship.
"35. On April 4, 2005, Mr. Lloyd and the Respondent went to US Bank to request bank records.
"36. On May 2, 2005, Mr. Lloyd paid the Respondent $678.00 from Mr. Fish's account. In the memo line, Mr. Lloyd indicated that the check was for 'accounting for VA.'
"37. On June 24, 2005, Mr. Lloyd paid the Respondent $600 from Mr. Fish's account. In the memo line, Mr. Lloyd indicated that the check was for 'audit Bill Fish.'
"38. The first annual accounting in Mr. Fish's curatorship was due in August, 2005. However, Mr. Lloyd did not prepare and file the annual accounting as required by the Court.
"39. On October 18, 2005, Mr. Lloyd paid the Respondent $600.00 for 'attorney fees.'(1)
"40. On March 9, 2006, Mr. Lloyd received a letter from the Veterans Administration indicating that Mr. Fish's benefits were suspended because Mr. Lloyd failed to file the annual accounting in a timely manner.
"41. After Mr. Fish's benefits were suspended, Mr. Lloyd came to the Respondent's building for assistance. Thereafter, on April 26, 2006, a First Annual Accounting, covering the period from August 27, 2004, to August 26, 2005, was filed in Mr. Fish's curatorship.(2)
"42. In the First Annual Accounting, Mr. Lloyd acknowledged that he paid the Respondent a total of $1,878.00 for 'Accounting Legal Fees.'
"43. On May 15, 2006, the Office of Regional Counsel of the Veterans Administration objected to the First Annual Accounting. One of the objections was based upon the 'Accounting Legal Fees' paid to the Respondent. Another objection lodged by the Veterans Administration included:
'The ward was renting the home, which he shares with Mr. Campa, an expense for rent of $350.00 for rent to Mr. Lloyd shows each month until 1-03-05 when mortgage payment to the Educational Credit Union of $691.00 appears and does each month for the remainder of the accounting period along with repair expenses for the residence, plumbing of $1,645.69, A/C repair $197.49 and monthly expense of over $100.00 to Orkin for pest control. The assets listed shows a home with a value of $35,900.00 and a mortgage of [$]10,467.50, [sic] this belonged to the Curator David J. Lloyd and his spouse. No rent payments from Mr. Campa are reflected in the accounting.'
"44. In May, 2006, Mr. Lloyd met with the Respondent regarding the issues raised by the Veterans Administration regarding the rent and mortgage payments made and the ownership of the property where Mr. Fish resided. Mr. Lloyd paid the Respondent $3,500 to assist him with resolving the problem with the property. The Respondent told Mr. Lloyd that Mr. Lloyd would have to 'make peace' with Mr. Kjorlie, the Court, and the Veterans Administration, over the issue with the property.(3)
"45. The Respondent contacted the title company and determined the ownership of the property. The Respondent accompanied Mr. Lloyd to the bank to determine how Mr. Lloyd financed the property.
"46. In order to resolve the problem with the property, the Respondent recommended to Mr. Lloyd that he execute a quitclaim deed regarding the property in question in favor of Mr. Fish. On May 24, 2006, Mr. Lloyd and his wife executed a quitclaim deed in Mr. Fish's favor. The quitclaim deed was prepared by Ms. McConnell.
"47. On May 24, 2006, Mr. Lloyd filed an Amended Petition for the Approval of First Annual Accounting and Approval of Successor Curator. The pleading was prepared after Mr. Lloyd met with the Respondent. The pleading purports to have been made and filed by Mr. Kjorlie. In the pleading, regarding the fees paid to the Respondent, Mr. Lloyd stated:
'The legal issues and reconstruction issues totaling One Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-Eight Dollars ($1,878.00) are due to locating lost bank statements; acquiring duplicate bank statements from the financial institution; reconstruction of the transactions during this accounting period using the bank statements, cancelled checks and check registers, which took a number of hours in order to prepare the First Annual Accounting.'
Further, in response to the issue raised concerning the rent and mortgage payments made and the ownership of the property, Mr. Lloyd stated:
'3. That the Petitioner prior to the curatorship on August 19, 2002, purchased a 24' x 41' mobile home and placed the mobile home on four (4) lots that were owned by the Petitioner and then sold the mobile home and lots to William A. Fish for a total amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Dollars ($25,300.00).
'4. That William A. fish [sic] at the time could not qualify for a loan to purchase a living space for himself and his caregiver.
'5. That the Petitioner states that the loan is now paid in full and the home and lots are deeded to William A. Fish.
