In re Rittmaster

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

Nos. 109,836
111,126

In the Matter of MIRIAM M. RITTMASTER,
Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE

Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed June 6, 2014. One-year suspension.

Stanton A. Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and was on the formal
complaints for the petitioner.

John J. Ambrosio, of Ambrosio & Ambrosio, Chtd., Topeka, argued the cause, and Miriam M.
Rittmaster, respondent, argued the cause pro se.

Per Curiam: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the
Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Miriam M. Rittmaster, of Overland
Park, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1998. Two separate
complaints were filed against the respondent as set out below.

Case No. 109,836

On January 4, 2013, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional
Conduct (KRPC). The respondent untimely filed an answer on March 7, 2013. A hearing
was held on the complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys
on March 7, 2013, where the respondent was personally present and was represented by
counsel. Respondent's oral motion to accept answer out of time was granted at the
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hearing. The hearing panel determined that respondent violated KRPC 1.1 (2013 Kan. Ct.
R. Annot. 446) (competence); 1.3 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 464) (diligence); 1.4(a) (2013
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 484) (communication); 1.15(b) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 553)
(safekeeping property); 8.1(b) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 646) (failure to respond to lawful
demand for information from disciplinary authority); 8.4(c) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
655) (engaging in conduct involving misrepresentation); and Kansas Supreme Court Rule
207(b) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 336) (failure to cooperate in disciplinary investigation).

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this court:

"Findings of Fact
. . . .

"7. On September 13, 2011, S.S. retained the respondent to represent her in a
domestic case. S.S. paid the respondent $1,500.00 for the representation. Prior to that
time, another attorney had filed a petition for divorce on behalf of S.S. The other attorney
was allowed to withdraw from the representation on September 23, 2011.

"8. Beginning on September 14, 2011, S.S. attempted to contact the
respondent to request that the respondent obtain service of the divorce petition on S.S.'s
estranged husband. Many of S.S.'s attempts to contact the respondent regarding service
went unanswered.

"9. On October 21, 2011, S.S. sent the respondent a text message asking
about service. When the respondent did not respond to S.S.'s request for information, S.S.
called the sheriff's department and learned the respondent had not requested that the
sheriff's department serve S.S.'s estranged husband. S.S. called the clerk of the Johnson
County District Court and learned that the respondent had not yet entered her appearance
on behalf of S.S.

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"10. Later that day, the respondent called S.S. and told S.S. that she would do
what was necessary to obtain service that day. The respondent also sent S.S. a text
message that she had provided the necessary information to the sheriff's department to
obtain service.

"11. On October 25, 2011, S.S.'s estranged husband was served with process.

"12. On October 27, 2011, S.S. contacted the respondent about what should
occur next in her divorce action. The respondent told S.S. she was trying to get in touch
with S.S.'s estranged husband's lawyer. On November 2, 2011, S.S. left a message
requesting a status update and asked the respondent provide her with a copy of certain
documents, including a copy of the answer filed in the case. The respondent did not
provide S.S. with a copy of the answer or the other documents.

"13. Through November 10, 2011, S.S. continued to contact the respondent in
an attempt to obtain information. The respondent continued to fail to provide S.S. with
the requested information. On November 10, 2011, the respondent called S.S. and
promised to provide her with sample parenting plans and the other documents previously
requested by S.S. On November 13, 2011, November 16, 2011, and November 22, 2011,
S.S. made additional requests for the information. The respondent failed to provide the
requested information.

"14. The court scheduled a hearing regarding the temporary orders in S.S.'s
divorce proceeding for December 1, 2011. The respondent received notice of the hearing.
The respondent failed to inform S.S. that a hearing had been scheduled. Neither S.S. nor
the respondent appeared at the hearing.

"15. At the hearing, the Court reduced the amount of child support that S.S.'s
estranged husband was required to pay S.S. Additionally, the Court made the child
support effective October 1, 2011, rather than the date the divorce petition was filed.
Previously, the respondent assured S.S. that the effective date of the child support would
be the date the divorce petition was filed.

