In re P.R.G.

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Nos. 104,025
104,026

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

In the Matter of

P.R.G.


In the Matter of

J.C.T.


SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.
The general rule is that when a statute is plain and unambiguous, an appellate
court does not speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and will not read into the
statute something not readily found in it. Where there is no ambiguity, the court need not
resort to statutory construction.

2.
An appellate court cannot delete vital provisions or supply vital omissions in a
statute. No matter what the legislature may have really intended to do, if it did not in fact
do it, under any reasonable interpretation of the language used, the defect is one that the
legislature alone can correct.

3.
K.S.A. 77-109 provides: "The common law as modified by constitutional and
statutory law, judicial decisions, and the conditions and wants of the people, shall remain
in force in aid of the General Statutes of this state; but the rule of the common law, that
statutes in derogation thereof shall be strictly construed, shall not be applicable to any
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general statute of this state, but all such statutes shall be liberally construed to promote
their object."

4.
When the legislature has intended to abolish a common-law rule, it has done so in
an explicit manner. In the absence of such an expression of legislative intent, the common
law remains part of our law.

5.
The legislature has not abolished the common-law rule given in In re Clyne, 52
Kan. 441, 35 Pac. 23 (1893).

6.
K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 38-2302(s) defines "warrant" as "a written order by a judge of
the court directed to any law enforcement officer commanding the officer to take into
custody the juvenile named or described therein."

7.
K.S.A. 22-2202(20) defines "warrant" as "a written order made by a magistrate
directed to any law enforcement officer commanding the officer to arrest the person
named or described in the warrant."

8.
The common law of Kansas requires that an accused shall have a prompt and
speedy public trial before the proofs of his or her guilt or innocence have been
obliterated. That basic right would be diminished when a warrant is issued but not
executed without unreasonable delay.


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9.
An arrest warrant is a judicial order that requires service within a reasonable time.
Neither the county attorney nor the sheriff, nor both together, can, by any voluntary act or
by any neglect of official duty, extend the limit of the law.

10.
The common-law rule that a warrant should be executed without unreasonable
delay should be applicable in proceedings under the Revised Kansas Juvenile Justice
Code (KJJC). The common-law rule is a rule to enforce a judicial order and thus ancillary
to judicial authority, not in derogation of legislative intent. Moreover, the rule enforces a
right that is basic to a free society, the right of an accused to be arrested within the statute
of limitations before charges are stale and evidence is lost. Proceedings under the KJJC
are akin to adult criminal proceedings and the same core values protected under the
common law are equally at risk in proceedings under the KJJC.

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; BRUCE C. BROWN and JAMES L. BURGESS, judges.
Opinion filed December 10, 2010. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

Karen R. Palmer, of Kansas Legal Services, of Wichita, for appellants.

Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney, and
Steve Six, attorney general, for appellee.

Before RULON, C.J., GREENE, J., and KNUDSON, S.J.

KNUDSON, J.: This joint appeal by the respondents, P.R.G. and J.C.T., challenges
their juvenile convictions under the Revised Kansas Juvenile Justice Code (KJJC). The
respondents contend that the district court erred in its determination that their
prosecutions were commenced within the applicable 2-year statute of limitations.

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P.R.G.'S UNDERLYING CIRCUMSTANCES

On September 13, 2006, the State filed a complaint alleging that P.R.G., a minor,
consumed alcohol in violation of K.S.A. 41-727(a). The complaint does not state the
month and day of P.R.G.'s birth but does state he was born in 1991. The State claimed
P.R.G.'s consumption of alcohol occurred on July 24, 2006.

The State unsuccessfully attempted to serve P.R.G. at 119 North Main, Viola,
Kansas, 67149, when in fact he lived at 119 South Main. An arrest warrant was issued on
October 4, 2006, for P.R.G. after his failure to appear in court.

P.R.G. was subsequently arrested under the warrant more than 3 years after it was
issued. P.R.G.'s motion to dismiss the underlying complaint on the ground it was barred
by the statute of limitations was denied by the district court. P.R.G. was found guilty of
violating K.S.A. 41-727(a) after a bench trial on stipulated facts. He was ordered to serve
nonreporting probation for 90 days, assessed a fine and costs, and also ordered to undergo
substance abuse counseling as a result of his juvenile conviction. P.R.G. has filed a
timely appeal.

