In re Harris

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 105,340

In the Matter of KEVIN C. HARRIS,
Respondent.


ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE

Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed July 22, 2011. Disbarment.

Kimberly L. Knoll, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Stanton A.
Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, was with her on the formal complaint for the petitioner.

Kevin C. Harris, respondent, argued the cause pro se.

Per Curiam: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office
of the Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Kevin C. Harris, of
Kansas City, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1985.

On June 4, 2010, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of
Professional Conduct (KRPC). The Disciplinary Administrator then filed an
amended complaint on July 26, 2010. Respondent answered the amended
complaint on September 9, 2010. A panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of
Attorneys conducted a hearing on the complaint on September 10, 2010, at which
the respondent was personally present. The hearing panel determined that
respondent violated Kansas Supreme Court Rules 207(b) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
308) (failure to cooperate in disciplinary investigation), 208(c) (2010 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 320) (failure to notify Clerk of the Appellate Courts of change of address),
211(b) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 327) (failure to file timely answer in disciplinary
proceeding), and 218(a) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 370) (failure to notify clients
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upon suspension). At the conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this
court:

"FINDINGS OF FACT
. . . .
"2. On December 10, 2007, Washington Mutual Bank (the 'Bank') filed suit
against Marvin M. Pottratz, deceased, et al., Case No. 07CV9785 in the District Court of
Johnson County, Kansas. The nature of the case was a mortgage foreclosure.

"3. Dale Angle Wesselman is an over‐the‐road truck driver who had entered
into an installment sale contract to purchase the property from Mr. Pottratz. The contract
pre‐dated the mortgage but was never recorded. Mr. Wesselman completed all obligations
under the installment sale contract; however, the property was never deeded to him and
no indication of the sale appeared of record.

"4. The Bank joined Mr. Wesselman into the lawsuit on February 5, 2008,
and obtained service on him on that same date.

"5. The Respondent had previously represented Mr. Wesselman on a
landlord/tenant case and agreed to represent Mr. Wesselman in this matter. The
understanding between the parties was that the Respondent would represent Mr.
Wesselman to protect against a default judgment but was going to seek other counsel who
would either assist the Respondent or enter their appearance because the Respondent did
not do mortgage foreclosures.

"6. Mr. Wesselman gave the Respondent all of the documentation Mr.
Wesselman had regarding the property and transactions with Pottratz at the time the
Respondent was hired. This included 'contracts on the deed' and evidence of payments.
Mr. Wesselman stated that this included 'every piece of paper that I had to deal with my
house, the Courts, anything to do with Marvin Pottratz against me on that property. I
turned over my whole pile to him.'

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"7. The official docket sheet of the Johnson County District Court . . .
indicates the following somewhat inconsistent entries which are listed by file‐stamp date:

02‐25‐2008 Entry of Appearance (Kevin C. Harris)
02‐25‐2008 Clerks Extension of Time (For Dale Wesselman & Betty
Wesselman)
03‐05‐2008 Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice
03‐05‐2008 Changed Case Status: From: Pending To: Case Terminated
(Dismissed)
03‐07‐2008 Motion to Extend Time to Answer (Wesselmans) [Filed by
Harris]
03‐10‐2008 Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice
05‐28‐2008 Changed Case Status: From: Reopened To: Case Terminated
(Default Judgment)
06‐09‐2008 Journal Entry of Judgment, for Pl.
06‐26‐2008 Order of Sale

"8. On June 27, 2008, the Kansas Supreme Court issued an order suspending
the Respondent's license to practice law for a period of two years. In re Harris, 286 Kan.
532, 186 P.3d 737 (2008). Within days of his suspension, the Respondent moved out of
his office on State Avenue. The Respondent testified that he told Mr. Wesselman four or
five days after the order of suspension was published that he had been suspended and that
he told him this again when they met on July 8, 2008. Mr. Wesselman testified that he
first learned of the Respondent's suspension when he found out his house was up for sale
and went to the courthouse to investigate.

