IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
No. 99,467
In the Matter of TROY L. DAUGHERTY,
Respondent.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed March 28, 2008. Indefinite suspension.
Alexander M. Walczak, deputy disciplinary administrator, argued the cause, and Stanton A. Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, was with him on the formal complaint for petitioner.
Troy L. Daugherty, respondent, argued the cause pro se.
Per Curiam: This is an original uncontested proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the Disciplinary Administrator alleging that the respondent, Troy L. Daugherty, violated the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. The hearing panel unanimously recommends that Daugherty be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in the state of Kansas.
Troy L. Daugherty, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in September 1990, is also admitted to the practice of law in the states of Illinois and Missouri. Respondent's last registration address with the Clerk of the Appellate Courts of Kansas is in Olathe, Kansas.
The complaint against respondent arises out of a final adjudication of a disciplinary action and sanctions in the state of Illinois, for which respondent received reciprocal attorney discipline and sanctions in the state of Missouri. The formal complaint here charged respondent with violating Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 3.1 (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 500) (meritorious claims and contentions required), KRPC 3.3(a)(1) (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 508) (false statement of fact to a tribunal), KRPC 3.3(a)(4) (2006 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 467) [now KRPC 3.3(a)(3) (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 508)] (offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false), KRPC 3.4(b) (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot 514) (falsify evidence), KRPC 8.1(b) (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 553) (failing to respond to a demand for information from a disciplinary authority), and KRPC 8.4(b), (c), and (d) (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 559) (commit a criminal act; engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; and engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). When respondent did not file an answer to the formal complaint within 20 days as required by Supreme Court Rule 211(b) (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 304), a supplement to the formal complaint charged respondent with violating KRPC 8.1(b). Respondent eventually filed an answer to the formal complaint wherein he denied violating the KRPC and denied the findings of fact made by the Illinois Disciplinary Hearing Panel.
The Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys held a hearing on October 4, 2007. Respondent appeared pro se. At the hearing, the Disciplinary Administrator's Exhibits 1 through 8 were admitted.
HEARING PANEL FINDINGS
The hearing panel found the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:
"2. On July 26, 2005, the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission filed a Complaint against the Respondent. Thereafter, on September 22, 2005, the Respondent filed an Answer to the Complaint.
"3. On September 2006, the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission held a hearing before a Hearing Panel. Thereafter, on January 3, 2007, the Hearing Panel issued its Report and Recommendation. On March 19, 2007, the Supreme Court of Illinois approved and confirmed the Report and Recommendation of the Hearing Board. As a result, the Court suspended the Respondent's license to practice law in the State of Illinois for one year. Additionally, the Illinois Supreme Court ordered that the Respondent's license to practice law will not be reinstated until the Respondent satisfies his restitution obligation with the Morton Community Bank.
"4. The Report and Recommendation of the Hearing Panel, affirmed and confirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court, provides as follows:
'INTRODUCTION
'The hearing in this matter was held on September 18, 2006, at the Chicago, Illinois offices of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) before the Panel of James A. Shapiro, Chair, Roma J. Stewart, and David A. Winter. Robert J. Verrando represented the Administrator of the ARDC. Respondent appeared in person and proceeded pro se.
'THE PLEADINGS
'On July 26, 2005, the Administrator filed a four-count Complaint against Respondent pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 753(b). The Complaint alleged that Respondent made misrepresentations in connection with a loan application, made false statements to a tribunal, committed perjury during a deposition, and failed to respond to the ARDC's requests for information.
'Respondent filed an Answer to the Complaint admitting some of the factual allegations, denying some of the factual allegations, and denying all allegations of misconduct.
'THE EVIDENCE
'The Administrator presented the testimony of two witnesses, called Respondent as an adverse witness, and tendered exhibits 1-13, which were admitted. Respondent testified on his own behalf.