J.C.T.'S UNDERLYING CIRCUMSTANCES

The State filed a complaint alleging that on October 8, 2007, J.C.T. committed
battery in violation of K.S.A. 21-3412(a)(2). The complaint was filed on June 11, 2008.
The complaint does not state the month and day of J.C.T.'s birth, only that he was born in
1990.

The State attempted to serve J.C.T. at his residence by attaching a copy of the
complaint to his door and mailing a copy to his known address. While the address on the
summons was J.C.T.'s correct address, no member of J.C.T.'s household was aware of his
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pending criminal charge. When J.C.T. failed to appear under the complaint, a warrant
was issued for his arrest on August 6, 2008.

J.C.T. was arrested on October 13, 2009, when he was 18 or 19 years old. J.C.T.'s
motion to dismiss the underlying complaint on the ground it was barred by the statute of
limitations was denied by the district court. After a bench trial on stipulated facts, J.C.T.
was found guilty and ordered to pay fines and court costs. J.C.T. has filed a timely notice
of appeal.

DISCUSSION

The respondents argued unsuccessfully to the district court that in order for the
filing of a complaint and issuance of process to toll the running of the statute of
limitations, process must be executed without unreasonable delay. They argued further
that the delay between issuance of process and actual service was unreasonable and as a
consequence the 2-year statute of limitations was not tolled.

In denying the motion of respondents to dismiss, the district court acknowledged
that K.S.A. 21-3106(7) of the Kansas Criminal Code does specifically state: "No such
prosecution shall be deemed to have been commenced if the warrant so issued is not
executed without unreasonable delay," but concluded there was no comparable statute in
the KJJC that would provide protection to a juvenile if there was unreasonable delay in
execution of process. The district court also relied on the reasoning in State v. Edwards,
No. 88,936, an unpublished opinion filed February 13, 2004. In Edwards the defendant
argued that his juvenile prosecution was unnecessarily delayed because of the failure to
serve his arrest warrant for nearly 2 years. The Court of Appeals concluded the issue had
not been raised below and was waived. However, in obiter dictum the appeals panel
stated the argument lacked merit because then K.S.A. 21-3106(5) (now K.S.A. 21-
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3106[7]) only applied to adult criminal prosecutions and there was no comparable statute
in the juvenile code. Edwards, slip op. at 13-14.

On appeal, the respondents acknowledge the KJJC has no statutory provision with
language comparable to K.S.A. 21-3106(7), but argue the concept of unreasonable delay
is derived from the common law of Kansas and is applicable in all prosecutions,
including prosecutions under the juvenile code.

In In re Clyne, 52 Kan. 441, 35 Pac. 23 (1893), the Kansas Supreme Court
engaged in a detailed discussion of the common law:

"It is contended by counsel for the petitioner, first, that the prosecution under
which he is now held is barred by the statute of limitations; that notwithstanding the fact
that the warrant was issued within two years after the commission of the offense, it was
not followed up with service, or an attempt at service, as the law directs. The statute
requires criminal prosecutions of this kind to be commenced within two years after the
commission of the offense. It also provides, that if the person committing the offense
conceals the fact of the crime, the time of concealment is not to be included in the period
of limitation. The legislature has nowhere provided what shall be deemed a
commencement of a criminal prosecution. It was held in In re Griffith, [35 Kan. 377, 11
Pac. 174 (1886)], that the mere filing of a complaint before a magistrate, charging the
party with the commission of the offense, was not such a commencement of the
prosecution as to prevent the running of the statute. It was intimated in that case that the
filing of the complaint, and the issuing of a warrant thereon in good faith, and the
delivery to an officer to execute, was a sufficient commencement of the action to prevent
the bar of the statute; but in this case we have the further question to consider, whether
the defendant can, after the lapse of nearly five months, be taken into custody and
prosecuted, after the filing of the complaint and issuing a warrant thereon, with a
direction on the part of the county attorney—who represents the state—to the sheriff not
to make present service, and where it appears that the defendant is in the county, and
frequently seen by the sheriff, who had frequent opportunities to make the arrest, yet
made no attempt to do so. The command of the warrant, if in the form prescribed by
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statute, is, that the sheriff shall forthwith arrest the defendant. May he then, at the
instance of the prosecuting attorney, disobey the command of his writ, until such time as
the prosecutor may feel prepared to proceed with the examination, and then make the
service? Can the sheriff, merely by neglecting to promptly perform the duty enjoined
upon him by law, extend the period of limitation prescribed by the legislature? and, if so,
where is the limit of his authority? We have examined the cases cited by counsel for the
state, and, while we find language in some of them which seems to be broad enough to
cover this case, they yet are hardly in point. We certainly are not satisfied with any such
construction of the law. We think the better rule is, that the complaint must be filed and
the warrant issued within the period limited by the statute; that it must be issued in good
faith, and with the intention that it be presently served, and that the officer must proceed
to execute it according to its command; that he must make the arrest within a reasonable
time and at the first reasonable opportunity offered him. Neither the county attorney nor
the sheriff, nor both together, can, by any voluntary act or by any neglect of official duty,
extend the limit of the law. This is the logic of the opinion in In re Griffith, above cited,
and is sustained by the weight of authority. (Ross v. Luther, 4 Cow. 158; Clark v. Slayton,
1 Atl. Rep. 113; People v. Clement, 72 Mich. 116; Burdick v. Green, 18 Johns. 13; Mason
v. Cheney, 47 N. H. 244)." (Emphasis added.) 52 Kan. at 446-48.