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"16. Later, on December 1, 2011, S.S. learned that a hearing had been held
that morning. S.S. contacted the respondent about the hearing. The respondent falsely
told S.S. that she did not know about the hearing. The respondent told S.S. not to worry
about missing the court hearing. The respondent told S.S. that the clerk of the district
court failed to notify the respondent of the hearing and that another hearing had been
scheduled for January 11, 2012. S.S. again requested that the respondent provide her with
a copy of certain documents. The respondent promised to send the documents by
electronic mail. Again, the respondent failed to forward the documents to S.S.

"17. On December 2, 2011, S.S. called the clerk of the district court. The
clerk informed S.S. that the respondent had been twice notified of the December 1, 2011,
hearing. The clerk indicated that the respondent received an electronic mail message on
November 16, 2011, notifying her of the hearing and also opposing counsel provided a
written notice of hearing to the respondent. Finally, the clerk told S.S. that a hearing was
not scheduled on January 11, 201[2], in S.S.'s divorce case.

"18. That same day, S.S. called the respondent but did not reach the
respondent. The respondent later returned the call, but did not reach S.S. The respondent
left a message stating that she would call S.S. again on Monday, December 5, 2011. The
respondent failed to call S.S. on Monday, December 5, 2011.

"19. On December 6, 2011, S.S. sent the respondent a letter terminating the
respondent's representation. Additionally, S.S. requested that the respondent send S.S. a
copy of her file.

"20. On December 7, 2011, S.S. called the respondent and left a message.
Later that day, the respondent sent S.S. a text message stating that the respondent had
experienced a family emergency and would not be able to get in touch with S.S. until the
following Monday. S.S. responded and directed the respondent to withdraw from the
representation as soon as possible.

"21. On December 9, 2011, S.S. retained new counsel, Stephanie Goodnow.
Ms. Goodnow entered her appearance on December 12, 2011.
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"22. Thereafter, S.S. called the respondent and asked for an itemized
statement and a refund of unearned fees. Later, S.S. sent the respondent a letter
demanding a refund. The respondent never provided S.S. with an itemized statement or
refund.

"23. On March 21, 2012, S.S. filed a complaint with the disciplinary
administrator's office.

"24. On March 30, 2012, the disciplinary administrator sent the respondent a
letter notifying her that a complaint had been received and docketed for investigation and
directing the respondent to provide a response to S.S.'s complaint. The respondent failed
to provide a response to S.S.'s complaint as directed by the disciplinary administrator.

"25. The complaint was sent to the Johnson County Ethics and Grievance
Committee for investigation. Michael Whitsitt was assigned to investigate S.S.'s
complaint.

"26. On April 10, 2012, and May 15, 2012, Mr. Whitsitt sent letters to the
respondent directing the respondent to provide a written response to S.S.'s complaint. The
respondent failed to provide a written response to S.S.'s complaint.

"27. On June 25, 2012, Mr. Whitsitt called the respondent. During the
telephone conversation, the respondent promised Mr. Whitsitt that she would provide a
response by July 6, 2012. The respondent never provided a response to S.S.'s complaint.

"Conclusions of Law

"28. Based upon the findings of fact and the respondent's stipulation, the
hearing panel concludes as a matter of law that the respondent violated KRPC 1.1, KRPC
1.3, KRPC 1.4, KRPC 1.15, KRPC 8.1, KRPC 8.4, and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207, as detailed
below.

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"KRPC 1.1

"29. Lawyers must provide competent representation to their clients. KRPC
1.1. 'Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.' The respondent failed to
represent S.S. with the thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated
KRPC 1.1.

"KRPC 1.3

"30. Attorneys must act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing their clients. See KRPC 1.3. The respondent failed to diligently and
promptly represent S.S. in her domestic relations case. Because the respondent failed to
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing her client, the hearing panel
concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.3.

"KRPC 1.4

"31. KRPC 1.4(a) provides that '[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably
informed about the status of a matter.' In this case, the respondent violated KRPC 1.4(a)
when she failed to timely respond to requests for information from S.S. Accordingly, the
hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.4(a).

"KRPC 1.15

"32. Lawyers must safeguard their clients' property. Specifically, KRPC 1.15
provides:

'(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client
or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client
or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by
law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to
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the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or
third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third
person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.'