"9. The Respondent testified that following the Order of Dismissal Without
Prejudice he received nothing from the Court, other counsel, or Mr. Wesselman about
this matter until Mr. Wesselman called him on the Wednesday or Thursday before July 8,
2008, to tell him the property had been sold at a Sheriff's sale. During the call they agreed
to meet on July 8, 2008. The Disciplinary Administrator offered nothing contrary to the
Respondent's testimony and presented no evidence that the Respondent was or should
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have been aware that the case status was other than dismissed prior to Mr. Wesselman's
call.

"10. On July 8, 2008, the Respondent and Mr. Wesselman met at a bank in
Kansas. There, the Respondent provided Mr. Wesselman with a letter informing him that
he was unable to continue to represent him. This was the first written notice Mr.
Wesselman received of the Respondent's suspension. The Respondent informed Mr.
Wesselman that Kent O. Docking was taking over his cases, including Mr. Wesselman's
case. The Respondent presented Mr. Wesselman with an 'Affidavit of Equitable Interest'
that Harris had prepared in Mr. Docking's office. The Respondent directed Mr.
Wesselman to review and sign the affidavit before a notary public. The affidavit was later
filed with the court along with a 'Motion to Set Aside Jugement [sic], Stay Sale of
Property and File Answer Instanter.'

"11. Thereafter, Mr. Wesselman met with Mr. Docking and paid Mr. Docking
an attorney fee to represent him. Mr. Docking entered his appearance in behalf of Mr.
Wesselman.

"12. The Respondent testified that after Mr. Wesselman agreed to hire Mr.
Docking on July 8, 2008, or July 9, 200[8], he returned some papers to Mr. Wesselman
and delivered the balance of the file to Mr. Docking.

"13. In May 2009, the Kansas Supreme Court disbarred Mr. Docking.

"14. In June 2009, after Mr. Wesselman learned that he was being evicted
from his property, he went to see the Honorable James F. Vano, the judge presiding over
the case. Mr. Wesselman told Judge Vano that the Respondent never advised him that
judgment had been entered against him, nor that his home was going to be sold.

"15. The Honorable Stephen R. Tatum, the Chief Judge of the Johnson
County District Court, set aside the eviction order and appointed Greg Blume to represent
Mr. Wesselman. Judge Tatum included the following in his order:

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'The defendant, Wesselman, has been represented in this matter by Kevin
C. Harris (KS Bar No. 12515) and by Kent Docking (KS Bar No.
12265). Neither attorney filed any notice or motion for withdrawal.

'On June 27, 2008, the Kansas Supreme Court entered its decision
suspending Kevin C. Harris from the practice of law for a period of two
years. In re Harris, Case No. 99,705.

'On May 20, 2009, the Kansas Supreme Court entered its decision and
disbarment order against Kent O. Docking. In re Docking, Bar Docket
No. 12,265.

'Neither counsel appears to have taken steps to communicate with the
client, Wesselman, provide his file or protect his interests in the
captioned case or otherwise comply with Kansas Supreme Court Rule
218. Furthermore it appears the affairs of the client are and have been
neglected in this matter.'

"16. Judge Tatum forwarded a copy of his order to the Office of the
Disciplinary Administrator. The Disciplinary Administrator docketed a complaint for
investigation and the matter was assigned to the Wyandotte County Ethics and Grievance
Committee for investigation. John Duma, the Chairman of the Wyandotte County Ethics
and Grievance Committee assigned Sheryl Lidtke to investigate the case.

"17. On July 25, 2009, the Respondent provided a written response to the
complaint. The Respondent's response consisted of the following:

'On July 8th, I received a letter from Frank Diehl dated June 24th. The
envelope was postmarked July 6, 2009. Enclosed with that letter was an
enclosed copy of an ex parte Order from Judge Tatum.

'On June 15th I called Dale Wesselman in the morning. When he
answered he said he wanted to talk to his attorney before talking to me.
He called late that afternoon. In our conversation he admitted receiving
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the letter that I handed him notifying him that I was unable to represent
him. He also acknowledged that at the time I handed him the letter he
had some money from his brother to retain an attorney, which he
immediately did. That attorney entered his appearance in Mr.
Wesselman's case, thus ending my active interest in that matter as the
record reflects.

