IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
No. 99,646
In the Matter of STEPHEN JAY DENNIS,
Respondent.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed July 18, 2008. Disbarment.
Stanton A. Hazlett, disciplinary administrator, argued the cause and was on the brief for petitioner.
Stephen J. Dennis, respondent, argued the cause and was on the brief pro se.
Per Curiam: This is a contested proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the Disciplinary Administrator against Stephen J. Dennis, of Overland Park, Kansas, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas. The formal complaint filed against Dennis alleged several violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) relating to the respondent's representation in two matters before the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. A unanimous hearing panel found that the respondent's conduct violated KRPC 1.1 (competence) (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 384), 1.3 (diligence) (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 398), 1.16(a)(1) (declining or terminating representation) (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 487), 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions) (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 500), 3.2 (expediting litigation) (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 503), 3.3(a)(1) (candor toward tribunal) (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 508), and 8.4(d) (misconduct) (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 559). Having found these violations, the hearing panel recommended that Dennis be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.
The respondent now takes exception to the panel's jurisdiction, conclusions of law, and recommended discipline.
Facts
Dennis was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Kansas on October 29, 1999. In re Dennis, 268 Kan. 48, 991 P.2d 394 (1999). This suspension was based on a hearing panel's findings that the respondent's representation of four clients violated Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 1.1 (competence), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 (communication), 1.15 (safekeeping property), 1.16 (declining or terminating representation), 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), and 8.4 (misconduct), as well as Supreme Court Rule 207 (1998 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 222) (failure to cooperate and respond to inquiries in a disciplinary investigation). 268 Kan. 48. The respondent has not been reinstated to practice law in this state since he was indefinitely suspended.
In addition to his suspension in this state, the respondent was disbarred by the Tenth Circuit in 1999 for failure to submit a timely response to court orders and failure to perfect a docketing statement; suspended from the practice of law in Missouri as reciprocal discipline to the 1999 suspension in this state; suspended from practicing in the Western District of Missouri; and administratively suspended in Minnesota.
On March 13, 2002, Judge Wesley Brown signed an order permitting the respondent to practice under the supervision of another attorney, Dennis Egan, in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. On November 18, 2003, Judge Brown signed an order that permitted the respondent to practice without supervision before that court.
This disciplinary action was initiated as a result of Dennis' representation in two cases--Sunderman v. Westar Energy, Inc., case number 05-2347JWL (the Sunderman litigation), and Francis v. Sprint United Management Co., case number 05-CV02062 (the Francis litigation)--filed while the respondent was practicing independently in federal court. In his brief before this court, the respondent does not dispute the hearing panel's factual findings, but instead asserts that these findings do not constitute clear and convincing evidence of the violations found. We therefore adopt the panel's factual determinations, as set forth below.
The Sunderman Litigation
In August 2005, the respondent filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas on behalf of Derrick Sunderman against Sunderman's former employer, Westar Energy. Westar was represented by Stephanie Scheck, who eventually filed a disciplinary complaint against the respondent for his representation in that matter. The hearing panel summarized the respondent's conduct during the Sunderman litigation as follows:
"Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
"9. On January 13, 2006, Westar filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The Respondent failed to file a timely response. Thereafter, on February 16, 2006, the Court issued an order to show cause. The Court's order required the Respondent to show cause by February 27, 2006, why the motion should not be granted. The order also required the Respondent to file a response to Westar's motion for partial summary judgment by March 1, 2006. The Respondent did not file a response to the show cause order. Additionally, the Respondent did not file a response to Westar's motion for partial summary judgment. At the hearing on this matter, Judge [James] O'Hara summed up the effect the Respondent's silence had as follows:
'. . . and even if a motion of a dispositive and serious nature, such as the defendant's partial summary judgment motion in this case, can and technically should be granted as unopposed, a very practical problem that's created in this situation is that by virtue of Mr. Dennis' silence, it's at least possible that Judge Murgia's law clerk, or one of them, was drilling valuable time into a project that was unworthy of that time.