'6. Any sum shown as rent was made as loan payments not rent.
. . . .
'8. That the Petitioner states that Raymond R. Campa is not a tenant; Raymond R. Campa is a full time caregiver and receives monthly room and board along with a weekly salary in the amount of Three Hundred Eleven Dollars ($311.00).'
Finally, Mr. Lloyd requested that Mr. Kjorlie be appointed as successor curator.
"48. Mr. Lloyd suffered various health problems and had difficulty in recalling the reason for paying the Respondent the $3,500.00. On June 19, 2006, Mr. Lloyd retained James G. Chappas to assist him in determining what Mr. Lloyd had paid the Respondent to do. To that end, Mr. Chappas wrote to the Respondent.
"49. On June 28, 2006, Mr. Kjorlie responded to Mr. Chappas in behalf of the Respondent, informed Mr. Chappas that he was representing the Respondent, and stated that Mr. Lloyd paid the Respondent the $3,500 for a business financial analysis relating to ownership by Mr. Lloyd of a piece of real estate.
"50. On June 29, 2006, Mr. Chappas wrote to Mr. Kjorlie and requested an itemization of the time expended in earning the $3,500.00. Neither the Respondent nor Mr. Kjorlie provided Mr. Chappas or his client with an itemization of the time expended in earning the $3,500.00.
"51. On July 6, 2006, Judge Yeoman sent Mr. Kjorlie a letter regarding the Amended First Annual Accounting. In the letter, Judge Yeoman stated:
'The appearance of payments as reflected in the accounting made to Rost & Rost is rather "out of the blue" since Thomas Rost had nothing to do with this case that was known to the Court. I have since learned more about this situation (VA attorney had made inquiry before me) so I am now at least informed that Mr. Lloyd went to Rost for help with his accounting. Why he would do that I do not know! Lloyd's records were, so I am told, in disarray and he required help. Rost was not his attorney, you were, and you have insisted that you and Rost have only an office sharing relationship.
'The payments were made for "accounting legal fees," whatever that terminology may mean. I know Mr. Rost is not an accountant and was, at that time, engaged in the practice of law. Lloyd was not authorized to pay a lawyer by use of the curatorship assets for services rendered without having first obtained permission of the Court by appropriate pleadings and order. The curator is ordered to reimburse the estate for all sums paid from the curatorship to the law firm of Rost and Rost – to the best of my knowledge that would be the total sum of $1,878.00 based on what is reported. He will have the opportunity to show, by appropriate documentation, the justification for the payments and this order will be reconsidered if he does that.'
"52. Mr. Kjorlie responded to the judge's letter on July 20, 2006. In that letter, Mr. Kjorlie explained what the Respondent did to earn the $1,878.00 in fees. Mr. Kjorlie, however, failed to file a motion with the Court to allow the fees.
"53. On September 4, 2006, Mr. Chappas wrote to Mr. Kjorlie and requested information regarding the Respondent's malpractice carrier.
"54. On September 20, 2006, Mr. Kjorlie wrote to Mr. Chappas. Mr. Kjorlie did not provide Mr. Chappas with information regarding the Respondent's malpractice carrier. Regarding the $3,500.00, Mr. Kjorlie stated: 'Mr. Rost, in addition, through a great deal of time and effort was able to work out the real estate transaction for which he charged Mr. Lloyd a commission . . .'
"55. On September 27, 2006, the Respondent sent a letter to the Disciplinary Administrator's Office. The letter was prepared on the Respondent's law firm letterhead and identified the Respondent as an attorney. However, on September 28, 2006, Ms. McConnell wrote to the Disciplinary Administrator's Office and explained that she was at fault for sending the letter the day before on attorney letterhead.
"56. On October 6, 2006, Mr. Kjorlie wrote to Mr. Chappas. Mr.
Kjorlie asserted that he does not represent the Respondent in regard to the Fish Curatorship. Additionally, Mr. Kjorlie stated:
'. . . It is my understanding that at the request of Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Rost as a matter of a business consultation did a background investigation as it relates to the Education Credit Union for a set consulting fee and not as previously stated as a real estate commission, which is inaccurate.'"
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In disciplinary proceedings, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the hearing panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether KRPC violations exist, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed on the respondent. In re McPherson, 287 Kan. 434, 440-41, 196 P.3d 921 (2008); In re Lober, 276 Kan. 633, 636, 78 P.3d 442 (2003). Attorney misconduct must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Nelson, 288 Kan. 179, 183, 200 P.3d 1262 (2009); Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 313). To be clear and convincing, evidence must establish the truth of the facts asserted is "highly probable." In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. 686, Syl. ¶ 3, 187 P.3d 594 (2008). In making that determination, the appellate court should refrain from weighing conflicting evidence, assessing witness credibility, or redetermining questions of fact. In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. at 699.