The respondent violated KRPC 1.15(b) in two ways. First, the respondent failed to
provide an accounting of fees as requested by S.S. and as required by KRPC 1.15(b).
Second, the respondent failed to refund unearned fees. Retaining unearned fees is
tantamount to conversion. If a fee has not been earned, it should remain available to be
refunded to the client. The respondent failed to account and failed to refund unearned
fees that were paid by S.S. Because the respondent failed to properly account for fees and
refund unearned fees, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC
1.15(b).

"KRPC 8.1 and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207

"33. Lawyers must cooperate in disciplinary investigations. KRPC 8.1(b) and
Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(b) provide the requirements in this regard. '[A] lawyer in connection
with a . . . disciplinary matter, shall not: . . . knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand
for information from [a] . . . disciplinary authority, . . . .' KRPC 8.1(b).

'It shall be the duty of each member of the bar of this state to aid the
Supreme Court, the Disciplinary Board, and the Disciplinary
Administrator in investigations concerning complaints of misconduct,
and to communicate to the Disciplinary Administrator any information
he or she may have affecting such matters.'

Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(b). The respondent failed to respond to the initial complaint as
directed by the disciplinary administrator and Mr. Whitsitt. As such, the hearing panel
concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.1(b) and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(b) by
failing to provide a written response to the initial complaint filed by S.S.

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"KRPC 8.4(c)

"34. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.' KRPC 8.4(c). The respondent
engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty when she falsely told S.S. that she had not
received notice of the hearing scheduled for December 1, 2012. Additionally, the
respondent engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty when she told S.S. that a second
hearing had been scheduled for January 11, 2012. As such, the hearing panel concludes
that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(c).

"American Bar Association
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

35. In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating
factors.

"36. Duty Violated. The respondent violated her duty to her client to provide
competent and diligent representation and adequate communication. Also, the respondent
violated her duty to the public and the legal profession to maintain her personal integrity.
Finally, the respondent violated her duty to the legal system to comply with court orders.

"37. Mental State. The respondent knowingly and intentionally violated her
duties.

"38. Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused
actual injury to S.S., the legal profession, and the legal system.
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"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

"39. Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following
aggravating factors present:

"40. Prior Disciplinary Offenses. The respondent has been previously
disciplined on one occasion. On April 23, 2007, the respondent entered a diversion
agreement with the disciplinary administrator. In the agreement, the respondent admitted
that she violated KRPC 1.1, KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, and KRPC 1.5. The respondent
successfully completed the terms and conditions of diversion.

"41. Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The respondent engaged in dishonest
conduct in her representation of S.S. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the
respondent's misconduct was motivated by dishonesty.

"42. A Pattern of Misconduct. The respondent engaged in a pattern of
misconduct by repeatedly failing to adequately communicate with S.S. Accordingly, the
hearing panel concludes that the respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct.

"43. Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule violations.
The respondent violated KRPC 1.1, KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, KRPC 1.15, KRPC 8.1,
KRPC 8.4, and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the
respondent committed multiple offenses.

"44. Bad Faith Obstruction of the Disciplinary Proceeding by Intentionally
Failing to Comply with Rules or Orders of the Disciplinary Process. The respondent
failed to provide a written answer to the initial complaint filed by S.S. as directed by the
disciplinary administrator and Mr. Whitsitt.

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"45. Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme
Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 1998. At the time
of the misconduct, the respondent had been practicing law for approximately 13 years.

"46. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following
mitigating circumstances present:

"47. Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes have Contributed
to Violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. During the hearing, the
respondent testified about personal and emotional problems that she has suffered during
the past couple of years and their adverse impact on her representation of S.S. The
respondent's personal and emotional problems were significant and occurred at
substantially the same time as the misconduct. The hearing panel concludes that the
respondent's personal and emotional problems contributed to her violations of the rules.
Additionally, based upon the respondent's appearance before the hearing panel, the
hearing panel concludes that the respondent's emotional difficulties continue to affect her
ability to practice law.

"48. Remorse. At the hearing on the formal complaint, the respondent
expressed genuine remorse for having engaged in the misconduct.

"49. In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly
examined and considered the following Standards:

'4.42 Suspension is generally appropriate when:

(a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client
and causes injury or potential injury to a client; or

(b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes
injury or potential injury to a client.
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'4.62 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly
deceives a client, and causes injury or potential injury to the
client.'