Subsequent case law embraces the common-law rule of In re Clyne and the impact
of unreasonable delay in the execution of arrest warrants. See State v. Bowman, 106 Kan.
430, 188 Pac. 242 (1920); State v. Waterman, 75 Kan. 253, 88 Pac. 1074 (1907); and In
re Broadhead, 74 Kan. 401, 86 Pac. 458 (1906).

Ultimately, the holding in In re Clyne was embodied in K.S.A. 21-3606(7) when
the 1969 Kansas Crimes Code was enacted. K.S.A. 21-3101 et seq. However, as we
previously noted, the juvenile justice code enacted in 2006 has no comparable statute.
Thus, we approach the heart of the issue before us: Does the judicial rule of In re Clyne
have efficacy regarding prosecutions under the KJJC notwithstanding the lack of a
specific provision within the code?

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K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 38-2301 provides "[t]he primary goals of the juvenile justice
code are to promote public safety, hold juvenile offenders accountable for their behavior
and improve their ability to live more productively and responsibly in the community."
These goals embrace concepts of punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation, much as we
find in our adult criminal proceedings.

As a consequence our Supreme Court in In re L.M., 286 Kan. 460, 186 P.3d 164
(2008), stated:

"In addition to being more aligned with the purpose of the criminal sentencing
statutes, the KJJC also incorporates language similar to that found in the Kansas Criminal
Code, see K.S.A. 21-3101 et seq., and the Kansas Code of Criminal Procedure, see
K.S.A. 22-2101 et seq. Under the [Kansas Juvenile Offender Code] KJOC, juveniles
were required to admit or deny the allegations against them or plead nolo contendere.
K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 38-1633(b). Under the KJJC, a juvenile is required to plead guilty, not
guilty, or nolo contendere like adults charged with a crime. See K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 22-
3208; K.S.A. 38-2344(b). Although both the KJOC and the KJJC refer to an adjudication
rather than a conviction, a 'dispositional proceeding' under the KJOC is now referred to as
a 'sentencing proceeding' in the KJJC. See K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 38-1605; K.S.A. 2006
Supp. 38-2305(c). The 'State youth center' referred to in the KJOC, K.S.A. 1982 Supp.
38-1602(g), is now called a 'Juvenile correctional facility,' K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2302(j),
which is more akin to an adult 'correctional institution,' K.S.A. 21-4602(e). Moreover, the
KJJC emulates the language of the Kansas Criminal Code when it refers to the term of
commitment to a juvenile correctional facility as a 'term of incarceration.' K.S.A. 21-
4603d; K.S.A. 21-4608; K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2374; K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2376. This
conceptualization of juvenile offenders stresses the similarities between child and adult
offenders far more than it does their differences.
"The legislature also emulated the structure of the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines
when it established a sentencing matrix for juveniles based on the level of the offense
committed and, in some cases, the juvenile's history of juvenile adjudications. See K.S.A.
21-4701 et seq.; K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2369. For example, a juvenile offender found
guilty of committing an off-grid felony may be sentenced to 'a juvenile correctional
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facility for a minimum term of 60 months and up to a maximum term of the offender
reaching the age of 22 years, six months.' K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2369(a)(1). A juvenile
offender found guilty of committing a level 7, 8, 9, or 10 person felony with one prior
felony adjudication may be sentenced to 'a juvenile correctional facility for a minimum
term of nine months and up to a maximum term of 18 months.' K.S.A. 2006 Supp.
2369(a)(2)(B).
"Like the adult sentencing guidelines, the KJJC allows the sentencing judge to
depart from the juvenile placement matrix upon a motion by the State or the sentencing