'Count I
'Admitted Facts
'In April 2001, Respondent agreed to purchase a 1997 Lincoln Town Car from Thomas Fincham. Also in April, Respondent represented to Morton Community Bank (Morton Bank) that he intended to purchase the car, and requested a loan for the purchase. On May 21, 2001, Respondent executed a document entitled "Consumer Note, Disclosure and Security Agreement" in favor of Morton Bank. On May 4, 2001, Morton Bank sent Respondent a check in the amount of $15,000 made payable to Respondent. At no time did Respondent purchase the car, give Morton Bank a security interest in any property in exchange for the loan, or repay the loan proceeds to Morton Bank.
'Thomas Fincham
'Thomas Fincham is an attorney licensed to practice law in Missouri. Fincham and Respondent worked at the same Missouri law firm for approximately two years. In early 2001, Fincham was attempting to sell a 1997 Lincoln Town Car, and Respondent expressed interest in purchasing it. He showed Respondent the car sometime between March and May 2001. The car was not damaged, and Respondent agreed to buy it for $15,000. On May 3, 2001, at Respondent's request, Fincham sent Gene Hart at Morton Bank, via facsimile, a copy of the car's title, and stated that Respondent was interested in purchasing the car.
'Respondent never purchased the car and told Fincham that he could not obtain financing. The car had never been in an accident, and Fincham never told Respondent that it had been in one. However, when Fincham purchased the car, it was not new, and the salesman told him there had been some quarter panel damage that had been repaired. Fincham informed Respondent about the quarter panel damage before Respondent agreed to purchase the car. After Respondent initially saw the car, someone threw a rock through the window on the driver's side. Fincham told Respondent about the incident during a telephone conversation, and had the window repaired. He did not recall Respondent coming to his office to discuss the window or to inspect the car.
'In February or March of 2002, Fincham received a telephone call from Hart asking him for the title to the car. He told Hart that he still owned the car, and had not sold it to Respondent. In February 2002, Fincham sold the car to someone else for $9,000. Fincham thought the price was low, but wanted to sell the car because he had purchased another one.
'Gene Hart
'In 2001, Gene Hart was the branch manager and loan officer at the Morton Bank. Respondent was a bank customer, and in early 2001 he told Hart he wanted to purchase a 1997 Lincoln Town Car, and requested a $15,000 auto loan. Hart called the seller of the car to get a copy of the title. Respondent did not complete a loan application because Respondent was an attorney, had several other loans with the bank, and had a good relationship with the bank. Respondent signed a "Consumer Note and Security Agreement" identifying the car, the amount of the loan, the payment schedule, and other terms of the loan. After receiving the signed note, the bank sent Respondent a check for $15,000. Hart made the check payable to Respondent, and relied on Respondent's integrity to send him the title.
'On February 8, 2002, Hart sent Respondent a letter explaining that Respondent had failed to make the last two payments on the loan. Hart also informed Respondent that he had contacted the seller of the car and learned that Respondent had not purchased it. Before sending the letter, Hart had attempted to discuss the late payments with Respondent by telephone but was unable to reach him, and Respondent failed to return Hart's voicemail messages. Before February 2002, Respondent had made three or four payments. After that time, Respondent made several additional payments. The balance of the loan is approximately $9,000. Eventually, Morton Bank sued Respondent and obtained a judgment against him. The bank spent approximately $18,000 in attorney's fees pursuing the matter.
'The consumer note would have given the bank a security interest in the Lincoln Town Car if the bank had received the title. The security interest would not have been transferable to another car without modifications to the loan. The bank made no modification to Respondent's loan. Because Respondent did not purchase the Lincoln Town Car, the loan was unsecured.
'Respondent
'Respondent signed the consumer note which accurately described Fincham's Lincoln Town Car. He also received and deposited the check for $15,000 from Morton Bank. He never told Hart that he failed to purchase the car.