"Recommendation

"50. At the hearing on the formal complaint, the disciplinary administrator
recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
six months. Additionally, the disciplinary administrator recommended that before the
respondent is reinstated that she undergo a reinstatement hearing, under Kan. Sup. Ct. R.
219. The respondent agreed with the disciplinary administrator's recommendation that the
respondent's license to practice law [be suspended] for a period of six months and that the
respondent undergo a reinstatement hearing under Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 219.

"51. During the disciplinary hearing, the respondent stated that she is
currently unable to practice law and tentatively agreed to the temporary suspension of her
license to practice law in the State of Kansas. Following the hearing, the disciplinary
administrator and the respondent filed a joint motion for temporary suspension, to be
effective April 1, 2013. The Supreme Court granted the motion and on April 1, 2013, the
Court suspended the respondent's license to practice law during the pendency of the
disciplinary proceedings.

"52. Based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, the aggravating
factors, and the Standards listed above, the hearing panel unanimously recommends that
the respondent's license to practice law in the State of Kansas be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six months. Further, the hearing panel also recommends
that the respondent undergo a reinstatement hearing, under Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 219, prior to
consideration of reinstatement.

"53. Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by
the office of the disciplinary administrator."

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Case No. 111,126

On November 5, 2013, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional
Conduct (KRPC). The respondent filed an answer on December 18, 2013. A hearing was
held on the complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys on
January 8, 2014, where the respondent was personally present and was represented by
counsel. The hearing panel determined that respondent violated KRPC 1.3 (2013 Kan. Ct.
R. Annot. 464) (diligence); 1.4(a) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 484) (communication);
1.16(a)(2) and (d) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 569) (termination of representation); and
8.4(d) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 655) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice).

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this court:

"Findings of Fact
. . . .

"License Status

"7. On April 24, 1998, the Kansas Supreme Court admitted the respondent to
the practice of law in the State of Kansas. In the spring of 2013, the respondent and the
disciplinary administrator filed a joint motion for temporary suspension, as the
respondent was unable to practice law at that time. On April 1, 2013, the Kansas Supreme
Court issued an order temporarily suspending the respondent from the practice of law.
The respondent's license remains suspended at this time.

"DA11793

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"8. In September, 2011, J.F. filed a petition for divorce against R.F. and
obtained a temporary order of custody of his minor children. J.F. was unable to serve R.F.
and requested and received permission from the court to serve R.F. by publication.
Following service by publication, on February 2, 2012, the court entered a decree of
divorce.

"9. On March 19, 2012, R.F. retained the respondent. The respondent agreed
to attempt to set aside the decree of divorce. However, R.F. did not provide the
respondent with the attorney fee at that time.

"10. On June 7, 2012, the State of Kansas filed a motion for the establishment
of support and qualified medical support order. The Court scheduled a hearing on the
motion for July 3, 2012.

"11. On July 3, 2012, R.F. appeared without counsel. By this time, R.F. still
had not paid the respondent the attorney fee.

"12. On July 16, 2012, August 1, 2012, and August 15, 2012, R.F. paid the
respondent's attorney fee in installments.

"13. On August 6, 2012, the respondent informed R.F. that she had entered
her appearance in the divorce action. At that time, the hearing regarding support had been
continued to August 7, 2012. The respondent contacted the attorney for the State of
Kansas, Roger Marrs, and requested that the hearing be continued until August 28, 2012.
Mr. Marrs agreed to the continuance and the court rescheduled the matter.

"14. Prior to August 28, 2012, the respondent requested that the hearing be
continued again. The respondent's request was denied. On August 28, 2012, the
respondent and R.F. failed to appear for the hearing. At that time, the Court entered an
order of child support against R.F. in the amount of $379.00 per month. The Court also
ordered R.F. to provide medical insurance for the children.

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"15. On October 5, 2012, the respondent filed a motion to set aside default
judgment on behalf of R.F. The respondent also filed a motion to modify custody,
parenting time, and child support and a motion to appoint a guardian ad litem. The
respondent failed to take any steps to have the motions set for hearing.

"16. After the respondent filed the motions on behalf of R.F., R.F. repeatedly
contacted the respondent to find out about the status of the motions. The respondent
failed to respond to text messages, electronic mail message[s], and telephone calls from
R.F. and the respondent failed to provide R.F. with updates regarding the status of the
representation.

