IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
No. 98,740
In the Matter of the Adoption of A.A.T., a Minor Child.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. Although abuse of discretion is generally the correct standard for review of district court decisions under K.S.A. 60-260(b), this is not so when a judgment is attacked as void under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(4). A district court has no discretion to exercise in such a case; either a judgment is valid or it is void as a matter of law. Thus, a reviewing appellate court must apply a de novo standard once a district court has made the necessary findings of fact regarding the validity of a judgment under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(4).
2. A judgment is void if a district court lacked jurisdiction to render it or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. A void judgment is a nullity.
3. A natural parent's right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her child is a liberty interest. The liberty interest of a natural parent has its origin in the biological connection between the parent and child, but a biological relationship does not guarantee the permanency of the parental rights of an unwed natural father. Rather, the significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. The opportunity is lost, however, if the natural father does not come forward to demonstrate a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood.
4. A natural father has a liberty interest affording a right to notice of proceedings to adopt his newborn child if he: (1) diligently took affirmative action that manifested a full commitment to parenting responsibilities and (2) did so during the pregnancy and in a prompt and timely manner as measured by the fleeting opportunity availed to the father under the circumstances of the case.
5. To determine if a natural father of a newborn child has taken diligent, affirmative action, courts measure the putative father's efforts to make a financial commitment to the upbringing of the child, to legally substantiate his relationship with the child, and to provide emotional, financial, and other support to the mother during the pregnancy.
6. States have an interest in being able to determine as early as possible in a child's life the rights, interests, and obligations of all parties, in eliminating the risk of unnecessary controversy that might impair the finality of an adoption, in encouraging adoptions, in protecting the adoption process from unnecessary controversy and complication, and in protecting the privacy and liberty interests of the birth mother and all parties to the adoption.
7. The finalization of an adoption gives rise to a legal relationship–a liberty interest–between the adoptive parents and the child.
8. As long as the state's statutes provide a process whereby most responsible natural fathers can qualify for notice in an adoption proceeding, the interests of the State in the finality of adoption decrees–i.e., providing a child stability and security early in life, encouragement of adoptions, protection of the adoption process from unnecessary controversy and complication, and protection of the privacy and liberty interests of the birth mother and parties to the adoption–justify a rule that a natural father's opportunity to develop a parenting relationship ends with the finalization of a newborn's adoption even if the reason the father did not grasp his opportunity was because of the mother's fraud.
9. Under the facts of this case, the natural father did not demonstrate a full commitment to parenting responsibilities during the pregnancy and his opportunity interest did not develop into a liberty interest.
10. Fraud entitling a party to relief from a judgment under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(3) must be committed by an adverse party.
11. In an adoption proceeding in which the mother has voluntarily relinquished parental rights and surrendered custody of the child, the natural mother does not qualify as an adverse party to the natural father under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(3).
12. K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment when there is newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under K.S.A. 60-259.
13. Under the facts of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the natural father, by exercising reasonable diligence, could have discovered the birth mother's lies about obtaining an abortion and her concealment of the birth and adoption of their child. Consequently, the natural father is not entitled to relief from the judgment under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2).
Appeal from Sedgwick district court; RICHARD T. BALLINGER, judge. Opinion filed December 12, 2008. Affirmed.
William A. Vickery, of Law Office of John F. Reals, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Nancy Ogle, of Ogle Law Office, L.L.C., of Wichita, was with him on the briefs for appellant natural father.
Rachael K. Pirner, of Triplett, Woolf & Garretson, LLC, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Paula D. Langworthy, of the same firm, was on the brief for appellees adoptive parents.
Martin W. Bauer, of Martin, Pringle, Oliver, Wallace & Bauer, L.L.P., of Wichita, was on the brief for amicus curiae American Academy of Adoption Attorneys.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LUCKERT, J.: In this appeal, a natural father seeks to set aside the adoption of his newborn child. Although he did nothing during the pregnancy to assume parenting responsibilities and preserve his liberty interest in fatherhood, he asserts this should be excused and a liberty interest should be recognized because the natural mother induced his inaction by lying to him about the pregnancy and the birth. Then, she lied to the district court regarding the father's identity, preventing him from receiving notice and an opportunity to be heard in the adoption. Consequently, according to his argument, the adoption is void.