'And as I think I explained to Mr. Dennis during the telephone status conference that I had with him and his opposing counsel on June 30, 2006, common sense and simple courtesy would suggest in this situation that if there were no meritorious argument that could be raised on behalf of the plaintiff to the defendant's motion, that the plaintiff would file some sort of pleading or at least communicate in some form with Judge Murgia's office to the effect that the motion was uncontested.'
"10. In his Answer to the Formal Complaint in the instant disciplinary case, the Respondent stated that a response to Westar's motion for partial summary judgment was not necessary as the motion was well founded.1 [Footnote 1: While the Respondent never provided a written response to Westar's motion for partial summary judgment nor did he provide a response to the Court order to show cause, on June 30, 2006, during a telephone conference call, the Respondent indicated that he had no objection to the Court granting the motion for partial summary judgment. Then, on July 5, 2006, the Respondent filed a 'Stipulation of Dismissal of Count II with Prejudice' without conferring with Westar's counsel.]
"Scheduling Order
"11. On January 17, 2006, the Court issued a scheduling order setting various deadlines. Specifically, the Court ordered the parties to make a good faith settlement offer by January 27, 2006. The Respondent did not make a good faith settlement offer by January 27, 2006. Further, the Respondent did not make a good faith settlement offer until April 21, 2006.
"12. In addition, in the scheduling order, the Court ordered the parties to file a confidential settlement report by February 24, 2006. The Respondent failed to file a confidential settlement report by February 24, 2006.
"13. On March 10, 2006, the Court entered an order directing the Respondent to immediately inform the Court of the status of the confidential settlement statement. The Respondent failed to immediately inform the Court of the status of confidential settlement statement as ordered. Thereafter, on April 17, 2006, the Court issued an order to the Respondent to show cause by April 21, 2006, why the Respondent should not be held in contempt of court for disregarding the March 10, 2006, order.
"14. On April 21, 2006, the Respondent provided a confidential settlement statement to the Court.
"15. The scheduling order also required the parties to file the Rule 26 disclosures by January 27, 2006. The Respondent did not timely file the Rule 26 disclosures. On February 26, 2006, the Respondent filed the Rule 26 disclosures.
"16. Finally, the Court directed the parties, in the scheduling order, to provide preliminary witness and exhibit lists by March 13, 2006. The Respondent failed to provide a preliminary witness and exhibit list.
"Discovery
"17. The scheduling order also directed that discovery be completed by June 2, 2006.
"18. On February 17, 2006, Westar provided the Respondent with the Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories and the Defendant's First Request for Production. The Plaintiff's responses were due on March 22, 2006. On April 3, 2006, counsel for Westar contacted the Respondent by telephone to inquire about the status of the outstanding discovery. The Respondent promised to provide the responses by April 14, 2006. Counsel for Westar confirmed the agreement in writing. The Respondent failed to provide the responses by April 14, 2006, as promised.
"19. On April 20, 2006, counsel for Westar sent the Respondent a golden rule letter directing the Respondent to provide responses to the discovery requests by April 24, 2006. On April 21, 2006, the Respondent sent an electronic mail message to counsel for Westar promising that the discovery responses would be electronically submitted to Westar no later than April 24, 2006. The Respondent failed to provide the responses by April 24, 2006, as promised.
"20. Because the Respondent failed to provide the discovery responses as promised, counsel for Westar sent the Respondent an electronic mail message. The Respondent did not respond to the message. However, on April 26, 2006, the Respondent filed a Notice of Service with the Court, stating that he had mailed the responses to the discovery requests that day.
"21. Counsel for Westar did not receive the discovery responses by mail as indicated in the Notice of Service.2 [Footnote 2: The Respondent claimed that he forwarded the responses to the discovery requests on April 26, 2006, but that he failed to maintain a copy of the discovery responses. On September 22, 2006, the Respondent finally provided the responses to the discovery requests to counsel for Westar.]
"22. On May 5, 2006, counsel for Westar filed a motion to compel discovery and a memorandum in support of the motion. The Respondent failed to respond to Westar's motion to compel.