'Respondent testified he intended to buy the car, but never agreed to buy it, and only told Fincham he was interested in buying it. However, Respondent admitted he told Fincham he would pay $15,000 for the car, and applied for and obtained a loan to purchase the car. Initially, Fincham told Respondent the quarter panel had been damaged prior to his ownership, and he would have the car checked and tell Respondent if there was any frame damage. Before Fincham had the frame checked, the car was vandalized when the window was broken. Respondent decided not to buy the car after he saw the broken window, and determined that it was not worth $15,000. He used $10,000 of the loan proceeds to buy a different car, a Cirrus, and spent the remaining $5,000 on living expenses. He did not intend to defraud the bank, and thought he would repay the loan. He is still willing to repay the loan, but Morton Bank is demanding repayment of the loan and $18,000 in attorney's fees. Respondent is unable to pay that much in a lump sum, but is willing to make payments.
'Also in 2001, Respondent was going through a divorce and representing a client in a wrongful death action, both of which were consuming a large amount of his time. In the wrongful death action, Respondent believed he would obtain a large settlement, and spent his own money on expert opinions and other costs of the litigation. He later learned that his client lacked standing, and was unable to pursue the case. Between his divorce and the wrongful death case, Respondent was having financial difficulties, and he defaulted on the Morton Bank loan.
'Counts II and III
'Admitted Facts
'On April 25, 2002, Morton Bank filed a lawsuit against Respondent to recover the loan proceeds. On December 13, 2002, the circuit court entered a default judgment against Respondent. On October 9, 2003, Respondent filed a petition under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. On January 3, 2003, Morton Bank filed an adversary complaint with the bankruptcy court objecting to the dischargeability of his debt to the bank. Respondent filed an answer to the adversary complaint, admitting that the purpose of Morton Bank's loan was to finance the purchase of a car, but stating Fincham had "wrecked" the car before Respondent could purchase it, the value of the car was "substantially diminished," and repair of the car was uncertain due to "insurance entanglements." On December 17, 2004, Respondent gave sworn testimony at a deposition in connection with the adversary complaint.
'Respondent
'After Respondent defaulted on the loan, Morton Bank filed a lawsuit against Respondent. Respondent filed an answer to the complaint. On December 3, 2002, a judgment in the amount of $15,251.60 was entered against Respondent.
'On October 9, 2003, Respondent filed a bankruptcy petition, in which he listed the loan from Morton Bank. In the petition, Respondent also listed several credit card debts, $79,000 owed to the Internal Revenue Service for employee withholding taxes, and $31,000 owed to his ex-wife as part of the divorce settlement. In January 2004, Morton Bank filed an adversary complaint against Respondent in the bankruptcy proceedings claiming that the debt to the bank was not dischargeable because Respondent had obtained the loan by deceit.
'In February 2004, Respondent filed an answer to the adversary complaint. Respondent admitted that the purpose of the loan was to purchase the Lincoln Town Car, and stated that he did not purchase the car because it was "wrecked by the then owner, its value substantially diminished, and the prospects of the repair of the vehicle in question due to insurance entanglements." Respondent explained that the words "then owner" refer to the person who owned the car before Fincham, and that the value was substantially diminished because Fincham sold the car for $9,000 instead of $15,000. In paragraph 11 of the answer, Respondent stated he did not own the car, and that Morton Bank knew he did not own it. He also stated he "utilized the funds to purchase an alternative vehicle in its stead." In paragraph 13, Respondent said he "never owned the collateral because of its wrecked condition."
'During his deposition in the adversary proceeding, Respondent was asked about the damage to the car, and he responded "somebody had T-boned the–this vehicle, the Lincoln Town Car." He also stated "the whole side of the vehicle was substantially damaged." Respondent acknowledged that he was wrong when he made these statements.
'During the deposition Respondent further explained, "the damage looked very substantial. It was hard for me to envision the vehicle looking and being in the same condition as it was when I was first going to buy it and then looking at it in the condition it was in." Respondent gave other incorrect answers at the deposition which he admitted were wrong and attributed to his lack of preparation for that testimony. For example, he repeatedly stated that Fincham was unsure if his or the other driver's insurance would pay for the damage to the car. Respondent was referring to the body damage that occurred before Fincham owned the car and not the broken window.