The district court rejected these arguments, and we affirm that ruling. A liberty interest, which results in the right to notice, is created by a developed familial relationship, not just biology. In a newborn adoption situation, a father must demonstrate a full commitment to parenting during the pregnancy, and in this case the natural father's opportunity to parent did not develop into a full parenting relationship that warrants constitutional protection. Even though the father may be blameless in this failure that was induced by the natural mother's fraud, his belated attempt to assert a parental interest, beginning 6 months after the adoption was final, cannot overcome the fully matured interests of the State and the adoptive family in the permanency and stability of the adoption.
Factual Background and Pretrial Procedural History
This case began in New York, where the natural mother, N.T., became sexually involved with the natural father, M.P. N.T. informed M.P. in mid-October 2003 that she was pregnant with his child. Then, just before Thanksgiving, N.T. left New York to visit her parents in Wichita. She later decided to stay in Kansas.
After leaving New York, N.T. refused to give M.P. the address where she was living, but the couple remained in telephone contact. M.P.'s cell phone records show that as early as November 25, 2003, he was making calls to Wichita.
In a phone call on January 22, 2004, N.T. falsely informed M.P. that she had undergone an abortion. She later testified that she did so because she knew M.P. would not consent to an adoption. After the conversation in which N.T. lied about the abortion, M.P. continued to question N.T. about the pregnancy, doubting her veracity. In May 2004, M.P.'s expression of skepticism led to an argument with N.T. that temporarily stopped their telephone contact.
After a period of time but before the child was born, M.P. and N.T. began talking again and continued to do so throughout the remainder of the pregnancy and following their child's birth on June 24, 2004, in Wichita. During this time, M.P. continued to express his doubts about N.T.'s truthfulness, making statements like, "Why do I have a feeling you're lying to me?" and "I know I have a child, I can feel it." M.P. told a friend that he thought he had a daughter, and he bought a pair of earrings before Christmas 2004, apparently as a gift for the child he imagined he might have.
M.P. was not the only one deceived by N.T. N.T. told her mother, other family members, and friends that the baby died at delivery. She also deceived the adoption agency regarding the identity of the father, claiming not to know his last name and to have only vague information about where he lived.
The day after the birth, N.T. directed that A.A.T. be given to the adoptive parents, who took the baby home from the hospital. The adoptive parents filed their petition for adoption and for termination of the parental rights of the father on July 1, 2004, when A.A.T. was 1 week old. As part of this proceeding, N.T. again lied. She executed an affidavit that gave a false surname for the newborn child's putative father. She also falsely stated that the father was "not willing to be of assistance to [her] during the pregnancy and with regard to these proceedings" and that she had no personal knowledge of his background information.
A guardian ad litem (GAL) was appointed to represent the putative father. After interviewing N.T., the GAL filed an affidavit with the court, passing on incorrect information supplied by N.T., including a false surname for the putative father and representations that N.T. had not contacted the father since her second month of pregnancy and that he was aware of her intent to place their child for adoption. In addition, N.T. failed to pass along information such as M.P.'s address.
Although there is some evidence that at the hospital N.T. told a representative of the adoption agency that she had just spoken to A.A.T.'s father, and that the agency did not follow up on this lead, an agency representative later testified that she had no recollection of N.T. making a statement to this effect. The representative also said she would have notified the GAL if she had been told about a recent conversation between N.T. and the child's father.
In the absence of correct information about M.P. and his willingness or unwillingness to relinquish his parental rights under K.S.A. 59-2124, a notice including the inaccurate name of the putative father and "To Whom It May Concern" was published in the New York Post on July 30, 2004, and August 6, 2004. See K.S.A. 59-2136(e), (f) (if father identified to satisfaction of court, than one man identified as possible father, each shall be given notice of adoption proceedings by personal service, certified return receipt requested, or "in any other manner court directs"). The item in the New York Post, which circulates to every county in New York, also contained A.A.T.'s last name and stated that Kansas was the location of the proceeding. Nothing was done to provide actual notice of the adoption to M.P.
No father appeared before the court. The natural father's parental rights thus were terminated and the adoption decree was finalized on August 24, 2004. See K.S.A. 59-2136(g) (if no person appears claiming to be father and claiming custodial rights, court shall enter order terminating father's parental rights).
In late December 2004, when A.A.T. was 6 months old, N.T. finally told M.P. the truth. Within 6 weeks, M.P. had retained Kansas counsel and had begun this action to set aside the adoption pursuant to K.S.A. 59-2213 and K.S.A. 60-260(b). M.P., possibly with the assistance of his lawyer, had been able to obtain the names, residential address, and church affiliation of the adoptive parents.