judge. K.S.A. 21-4718; K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2371. The KJJC sentencing judge may
consider the aggravating factors from K.S.A. 21-4716(c)(2) or K.S.A. 21-4717(a). K.S.A.
2006 Supp. 38-2371(a)(3). If the sentencing judge departs from the presumptive sentence,
he or she must state on the record the substantial and compelling reasons for the
departure just as if he or she were sentencing an adult offender. See K.S.A. 21-4716(a);
K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2371(d). Although any juvenile sentence within the presumptive
sentencing range is not subject to appeal, juvenile departure sentences, like adult
departure sentences, may be appealed. K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2380(b)(2)(A); (b)(3);
(b)(4).
"The KJJC is also similar to the adult sentencing guidelines in imposing a term of
after-care on any juvenile sentenced in accordance with the juvenile placement matrix.
See K.S.A. 21-4703(p); K.S.A. 21-4704(e)(2); K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2369. Another
similarity between the KJJC and the adult sentencing guidelines is the juvenile offender's
opportunity to earn good time credits to reduce his or her term of incarceration. K.S.A.
21-4722; K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2370.
"In addition to reflecting the provisions of the sentencing guidelines, the KJJC
also establishes sentencing options that are similar to those available for adult offenders.
Both adults and juveniles may be sentenced to probation; a community-based program;
house arrest; a short-term behavior-modification program like a sanctions house or
conservation camp; placement in an out-of-home facility; or incarceration in a
correctional facility. K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2302; K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2361(a)(1), (2),
(9), (10), (11), (12); K.S.A. 21-4603d(a)(1), (3), (4), (5), (6); K.S.A. 21-4610(c)(9). The
district court also has authority to order both adults and juveniles to attend counseling;
drug and alcohol evaluations; mediation; or educational programs. K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-
2361(a)(4); K.S.A. 21-4603d(a)(7), (c); K.S.A. 21-4610(c)(9). In addition, the district
court may require both adults and juveniles to perform charitable or community service;
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pay restitution; or pay a fine. K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2361(a)(6), (7), (8); K.S.A. 21-
4603d(a)(2), (b); K.S.A. 21-4610(c)(10). Sentencing of juveniles has become much more
congruent with the adult model." 286 Kan. at 466-69.

The In re L.M. court concluded:

"These changes to the juvenile justice system have eroded the benevolent parens
patriae character that distinguished it from the adult criminal system. The United States
Supreme Court relied on the juvenile justice system's characteristics of fairness, concern,
sympathy, and paternal attention in concluding that juveniles were not entitled to a jury
trial. McKeiver [v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550, 91 S. Ct. 1976, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647,
(1971)]. Likewise, this court relied on that parens patriae character in reaching its
decision in Findlay [v. State, 235 Kan. 462, 681 P.2d 20 (1984)]. However, because the
juvenile justice system is now patterned after the adult criminal system, we conclude that
the changes have superseded the McKeiver and Findlay Courts' reasoning and those
decisions are no longer binding precedent for us to follow. Based on our conclusion that
the Kansas juvenile justice system has become more akin to an adult criminal
prosecution, we hold that juveniles have a constitutional right to a jury trial under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. As a result, K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2344(d), which
provides that a juvenile who pleads not guilty is entitled to a 'trial to the court,' and
K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2357, which gives the district court discretion in determining
whether a juvenile should be granted a jury trial, are unconstitutional." 286 Kan. at 469-
70.