'Further in our conversation on the 15th, Mr. Wesselman told me that if I
provided money for fees and did legal work for him he said he would try
to do something to help me in my legal troubles arising from Judge
Tatum's Order.

'When Mr. Wesselman's new attorney called me the next morning (June
16th) I told him of that demand. I believe that he made a tape of that
conversation.

'I have filed a Notice of Appeal of Judge Tatum's Order. I shall forward a
copy of the Docketing Statement when it is filed.'

"18. On September 14, 2009, Ms. Lidtke wrote to the Respondent requesting
that the Respondent call to schedule an interview and that the Respondent provide her
with a copy of the letter he provided to Mr. Wesselman. The Respondent did not contact
Ms. Lidtke nor did he provide her with a copy of the letter that he provided to Mr.
Wesselman.

"19. On October 1, 2009, Mr. Duma wrote to the Respondent and reminded
him of his obligation to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation.

"20. The Respondent attempted to docket an appeal of the court's order with
the Kansas Appellate Courts. However, on December 3, 2009, the clerk's office returned
the Respondent's docketing statement to him because he was not a party to the action.

"21. On December 7, 2009, Mr. Duma forwarded documents that he received
from the Respondent to Ms. Lidtke. According to Mr. Duma's letter, he spoke by
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telephone with the Respondent on December 4, 2009. Again, Mr. Duma reminded the
Respondent of his obligation to cooperate in the investigation.

"22. On December 16, 2009, Ms. Lidtke wrote to the Respondent for a second
time. Ms. Lidtke reminded the Respondent of her earlier requests. The Respondent did
not respond to Ms. Lidtke's December 16, 2009, letter. The Respondent never met with
Ms. Lidtke pursuant to her request nor did he ever provide a copy of the letter that he
provided to Mr. Wesselman on July 8, 2008.

"23. Mr. Wesselman's documents that the Respondent delivered to Mr.
Docking have never been returned and cannot be located.

"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

"1. Based upon the findings of fact, the Hearing Panel concludes as a matter
of law that the Respondent violated Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207, Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208, Kan.
Sup. Ct. R. 211, and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 218, as detailed below. (Footnote: The Deputy
Disciplinary Administrator also alleged that the Respondent violated KRPC 1.3, KRPC
1.4, and KRPC 1.16. However, the Deputy Disciplinary Administrator failed to present
evidence to establish a violation of those rules. Accordingly, the Hearing Panel dismisses
the allegations that the Respondent violated KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, and KRPC 1.16.)

"2. Lawyers must cooperate in disciplinary investigations. Kan. Sup. Ct. R.
207(b) provides the requirements in this regard.

'It shall be the duty of each member of the bar of this state to aid
the Supreme Court, the Disciplinary Board, and the Disciplinary
Administrator in investigations concerning complaints of misconduct,
and to communicate to the Disciplinary Administrator any information
he or she may have affecting such matters.'

The Respondent knew that he was required to cooperate in the disciplinary
investigation—he had been instructed to do so in writing by the Disciplinary
Administrator, by Mr. Duma, and by Ms. Lidtke. Because the Respondent knowingly
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failed to provide a copy of the letter given to Mr. Wesselman and because the Respondent
failed to submit to an interview by Ms. Lidtke, the Hearing Panel concludes that the
Respondent violated Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(b).

"3. Attorneys are required to notify the Clerk of the Appellate Courts of any
change of address within thirty days. Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208(c). In this case, the
Respondent did not provide the Clerk of the Appellate Courts with his current address
until June 28, 2010, two years after his address changed. Accordingly, the Hearing Panel
concludes that the Respondent violated Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208(c).

"4. The Kansas Supreme Court Rules require attorneys to file Answers to
Formal Complaints. Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(b) provide the requirements:

'The Respondent shall serve an answer upon the Disciplinary
Administrator within twenty days after the service of the complaint
unless such time is extended by the Disciplinary Administrator or the
hearing panel.'

Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(b). The Respondent filed an Answer to the Formal Complaint on
September 9, 2010, the day before the hearing. The Respondent's Answer was not timely.
As such, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent violated Kan. Sup. Ct. R.
211(b) by failing to file a timely written Answer to the Formal Complaint.