'When Respondent filed an answer to the adversary complaint and gave a deposition in the bankruptcy matter, he was confused about the condition of the car and believed his statements were accurate. He now acknowledges he was wrong when he said the car had been wrecked, but denies engaging in a four-year pattern of deceit.
'Count IV
'Admitted Facts
'On January 5, 2005, counsel for the Administrator sent Respondent a letter requesting that he provide information relating to the Morton Bank loan. As of February 1, 2005, Respondent had not responded to the letter, and on that date, counsel for the Administrator sent a second letter requesting the same information. On April 5, 2005, Respondent had not responded to either letter, and counsel for the Administrator sent Respondent a subpoena duces tecum requiring his appearance and the production of documents at the Administrator's office on May 3, 2005. Respondent failed to appear on that date. As of July 19, 2005, the date of the Inquiry Panel meeting, Respondent had failed to provide the Administrator with the requested information.
'Respondent
'Respondent testified that he cooperated with the Administrator. He failed to respond to the subpoena because he did not have any of the documents requested by the Administrator. He sent the Administrator one letter along with his deposition from the adversary proceeding.
'Evidence Offered in Mitigation
'Respondent was licensed to practice law in 1985. He has performed pro bono legal services for [the] vast majority of his legal career, handling between one and three cases each year. Respondent acknowledged he made a mistake by failing to give the bank a security interest in the car he purchased, and he is sorry for making that mistake.
'Prior Discipline
'On January 30, 2004, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas imposed a censure against Respondent. On January 14, 2005, the Illinois Supreme Court censured Respondent in a reciprocal discipline proceeding. The discipline was based on Respondent's misconduct in 2001 involving neglect of two divorce matters and failing to communicate with those clients. After the clients discharged Respondent, he continued to bill them for legal work, including for responding to their disciplinary complaints. The Kansas decision noted that Respondent's misconduct was aggravated by the harm he caused to his clients, the waste of court resources, and his failure to acknowledge his misconduct. In re Daugherty, 04 RC 1512, M.R. 19795 (January 14, 2005).
'FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
'In attorney disciplinary proceedings, the Administrator must prove the alleged misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. Supreme Court Rule 753(c)(6); In re Ingersoll, 186 Ill. 2d 163, 168, 710 N.E.2d 390 (1999). It is well-settled that "clear and convincing evidence is a standard of proof which, while less than the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is greater than the civil standard of preponderance of the evidence." Cleary and Graham, Handbook of Illinois Evidence, § 301.6 (6th ed. 1994). This standard of proof is one in which the risk of error is not equally allocated; rather, this standard requires a high level of proof, both qualitatively and quantitatively, from the Administrator. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 764-66, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982); In re Tepper, 96 CH 543, M.R. 14596 (1998) (Review Bd. Dec. at 12). Suspicious circumstances are insufficient to warrant discipline. In re Lane, 127 Ill. 2d 90, 111, 535 N.E.2d 866 (1989).
'In this case, based on the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, we find that the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in all the misconduct alleged in the Complaint. Specifically, we find that Respondent: 1) advanced a claim the lawyer knows is unwarranted under existing law (Count II); 2) made a statement of material fact to a tribunal which the lawyer knew or reasonably should know is false (Count II); 3) offered evidence the lawyer knows to be false in appearing in a professional capacity before a tribunal (Count III); 4) participated in the creation of false evidence in appearing in a professional capacity before a tribunal (Count III); 5) failed to respond to a lawful demand for information form [sic] a disciplinary authority (Count IV); 6) engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation (Counts I, II, III); 7) engaged in conduct which is prejudicial to the administration of justice (Counts I, II, III, IV); and 8) engaged in conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute (Counts I, II, III, IV) in violation of Rules 1.2(f)(2), 3.3(a)(1), 3.3(a)(4), 3.3(a)(5), 8.1(a)(2), 8.4(a)(4), and 8.4(a)(5) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct and Supreme Court Rule 770.