"23. On May 23, 2006, the Court granted Westar's motion to compel and directed the Respondent to serve written answers to Westar's discovery requests by June 6, 2006. The Respondent failed to serve written answers to Westar's discovery requests by June 6, 2006, as ordered. Additionally, the Court ordered the Respondent to show cause by June 6, 2006, why the Respondent and his client should not be required to pay Westar's costs and fees. The Respondent failed to respond to the Court's show cause order.
"24. Thereafter, the Court granted Westar's request that the Respondent and his client be required to pay $842.21 in attorneys fees. The Court ordered the Respondent and his client to pay Westar's attorneys fees by June 22, 2006. The Respondent failed to pay Westar's attorneys fees by June 22, 2006. Eventually, on November 14, 2006, the Respondent paid Westar's attorneys fees.
"Motion to Dismiss
"25. On May 22, 2006, Westar filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to extend the deadline to take Plaintiff's deposition. Additionally, Westar filed a memorandum in support of its motion. In its memorandum, Westar stated:
'20. Defendant's Counsel has on multiple occasions attempted to schedule Plaintiff's deposition. Plaintiff has failed to provide dates as requested by Defendant's counsel, which prompted Defendant's counsel on May 2, 2006 to file a Notice to Take Deposition. Plaintiff's deposition was noticed for May 24, 2006 but Defendant has not been able to confirm Plaintiff's availability or whether it will have responses to Defendant's discovery requests by that time. Defendant's counsel and its representative will need to travel from Wichita and Topeka respectively to attend Plaintiff's deposition in Kansas City. Given Plaintiff's repeated failures to prosecute this case and failure to respond to Defendant's inquiries regarding Plaintiff's availability, Defendant has cancelled the deposition pending resolution of this motion to avoid further wasted time and expense in this case.
'21. On May 19, 2006, counsel for Defendant again attempted to reach Plaintiff's counsel regarding the discovery responses and the deposition but was unable to reach him by phone. Defendant's counsel left a voicemail message and sent an e-mail inquiring again regarding the status of discovery responses and the deposition of Plaintiff, advising that the deposition could not proceed without discovery responses. Defendant's counsel also inquired whether Plaintiff was "intending to pursue this case at all." As of the date of filing this motion, Plaintiff has failed to respond to Defendant's inquiries.
'22. Plaintiff has not issued any written discovery or made any attempts to schedule depositions in this case and is beyond the time to do so given the discovery deadline of June 2, 2006.
'23. Defendant has expended considerable time and money in complying with the various deadlines and requirements of the Court and in attempting to obtain information from Plaintiff and third party sources to defend this case.
'24. Plaintiff's counsel's delays and failures to comply with various court orders and failures to respond to Defense counsel has caused unnecessary time and wasted expense in this litigation.'
"26. On June 14, 2006, the Respondent filed a motion for extension of time to respond to Westar's motion to dismiss. The Respondent detailed personal family problems that he suffered during that time.
"27. The Court granted the Respondent's motion and extended the Respondent's time to file a response to Westar's motion to dismiss to July 5, 2006.
"28. On July 5, 2006, the Respondent filed a response to Westar's motion to dismiss.
"29. The Court denied Westar's motion to dismiss and, at the time of the disciplinary hearing, the case was scheduled for trial."
At the time that the hearing panel issued its final hearing report in this matter, the Sunderman litigation was still pending in federal district court. Since that time, the court has granted summary judgment in favor of Westar. See Sunderman v. Westar Energy, Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Kan. 2007). Dennis indicated during oral argument before this court that the Sunderman litigation is currently being appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
The Francis Litigation
In February 2005, the respondent filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas on behalf of Meredith Francis against Sprint, alleging that Francis was terminated from her employment with Sprint in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Sprint was represented in the action by Jeannie DeVeney. The case was assigned to District Judge Kathryn H. Vratil and referred to Magistrate Judge David J. Waxse. After the case was eventually dismissed in 2006, Judge Vratil filed a disciplinary complaint against the respondent for his representation in that matter. The hearing panel summarized the respondent's conduct during the Francis litigation as follows:
"31. On February 7, 2005, Sprint filed a motion for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P[roc.]. 11(b)(3), asserting that the case was frivolous and that the Respondent had failed to conduct a reasonable investigation prior to signing and filing the complaint. According to Sprint, Ms. Francis was not terminated in retaliation for filing a claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act. Sprint eliminated the center where Ms. Francis worked and relocated the entire group employing Ms. Francis from Denver, Colorado, to Kennesaw, Georgia. Ms. Francis declined the opportunity to relocate. When Ms. Francis refused to relocate to Georgia, her position ended.