In In re D.E.R., 290 Kan. 306, 225 P.3d 1187 (2010), the Supreme Court
considered whether a juvenile charged with an offense that would constitute a felony
under the crimes code should have the right to a preliminary hearing. Justice Johnson,
after concluding there was no statutory basis for requiring a preliminary hearing in a
juvenile proceeding, turned to the issue of constitutional requirements and stated:

"Apparently, some have interpreted In re L.M. to mean that, because a juvenile
proceeding is akin to a criminal prosecution for purposes of the right to a jury trial,
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juvenile proceedings must also utilize all of the same statutory procedures as a criminal
prosecution. Such an interpretation reads too much into In re L.M. That decision was
founded upon a juvenile's entitlement to a constitutional right. At most, In re L.M.'s
equating of juvenile proceedings and criminal prosecutions would support the proposition
that juveniles are entitled to all of the constitutional rights which adult criminal
defendants possess, not that juvenile proceedings must look exactly the same as a
criminal prosecution." 290 Kan. at 311.

Justice Johnson noted that an adult's right to a preliminary hearing is simply a
statutory right; a right neither mandated by general constitutional privileges nor
implicating due process concerns, and concluded:

"Without the need to accommodate constitutional concerns, this court is without
the authority to declare that a juvenile is entitled to a K.S.A. 22-2902 preliminary
examination, when neither that statute nor the Juvenile Code provides for such a
procedure. It would be the legislature's place to create a mechanism for juvenile
preliminary examinations. Accordingly, we find that the district court erred in holding
that D.E.R. was entitled to a K.S.A. 22-2902 preliminary examination, and our answer to
the question reserved, as it relates to that ruling, is no." 290 Kan. at 313.

In summary, In re L.M. and In re D.E.R. together tell us: (1) The KJJC is
patterned after the adult criminal code, including the designation of proceedings as
prosecutions; and (2) juveniles may be entitled to constitutional protections that are
extended to adult offenders, but generally not statutory rules of procedure unless
specifically provided for in the KJJC.

We note the language of K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 38-2303(f) and K.S.A. 21-3106(5) is
identical in substance. However, there is no corollary subsection in K.S.A. 2009 Supp.
38-2303 to that contained in K.S.A. 21-3106(7) concerning the effect of unreasonable
delay in the execution of an arrest warrant. The general rule is that when a statute is plain
and unambiguous, an appellate court does not speculate as to the legislative intent behind
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it and will not read into the statute something not readily found in it. Where there is no
ambiguity, the court need not resort to statutory construction. State v. Trautloff, 289 Kan.
793, 796, 217 P.3d 15 (2009). Our Kansas Supreme Court has also held:

"A court cannot delete vital provisions or supply vital omissions in a statute. No matter
what the legislature may have really intended to do, if it did not in fact do it, under any
reasonable interpretation of the language used, the defect is one that the legislature alone
can correct." State v. Urban, 291 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 1, 239 P.3d 837 (2010).

Under a plain reading of K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 38-2303 it would appear there is no room for
applying rules of construction to ascertain legislative intent. However, while fully
embracing what was said in In re D.E.R., we find the issue before us to be more nuanced
because of the law enunciated in In re Clyne.

The respondents argue that there is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that the
legislature intended by its silence in the KJCC to abrogate the common-law rule adopted
by the Supreme Court almost a century earlier, or that the legislature viewed the policies
underlying the statutes of limitations as different for juveniles than for adults.

K.S.A. 77-109 provides:

"The common law as modified by constitutional and statutory law, judicial
decisions, and the conditions and wants of the people, shall remain in force in aid of the
General Statutes of this state; but the rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation
thereof shall be strictly construed, shall not be applicable to any general statute of this
state, but all such statutes shall be liberally construed to promote their object."

As observed in In re Estate of Mettee, 10 Kan. App. 2d 184, 694 P.2d 1325, aff'd
237 Kan. 652, 702 P.2d 1381 (1985), when the legislature has intended to abolish a
common-law rule, it has done so in an explicit manner. In the absence of such an
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expression of legislative intent, the common law remains part of our law. See In re Frye,
173 Kan. 392, 246 P.2d 313 (1952).

We hold the legislature has not abolished the common-law rule given in In re
Clyne and subsequently embraced in other reported cases. See State v. Dozal, 31 Kan.
App. 2d 344, 65 P.3d 217 (2003); and State v. Washington, 12 Kan. App. 2d 634, 752
P.2d 1084, rev. denied 243 Kan. 781 (1988). The difficult question is whether the rule
should be made applicable to proceedings under the KJJC. We conclude that it should for
the following reasons.