HEARING PANEL LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
In finding a violation of KRPC 5.5(a) (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 565), which prohibits the unauthorized practice of law, the panel relied in part on State v. Schumacher, 214 Kan 1, 519 P.2d 1116 (1974), which it found to be factually analogous. There, "[t]he only act respondent refrained from doing as a lawyer was making a formal appearance in court, i.e., he stayed behind the rail; in all other respects he continued to function just as he had before the suspension." 214 Kan. at 20. The panel specifically noted Schumacher's quotation from State ex rel., v. Perkins, 138 Kan 899, 908, 28 P.2d 765 (1934):
"One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights, and then takes the business to an attorney and arranges with him to look after it in court is engaged in the practice of law." 214 Kan. at 9.
The panel found that, after Rost took retired status, he continued "to serve his clients in the same manner in the same location under the same name without interruption or discontinuity," with the only change being to have another attorney "front for him on most court appearances." The panel recited:
"62. After the Respondent registered as a retired attorney, he practiced law. The Respondent held himself out as an active attorney, sent correspondence to the Court indicating that he continued to be an active attorney, utilized his bar number, filed pleadings with the Court, met with clients, provided Mr. Lloyd with legal advice, and directly assisted Mr. Lloyd in resolving legal problems, all in violation of the Respondent's agreement with [the Disciplinary Administrator]. Because the Respondent continued to practice law after taking retired status, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 5.5(a)."
With respect to the remaining violations, the panel declared:
"63. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). In this case, the Respondent engaged in 'conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice' when he practiced law when he was not authorized to do so. As such, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 8.4(d).
"64. Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208(a) states, in pertinent part, that, '[o]nly attorneys registered as active may practice law in Kansas.' The Respondent engaged in the practice of law after he took retired status. Because the Respondent practiced law at a time when he was not registered as an active attorney, but rather as a retired attorney, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent violated Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208(a)."
RESPONDENT'S ISSUES
In his brief to this court, Rost identifies seven issues, which we take the liberty of paraphrasing as follows: (1) The Kansas Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to enforce the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct against an attorney who has registered as being retired; (2) the hearing panel's conclusions of law regarding the areas of law in which a retired attorney could properly engage in nonlegal work improperly restricts a retired person's business opportunities; (3) the hearing panel improperly ignored Rost's written and oral notifications that he was no longer practicing law; (4) Rost's post-retirement activities did not constitute the practice of law; (5) the hearing panel failed to use the clear and convincing standard; (6) the hearing panel improperly applied the standards for imposing sanctions; and (7) the hearing panel recommendations for sanction were inappropriate.
JURISDICTION
Rost concedes that "[a]ny attorney admitted to practice law in this state and any attorney specially admitted by a court of this state for a particular proceeding is subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the authority hereinafter established by these Rules." Supreme Court Rule 201(a) (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 261). He does not deny that he was admitted to practice law in this state in 1966. However, he crafts an argument, based upon the provisions of Supreme Court Rules 208(a) and (f)(1) (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 307), that he ceased to be admitted to practice law when he registered as a retired attorney.
Specifically, Rost points to the provision in Rule 208(a) which permits an attorney to register as "active; inactive; retired; or disabled due to mental or physical disabilities," and the following requirement that "[o]nly attorneys registered as active may practice law in Kansas." 2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 307. Likewise, Rost notes that Rule 208(f)(1) declares that "[a]n attorney who has registered as retired, . . . shall not be eligible to practice law in this state." 2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 308. He then argues that because an attorney registered as retired is not permitted to practice law, such an attorney is not "admitted to practice law" within the meaning of the jurisdictional provisions of Rule 201(a).
We disagree with the suggestion that an attorney loses his or her hard-earned status as an admitted Kansas attorney simply by registering as anything other than "active." First, Rost ignores that our Rules Relating to Admission of Attorneys are set forth in Rules 701 through 710, inclusive (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 705-726). Most applicants for admission are governed by Rule 704 (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 710), entitled Admission to the Bar Upon Written Examination. Those applicants must demonstrate that they are "of good moral character, possessed of the requisite general education, and otherwise qualified to be examined," prior to taking a written examination to demonstrate their knowledge of the law. Rule 704(c) (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 711). Then, if an applicant successfully passes the bar examination, the Supreme Court is