"5. Upon suspension or disbarment, attorney must take certain action. Kan.
Sup. Ct. R. 218(a) provides the requirements in this regard:

'In the event any attorney licensed to practice law in Kansas shall
hereafter be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law pursuant to
these Rules, or shall voluntarily surrender his or her license, such attorney
shall forthwith notify in writing each client or person represented by him
or her in pending matters, of his or her inability to undertake further
representation of such client after the effective date of such order, and
shall also notify in writing such client to obtain other counsel in each such
matter. As to clients involved in pending litigation or administrative
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proceedings, such attorney shall also notify in writing the appropriate
court or administrative body, along with opposing counsel, of such
inability to further proceed, and shall file an appropriate motion to
withdraw as counsel of record.'

Upon suspension, the Respondent was required to notify his clients, opposing counsel,
and the courts of his inability to continue the representation. The Respondent failed to
'forthwith notify in writing' Mr. Wesselman of his suspension from the practice of law.
Accordingly, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent violated Kan. Sup. Ct. R.
218(a). The Respondent also did not notify the Court or opposing counsel in Mr.
Wesselman's case, but because no evidence was presented to refute the Respondent's
testimony that he was unaware the case [was] reinstated following its dismissal, no
violation results from this omission.

"6. While suspended, the Respondent met with Mr. Wesselman, presented to
him an affidavit of equitable interest and discussed the pending matter. The Respondent
testified that he did this to assist Mr. Docking. KRPC 5.5 prohibits a suspended lawyer
from advising clients or assisting another lawyer by meeting directly with clients. The
Respondent, by his own testimony, admitted violating this prohibition; however, this
point was not raised prior to the hearing.

"7. It is appropriate to consider violations not specifically included in the
Formal Complaint under certain circumstances. The law in this regard was thoroughly
examined in State v. Caenen, 235 Kan. 451, 681 P.2d 639 (1984), as follows:

'Supreme Court Rule 211(b) (232 Kan. clxvi), requires the
formal complaint in a disciplinary proceeding to be sufficiently clear and
specific to inform the respondent of the alleged misconduct.

'The seminal decision regarding the applicability of the due
process clause to lawyer disciplinary proceedings is found in In re
Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S. Ct. 1222, 20 L. Ed. 2d 117, reh. denied 391
U.S. 961 (1968). There the United States Supreme Court held that a
lawyer charged with misconduct in lawyer disciplinary proceedings is
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entitled to procedural due process, and that due process includes fair
notice of the charges sufficient to inform and provide a meaningful
opportunity for explanation and defense.

'Decisions subsequent to Ruffalo have refined the concept of due
process as it applies to lawyer disciplinary hearings, and suggest that the
notice to be provided be more in the nature of that provided in civil
cases. The weight of authority appears to be that, unlike due process
provided in criminal actions, there are no stringent or technical
requirements in setting forth allegations or descriptions of alleged
offenses. . . . Due process requires only that the charges must be
sufficiently clear and specific to inform the attorney of the misconduct
charged, but the state is not required to plead specific rules, since it is the
factual allegations against which the attorney must defend. . . . However,
if specific rules are pled, the state is thereafter limited to such specific
offenses. . . .

'Subsequent to the Ruffalo decision, the due process
requirements in lawyer disciplinary proceedings have been given
exhaustive treatment by this court. In State v. Turner, 217 Kan. 574, 538
P.2d 966 (1975), 87 A.L.R. 3d 337, the court summarized prior Kansas
and federal precedent on the question, including Ruffalo, and held in
accordance with established precedent that the state need not set forth in
its complaint the specific disciplinary rules allegedly violated . . ., nor is
it required to plead specific allegations of misconduct. . . . What is
required was simply stated therein:

'"'We must conclude that where the facts in connection with the charge
are clearly set out in the complaint a respondent is put on notice as to
what ethical violations may arise therefrom. . . .

. . . .

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'"'It is not incumbent on the board to notify the respondent of charges of
specific acts of misconduct as long as proper notice is given of the basic
factual situation out of which the charges might result.'"'