K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 38-2302(s) defines "warrant" as "a written order by a judge of
the court directed to any law enforcement officer commanding the officer to take into
custody the juvenile named or described therein."

K.S.A. 22-2202(20) defines "warrant" as "a written order made by a magistrate
directed to any law enforcement officer commanding the officer to arrest the person
named or described in the warrant."

In In re Griffith, 35 Kan. 377, 11 Pac. 174 (1886), the Supreme Court provided
foundation for the common-law rule fashioned in In re Clyne where the mere filing of a
criminal complaint without issuance of a warrant was considered. In concluding that the
filing of the complaint was insufficient to toll the running of the statute of limitations, the
court stated:

"The policy of the law is, that the accused shall have a prompt and speedy public trial
before the proofs of his guilt or innocence have been obliterated. This purpose would not
be accomplished by holding that the filing of a complaint alone operated as a bar to the
statute [of limitations], because complaints might be lodged before magistrates upon
which no warrants would issue or arrests be made, and of which the public, as well as the
accused, would have no knowledge until such time as interested persons might cause
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warrants to be issued and arrests to be made. If this were permitted, prosecutions for
supposed offenses could thus be kept alive and delayed indefinitely, and the accused, who
at first was prepared with the proofs of his innocence, might, after the period of
limitation fixed by the law, be lulled into a sense of security, and fail to preserve such
proofs; and when a warrant is issued long after the statutory limitation, as was done in
this case, he might, by reason of the delay, be entirely unprepared to meet the charge."
(Emphasis added.) 35 Kan. at 380.

The common-law rule fashioned in In re Griffith recognizes the basic right of an
accused in a free society to be charged and brought before the bar of justice in a timely
manner without unreasonable delay. That basic right would be diminished when a
warrant is issued but not executed without unreasonable delay. Thus, in In re Clyne the
court implicitly recognizes an arrest warrant is a judicial order that requires service
within a reasonable time when it stated "[n]either the county attorney nor the sheriff, nor
both together, can, by any voluntary act or by any neglect of official duty, extend the
limit of the law." In re Clyne, 52 Kan. at 448.

We conclude the common-law rule given to us in In re Clyne should be applicable
in proceedings under the KJJC. The common-law rule is neither fish nor fowl to be fit
neatly within the holdings in In re L.M. or In re D.E.R. Instead, it is a rule to enforce a
judicial order and thus ancillary to judicial authority, not in derogation of legislative
intent. Moreover, the rule enforces a right that is basic to a free society, the right of an
accused to be arrested within the statute of limitations before charges are stale and
evidence is lost. Proceedings under the KJJC are akin to adult criminal proceedings and
the same core values protected under the common law are equally at risk in juvenile
proceedings. Finally, the rule applied in juvenile proceedings will deter the untimely
reach of the KJJC to arrest adults on stale warrants for offenses committed years earlier
during their adolescence.

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P.R.G.'s appeal affords us a case study as to why the common-law rule should be
applied. When P.R.G. was 15 or 16 years of age, he ostensibly consumed alcohol in
violation of K.S.A. 41-727(a), a class C misdemeanor. A complaint was promptly filed
with an arrest warrant issued on October 4, 2006. Notwithstanding that P.R.G. lived in
the small town of Viola, Kansas, at all times material, it was not until October 31, 2009, 3
years after the warrant was issued by a judge that P.R.G. was arrested under the warrant.
The district court ruled that under K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 38-2327 the action was commenced
when process was issued and denied the motion to dismiss.

If P.R.G. had been subject to prosecution as an adult, under the undisputed facts,
his claim that the statute of limitations had run would have been sustained. See K.S.A.
21-3106(7). At the time of his arrest, P.R.G. was 18 or 19 years old and required to
answer a 3-year-old complaint for a class C misdemeanor in juvenile court. We conclude
that as a matter of law, his conviction must be vacated and the underlying juvenile
proceeding dismissed.

In the case of J.C.T., the underlying offense occurred on October 8, 2007, and the
arrest warrant was executed on October 31, 2009. Under this acknowledged time line we
are not persuaded that the determination can be made on appeal whether the warrant was
executed without unreasonable delay. Accordingly, we remand for further evidentiary
hearing.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.