'Count I
'We find Respondent engaged in the misconduct alleged in Count I of the Complaint. Respondent acted dishonestly when he obtained the loan from Morton Bank. He agreed to purchase the Lincoln Town Car from Fincham. He received a $15,000 loan from Morton Bank to purchase the car. He signed the loan documents agreeing to give Morton Bank a security interest in the car as collateral for the loan. Based on his representations to the bank and signing the loan documents, the bank gave him a $15,000 loan. Respondent received the loan proceeds and deposited them into his personal account. But he never purchased the car in which the bank was supposed to have a security interest.
'Instead, he later used $5,000 for living expenses and $10,000 to buy a different car. Respondent never told Morton Bank that he failed to buy the Lincoln Town Car, or that he used part of the money to buy a different car. He also did not give the bank a security interest in the car he ultimately purchased. There is no question that Respondent's conduct was dishonest and deceitful. He obtained the loan based on false statements and used the proceeds for other purposes without informing the bank. Although not charged by the Administrator, we believe Respondent's conduct amounted to bank fraud.
'Respondent argues he was not dishonest with Morton Bank because when he applied for and accepted the loan, he intended to purchase the car. According to Respondent, he decided not to purchase the car only after signing the loan documents. Even if Respondent's testimony were believable, which it is not, he would not avoid a finding of misconduct. Regardless of when he decided not to purchase the car, he still failed to inform the bank of his decision and used the loan proceeds for a purpose other than purchasing the Lincoln Town Car. Respondent's attempt to somehow justify his actions by claiming that he intended to purchase the car illustrates his complete lack of understanding of his misconduct.
'Respondent also attempts to minimize his wrongdoing by arguing that if he had informed the bank of his decision to purchase a different car, the bank could have simply modified the loan documents and there would have been no problems. This argument is illogical. Respondent testified he ultimately purchased a Cirrus for $10,000. If he had informed the bank of this purchase, the bank would have had to significantly modify the loan documents. The original loan was based on the $15,000 value of the Lincoln Town Car. Assuming the Cirrus was worth $10,000, the bank would not have lent Respondent $15,000. The loan involved the bank receiving a security interest in the car, and the bank would not have given Respondent a loan for more than the value of the car.
'Respondent's conduct was also prejudicial to the administration of justice, defeated the administration of justice, and brought the legal profession into disrepute. One of the reasons the bank was so cooperative with Respondent was because he was an attorney and had had other loans with the bank. See In re Chandler, 161 Ill. 2d 454, 641 N.E. 2d 473 (1994). Respondent betrayed that trust and in so doing discredited the legal profession.
'Counts II and III
'We also find Respondent engaged in all the misconduct alleged in Counts II and III of the Complaint by making false statements in his answer to the adversary complaint and in a deposition during the bankruptcy proceedings. Respondent failed to make payments on the Morton Bank loan. Morton Bank filed a complaint in the circuit court against Respondent, and in December 2002, obtained a default judgment against him. On October 9, 2003, Respondent filed a bankruptcy petition, which included the Morton Bank judgment. On January 3, 2004, Morton Bank filed an adversary complaint with the bankruptcy court objecting to the dischargeability of his debt to the bank. Respondent filed an answer to the adversary complaint, admitting the purpose of Morton Bank's loan was to finance the purchase of the car, but stating it was "wrecked by the then owner, its value substantially diminished, and the prospects of the repair of the vehicle in question due to insurance entanglements. . ." Respondent also stated in the answer he "never owned the collateral because of its wrecked condition."
'In a subsequent deposition, Respondent was asked about the damage to the car, and he responded "somebody had T-boned the–this vehicle, the Lincoln Town Car." He also stated "the whole side of the vehicle was substantially damaged." He further explained, "the damage looked very substantial. It was hard for me to envision the vehicle looking and being in the same condition as it was when I was first going to buy it and then looking at it in the condition it was in." Respondent also repeatedly stated that Fincham was unsure if his or the other driver's insurance would pay for the damage to the car.