M.P. requested DNA testing to confirm paternity, a status conference to set a discovery schedule, and "orders to proceed with the case." The adoptive parents moved to dismiss. At a March 23, 2005, hearing, the district court ordered the matter to proceed and considered whether genetic testing should be performed to determine if M.P. was the father and thus had standing to challenge the adoption. The attorneys present agreed that the adoptive parents were entitled to a Ross hearing to determine whether such testing was in A.A.T.'s best interests. See In re Marriage of Ross, 245 Kan. 591, 783 P.2d 331 (1989). A GAL was appointed for A.A.T.
Before the Ross hearing could be held, M.P. advocated for a different approach, submitting a memorandum arguing that the Ross hearing was unnecessary. The district court was persuaded, and the adoptive parents took an interlocutory appeal to our Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in In re Adoption of A.A.T., No. 95,914, unpublished opinion filed December 22, 2006.
Upon remand, DNA tests were performed. The results confirmed M.P.'s paternity of A.A.T. M.P. then sought a trial on the issue of whether the adoption should be set aside and requested visitation with A.A.T. pending resolution of the issue. The record on appeal is silent on the district court's decision on the visitation question. The information before us indicates that A.A.T. has been living exclusively with the adoptive parents since leaving the hospital with them as a newborn. Recently, M.P. filed a motion with this court renewing his request to have visitation with A.A.T.
District Court's Ruling on the Adoption
After trial, the district court refused to set aside the adoption decree. The court found, inter alia, that the adoption agency and adoptive parents had acted in good faith in the adoption proceeding. The court also found that M.P. had not abandoned N.T. during her pregnancy and that M.P. had not learned of A.A.T.'s birth until December 24 or 25, 2004. Still, the court further found that M.P. "should have known and did suspect [N.T.] was still pregnant with his child and she gave birth to his child." Under these circumstances, M.P. "should have taken action to determine whether [N.T.] had had an abortion or was still pregnant . . . and . . . gave birth to his child."
The district court ruled against M.P. on his argument under K.S.A. 59-2213, which provides that a court shall have continuing control over its own probate orders, judgments, and decrees for 30 days. Under this statute, the court held M.P.'s effort to set aside the adoption decree was time-barred.
The district court also rebuffed M.P.'s arguments under K.S.A. 60-260(b), which controls vacation or modification of probate judgments after the 30-day time limit of K.S.A. 59-2213 has passed. Under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2), the court refused to set aside the adoption decree based on newly discovered evidence because "M.P should have taken action to verify whether N.T. had an abortion." Under subsection (b)(3), which allows a judgment to be set aside for fraud, the district court ruled that N.T. was not an adverse party and that fraud justifying relief must have been committed by an adverse party. The court also rejected subsection (b)(4) as a basis for setting aside the adoption decree as void; in the court's view, although M.P. did not have notice of the adoption proceeding, the decree was not void because, again, "[M.P] should have taken action to protect his parental rights." Finally, the court considered the so-called catch-all provision of subsection (b)(6) and determined M.P. was not entitled to relief under that provision.
Arguments Raised on Appeal
M.P. relies on K.S.A. 60-260(b) in this appeal, transferred to this court from our Court of Appeals pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3017 and Supreme Court Rule 8.02 (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 62). He first asserts that the adoption decree was void under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(4) because he did not receive notice of the proceeding in violation of his rights to substantive and procedural due process. M.P. argues that he had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his fatherhood of A.A.T. and that he could not be deprived of it without his consent or compliance with the Kansas Adoption and Relinquishment Act (Act), K.S.A. 59-2111 through K.S.A. 59-2144, i.e., due process of law. He asserts that N.T.'s fraud cut off his ability to assert his interest before the adoption decree was entered and that his only recourse has been his timely and diligent prosecution of this action. Because his consent was required and not obtained and there was no other basis to support termination of his parental rights, M.P. argues, the adoption decree is void.
In response, the adoptive parents argue that M.P. had a mere biological link and bore the burden to discover A.A.T.'s existence and transform that biological link into a full and enduring relationship worthy of constitutional protection. They also assert that M.P. was not denied due process because he "wholly neglected his parental responsibilities" and therefore the Act constitutionally allowed termination of his parental rights.
We also have the benefit of an amicus brief filed by the American Academy of Adoption Attorneys, which argues that a child has a constitutional interest in the protection of his or her "established family," here, the adoptive parents. The Academy contends this right must trump any mere "possessory" right of another. The Academy also supports the adoptive parents' responses to M.P.'s issues, arguing that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to set aside the decree and that substantial competent evidence supported termination of M.P.'s parental rights under K.S.A. 59-2136(h).