235 Kan. at 458‐59. Thus, only when the Formal Complaint alleges facts that would
support findings of violations of additional rules, will considering additional violations be
allowed. In this case, the Formal Complaint does not include sufficient facts to give a
contention that the Respondent violated KRPC 5.5. The Hearing Panel concludes that it is
not proper to consider a violation of KRPC 5.5.

"AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
"STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS

"In making this recommendation for discipline, the Hearing Panel considered the
factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors to be considered
are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by
the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.

"Duty Violated. The Respondent violated his duty to the legal system to comply
with court rules. Additionally, the Respondent violated his duty to the legal profession to
cooperate in the disciplinary investigation.

"Mental State. The Respondent knowingly and intentionally violated his duties.

"Injury. As a result of the Respondent's misconduct, the Respondent caused
actual or potential injury to his client, to the legal system, and to the legal profession.

"Aggravating or Mitigating Factors. Aggravating circumstances are any
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be
imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the Hearing Panel, in this case,
found the following aggravating factors present:

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"Prior Disciplinary Offenses. The Respondent has been previously disciplined on
four occasions. Following a hearing before a Hearing Panel of the Kansas Board for
Discipline of Attorneys, on April 26, 1994, the Respondent was informally admonished
by the Disciplinary Administrator for failing to diligently represent his client, for failing
to appear in court in behalf of his client, and for failing to forward the fine and costs to
the Court in behalf of his client.

"On March 14, 1997, the Kansas Supreme Court placed the Respondent on
supervised probation for two years for having engaged in misconduct. Specifically, the
Respondent violated MRPC 1.15, MRPC 1.4, MRPC 1.16(a)(3), MRPC 1.16(d), and
MRPC 1.5(a). In re Harris, 261 Kan. 1063 (1997).

"On January 28, 2002, the Disciplinary Administrator informally admonished the
Respondent for failing to provide diligent representation in an appellate case.

"On June 27, 2008, the Kansas Supreme Court suspended the Respondent's
license to practice law in the State of Kansas for a period of two years for having violated
KRPC 3.1, KRPC 3.2, and KRPC 3.4(d).

"Pattern of Misconduct. The Respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct by
repeatedly ignoring requests for information from Ms. Lidtke.

"Multiple Offenses. The Respondent committed multiple offenses by violating
Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207, Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208, Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211, and Kan. Sup. Ct. R.
218.

"Bad Faith Obstruction of the Disciplinary Proceeding by Intentionally Failing
to Comply with Rules or Orders of the Disciplinary Process. The Respondent obstructed
the disciplinary proceeding, in bad faith, by repeatedly failing to comply with the
requests of Ms. Lidtke.

"Refusal to Acknowledge Wrongful Nature of Conduct. The Respondent has
refused to acknowledge that he was required to change his registered address with the
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Clerk of the Kansas Supreme Court, as required by Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208. Additionally,
the Respondent also failed to take responsibility [for] the other violations.

"Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Respondent has substantial
experience in the practice of law. The Kansas Supreme Court first admitted the
Respondent to the practice in 1985.

"Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify a
reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its recommendation for
discipline, the Hearing Panel, in this case, found the following mitigating circumstances
present:

"Absence of a Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The Respondent's misconduct does
not appear to have been motivated by dishonesty or selfishness.

"Remoteness of Prior Offenses. The Respondent's offenses that lead to discipline
in 1994, 1997, and 2002 are remote in time and character to the instant offenses.
Additionally, the Respondent's conduct that [led] to the Respondent's 2008 suspension is
remote in character to the current case.

"In addition to the above‐cited factors, the Hearing Panel has thoroughly
examined and considered the following Standards:

'8.1 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer

(a) intentionally or knowingly violates the terms of a prior
disciplinary order and such violation causes injury or potential
injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession;
or

(b) has been suspended for the same or similar misconduct, and
intentionally or knowingly engages in further acts of misconduct
that cause injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the
legal system, or the profession.'
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"RECOMMENDATION

"The Disciplinary Administrator recommended that the Respondent be disbarred.
The Respondent took the position that he did not engage in any misconduct and that the
complaint should be dismissed.