"17. On March 7, 2013, after the respondent failed to communicate with R.F.,
R.F. informed the respondent that she had retained another attorney to represent her. R.F.
requested that the respondent provide an accounting of time and charges in the case.
Additionally, R.F. requested that the respondent return her papers. The respondent did not
provide an accounting, return any unearned fees, nor did she return R.F.'s papers.

"Conclusions of Law

"18. Based upon the respondent's stipulation and the above findings of fact,
the hearing panel concludes as a matter of law that the respondent violated KRPC 1.3,
KRPC 1.4, KRPC 1.16, and KRPC 8.4, as detailed below.

"KRPC 1.3

"19. Attorneys must act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing their clients. See KRPC 1.3. The respondent failed to diligently and
promptly represent R.F. in the domestic case. The respondent failed to appear in court,
the respondent failed to obtain a hearing date for the motions, and the respondent failed to
take any action, other than filing the motions, to complete the representation of R.F.
Because the respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing R.F., the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.3.

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"KRPC 1.4

"20. KRPC 1.4(a) provides that '[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably
informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information.' In this case, the respondent violated KRPC 1.4(a) when she repeatedly
failed to respond to requests for information from R.F. Accordingly, the hearing panel
concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.4(a).

"KRPC 1.16

"21. KRPC 1.16 requires lawyers to take certain steps to protect their clients.
In this case, the respondent's conduct violated KRPC 1.16(a) and KRPC 1.16(d). KRPC
1.16(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

'(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not
represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall
withdraw from the representation of a client if:
. . . .
(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition
materially impairs the lawyer's ability to
represent the client.'

The respondent violated KRPC 1.16(a)(2) by failing to withdraw from the representation
after her mental health deteriorated to the point where she was unable to provide
representation to her client.

"22. KRPC 1.16(d) is also applicable in this case. It provides:

'(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take
steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests,
such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which
the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has
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not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to
the extent permitted by other law.'

The respondent violated KRPC 1.16(d) when she failed to return R.F.'s papers, when she
failed to provide an accounting of the fee, and when she failed to return the unearned
attorney fees. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent repeatedly violated KRPC
1.16(d).

"KRPC 8.4(d)

"23. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent engaged in
conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice when she failed to appear in
court on behalf of R.F. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated
KRPC 8.4(d).

"American Bar Association
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

"24. In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating
factors.

"25. Duty Violated. The respondent violated her duty to her client to provide
diligent representation and adequate communication and to the legal system by her failure
to appear for scheduled hearings.

"26. Mental State. The respondent knowingly violated her duty.

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"27. Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused
actual injury to her client.

"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

"28. Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following
aggravating factors present:

"29. Prior Disciplinary Offenses. On April 23, 2007, the respondent entered a
diversion agreement with the disciplinary administrator. In the agreement, the respondent
admitted that she violated KRPC 1.1, KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, and KRPC 1.5. The
respondent successfully completed the terms and conditions of diversion.

"30. In addition, last year, the respondent had another attorney disciplinary
hearing. The Kansas Supreme Court placed that case on hold pending the hearing in the
instant case.

"31. A Pattern of Misconduct. The respondent has engaged in a pattern of
misconduct. The misconduct committed by the respondent in [the] case that gave rise to
the diversion and the misconduct in the case that is currently on hold before the Kansas
Supreme Court involved misconduct similar to the misconduct in this case. As such, the
hearing panel concludes that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of misconduct.

"32. Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule violations.
The respondent violated KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, KRPC 1.16, and KRPC 8.4. Accordingly,
the hearing panel concludes that the respondent committed multiple offenses.

"33. Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme
Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 1998. At the time
of the misconduct, the respondent had been practicing law for more than 15 years.

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"34. Indifference to Making Restitution. The respondent failed to make
restitution to R.F. for the unearned attorney fees, although the hearing panel notes that the
respondent has not had the finances to make restitution as of the hearing.

"35. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following
mitigating circumstances present:

"36. Absence of a Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The respondent's misconduct
does not appear to have been motivated by dishonesty or selfishness.