If we do not accept M.P.'s argument that the adoption is void, he argues alternatively that (1) the district court misinterpreted the phrase "adverse party" in K.S.A. 60-260(b)(3), meaning the decree must be set aside on the basis of N.T.'s fraud and (2) the district court abused its discretion by failing to set aside the decree because of newly discovered evidence under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2), specifically evidence of M.P.'s identity as A.A.T.'s biological father.
M.P. does not argue for relief under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(6); instead, he argues the district court erred in relying upon the provision because it applies only if there is no other applicable grounds for relief and, according to him, three other provisions do apply.
Analysis
K.S.A. 60-260 expressly provides for relief from district court decisions in certain circumstances. See In re Marriage of Leedy, 279 Kan. 311, 321, 109 P.3d 1130 (2005). K.S.A. 60-260(b) reads in pertinent part:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (2) newly discovered evidence . . .; (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void . . . . The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons . . . (2) and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subsection (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This section does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or . . . to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court."
Issue 1: Is the Adoption Decree Void?
The parties disagree about the proper standard of review applicable to the first issue raised by M.P., i.e., whether the adoption decree is void under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(4). M.P. seeks application of a de novo standard. The adoptive parents argue for an abuse of discretion standard.
Although abuse of discretion is generally the correct standard for review of district court decisions under K.S.A. 60-260(b), see In re Marriage of Reinhardt, 38 Kan. App. 2d 60, Syl. ¶ 1, 161 P.3d 235 (2007), this is not so when a judgment is attacked as void under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(4). A judgment is void and therefore a nullity if a court lacked jurisdiction to render it or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. Automatic Feeder Co. v. Tobey, 221 Kan. 17, 21, 558 P.2d 101 (1976); Board of Jefferson County Comm'rs v. Adcox, 35 Kan. App. 2d 628, 635-36, 132 P.3d 1004 (2006). A district court has no discretion to exercise in such a case; either a judgment is valid or it is void as a matter of law. Thus, a reviewing appellate court must apply a de novo standard once a district court has made the necessary findings of fact. See In re Marriage of Hampshire, 261 Kan. 854, 862, 934 P.2d 58 (1997); Adcox, 35 Kan. App. 2d at 635.
The necessary, underlying findings of fact are reviewed under a different standard of review: Findings of fact are reviewed on appeal to determine if they are supported by substantial competent evidence and are sufficient to support the conclusions of law. Substantial evidence is such legal and relevant evidence as a reasonable person might regard as sufficient to support a finding. Owen Lumber Co. v. Chartrand, 283 Kan. 911, 915-16, 157 P.3d 1109 (2007). An appellate court must not reweigh the evidence, substitute its evaluation of the evidence for that of the district court, or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. See In re Estate of Sauder, 283 Kan. 694, 718, 156 P.3d 1204 (2007).
Underlying Findings of Fact
In this case, many of the district court's findings of fact are not disputed. For example, there is no disagreement with the findings that N.T. lied to M.P. and took extraordinary measures to prevent him from knowing about the birth of his child. Nor is it disputed that N.T. falsified her affidavit and gave false information to the court regarding the identity of the putative father. Also, the parties do not dispute the district court's finding that the adoption agency and the adoptive parents acted in good faith and without knowledge of N.T.'s deceptions.
Arguments are made regarding other findings, however. As evidenced by the separate opinions of this court, some disagree with the district court's findings that M.P. "should have known and did suspect [N.T.] was still pregnant with his child and she gave birth to his child" and that he took no action to protect his parental rights. Although the evidence could be reweighed to reach contrary findings regarding whether M.P. should have known of the continued pregnancy and the birth, that is not our role. Our task is to determine if the district court's findings are supported by substantial competent evidence, and we conclude they are. In fact, M.P. testified to his suspicions and his inaction.
Other evidence establishes that had he acted on those suspicions, it would have required relatively little effort for M.P. to have discovered the continued pregnancy or the birth of the child. N.T. testified that, although she discouraged contact between M.P. and her mother, her mother would have confirmed the continued pregnancy had M.P. asked. In addition, through M.P.'s phone records he could determine where N.T. was, and he had a Wichita address for N.T.'s sister.