"The hearing held on September 10, 2010, was the Respondent's fourth hearing
before a Hearing Panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys. Following each
hearing, the Respondent received discipline. The Respondent's disciplinary history is
significant and because he continued to violate the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct
and the Kansas Supreme Court rules after his extensive contact with the disciplinary
process, disbarment is appropriate.

"Based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the Standards listed
above, the Hearing Panel unanimously recommends that the Respondent be disbarred.

"Costs are assessed against the Respondent in an amount to be certified by the
Office of the Disciplinary Administrator.

"After the hearing on the Formal Complaint, held on September 24, 2010, the
Respondent filed a Motion to Reconsider the Decision of the Hearing Panel seeking
dismissal of the Hearing Panel's decision regarding a violation of Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207
and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208(c). The Respondent cited and sent to the Presiding Officer an
original letter and envelope that investigator Sheryl Lidtke sent to the Respondent dated
September 14, 2009, on the stationery of her employer, Wyandotte District Attorney
Jerome A. Gorman. This information was consistent with the evidence presented at the
hearing but the motion was premature. The Respondent was so advised."

DISCUSSION

In a disciplinary proceeding, we consider the evidence, the findings of the
disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determine whether
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violations of the KRPC exist and, if they do, the discipline to be imposed.
Attorney misconduct must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re
Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 610 (2009); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f)
(2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 327). Clear and convincing evidence is "'evidence that
causes the factfinder to believe that "the truth of the facts asserted is highly
probable."'" Lober, 288 Kan. at 505 (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188
P.3d 1 [2008]).

Here, the respondent failed to file exceptions to the hearing panel's final
hearing report. As such, the findings of fact are deemed admitted. Supreme Court
Rule 212(d) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 344). We conclude the hearing panel's
findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, the only issue
before us is the appropriate discipline.

At the hearing before this court, at which the respondent appeared, the
office of the Disciplinary Administrator reiterated its recommendation that the
respondent be disbarred. The respondent argued against disbarment and suggested
to the court that at most, he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of 1
year to be applied retroactively beginning July 1, 2010, the date he would have
been eligible to apply for reinstatement following his 2-year suspension had he
chosen to do so. In re Harris, 286 Kan. 532, 186 P.3d 737 (2008).

We decline the respondent's invitation to impose a lesser sanction than that
recommended by the Board and the Disciplinary Administrator. As the hearing
panel noted, the respondent has had extensive contact with the disciplinary process
resulting in respondent receiving (1) an informal admonishment in 1994 for failing
to diligently represent his client, failing to appear in court on behalf of a client,
and failing to forward a fine and costs to the court on behalf of a client; (2)
supervised probation for 2 years in 1997 for having engaged in misconduct,
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including violations of MRPC 1.15 (1996 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 302), 1.16(a)(3) and
(d) (1996 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 310), 1.4 (1996 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 270), and 1.5(a)
(1996 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 276), In re Harris, 261 Kan. 1063, 934 P.2d 965 (1997);
(3) an informal admonition in 2002 for failing to provide diligent representation in
an appellate case; and (4) a 2-year suspension in 2008 for respondent's violations
of KRPC 3.1 (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 500), 3.2 (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 503),
and 3.4(d) (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 514), In re Harris, 286 Kan. 532.

When these prior disciplinary offenses are considered along with the
respondent's multiple offenses in this case, including violations of Kansas
Supreme Court Rules 207, 208, 211, and 218, we find disbarment is the
appropriate discipline.

In so holding, we note that the Disciplinary Administrator did not challenge
the panel's conclusion that it was not permitted to consider allegations that the
respondent violated KRPC 5.5 (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 579) because those
allegations were not included in the formal complaint. We make no findings
regarding this determination by the panel but point out that the violations found by
the panel are more than sufficient to justify the discipline imposed, even absent the
allegations the panel declined to consider.

CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that respondent, Kevin C. Harris, be disbarred
from the practice of law in the state of Kansas, effective on filing of this opinion,
in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(1) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 276).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Kevin C. Harris comply with Supreme Court
Rule 218 (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 370).
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to
the respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.