'Respondent's statements in the answer and deposition were false. Fincham testified the car was not "wrecked" and there were no insurance entanglements. He also testified the only damage the car had was before he owned it. When Fincham bought the car, the salesman told him one of the quarter panels had been repaired. Fincham told Respondent about the repair, but there was no sign of damage when Respondent initially looked at the car. After Respondent saw the car, the driver's side window had been broken. Fincham told Respondent about that damage, had the window replaced, and there was no residual damage to the car. Fincham's testimony was clear and unequivocal, and we find it credible. In re Smith, 168 Ill. 2d 269, 283, 659 N.E.2d 896 (1995). During the disciplinary hearing, Respondent admitted that he was incorrect when he made contrary statements in his answer and deposition.
'Respondent claims he believed his statements were correct when he made them, but subsequently learned he was mistaken. We find Respondent's testimony on this point not credible in the least. The Lincoln Town Car was never in an accident or suffered damage as Respondent described. There were no facts relating to the car even remotely similar to the ones propounded by him. He could not have been confused or mistaken. Instead, we find he fabricated a set of facts in an effort to defeat the bank's adversary complaint. Based on Respondent's testimony before us, and the facts of this case, we also believe Respondent knew these facts were false when he made them and intentionally lied during the bankruptcy proceedings.
'Respondent further stated he failed to pay close attention to the loan transaction because he was distracted by his divorce and a wrongful death case he was handling. Although we understand the importance of these other matters, Respondent had an obligation to act properly regarding the loan transaction. His misconduct is not excused or explained by his involvement in the other matters. Furthermore, Respondent made the false statements in his answer and deposition long after those other matters concluded. He therefore has no excuse for making blatantly false statements in a court document and under oath after the distracting matters had long concluded.
'Additionally, we find that the other matters explain, in part, the reason Respondent engaged in the misconduct. It is apparent that Respondent was having financial difficulties during the period of time he engaged in the misconduct. He admitted he was undergoing a divorce and his bankruptcy petition lists a $31,000 debt he owed to his wife. He also explained he had advanced large amount of money in the wrongful death action by taking cash advances on his credit cards. The case was ultimately dismissed, and he was unable to recover any of the money. We believe Respondent lied to the bank and misused the loan proceeds because of these financial problems and he fabricated the story about the car being in a wreck in an attempt to justify his misconduct.
'Based on these facts, we find Respondent advanced a claim he knew was unwarranted, made a statement of material fact to a tribunal he knew or reasonably should have known was false, offered evidence he knew to be false when appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, participated in the creation of false evidence, engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, and engaged in conduct that tends to defeat the administration of justice and bring the legal profession into disrepute. See In re Ingersoll, 186 Ill. 2d 165, 71 N.E.2d 390 (1999); In re Cagle, 03 SH 14, M. R. 20140 (September 26, 2005).
'Count IV
'We further find that Respondent engaged in all of the misconduct alleged in Count IV of the Complaint. On January 5, 2005, the Administrator sent Respondent a letter requesting he provide information relating to the Morton Bank loan. Respondent failed to respond to the letter. On February 1, 2005, the Administrator sent Respondent a second letter requesting the same information. Respondent failed to respond to either letter, and on April 5, 2005, the Administrator sent Respondent a subpoena duces tecum requiring his appearance and the production of documents at the Administrator's office on May 3, 2005. Respondent failed to appear on that date. As of July 19, 2005, the date of the Inquiry Panel meeting, Respondent had failed to provide the Administrator with the requested information. On July 18, 2005, the Administrator received a letter from Respondent denying misconduct and giving the Administrator a copy of his deposition from the adversary proceeding.
'Based on these facts, we find that Respondent failed to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority, engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and engaged in conduct that tends to defeat the administration of justice and brings the legal profession into disrepute.
'RECOMMENDATION
'The purpose of the disciplinary system is to protect the public, maintain the integrity of the legal system and safeguard the administration of justice. See In re Gorecki, 208 Ill. 2d 350, 802 N.E.2d 1194 (2003); In re Howard, 188 Ill. 2d 423, 721 N.E.2d 1126 (1999). "The Rules of Professional Conduct recognize that the practice of law is a public trust and lawyers are the t