Fourteenth Amendment Framework
In light of these circumstances, we must determine whether M.P. had a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the only basis M.P. asserts for his claim that he was entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding. The Due Process Clause is invoked only when the State takes action to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256, 77 L. Ed. 2d 614, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
If life, liberty, or property is at stake, procedural due process requires the State to provide notice of a potential deprivation of the interest and an opportunity to be heard regarding the deprivation. Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 223, 233, 17 L. Ed. 531 (1863). It is necessarily implied that both the notice and opportunity to be heard must be provided at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner to comport with the constitutional guarantee. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62, 85 S. Ct. 1187 (1965); Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Pastine, 281 Kan. 1266, 1275, 136 P.3d 457 (2006).
In arguing that he has a liberty interest, M.P. relies upon the United States Supreme Court's recognition of a natural parent's right to "the companionship, care, custody, and management" of his or her child as a liberty interest far more important than any property right. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982); Lassiter v. Department of Social Services., 452 U.S. 18, 27, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640, 101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972) (parents have protected liberty interest in controlling their children's religious upbringing); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925) (parents have protected liberty interest in the way they choose to educate their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923) (parents have protected liberty interest in controlling their children's education). Similarly, this court has long recognized that "parental rights are fundamental in nature and are constitutionally protected." In re Adoption of McMullen, 236 Kan. 348, 352, 691 P.2d 17 (1984).
Obviously, the liberty interest of a natural parent has its origin in the biological connection between the parent and the child. Nevertheless, a biological relationship does not guarantee the permanency of the parental rights of an unwed natural father. See In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 53, 77, 169 P.3d 1025 (2007), cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 36 (2008) (no parental rights arose for sperm donor who had no written agreement with mother). Rather, "[t]he significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring." Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. The opportunity is lost, however, if the natural father does not come forward to "demonstrate[] a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood." 463 U.S. at 261.
Decisions Regarding Unwed Fathers
Several decisions of the United States Supreme Court establish this principle and emphasize the importance of an actual relationship of parental responsibility as distinguished from a mere biological relationship.
In the earliest of the Supreme Court decisions involving an unwed father, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972), the Court clarified that the liberty interest of a natural parent could attach to an unwed father. Therefore, an Illinois statute that conclusively presumed every father in such circumstances to be an unfit parent was declared unconstitutional.
Peter Stanley, Sr., although not married to his children's mother, had always acted as a parent to them and had lived periodically with their mother for 18 years. When the mother died, the children were immediately made wards of the state and were eligible for adoption. Stanley claimed he was denied due process of the law because he was refused a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were declared wards. The Supreme Court agreed, finding he was entitled to a hearing. 405 U.S. at 658-59; compare Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 550 (recognizing divorced natural father's liberty interest in parental relationship, requiring notice of adoption proceedings to satisfy due process).
Six years after Stanley, the Court decided Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511, 98 S. Ct. 549, reh. denied 435 U.S. 918 (1978), addressing the rights of an unwed father in a stepparent adoption and whether those rights were protected adequately by application of a "'best interests of the child'" standard.
Under Georgia law, an unwed father who had not legitimated his child was not permitted to object to an adoption. Leon Webster Quilloin had not petitioned to legitimize his 11-year-old before the adoption petition was filed; and he had never sought actual or legal custody or otherwise assumed any significant responsibility with respect to the child's supervision, education, protection, or care. In these circumstances, the Court held, Quilloin had not grasped his opportunity to assert his constitutional rights, and due process did not require any more than a finding that the adoption and denial of legitimation were in the best interests of the child. 434 U.S. at 255.
The Court followed its Quilloin decision with Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 60 L. Ed. 2d 297, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979). In Caban, a putative father challenged a New York statute that allowed an unwed mother to veto the adoption of her child by withholding consent but prevented an unwed father from doing so without showing the adoption was not in the best interests of the child. Appellant Abdiel Caban had developed substantial relationships with his 6- and 4-year-old children before the adoption proceedings began.
The Court held that New York did not have a compelling interest in treating Caban differently from the children's mother and thus the statute violated equal protection. 441 U.S. at 394. Although the Court stated that a difference between maternal and paternal roles in the care of a newborn might justify distinct treatment, it suggested that any gender distinction between parents would become less acceptable as a basis for legislative line drawing as a child grows older. 441 U.S. at 388-89.
The analysis in Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban, which established that an unwed father who admitted paternity and had established a substantial relationship with his child would be able to protect his rights under due process and equal protection theories, provided the necessary stepping stones for the Court's 1983 opinion in Lehr, 463 U.S. 248, which focused upon the right to notice in an adoption proceeding.
Jonathan Lehr, an unwed father, was not given actual notice of his 2-year-old child's proposed adoption and sought to have it declared void because the lack of notice violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. During his child's life, Lehr did nothing to protect his legal interest; he filed no legal actions and did not fi