"The Court deferred ruling on the motion.
"32. On June 15, 2005, the Respondent filed a motion to stay the plaintiff's suit until Chief Judge John W. Lungstrum resolved a collective action in which the plaintiff alleged age discrimination. In response to the motion to stay, Sprint argued that the plaintiff's FMLA claim had nothing to do with an age discrimination claim. On September 2, 2005, Magistrate Judge David J. Waxse denied the motion to stay.
"33. On July 14, 2005, the Court entered an Initial Order Regarding Planning and Scheduling. In the order, the Court set a number of deadlines. Then, on September 21, 2005, the Court entered a second Initial Order Regarding Planning and Scheduling, which appears similar to the first order, but with later dates. In the Order, the Court directed the parties as well as their attorneys to appear at a scheduling conference by telephone on October 26, 2005. The plaintiff did not appear at the scheduling conference by telephone.
"Scheduling Order
"34. At the scheduling conference on October 26, 2005, the Court set a number of deadlines. First, the Respondent was ordered to provide a settlement proposal by November 4, 2005. The Respondent never provided the settlement proposal.
"35. The Court ordered the parties to provide confidential settlement reports to the Court by November 23, 2005. The Respondent failed to provide a confidential settlement report as required. As a result, on December 12, 2005, the Court issued an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for failing to provide the confidential settlement report as ordered.
"36. The scheduling order required the parties to exchange Fed. R. Civ. P[roc.]. 26 disclosures by November 4, 2005. By agreement, the parties agreed to extend the disclosure exchange to November 11, 2005. On November 11, 2005, Sprint served its disclosures and documents. The Respondent failed to provide Sprint with its disclosures and documents. On December 12, 2005, the Respondent filed Certificate indicating that the disclosures had been served. On December 16, 2005, Sprint received the Respondent's disclosures. However, the Respondent failed to produce any documents with the disclosures.
"37. On October 28, 2005, Sprint served discovery requests on the Respondent. The responses to the discovery requests were due on December 2, 2005. The Respondent failed to provide the responses to the discovery requests by December 2, 2005. On December 12, 2005, the Respondent filed a Certificate, indicating that he served the responses to the discovery requests. On December 16, 2005, Sprint received the Respondent's responses to the discovery requests. However, the interrogatory answers were not verified, the Respondent did not return the requested authorizations, and the responses were deficient in other respects.
"38. Counsel for Sprint contacted the Respondent regarding the deficient disclosures and the deficient discovery responses. The Respondent agreed to supplement his responses by January 6, 2006. The Respondent did not supplement the disclosures or the discovery responses. Because the Respondent did not supplement the disclosures or the discovery responses, Sprint filed a motion to compel. Included in that motion was a request that the case be dismissed. In the motion, counsel for Sprint alleged that '[p]laintiff has ignored and continues to ignore virtually every applicable rule in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules, and the Orders of this Court.' The Respondent failed to respond to the motion to compel.
"39. Because the Respondent failed to respond to Sprint's motion to compel, on February 15, 2006, the Court granted the Motion. In [its] order, the Court stated:
'As Plaintiff has not filed any responses to the Motion to Compel, the Court cannot find that any of the stated exceptions apply here. The Court notes that it is not required to hold a hearing before imposing these sanctions. Although the Court must afford the party an "opportunity to be hear[d]," that Court may consider the issue of sanctions "on written submissions." Here, Defendant expressly requested in its motion that it be awarded its expenses and attorney fees. Although Plaintiff did not file a brief in response to her request for sanctions, she had the opportunity to do so. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has had sufficient "opportunity to be heard" within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P[roc.]. 37(a)(4).
'In light of the above, the Court will grant Defendant'[s] request for expenses and fees.'