"37. Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes Have Contributed
to Violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. The respondent suffers from
attention deficit disorder and depression. It is clear that the respondent's mental health
difficulties contributed to her misconduct. The respondent has been working diligently in
psychotherapy and has made excellent progress, according to her clinical psychologist.
Additionally, the respondent has complied with the recommendations to take medication
to treat her mental health conditions. Finally, the chair of the hearing panel noted a
significant improvement in her appearance as compared to her appearance in the previous
attorney disciplinary hearing.

"38. The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her
Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Acknowledgment of the
Transgressions. The respondent fully cooperated with the disciplinary process and fully
and freely acknowledged her misconduct. The respondent accepted full responsibility for
her misconduct.

"39. Remorse. At the hearing on this matter, the respondent expressed
genuine remorse for having engaged in the misconduct.

"40. In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly
examined and considered the following Standards:
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'4.42 Suspension is generally appropriate when:

(a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client
and causes injury or potential injury to a client; or

(b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes
injury or potential injury to a client.'

"Recommendation

"41. Accordingly, based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the
Standards listed above, the hearing panel unanimously recommends that the respondent
be suspended for a period of one year retroactive to April 1, 2013. The hearing panel
further recommends that prior to reinstatement, the respondent be required to undergo a
hearing pursuant to Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 219. The respondent must be prepared to establish,
prior to filing a petition for reinstatement, that she has made full restitution to her clients
and/or the Client Protection Fund.

"42. Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator."

DISCUSSION

In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the
disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of
KRPC exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945,
258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 356).
Clear and convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the
20



truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d
610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]).

Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaints, to which she
filed answers, and adequate notices of both the hearings before the panel and the hearing
before this court. The respondent filed no exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing
reports. As such, the findings of fact are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule 212(c),
(d) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 375).

The evidence before the hearing panel establishes by clear and convincing
evidence the charged misconduct violated KRPC 1.1 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 446)
(competence); 1.3 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 464) (diligence); 1.4(a) (2013 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 484) (communication); 1.15(b) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 553) (safekeeping
property); 1.16(a)(2) and (d) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 569) (termination of
representation); 8.1(b) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 646) (failure to respond to lawful
demand for information from disciplinary authority); 8.4(c) and (d) (2013 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 655) (engaging in conduct involving misrepresentation and engaging in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice); 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice); and Kansas Supreme Court Rule 207(b) (2013 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 336) (failure to cooperate in disciplinary investigation), and it supports the panel's
conclusions of law. We adopt the panel's conclusions.

At the hearing before this court, at which the respondent appeared, the office of
the Disciplinary Administrator recommended that the respondent be suspended for a
period of 1 year and that the respondent undergo a reinstatement hearing, under Kansas
Supreme Court Rule 219 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 407). The respondent agreed with the
recommendation of the Disciplinary Administrator. The Hearing Panel also agreed with
the recommendation of the Disciplinary Administrator.
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We hold that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of 1 year, retroactive to April 1, 2013, and that she be subject to a Rule 219 reinstatement
hearing before her suspension may be lifted. In respondent's motion for reinstatement she
is required to address whether an appropriate plan for supervision and support of her
resumption of the practice of law is needed. At the reinstatement hearing, the respondent
is required to present clear and convincing evidence that she has (1) made full restitution
to her clients and/or the Client Protection Fund, and (2) received adequate mental health
treatment to render her capable of engaging in the active practice of law.

CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Miriam M. Rittmaster be suspended from the
practice of law in the state of Kansas for a period of 1 year, retroactive to April 1, 2013,
in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(2) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 300).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall comply with Supreme Court
Rule 218 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 406) and Rule 219. More specifically, her motion for
reinstatement must address whether an appropriate plan for supervision and support of
her resumption of the practice of law is needed. At the reinstatement hearing, she is
required to present clear and convincing evidence that she has made full restitution and
has received adequate mental health treatment to render her capable of engaging in the
active practice of law.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.

MORITZ, J., not participating.
22




DAVID J. KING, District Judge, assigned.
1

1
REPORTER'S NOTE: District Judge King was appointed to hear cases Nos. 109,836
and 111,126 vice Justice Moritz pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme Court by
art. 3, § 6(f) of the Kansas Constitution.