The Court also directed the Respondent to provide the requested information. Specifically, the Court ordered the Respondent to cure the deficiencies in the disclosures and the discovery responses by February 28, 2006. The Respondent failed to provide the documentation as ordered.
"40. Finally, the Court directed Sprint to forward an affidavit itemizing the reasonable attorney fees and expenses it incurred in connection with the motion to compel.
"41. Thereafter, counsel for Sprint filed an affidavit, seeking $2,200.00 in attorneys fees associated with the motion to compel. The Respondent filed a response, arguing that counsel for Sprint's fees were not reasonable. The Court ordered the Respondent to pay $588.00 to counsel for Sprint in attorneys fees by June 6, 2006. The Respondent paid the $588.00 in sanctions.
"Plaintiff's Deposition
"42. On November 14, 2005, and November 18, 2005, Sprint contacted the Respondent and requested possible dates to take Ms. Francis' deposition. The Respondent failed to respond to either request.
"43. On November 21, 2005, Sprint filed a notice to take Ms. Francis' deposition on December 14, 2005. The Respondent failed to contact Sprint after receiving the notice to take Ms. Francis' deposition.
"44. On December 6, 2005, counsel for Sprint wrote to the Respondent and informed him that she would seek fees and costs if Ms. Francis did not appear for her deposition. On December 7, 2005, the Respondent sent an electronic mail message to counsel for Sprint and indicated that he would be in contact with her on December 9, 2005, to discuss these matters. The Respondent failed to contact counsel for Sprint on December 9, 2005, as promised.
"45. Thereafter, on December 12, 2005, the Respondent filed a motion for a protective order, postponing Ms. Francis' deposition due to her inability to pay for the travel expenses from Colorado where she resides.
"46. On December 13, 2005, the Court denied the Respondent's motion because he failed to certify to the Court that he attempted to confer with opposing counsel in good faith. Despite the denial of the motion, neither the Respondent nor Ms. Francis appeared at the deposition.
"47. On January 11, 2006, Sprint served a second notice of deposition, scheduling Ms. Francis' deposition for January 27, 2006.
"48. Ms. Francis and the Respondent appeared at the deposition on January 27, 2006. During the deposition, the Respondent's office staff sent 168 pages of documents to counsel for Sprint by electronic mail. During her deposition, Ms. Francis testified that she has calendars and notes related to the litigation. However, the Respondent had not provided the calendars and notes to counsel for Sprint. Finally, also during her testimony, Ms. Francis referred to documents that had not been provided to support her position. Because counsel for Sprint had not been provided with relevant documents in response to the requests for discovery prior to the deposition, counsel for Sprint was not able to conclude the deposition. Thus, the deposition was adjourned to allow the Respondent time to provide additional documents and for counsel for Sprint time to review the documents.
"49. On February 23, 2006, Sprint served a third notice of deposition of Ms. Francis, scheduling the continued deposition for March 9, 2006.
"50. Prior to the scheduled deposition, the Respondent confirmed that Ms. Francis would appear at the deposition. However, the morning of the deposition, the Respondent contacted counsel for Sprint and indicated that Ms. Francis was not sufficiently emotionally stable to appear for her deposition. Ms. Francis did not appear for the deposition.
"Motion to Dismiss
"51. On December 14, 2005, Sprint filed a motion to dismiss. Counsel for Sprint based the motion on the Respondent's failure to comply with the deadlines in the scheduling order and the Respondent's failure to communicate regarding the initial deposition scheduled. Thereafter, on March 9, 2006, the Court denied Sprint's motion to dismiss. However, in the Memorandum Order the Court stated that the Respondent 'has consistently missed deadlines in this case and is partly to blame for plaintiff's failure to appear.' Additionally, the Court stated, in footnote 4, the following:
'On October 26, 2005, plaintiff did not appear at the scheduling conference. Plaintiff did not provide a settlement proposal which was due on November 4, 2005. Plaintiff served her initial disclosures and related documents on December 12, 2005, more than one month after they were due. Plaintiff responded to discovery requests on December 12, 2005, some ten days late. On January 9, 2006, defendant filed a motion to compel plaintiff's responses to certain discovery requests, but plaintiff did not file an opposition brief.'
In conclusion the Court stated:
'In the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that dismissal is not an appropriate sanction at this time. Plaintiff and her counsel certainly should now be aware that dismissal is a likely sanction for further noncompliance with discovery and Court orders. The Court cautions plaintiff and her counsel that it will not tolerate future missed deadlines. Any future breach of plaintiff's duties to the Court may result in sanctions including but not limited to (1) an order which requires plaintiff to pay reasonable attorneys' fees which defendant incurs as a result of her actions; (2) an order which establishes certain matters and/or facts for purposes of the action; (3) an order which disallows plaintiff to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibits plaintiff from introducing designated witnesses or matters into evidence; (4) an order which strikes pleadings or parts thereof, stays future proceedings, dismisses the action with prejudice or enters judgment in favor of defendant; and (5) an order which holds plaintiff in contempt of court.'
"Status Conference and Order
"52. On February 8, 2006, the Court held a status teleconference. During the teleconference, the Court took up two motions filed by Sprint--a motion for extension of time to designate experts and a motion to modify the scheduling order. The Court granted the motions and, on February 15, 2006, issued an order with certain deadlines. On February 28, 2006, the Respondent filed a response to the Order.
"Thereafter, on March 3, 2006, Sprint filed another motion for sanctions against the Respondent. This motion for sanctions was filed because the Respondent failed to comply with the Court's February 15, 2006, Order. The Court denied Sprint's motion for sanctions on procedural grounds.
"Second Motion to Dismiss
"53. On March 21, 2006, Sprint filed a second motion to dismiss. The Respondent failed to respond to the motion. On May 15, 2006, the Court dismissed the case with prejudice. The Courts' Memorandum and Order contained the following language:
'The Court finds that dismissal is warranted under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court previously outlined the factors which it must consider before dismissing a case with prejudice. Those factors now clearly warrant dismissal. . . . Plaintiff chose not to file a response to defendant's motion to dismiss. In addition, plaintiff has employed numerous delay strategies in this case as outlined in defendant's memorandum. Accordingly, the Court concludes that dismissal is an appropriate sanction.'
Further, the Court ordered . . . Ms. Francis to pay counsel for Sprint for the costs of fees associated with defending the case from March 9, 2006, through the filing of its second motion to dismiss. Finally, the Court ordered the Respondent to show cause why he should not be held personally liable for the sanctions ordered in the case.
"54. On May 31, 2006, the Respondent filed a response to the order to show cause and a motion to file exhibits under seal. The Court granted the Respondent's request to file exhibits under seal. However, the Respondent failed to file exhibits under seal.
"55. On August 11, 2006, the Court ordered the Respondent to pay $1,108.75 in attorneys fees and the Plaintiff to pay $2,119.59 in costs. In its order, the Court stated:
'(1) the Court hereby grants Defendant's Motion for Fees and Costs and orders Plaintiff's counsel to pay $1,108.75 in fees and costs to Defendant pursuant to the Court's May 15, 2006 Memorandum and Order. The sanctions are imposed against the law firm of Plaintiff's counsel, rather than Plaintiff herself, as the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff was responsible for the sanctionable conduct; and
'(2) the Court hereby grants Defendant's request for taxation of costs to Plaintiff in the amount of $2,119.59 and hereby directs the Clerk of the Court to tax such amount as costs.'"
The hearing panel also found that the Francis litigation cost Sprint $41,207.95 in litigation expenses.
Federal and Kansas Disciplinary Actions
Stephanie Scheck, opposing counsel in the Sunderman litigation and the complainant as to respondent's representation in that matter, filed a complaint with Kansas' office of the Disciplinary Administrator on May 26, 2006. Judge Vratil filed a similar complaint regarding the respondent's actions in the Francis litigation on January 19, 2007. The Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal complaint regarding the respondent's representation in both cases on April 13, 2007.
In addition to these state disciplinary proceedings, the respondent's actions are also being considered by a disciplinary panel of the Kansas federal court. In January 2007, Judge Vratil and Judge O'Hara filed complaints against the respondent regarding the Sunderman an